




To Duru and Deniz

FOREIGN POLICY OPERATIONAL CODES OF EUROPEAN POPULIST
RADICAL RIGHT LEADERS

The Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

by

ERDEM CEYDİLEK


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ANKARA

January 2020

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
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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

FOREIGN POLICY OPERATIONAL CODES OF EUROPEAN POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT LEADERS

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Recently, both in scholarly and policy circles, the populist radical right has been a popular and contested topic in Europe. Despite the increasing influence and visibility of European populist radical right (EPRR) parties and leaders, their foreign policy beliefs have not been studied thoroughly by scholars of International Relations (IR) and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), with a few descriptive exceptions. This study aims at filling this gap by linking the FPA and populist radical right literatures with an empirically and theoretically robust analysis. With an operational code analysis of the foreign policy beliefs of nine prominent EPRR leaders, this dissertation first seeks similarities or differences between EPRR leaders and also compare them to the average world leader, and then discuss the underlying reasons for the presence or lack of these similarities and differences. On the one hand, the results show that, in terms of beliefs about the political universe, the EPRR leaders can be grouped into two categories: Where nativism dominates over populism, the EPRR leaders' beliefs about the political universe are more conflictual and vice versa. On the other hand, in terms of beliefs about foreign policy instruments, the general picture shows that the EPRR leaders are not and will not necessarily be conflictual. This study presents significant findings about the foreign policy beliefs of EPRR leaders and may also provide a basis for future research in this under-studied field.

Keywords: Europe, Foreign Policy Beliefs, Leadership, Operational Code Analysis,
Populist Radical Right



ÖZET

AVRUPALI POPULİST RADİKAL SAĞ LİDERLERİN DİŞ POLİTİKA OPERASYONEL KODLARI

CEYDİLEK, Erdem

Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Danışmanı: Doçent Dr. Özgür Özdamar

Ocak 2020

Avrupa'da son dönemde, popülist radikal sağ, hem akademi hem de siyaset çevrelerinde popüler ve üzerinde çokça tartışılan bir konu olmuştur. Ancak, Avrupalı popülist radikal sağ (APRS) liderlerin ve partilerin artan etkisi ve görünürlüğüne rağmen, dış politika inançları, Uluslararası ilişkiler (Uİ) ve dış politika analizi (DPA) araştırmacıları tarafından yeteri kadar ilgi görmemiştir. Bu doğrultudan, bu çalışma, DPA ve popülist radikal sağ literatürlerini, ampirik ve teorik olarak güçlü bir analizle bir araya getirerek literatürdeki bu boşluğu doldurmayı amaçlamaktadır. Dokuz önemli APRS liderin dış politika inançlarının operasyonel kod analizini yaptığımız bu çalışmada, APRS liderlerinin hem kendi arasında hem de ortalama dünya liderine kıyasla gösterdikleri benzerlik ya da farklılıkları bulmak amaçlanmıştır. Akabinde ise, bu benzerlik ve farklılıkların altında yatan sebepler tartışılmıştır. Bulgular, politik evren hakkındaki inançlar açısından, APRS liderlerin iki gruba ayrılabilceğini gösteriyor: Yerliliğin popülizme baskın geldiği örneklerde APRS liderler politik evreni daha çatışmacı görürken, aksi durumda daha çatışmacı görmemektedirler. Öte yandan, dış politika enstrümanları açısından ise, sonuçlar APRS liderlerle çatışmacı bir dış politikayı doğrudan ilişkilendirmenin mümkün olmadığını göstermektedir. Bu çalışmanın, APRS liderlerin dış politika inançları ile ilgili sunduğu önemli bulguların yanında, yeterli ilgiyi görmeyen bu alandaki gelecek çalışmalara da temel hazırlayacağına inanıyoruz.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa, Dış Politika İnancıları, Liderlik, Operasyonel Kod
Analizi, Popülist Radikal Sağ



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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Research Scope

Margaret Hermann (2008: 151) begins her chapter on content analysis with a fascinating quote: “Only movie stars, hit rock groups, and athletes leave more traces of their behavior in the public arena than politicians.” In fact, such an assumption is necessary to be able to study political leaders from a cognitive perspective. In most cases, researchers do not have access or opportunities to conduct traditional psychological research on political leaders, which forces them to study them from a distance, relying on the assumption that words reflect beliefs. This study shares this premise, working from the assumption that the foreign policy beliefs of leaders can be understood by analyzing these leaders’ public texts. Accordingly, the scope of this study is the analysis of the foreign policy beliefs of European populist radical right (EPRR) leaders via these leaders’ public texts about foreign policy issues.

EPRR leaders and parties constitute a popular topic in academia. A basic Google Scholar search done with “European,” “populist,” “radical,” and “right” keywords yielded more than 17,000 results after 2015. This popularity is not groundless. EPRR leaders and parties are not only much stronger and more visible than ever, but also, the margin between them and mainstream parties has never been this small. In parallel to this rise, the concern across the continent is also increasing due to the fundamental challenges and criticisms brought by EPRR leaders against European integration and its liberal and cosmopolitan values.

EPRR leaders and parties are believed to be isolationist and, therefore, uninterested in foreign policy issues. However, international topics such as migration, European integration, and international trade are at the top of the EPRR leaders’ agendas.

There are some common foreign policy themes among EPRR leaders, such as Euroscepticism, cosmopolitan internationalism, global terrorism, immigration, relations with Russia, Turkey's EU membership, and NATO (Chrysogelos, 2017; Liang, 2007). As discussed in Chapter 2, these themes are essential factors for the rise of EPRR leaders and parties in national and European politics. They have become crucial for EPRR parties to attract a considerable portion of the electorate, who had voted for mainstream parties in previous elections.

Moreover, the relationship between international issues and EPRR leaders and parties is not one-way. Instead, as these global issues have assisted the rise of the EPRR, its influence is not only at the domestic level; it is also capable of influencing world affairs (Chrysogelos, 2017). EPRR parties have started to claim offices, and even when that is not possible, they can influence the domestic and international political atmospheres through how they frame issues. The Brexit campaign is a perfect example, as UKIP under the leadership of Nigel Farage was able to frame Brexit as a positive move for the British people.

For this reason, FPA literature should use its analytical tools to understand the foreign policy beliefs and behavior of these leaders. In the following years, these leaders have the potential to rule their countries, either as a single-party government or as a partner in a coalition government. Therefore, ignoring these leaders as agents of foreign policy will be a mistake. EPRR leaders are already actors of foreign policy, as illustrated by several examples: In Hungary, they already rule. In Britain, they have played a significant role in one of the most critical decisions in British history, which is Brexit. In France and Austria, they were very close to winning the presidential elections, and they still work hard to succeed in the upcoming elections. Regardless of country, EPRR leaders have been active in the European Parliament, even if they criticize the EU itself. Also, these leaders are increasingly in contact with each other at the transnational level.

Despite the increasing importance, the literature on populist radical right leaders' international agendas is minimal. Foreign policy beliefs, decisions, and behaviors of EPRR leaders have not been studied much with few exceptions: a book edited by Liang in 2007, Verbeek and Zaslove's works on the relationship between populism

and foreign policy (2015, 2017), and a 2016 Reflection Group Report by a pan-European network of experts on radical right populism in Europe, in which EPRR parties are described as the “troublemakers” of Europe in terms of their attitude towards foreign policymaking (Balfour et al., 2016). Recently, Cas Mudde (2016a: 14) argued that “recent developments, like Brexit and the refugee crisis, have made it clear that this cannot continue, as radical right parties are increasingly affecting foreign policy, and not just the process of European integration.”

Considering the current status of the literature, this study has an overall aim of filling this scholarly gap using the analytical tools developed by the Foreign Policy Analysis. In other words, this study is an effort to link the FPA and populist radical right literatures, to draw an overall picture of the foreign policy beliefs of EPRR leaders, and to present a baseline for future studies. The intersection point of these two distinct literatures is a timely and essential topic, and it is a very fertile topic for future research. Therefore, this study constitutes an important contribution to the growing literature on the impact of the populist radical right in foreign policy, a topic that has been receiving increasing attention in policy and journalistic debates for some time now. Many of these discussions are impressionistic or, at best, qualitative-comparative. It is hoped that the present effort to underpin this debate with robust quantitative data and to credibly map populist radical right discourses on international affairs will add significant weight to the debate. As such, the study makes innovative methodological contributions to this specific literature.

Considering the unpredictability and obscurity of the EPRR leaders together with their rise in European politics, it is especially vital to understand their foreign policy belief systems and potential foreign policy behaviors. There are essential questions that should be answered about EPRR leaders, such as whether or not their leadership type is different from the mainstream leaders and whether or not they are more conflictual than the mainstream leaders. The widespread perception in the policy and media circles is that they are different from the mainstream leadership in the sense of being more conflictual. It could be argued that this study checks the validity of this popular belief about EPRR leaders and, by doing so, it contributes to the literatures on foreign policy analysis, populist radical right as well as the policy-oriented studies.

1.2 Theory and Methodology

This study uses a well-established FPA theory—operational code analysis—and its analytical tools (George, 1969; Leites, 1951, 1953; Walker, 2000) to analyze the foreign policy beliefs of EPRR leadership. Based on political psychology literature, the theoretical basis of operational code analysis is strong, and it enables the researcher to measure the foreign policy beliefs of leaders. A leader's belief about the nature of the political universe (how conflictual or cooperative) and the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action (conflictual or cooperative tools) can be analyzed using operational code constructs. Moreover, the rich literature of operational code analysis uses an automated coding system known as the Verbs In Context System, which makes it possible to make comparisons across leaders and to a norming group of world leaders.

Using the operational code analysis construct, this dissertation analyzes the foreign policy belief systems of nine influential EPRR leaders: Marine Le Pen (France), Viktor Orbán (Hungary), Geert Wilders (Netherlands), Nigel Farage (Britain), Boris Johnson (Britain), Jimmie Åkesson (Sweden), Frauke Petry (Germany), Norbert Hofer (Austria), and Nikolaos Michaloliakos (Greece). A total of 116 texts from the period between 2013 and 2017 by these leaders are included in the research. Both the number of leaders and the texts analyzed makes the analysis even stronger as the dataset used in this research both satisfies and surpasses the requirements listed in the literature (Walker, Schafer, & Young, 1998; Schafer & Walker, 2006b). The operational code scores of the EPRR leaders retrieved from these 116 speeches are contextualized in Chapters 5, 6, and 7 at social, national, and international levels.

1.3 Questions and Findings

The following questions are addressed throughout this study: What are the international reflections of EPRR leaders' populist and illiberal stances at the domestic level? Do EPRR leaders have a more cooperative or hostile foreign policy attitude towards other actors in foreign policy? Do they or will they use coercive or cooperative tools of power as strategies to realize their foreign policy goals? Is it possible to identify a shared pattern among EPRR leaders in terms of their foreign policy beliefs? How different are EPRR leaders than the average world leader in terms of their foreign policy beliefs? How can the similarities or differences of EPRR

leaders in comparison to the average world leader be explained within the social, national, and international context?

The main findings of this study are as follows: First of all, populism's thin-centered nature is also apparent in the foreign policy belief systems of EPRR leaders, as it is difficult to identify a pattern among EPRR leaders. However, secondly, the average EPRR leader has a more conflictual belief about the political universe than the average world leader. Thirdly, an in-depth reading of the texts by EPRR leaders shows that when nativism is the dominant component, rather than populism or geopolitical and cultural otherings, a conflictual belief about the political universe becomes dominant. Fourth, on the other hand, except for Greece's Michaloliakos, EPRR leaders' beliefs about foreign policy instruments are as cooperative as those of the average world leader—and even more collaborative in some cases. As opposed to the widespread and alarming ideas about EPRR leaders' conflictual policies that would undermine European peace and stability, they seek a pragmatist foreign policy based on national interests. Such a policy also includes cooperative tools, but at different levels and in different forms than the existing supranational cooperation. Finally, there are three underlying reasons for the EPRR leaders' 'not-necessarily-conflictual' foreign policy instruments, which are socialization into European culture, fear of stigmatization, and inter-EPRR cooperation. Therefore, the empirical findings of this study are intuitive and largely in line with other results in the populist foreign policy literature.

1.4 Structure of the Dissertation

The dissertation is organized into eight chapters, including the introduction and conclusion. The next chapter, Chapter 2, consists of a review of the literature on the populist radical right. 'Populism' and 'radical right' are defined with references to the literature. The chapter maps the current situation in Europe in terms of EPRR leaders and parties with their roots and present-day causes. It also includes a discussion on the impact of EPRR parties on policymaking and the importance of leadership for these parties. The chapter concludes with a review of the role of international developments in the rise of EPRR parties and their foreign policies regarding specific issues.

Chapter 3 provides a background for the foreign policy analysis and the place of operational code analysis within FPA. Due to the nestedness of theory and methodology in operational code analysis, Chapter 3 only includes a theoretical discussion about operational code analysis.

The research design and the methodology are presented in Chapter 4 with specific sections on the research puzzle, research questions, data collection, data processing, data analysis.

Chapter 5 presents the empirical results for the operational code analysis of the EPRR leaders. Statistical analysis of the results, comparison to the average world leader, leadership types, and hypotheses testing are included in Chapter 5. Based on the findings in Chapter 5 regarding the foreign policy beliefs of EPRR leaders about the nature of the political universe and the instruments to be used to achieve goals, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 discuss these two specific foreign policy beliefs in more detail.

Chapter 6 answers the question of “Who are the Others for the EPRR leaders?” and goes deeper into the texts analyzed quantitatively in Chapter 5. Following individual discussions for the nine leaders, different types of othering (geopolitical, cultural, etc.) are discussed with efforts to connect them with the populist and nativist components of the populist radical right.

Chapter 7, on the other hand, answers the question of “Which instruments do or will the EPRR leaders use in foreign policy?” This question enables us to understand these EPRR leaders’ images of Self and how cooperative or conflictual they are. The nine leaders’ texts are revisited in this chapter with a particular focus on their actual or promised foreign policies in connection with their I-1 scores. This individual and in-depth focus supports the findings in Chapter 5 and shows that the EPRR leaders’ foreign policy is not necessarily conflictual. The rest of the chapter includes a discussion on the reasons for this finding under three headings: socialization into the peaceful European culture, fear of stigmatization, and ongoing cooperation among EPRR leaders at the transnational level.

Chapter 8 reviews the findings of the dissertation. Acknowledging the theoretical and methodological limitations, it points out potential areas for future research.



CHAPTER II: THE RISE OF POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT PARTIES IN EUROPE AND THEIR FOREIGN POLICY

This chapter aims at drawing a useful framework before looking at the foreign policy beliefs of populist radical right leaders in Europe. More specifically, it will discuss the role of international developments in the rise of the EPRR parties in Europe, which interestingly have not yet generated literature focusing on the foreign policies of these parties and leaders within the general literature on populism. The chapter starts with a conceptual discussion of ‘populism.’ This is followed by a section examining the EPRR parties in Europe in more detail, with their current electoral positions, their common themes, and causes for their rise. The next section will seek an answer to the question of why one should care about these mostly peripheral parties, i.e., their impacts. A section discussing the populist radical right leadership will follow, and the chapter will conclude by elaborating on the foreign policy of the EPRR parties, including the international developments leading to their rise and their key foreign policy-related positions.

2.1 Populism as a ‘Chameleon’ Concept

For more than half a century, populism has been a debated concept among scholars in terms of how to define and study it (see Ionescu and Gellner, 1969; Taggart, 2000; Mudde, 2004; Betz, 1994; Norris, 2005). Furthermore, the fact that the term has been mostly used as a pejorative in the media and by opponents of populist political actors has contributed to this definitional difficulty. The term has been applied to wide-ranging political actors from different and even competing ends of the political spectrum. Therefore, the current situation has come to the point of “defining the undefinable” (Rooduijn, 2015: 4). Especially in the second decade of the new millennium, the concept has diffused to most political discussions, and neither

policymakers nor political science scholars can avoid the concept. Populism is a contested concept, for which every scholar starts with his or her own definition or with a clarification of which definition he or she applies. Diamanti (2010; as quoted in Benveniste, Campani, & Lazaridis, 2016: 4) sums up this conceptual uncertainty as he argues that:

Populism is one of the words that appear the most (...) in the political discourse for some time now. Without much difference, however, between the scientific environment, public, political and everyday life. Indeed, it is a fascinating concept, able to “suggest” without imposing too much precise and definitive meaning. In fact, it does not define, but evokes.

Though in daily use, populism evokes an uncertain group of actors, actions, and discourses instead of defining a particular group, scholars have devoted significant effort to pinpointing the defining characteristics of populists/populisms. In other words, populism is not a tangible concept: it has a chameleon-like quality, and its hearty is empty (Taggart, 2000). Jagers and Walgrave (2007) contributed to the literature by reducing the meanings given to populism into three categories. These are populism as an organizational form, populism as a political style, and populism as an ideology, and these three veins in the populism literature will be briefly summarized below.

Firstly, populist parties are hierarchically organized, which lets them mobilize people from heterogeneous social classes, whose demands and wills are raised by a charismatic leader perched at the top of the hierarchy. As Weyland explains, “populism emerges when personalistic leaders base their rule on massive yet mostly uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of people” (Weyland, 2001: 18). Levitsky and Roberts also stress this top-down political mobilization “of mass constituencies by personalistic leaders who challenge established political or economic elites on behalf of an ill-defined pueblo” (Levitsky & Roberts, 2013: 6). Such an organizational structure makes it possible to attract the support of the masses, as it is “in line with the interests of the median voter” (Acemoglu, Egorov, & Sonin, 2013: 802) in comparison with the bureaucratic model of mass political parties (Pauwels, 2014: 17). However, although such an organization is a characteristic of populist parties, it is not a distinguishing one since there are also examples of mass mainstream parties that are organized hierarchically and under the

leadership of a charismatic leader, such as Christian Democrats and Social Democrats. Therefore, the organizational structure of populist parties tells us something about these parties but falls short of defining them on its own.

Secondly, populism is defined as a political style used by politicians in a simple, direct, and even banal way. Populist leaders repeatedly discuss ‘the people’ with the assertion that they speak in the name of and for the benefit of these ‘people.’ This is a rhetoric “that constructs politics as the moral and ethical struggle between the people and the oligarchy” (de la Torre, 2000: 4, as cited in Barr, 2009), and it carries the characteristics of a Manichean discourse with a clear demarcation line between us (people) and them (oligarchy). In this rhetoric, the use of “slang, swearing, political incorrectness and being overly demonstrative and ‘colourful,’ as opposed to the ‘high’ behaviours of rigidity, rationality, composure and technocratic language” (Moffitt & Tormey, 2013: 12) is crucial in order to highlight that demarcation line. This tabloid-like style, utilizing the language of ordinary people, suggests that its user is brave enough to say what elites hide from the people or lie about in the name of political correctness.

Understanding populism as a feature of political rhetoric “shifts our assessments from binary opposition—a party is populist or not—to a matter of degree—a party has more populist characteristics or fewer” (Deegan-Krause & Haughton, 2009: 822). While it does seem that such an approach to populism is better equipped for grasping the varying tendencies labeled as populist, there is a risk that this approach can deprive the concept of its analytical power: “as almost all politicians appeal to the people at one point in time” (Pauwels, 2014: 18), it will be possible to call every politician and party running for election ‘populist.’

Finally, political ideology can be defined as “a relatively coherent set of empirical and normative beliefs and thoughts, focusing on the problems of human nature, the process of history, and socio-political arrangements” (Eatwell, 1993: 9-10). Although populism was once defined as an ideology (MacRae, 1969: 154), recent scholarship on populism refrains from making such a firm attribution, which would automatically place populism into the same category as liberalism, Marxism, etc. Populism’s relative lack of substance in comparison with these full-fledged

ideologies has pushed scholars to conceptualize it as a so-called thin-centered ideology, meaning that “it has not the same level of refinement as for instance liberalism, it can be easily attached to other (full) ideologies” (Pauwels, 2014: 18). Mudde (2004:543) provided an extensive and clear definition of populism as “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people.” This thin-centered ideology of populism, Mudde (2004: 544) argues, “can be easily combined with very different (thin and full) other ideologies, including communism, ecologism, nationalism or socialism.” herefore, it is possible to describe populism through “a parasitic relationship with other concepts and ideologies” (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2014: 379).

In comparison with the first two definitions of populism as a type of organization and as a style, defining populism as a thin-centered ideology does not exclude or ignore the kind of organization or style used by populist parties and leaders. Instead, the organizational type and rhetorical style of populism are “symptoms or expressions of an underlying populist ideology” (Abts & Rummens, 2007: 408). Because of this overarching characteristic, in looking at the recent literature on populism in the last decade it is possible to argue that Mudde’s definition has gained recognition among scholars. For this reason, it will be elaborated more on Mudde’s definition below.

There is neither a reference book of populism nor its ideologues. Given the lack of key populist texts or intellectual figures, it is a difficult task to identify the system of values that populism aims to defend or the very foundations of this thin-centered ideology. Efforts to determine these fundamental tenets involve analyzing the party programs and the actions, discourses, and policies of the political actors evoked as populists. Therefore, the following points have not been raised in a ‘Populist Manifesto,’ nor are they from the final declaration of a ‘Populist Internationale.’ The following points are the shared characteristics of populist parties and leaders, which were later conceptualized and framed by scholars working on populism.

First of all, populism presupposes that society consists of two separate and homogenous groups: the people and the elites. This assumption leads to other

elements producing societal divisions being ignored, such as class or gender. Such neglect of “potential horizontal cleavages or conflicts within the people facilitates the creation of a vertical cleavage between the people and the elite” (Pauwels, 2014: 20). It is worth noting that this vision of ‘homogeneous people’ excludes outsiders such as immigrants, refugees, foreigners, and minorities. This implies that elements in a society threatening this homogeneity are natural enemies of populists. On the other hand, elites are also understood as a homogeneous group, with populists arguing that all mainstream parties, independent of their position in the political spectrum, are all the same.

Secondly, in addition to understanding them as two homogeneous groups, populism also establishes an antagonistic relationship between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite.’ With this antagonism, populism appeals to the people “against both the established structure of power and the dominant ideas and values of society” (Canovan, 1999: 3). The people as the “silent majority” (Taggart, 2000: 93), who work hard, pay taxes, and produce almost all the economic welfare in society, do not have a voice in the administration of the country. The elites, on the other hand, are attacked for seeking privileges and for doing so in a corrupt and unaccountable way. They live in isolation from ordinary people and everyday life, which makes it impossible for them to know and defend the interests of the people. Since all mainstream parties work for the interest of the elites, compromise with these parties would bring a loss of the rights and benefits of the people. Therefore, the establishment in the current political system is not only an ‘Other’ but also an ‘enemy’ that functions to increase its benefit at the expense of the benefits of the people (Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 2017: 515). Such a formulation of the relationship between the people and elites helps populists to present themselves as the heroes fighting on the frontline in this war.

Finally, the restoration of popular sovereignty is the ultimate aim of populists. The decreasing level of belief and trust in representative democracy, which has become “a simulacrum carefully cultivated by the elite to delude ordinary voters into believing that their vote counts for something” (Betz & Johnson, 2004: 316), is the basis of this aim. What is necessary is the immediate expression of the general will of the ordinary people through more direct forms of political participation such as referenda and majority rule. These direct forms are believed to replace the current

complex system consisting of several representative and intermediary institutions and to increase the quality of democracy in a country. Furthermore, as opposed to the inert nature of representative democracy, direct decision-making under the leadership of a charismatic leader who defends the interests of the people is a better structure for the people.

At this point, Mudde's discussion on the dichotomy between illiberal democracy and undemocratic liberalism warrants attention. It is a popular subject of debate whether populism is democratic or anti-democratic. While populists declare themselves as the "true democrats" (Canovan, 1999: 2), there are many political scientists who argue that more direct participation of people in decision-making cannot be the sole criterion in weighing the quality of democracy (Lucardie, 2009: 320). Violation of fundamental civil liberties in many cases by populists is the key reason for this distrust in populists as true democrats. However, Mudde and Kaltwasser (2012) argue that what is at stake with the populist challenge is not democracy itself, but liberal democracy and its pluralistic vision. In Mudde's (2015) words, "populism is an illiberal democratic response to undemocratic liberalism. It criticises the exclusion of important issues from the political agenda by the elites and calls for their repoliticisation." Therefore, it is certain that there is a conflict between the basic tenets of populism and liberal democracy.

As discussed above, populism is a thin-centered ideology, and it needs to be incorporated with other ideologies. This results in different populisms, such as neoliberal populism, social populism, and national populism, as categorized by Pauwels (2014: 21-27), or left-wing and right-wing populism. Left-wing populism, which is experienced in mostly Latin America and lately in Greece and Spain, is "predominantly inclusionary" (Grabow & Hartleb, 2013: 17). The inclusion of socially disadvantaged people into society through the redistribution of wealth in favor of the lower classes is the fundamental promise of left-wing or social populism. Elites are equated with the capitalist class, or in close relationship with it, which functions hand in hand with the capitalists of other countries within the neoliberal global world order. Charismatic leadership is vital for left-wing populism as well, especially as the influential figures of the Latin American populisms have shown us.

However, some scholars prefer to call left-wing populism “populism from below” (Hartleb, 2004: 59, cited in Grabow & Hartleb, 2013: 18).

Since the focus of this study is the populist radical right, it will be discussed in more detail in the following section.

2.2 Rise of Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe

The European populist radical right (EPRR) has been attracting a substantial amount of attention in the literature and in politics as a result of the challenges brought by these parties to European and Western politics. The fact that these parties “do not self-identify as populist or even (radical) right” (Mudde, 2016c: 295-296) means that different names are used to identify them, such as extreme right, radical right, or right-wing populist. This study will follow Mudde’s terminology of “populist radical right” (Mudde, 2007). Mudde argues that there are at least three features of the core ideology shared by EPRR parties. These are nativism, authoritarianism, and populism.

Nativism refers to the argument that a state should be inhabited and governed by members of a particular group and/or that the state’s benefits should not be accessible to non-members. In the European case, these non-members may range from the Roma people to Jews, from immigrants to Muslims. Mudde (2007: 19) argues that the term “nativist” is better than alternative words such as “nationalist,” “racist,” or “anti-immigrant,” because by using “nativism,” the liberal forms of nationalism can be excluded. The nativist characteristic of the EPRR makes it exclusionary, in contrast to left-wing populism. On the other hand, these parties are also authoritarian, not in the sense that they aim to establish antidemocratic regimes, but rather as defined as “a general disposition to glorify, to be subservient to and remain uncritical toward authoritative figures of the ingroup and to take an attitude of punishing outgroup figures in the name of some moral authority” (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, & Sanford, 1969: 228). In other words, problems not framed initially as a “crime,” such as homosexuality or abortion, are criminalized by these parties with a “belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely” (Mudde, 2007: 22). Finally, populism, as discussed above, is the third essential feature of the EPRR.

In the second decade of the new millennium, “it is now difficult to imagine West European politics without radical right parties” (Art, 2011: xi). It is possible to identify EPRR parties and leaders in every European country. Although very few of them are able to be a part of the government, it is a fact that the recent years have been a period of electoral gain for these parties, and more is yet to come. Therefore, these parties “have become firmly established across Europe as relevant political actors” (Grabow & Hartleb, 2013: 13).

2.2.1 The Current Situation in European Countries

Cas Mudde, in 2004, was arguing that the normal pathology thesis, which explains the EPRR as marginal actors of politics, had been rejected; in its stead, “it is argued that today populist discourse has become mainstream in the politics of western democracies,” which results in speaking about a “populist Zeitgeist” (Mudde, 2004: 542). Since then, EPRR parties have enlarged their sphere of influence in national and European politics, both in terms of a rise in their votes in national, presidential, and European parliamentary elections and in terms of their capacity to influence the political agendas of their respective countries. A successful campaign organized under the leadership of UKIP for Brexit, close election results in France and Austria in recent presidential elections, the increased number of EPRR members sitting in the European Parliament (EP) and voicing their Eurosceptic views more loudly, and center-right parties in Hungary and Poland that have rapidly transformed into populist radical right parties have all turned this abstract and intangible Zeitgeist into a more concrete reality. On the other coast of the Atlantic, the victory of Donald Trump in the US elections in 2016 made a considerable contribution to the rise of the EPRR.

Table 1 gives a comprehensive list of the EPRR parties in Europe and their electoral performances by 2019. The list is a combination of the EPRR parties founded in the early 1970s and those founded in the late 1990s and early 2000s. There are also some parties such as the SVP, FPÖ, and FIDESZ that were not initially founded as EPRR parties but then transformed into such. Therefore, while the primary determinant is ideologically being an EPRR party, engaging in EPRR politics continuously and at a significant level is another determinant for the inclusion of these parties into this list.

Table 1: Electoral results of main populist radical right parties in Europe

Country	Party	Highest result*	Last result**
Austria	Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)	46.7% (2016)	17.2%
Belgium	Flemish Interest (VB)	12% (2007)	11.45%
Bulgaria	Attack	24% (2006)	1.07%
Croatia	Croatian Party of Rights (HSP)	7.1% (1992)	4.37%
Denmark	Danish People's Party (DF)	26.6% (2015)	10.8%
Finland	The True Finns (PS)	19.05% (2011)	13.8%
France	Front National (FN) / National Rally	33.9% (2017)	23.3%
Germany	Alternative for Germany (AfD)	12.6% (2017)	11%
Greece	Popular Association (Golden Dawn)	7% (2015)	4.9%
Hungary	Hungarian Civic Alliance (FIDESZ)	56.36% (2009)	52.56%
Hungary	The Movement for a Better Hungary (JOBBIK)	20.22% (2014)	6.34%
Italy	Northern League (LN)	34.3% (2019)	34.3%
Netherlands	Party for Freedom (PVV)	16.97% (2009)	3.53%
Poland	Law and Justice (PiS)	45.38% (2019)	45.38%
Sweden	Sweden Democrats (SD)	15.3% (2019)	15.3%
Switzerland	Swiss People's Party (SVP)	29.4% (2015)	29.4%
United Kingdom	UK Independence Party (UKIP)***	27.5% (2014)	3.2%

* National, EP, and presidential elections are included in these numbers.

** 2019 EP election results for parties, except SVP. For SVP, the data are from the 2014 Swiss federal elections.

*** Nigel Farage left UKIP and founded the Brexit Party in 2019. The Brexit Party came first in the 2019 EP elections with a share of 30.5%.

This is because, as Mudde (2016b: 48) argues, “radical right politics are not limited to radical right parties: conservative, and other, parties can even introduce populist radical right policies.” This approach explains the presence of parties such as FIDESZ and PiS in this list, while at the same time explaining why Viktor Orbán and Boris Johnson have been included in the sampling group as EPRR leaders. It can be argued that these leaders and parties behave strategically by using a more radical right discourse to compete with other parties and especially more hardcore right-

wing parties. However, if this has been the case for many years, rather than a temporary attitude, then it is reasonable to assume that these parties can be included among the EPRR parties. These parties and leaders are thus included in the present list of the populist radical right since they are taking “similar positions in the political space and attracting voters with similar backgrounds,” while at the same time, these borderline cases “could potentially represent archetypes of evolution among radical right-wing populist parties” (Akkerman, De Lange, & Rooduijn, 2016: 6).

Vejvodova (2013: 377) lists the common themes among EPRR parties as follows:

- the rejection or criticism of the EU as an international institution and an actor in economic globalization;
- emphasis on national self-determination and the organization of the European order according to nationally defined communities;
- the achievement of ethnic and cultural homogeneity in their countries by stopping immigration, by displacing immigrants, and also by (forcibly) assimilating immigrants and ethnic minorities;
- a strong emphasis on the idea of a Christian Europe, accompanied by demands for repressive measures against Islam and its teachings, and a ban on the construction of mosques and minarets;
- the rejection of Turkey’s accession to the EU;
- defense of a traditional understanding of marriage and the family, including a prohibition on abortion;
- criticism of homosexuality;
- support for direct democracy and a more significant role of citizens in the decision-making process, for instance by holding referenda on issues such as European integration;
- a policy of zero tolerance in fighting corruption;
- the deportation of immigrants who have been convicted of criminal offenses;
- restoration of the death penalty;
- an economic policy based on supporting small and medium-sized business, traditional crafts, and agriculture;
- social welfare and employment policies adapted to the needs and interests of the individual nations.

This is a comprehensive list of themes more or less shared by EPRR parties across Europe. However, depending on the national and temporal context, the level of importance and the frequency of discourses based on these themes can vary. In fact, “different EPRR parties can take diametrically opposing positions” (Rooduijn, 2015: 5). Homosexuality is a good illustration of these opposing positions since EPRR parties in East and West Europe do not have a common ground for this. On the other hand, besides sharing some common themes, the EPRR parties of the present day cooperate with one another both for ideological and strategical reasons. This cooperation may seem awkward at first, “given [the populist radical right’s] traditional embrace of nationalism and antipathy toward any forms of globalism” (von Mering & McCarty, 2013: 3).

However, especially in recent years, international collaboration among EPRR parties has increased. The reasons for this rise can be found in the EP, Islamophobia, and the Internet (von Mering & McCarty, 2013: 3-7). While the EP is an ironic platform for EPRR parties as they are against the supranational characteristic of European integration, they have also preferred to form their groups, which Almeida (2010: 237) refers to as “Europeanized Eurosceptics.” Secondly, the perception that the ‘threat’ of Islam is not only a threat to their national identity but to European civilization also pushes the EPRR parties to collaborate among themselves. They ‘defend’ European civilization and Europe’s roots, values, and culture against Islam’s ‘invasion’ (Vejvodova, 2013: 379). Finally, opportunities provided by the Internet have made it much more straightforward to coordinate and diffuse specific ideas and strategies.

As a result, the current situation in Europe in terms of the EPRR parties is an ambiguous one, which shares some core characteristics and works in collaboration to gain strategic benefits in these policy areas, while at the same time with the potential for opposing positions on some other issues. Nevertheless, the apparent fact is that they are gaining ground in Europe, and the next section will discuss the root causes of this rise.

2.2.2 Roots and Present-Day Causes of Their Rise

Discussions on the success of EPRR parties in the new millennium are usually according to one of two sub-headings. Demand-side explanations focus on the voters of the EPRR parties, while supply-side explanations focus on the parties (Koopmans, Statham, Giugni, & Passy, 2005; Mudde, 2007). However, these two sides of the same phenomenon are complementary, not competing. Also, it is not possible to make a clear-cut categorization, since these two sides are continually influencing and shaping each other. Growing dissatisfaction among the people about uncontrolled immigration opens a fertile political sphere for the EPRR parties, while at the same time, stronger leadership in the EPRR parties attracts a higher level of popular interest. Therefore, beyond this categorization of demand-side and supply-side explanations, it is better to identify some overarching factors that work in favor of the EPRR parties for both the voters and the parties.

To begin with the political sphere, one of the most critical points in the rise of the EPRR is the fact that “mainstream parties converge on centrist positions” (Rooduijn, 2015: 6). In other words, the positioning of other parties, and especially the mainstream parties, has left “a gap in the electorate market” (Muis & Immerzel, 2017: 913). When the center-left parties started to sacrifice their leftist character and when the center-right parties began to give up their rightist character, the EPRR parties became capable of finding an ideological space for themselves. For example, as Heinisch illustrates, the rise of the FPÖ in Austria followed a grand coalition founded between the Austrian Social Democrats and conservatives in the 1980s and 1990s. The FPÖ gained success by filling the ideological gap created by this coalition. Later, the parties of that coalition needed to get closer to each other to balance the achievement of the FPÖ, which ironically contributed to the success of the FPÖ again (Heinisch, 2008). Recent discussions about European integration can be another example. Rhetorically, the Euroscepticism of EPRR parties pushed the other parties together into one block, which provided another chance for the EPRR parties to portray themselves as the disparate actor of politics while all other parties converged.

What is more, such convergences among the center parties have depoliticized specific important topics such as EU integration, migration, and monetary policy.

Therefore, apart from the status quo, parties other than the EPRR parties started to promise nothing to citizens, as alleged by the EPRR parties. The EPRR parties succeeded in turning the permissive consensus to constraining dissensus, which jeopardizes not only the EU's substantive legitimacy (Schmidt, 2006) but also the ruling elites of the EU states, mostly members of mainstream political parties.

The second root cause is globalization and increased supranational collaboration. As Mudde (2016b: 299) argues, the typical EPRR supporter is the loser of globalization: "a white, lowly educated, blue-collar male." Therefore, it is argued that globalization has widened the gap between losers and winners (Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, & Bornschie, 2006; 2008). In this dichotomy, elites have benefited from globalization, both at the European level and at the global level, at the expense of the people. Ordinary people are negatively influenced by the results of increased globalization, such as immigration, terrorism, and the global economic crisis. This is why most of the EPRR parties promise a return to the 'good old days,' when the people had the sole control over the management of such issues through national mechanisms, instead of a supranational authority. On the other hand, Mudde (2016b: 299) warns about overestimating the effect of globalization on the rise of the EPRR, since, for example, the success of the EPRR parties in different European countries differs widely although the effects of globalization on different European countries are almost the same.

Thirdly, the social, cultural, and economic crises of the new millennium are also correlated with the rise of EPRR parties. Recent studies have shown that the number of immigrants in a country (Werts, Scheepers, & Lubbers, 2013) and higher unemployment rates (Arzheimer, 2009) have positive correlations with the success of EPRR parties. On the one hand, European countries have been experiencing one of the most severe refugee and immigrant influxes of their history. Civil wars and Western military interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Libya have displaced millions of people who have sought shelter in European countries. The physical presence of these people in European countries also creates further questions concerning security, terrorism, Islam, welfare distribution, etc. The liberal pluralist responses to this influx by European institutions and mainstream political parties have diminished the trust of ordinary people in mainstream politicians, opening a gap

for the EPRR parties to fill with their anti-immigrant and anti-Islam policies and discourses. In addition to the migration crisis, the global financial crisis and the European debt crisis have had positive effects on the success of the EPRR parties.

The fourth cause for the rise of EPRR parties in Europe is directly related to the evolution of the style and images of these parties. In the past, because of Europeans' bloody memories of fascism, EPRR parties had problems gaining widespread acceptance as legitimate political parties competing in the democratic system. The anti-Semitic and racist rhetoric used by ex-leaders of these parties and movements kept those memories alive and pushed these parties to the margins of politics. However, in the 1980s and 1990s, these parties recognized a common need to reinvent themselves to "get away from fascism and to position themselves as legitimate parties of government" (Williams, 2006: 187). This "detoxification" (Mudde, 2007) is not a completed process, and it continues. For example, the leader of the Front National in France, Marine Le Pen, expelled her father and the party's founder, Jean-Marie Le Pen, from the party in 2016 because of his 'extreme' views.

Finally, strong leadership is another facilitator in the success of the EPRR parties both in the past and in the present. In the past, Jean-Marie Le Pen (FN), Jörg Haider (FPÖ), Pim Fortuyn (of Lijst Pim Fortuyn, LPF), and Umberto Bossi (of the Northern League, Lega Nord) were prominent in the success of their respective parties, being able to use their rhetorical skills to appeal to ordinary voters (De Lange & Art, 2011). Today, Viktor Orbán, Marine Le Pen, Nigel Farage, and Geert Wilders are all considered as charismatic leaders, despite their different leadership styles. EPRR leadership will be discussed in more detail in the following sections.

To summarize, it is identified five fundamental causes of the rise and the success of EPRR parties in Europe. These are (i) the increasing resemblance among mainstream parties, which opens a gap for the EPRR parties; (ii) the impacts of globalization; (iii) social, cultural, and economic crises, including but not limited to immigration; (iv) the evolution of the EPRR parties into more acceptable positions; and (v) strong leadership in these parties. The next section will try to answer whether these are peripheral parties with little influence or not, despite the success caused by these five factors.

2.3 Impact of the EPRR Parties: Why Should We Care About Them?

The impact or the political relevance of the EPRR parties is another point of debate in the literature. In daily politics and media, there is a tendency to either underestimate these parties' impact or to take an alarming attitude, as if these parties are suddenly jeopardizing the continuity of the existing system. Reality lies somewhere between these two extremes. Williams (2006: 2) frames this issue nicely:

Peripheral parties matter in unorthodox ways. Despite the smallness in size and often extraparlimentary status of radical right-wing parties, their impact is felt throughout Western Europe. Their survival and success depend upon their ability to create their own political opportunities.

This conclusion by Williams challenges Michael Minkenberg's (2001) study, in which he argued that the impact of EPRR parties is irrelevant and only limited to the cultural dimension. However, when political impact is understood as "the ability to promote a particular outcome that would not be observed in the absence of the agency of the challenger party" (Carvalho, 2014: 2), one can argue that the EPRR parties have had a significant level of impact on Western democracies even if very few of them have a voice in the governments of their own countries.

In the conclusion of her comparative study on Western European countries, Williams (2006: 6) argues that the EPRR parties have an impact in three dimensions: the agenda-setting dimension, institutional dimension, and policy dimension. Among these three dimensions, agenda-setting is the one with the most robust impact as the EPRR parties "are affecting popular discourse and opinion on the issue of immigrants" (Williams, 2006: 201). Also, at the policy level, EPRR parties have been occupying an increasing number of seats in national parliaments and the EP. For example, in the 2014 EP elections, EPRR parties gained 52 seats, 15 more seats than in the 2009 elections.

Co-option is another way for EPRR parties to have a political impact. Carvalho (2014: 1) defines co-option as:

a strategy employed by a social group or an institution to enhance its own position in the political arena by the formal or informal incorporation of the political proposals into the decision-making process that are supported by a challenger group or the group itself.

In other words, although the EPRR parties' influence on direct policymaking is limited, they can influence mainstream parties with a higher potential of being in the government, as these mainstream parties strategically incorporate the political proposals of the EPRR parties into their own programs and discourses. There are two reasons for this: First, the EPRR parties have support in society and among the electorate, which is not statistically sufficient for an EPRR party to be elected on its own, but is enough to shift the competition among the larger parties. Therefore, mainstream and mostly center-right parties may co-opt the proposals and electorates of EPRR parties. Secondly, a center-right party may see an EPRR party as a political opponent, and, through co-option, it can make strategic moves. When the center-right party co-opts its stance, the most significant leverage of the EPRR party—namely, being different from all the similar mainstream parties—is diminished. Therefore, co-option can be understood not only as a way of indirect political influence for EPRR parties but also as a strategy by mainstream parties to hold back EPRR parties.

It is thus possible to conclude that EPRR parties have significant impacts on particular policy areas and especially on immigration (Schain, 2006; Minkenberg & Schain, 2003). Recently, Röth et al. (2017) have shown that even in areas other than immigration, the presence of an EPRR party in the government has significant consequences for socio-economic policies. The first reason for this impact by EPRR parties is that they have a transformative influence on how people frame specific issues, such as the xenophobic framing of the issue of immigration. Secondly, this is also because the EPRR parties can shift other political actors' preferences and actions, as discussed above (Rydgren, 2003: 60).

2.4 Leadership in the EPRR parties

As it is discussed above, strong political leadership is one of the critical factors influencing the success of the EPRR parties. In almost all cases, in both left-wing and right-wing populisms, there is always a need for a strong person at the top. However, Mudde and Kaltwasser (2014: 376-377) are cautious about the link between political leadership and populism, arguing that "it would be erroneous to equate populism with charismatic or strong leadership." This is partly because of how Mudde defines populism (i.e., as an ideology) but also because of the lack of scholarly work on populist leadership. As Mudde (2017: 219) recognizes, there are

only a few studies on the subject, and, together with the members of EPRR parties, leaders of EPRR parties are under-studied.

Many studies on understanding populism argue the importance of charismatic leadership (e.g., Weyland, 2001; Taggart, 1995). Eatwell (2002) has focused on the possibilities of applying Weber's concept of charismatic leadership for the EPRR and has come up with interesting conclusions. As he analyzes Jean-Marie Le Pen and Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Eatwell (2002: 235) argues that "the Weberian conception of a mass affective bond with the charismatic leader has little relevance to politics in twentieth- and twenty-first-century European societies." However, the term 'charisma' can still be used by social scientists to understand the populist leadership as long as "we focus on coterie rather than mass effective charisma, and the way in which some leaders become the personification of politics, which helps send clear policy signals to some voters" (Eatwell, 2002: 21). That is to say, charismatic leadership in the case of EPRR parties has a higher impact on internal relations than external relations. Through this coterie charisma, EPRR leaders can mobilize a group of activists within their parties more easily.

There is a reason why EPRR leaders have a different 'charisma' than the prevalent meaning of the term. Unlike the individuals conventionally put forward as charismatic leaders, such as Kennedy, or Churchill, these leaders present themselves as an integral part of the people and even a servant of the people. They do not act like a different kind of political elite that is respectful of whatever the people care about. Instead, these leaders are also members of this imagined community of 'people.' They stress that they do not have a higher status than ordinary people, and they have the same ideals, same habits, and same concerns. For example, Nigel Farage's fondness of a pint of ale and the continuous pictures of him in pubs are not coincidental but rather are a message to the people.

As Mudde and Kaltwasser (2014: 386) also agree, "one of the few commonalities between all the different manifestations of populism is the existence of a charismatic and strong leader, who is able to mobilize the masses and control the political organization behind him." However, despite this fact and despite the role of strong leadership in the success of the EPRR parties, this cannot be a defining characteristic

of populism because it is also true for other non-populist parties as well. Strong political leadership is a key for all political parties. Therefore, leadership strength can be used as a variable in explaining the success of an EPRR party, but not to define populism itself. However, in cases where the party is not very institutionalized, a successful election with the help of a strong leader can bring further problems, such as the incapacity of the party to function in the new post-election scenario. Personalization of the party, in other words, brings the advantage of a better election campaign and the disadvantage of a problem of institutionalization at the same time. The intra-party fights in the LPF following the assassination of their charismatic leader Pym Fortuyn in 2002 and the dramatic fall of the party's votes in the 2003 general elections is an excellent example of the benefits and disadvantages of having a charismatic and strong leader and equating the party with that leader.

2.5 Foreign Policy and EPRR Parties

Until now, the vast majority of research on these parties has focused on their historical origins, political platforms, voter patterns, and domestic politics. Only limited attention has been given to their international agenda. This is especially surprising since several of these parties were founded to specifically deal with foreign political issues (Liang, 2007: 2).

If the rise of the EPRR in Europe is one fact, another reality is that, as even a superficial look at their discourses will show, this rise is largely connected with foreign policy-related issues such as EU membership, immigration policies, and security. On the other hand, it is also observable that domestic political gains have a larger priority for these EPRR leaders than foreign policy goals. For this reason, foreign policy issues have an ambivalent nature for EPRR leaders: They are the very root causes of the rise of these EPRR leaders and parties but simultaneously have a secondary role in the political agendas of these leaders. The EPRR parties and leaders can turn this ambivalent nature into a strategic advantage for themselves. The 'jumping of scales' technique, as described by Swyngedouw (1992, as cited in Urry, 2003), enables the EPRR parties to define global issues such as European integration and economic globalization as "local, comprehensible matters which are a direct threat to established prosperity, rights and power" (Liang, 2007: 6). As a result, global problems can easily be framed as local ones, which lays the groundwork for presenting them as a threat. These fears of insecurity, originating from less tangible

threats such as terrorism and uncontrolled migration, have taken the place of the classical concerns of the Cold War period, such as Soviet aggression (Liang, 2007: 1).

Despite this importance of global issues in the rise of EPRR parties, the foreign policy attitudes of these parties and leaders have not been studied much, with few exceptions (Liang, 2007; Verbeek and Zaslove, 2015, 2017; Balfour et al., 2016). Recently, Cas Mudde (2016a: 14) argued that “recent developments, like Brexit and the refugee crisis, have made it clear that this cannot continue, as far-right parties are increasingly affecting foreign policy and not just the process of European integration.” Therefore, the apparent fact that the analytical tools developed by FPA have been under-utilized in the literature proves that there is a research gap to be filled. The following sections will first discuss the role of international developments that have been important in the rise of the EPRR parties and then summarize the general foreign policy attitudes of the EPRR parties for specific issues. This general picture will facilitate the discussion of the empirical study on the foreign policy beliefs of EPRR leaders in the following chapters.

2.5.1 Role of International Developments in the Rise of the EPRR Parties

Three global events have shaped the foreign policy attitudes of the EPRR parties. These are the increasing level of globalization, which has challenged the economic and social well-being of Europeans; the deepening and enlargement of European integration; and the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which launched the US-led war on terror.

2.5.1.1 Globalization

The EPRR parties understand globalization as a phenomenon for the benefit of the United States, economically, politically, and culturally. Together with the United States, the rapid development of Asia as a global economic power has also created a significant level of fear among the EPRR parties. Therefore, they prepare their political programs based “on the feared impact of globalization on the economy, political sovereignty and national culture” (Liang, 2007: 8). According to Mudde (2007: 187), there are two reasons for this attitude towards globalization: The first one is that a global market would directly mean that foreign capital and the foreign

owners of that capital can influence the national economy. Secondly, as argued above, economic globalization is against the national interests of their respective countries, only benefitting the US and Asian and other Third World countries.

To counter these threats of economic globalization, the EPRR parties offer national economy and welfare chauvinism, which will “serve the nation and should be controlled by it, while a welfare state is supported, but only for the ‘own people’” (Mudde, 2007: 186-87). The scenario in which one global culture assimilates all national cultures is rejected by the EPRR parties. Moreover, this one global culture based on the American lifestyle is also corrupt, since it engages in ‘cultural suicide,’ such as high crime rates and drug use. Therefore, American culture is an embodiment of the alleged multicultural society myth, “composed of the cultural degenerates” (Liang, 2007: 10). Finally, politically, the EPRR parties reject the ‘new world order,’ of which European integration is a part. The new world order evokes a cosmopolitan and liberal type of political organization, which the EPRR parties oppose ideologically. Therefore, it is possible to argue that “globaphobia” is an essential characteristic of the EPRR (Held & McGrew, 2000: ix).

2.5.1.2 European Integration

European integration is the primary international development in the rise of the EPRR in the new millennium. In fact, in the past, namely the period before the Maastricht Treaty, EPRR parties were pro-European, as they believed that working together on specific issues would serve the national benefits of the member states as well as the idea of a “fortress Europe” (Betz, 1994: 424). For instance, in its 1986 manifesto, the FPÖ said: “we consider Austria’s membership of the EC to be essential, in order to further our objective of the greatest possible participation of our country in European integration” (FPÖ, 1986: 5). Similarly, France’s FN’s 1985-dated manifesto included calls for the European Community to take more responsibility, such as a common currency, common police, and common judicial space. While Mudde (2007: 161) calls the EPRR parties in this period “Euroenthusiasts,” Williams (2013: 135) prefers to attribute them with “Europhilia.”

At present, most of the EPRR parties have a Eurosceptic position regarding European integration. Especially after the Maastricht Treaty, concerns about the transfer of sovereignty to the EU and increasing competences of Brussels have led to this skepticism. While the Euroenthusiasts of the past continue to emphasize their European credentials, they severely criticize how European integration is directed (Mudde, 2007: 164). These parties do not necessarily reject a European project. As the EPRR leaders emphasize sovereignty as opposed to European integration, they offer a looser intergovernmental alliance instead of supranational arrangements under names such as “Europe of fatherlands” or “Europe of nations” (Balfour et al., 2016: 29).

There are also numerous conspiracy theories regarding the European Union in both Western and Eastern Europe. While the most popular one is to understand the European Union as an American tool to control European states, there are also others, such as Germans being in charge of the EU. In the Central and Eastern European cases, the European Union connotes old memories of Soviet control or its economic organization, COMECON. For instance, the European Constitution is considered as “a new Soviet system of centralization that was prepared in the West” by the Hungarian MIEP party. Similarly, Lega Nord of Italy refers to the “Soviet Union of Europe as a nest of freemasons and Communist bankers” (Liang, 2007: 12).

In other words, EPRR leaders want to return to the roots of international relations, where individual nation-states act with full sovereignty in the international arena and where they seek to maximize their national interests through unilateral and intergovernmental tools. The meaning of this for the EPRR parties is a European utopia, which comes with “some alternative form of European cooperation” (Mudde, 2007: 165). As Mudde (2007) quotes the Swedish SD, “European cooperation is a good thing, but the establishment of a new European superstate is not.” (SD, 2005,) Therefore, the current structure of the EU is not acceptable, and it should be either completely abolished or reformed so that it fundamentally becomes compatible with the concerns of the EPRR parties.

On the other hand, European integration has provided a chance for the EPRR parties to cooperate with each other, rather than just sticking to national politics. They have

held several international meetings and forums, in which EPRR leaders from all over Europe have come together to discuss what can be done on problematic issues such as immigration, minorities, and Turkey's accession to the EU. In 2005, for example, the leaders of eight EPRR parties met in Vienna and adopted the Vienna Declaration of Patriotic and National Movements and Parties in Europe, where they declared their "globalized nationalist agenda" (Liang, 2007: 14):

- The establishment of a Europe of free and independent nationals within the framework of a confederation of sovereign nation-states;
- The renunciation of all attempts to create a constitution for a centralist European superstate;
- The clear rejection of a boundless enlargement of European integration to geographically, culturally, religiously, and ethnically non-European areas of Asia and Africa such as Turkey;
- The adequate protection of Europe against the dangers of terrorism, aggressive Islamism, superpower imperialism, and economic aggression by low-wage countries;
- An immediate stop to immigration in all states of the European Union, including so-called family reunions;
- A pro-natalist family policy, which aims at the promotion of large numbers of children of the European ethnic communities (Völker) within the traditional family;
- The solidarist struggle of European ethnic communities against the social and economic effects of globalization;
- The restoration of the social systems of the member states of the European Union and social justice for European ethnic communities.

Since 1999, European-wide cooperation among the EPRR parties has continued through other meetings (the last one held in Koblenz in 2017) and several political groups in the EP, such as the Union for Europe of the Nations (UEN), Identity, Tradition, Sovereignty (ITS), Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD), and Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF).

2.5.1.3 9/11 Terrorist Attacks and the War on Terror

The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001 had dramatic influences for Europe and the EPRR parties. While the identity of immigrants and asylum-seekers has changed together with the perceptions of native Europeans about them, there has also been a quantitative shift in the numbers of immigrants and asylum seekers. These two shifts resulted in the securitization of immigration in Europe in the post-9/11 period, in which the EPRR parties have also been securitizing actors.

First of all, the 9/11 terrorist attacks and other terrorist attacks in their aftermath have changed the security and threat perceptions of Westerners. Before that, and especially after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, citizens of European states did not experience direct security threats in their ordinary lives. The immigration problem was there, but those anxieties were “focused on migrants from the developing world who were perceived to exploit Europe’s welfare systems” (Liang, 2007: 20). A Turkish or a Romanian immigrant in Berlin was considered to be a cultural and socioeconomic problem, but he or she was not a security problem. However, the global civilizational conflict between the Western and Muslim worlds has brought new perceptions, new identities, and new roles for the people living in Europe, whether they are natives or immigrants, hence bringing new and deeper conflicts between these groups. As a result, although immigration has always been at the top of EPRR parties’ agendas, Muslims have become the primary target of the EPRR parties. An immigrant neighbor was previously perceived as a foreigner with an entirely different culture and an alleged aim of exploiting the welfare of the country. However, after the 9/11 attacks, the perception of that very same neighbor as a potential suicide bomber has gained ground. Zúquete (2008: 322) elaborates on this:

...in the early 21st century, and particularly in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the threat that the Crescent will rise over the continent and the spectre of a Muslim Europe have become basic ideological features and themes of the European extreme right. Thus, the concept of ‘Islam’ galvanizes group action: as the group rallies a ‘defence’ against Islamization, new issues emerge, existent issues heighten or decline in prominence, party objectives become reconsidered, and new alliances form against the ‘threat’ of this ‘common enemy.’

Secondly, in addition to the change in the perception of immigrants, a quantitative change has also occurred, which is also related to the 9/11 attacks and the war on terror afterwards. Following the US-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and then the Syrian civil war, the number of refugees and asylum seekers peaked in 2015 and 2016, as shown in Figure 1. Eurostat (2017) statistics also show that Syrian, Afghani, and Iraqi asylum seekers are the top three in the list of countries of origin of non-EU asylum seekers in the EU-28 member states in 2015 and 2016.




Figure 1: Number of Asylum Applicants in EU-28 by Years

Source: Eurostat 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics

Because of these two shifts in Europeans' encounters with immigrants and refugees, these tragic human flows have been securitized as one of the non-military threats to state security. Although other voices suggest that "9/11 has by no means created a new security agenda" (Bigo, 2005: 72) for the problem of asylum and immigration in Europe, the 9/11 attacks have been considered as an important catalyst (Crisp, 2005: 46). Baldaccini (2008: 31) also maintains a similar view, highlighting the significant impact of the 9/11 attacks on how the EU has shaped its migration policies. The idea behind this securitization is that "liberal migration regimes advance cross-border risks – for example, terrorism, drug, and human trafficking – while more restrictive

regimes minimise such threats and improve state/national and societal security” (Lazaridis & Wadia, 2015: 1-2).

The EPRR parties are not only securitizing actors in this process; their rise has also been a result of this securitization of immigration after 9/11. While the EPRR parties have had the chance to influence both the political agenda and the applied policies through different impact mechanisms as discussed above, they also attracted the support of citizens concerned with this threat of immigration. Therefore, 9/11 and the ‘war on terror’ activities have been significant international developments for the rise of EPRR parties concerning increased migration.

2.5.2 EPRR Parties’ Foreign Policies

Table 2 below summarizes the positions of the EPRR parties on key foreign policy-related issues such as European integration, migration, refugees, development aid, international trade, and relations with Russia, the US, and NATO.

2.6 Conclusion

As discussed in this chapter, the EPRR owes its existence and rise to mostly international events and crises. However, despite the importance of foreign and security issues for EPRR parties, scholars have rarely examined the foreign policies of the EPRR parties and leaders. Therefore, this study aims at addressing this gap in the literature and providing a significant contribution to the understanding of the foreign policy beliefs of EPRR leaders. The empirical chapters in the rest of this study will be original contributions to the literature considering this gap.

Table 2: Key Foreign Policy-Related Positions of Major EPRR Parties in Europe

Country	Party	Key FP-Related Positions*
Austria	Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)	No further enlargement. Abolish the Euro. Stop immigration. Against multicultural demon. Russia as an essential partner. European independence from US hegemony. Anti-Islamist.
Belgium	Flemish Interest (VB)	Leave the EU and return to the pre-Maastricht level of cooperation. Abolish Schengen and apply a stricter asylum policy. Re-admission of migrants as a prerequisite of development aid. National defense policies rather than international cooperation on defense. No further enlargement.
Bulgaria	Attack (ATAKA)	Against the Eurozone. EU's current form is not acceptable. The influx of low-skilled immigrants should be reduced. Stronger economic ties with BRICS countries. Staunch supporters of Russia and Putin. Wants to leave NATO and no military base in Bulgaria. Anti-American stance. Against Turkey's and FYROM's EU membership.
Croatia	Croatian Party of Rights (HSP)	Against Croatian accession to EU and NATO. For the annexation of certain lands in the former Yugoslavia.
Denmark	Danish People's Party (DF)	No further enlargement. EU's functions should be limited to economic and technical matters with a referendum on all these points. No more immigration from non-Western countries. Existing immigrants should leave once their country of origin is safe. Re-admission of migrants as a prerequisite of development aid. For a stronger NATO. Against Turkey's accession.
Finland	The True Finns (PS)	Reform of EU so that it is limited with economic cooperation. A referendum on EU membership. No to Eurozone. Reducing the number of immigrants and following a nationalized immigration and asylum policy. Critical of NATO and for a more prominent role of UN in security matters. Against Turkey's membership.

Country	Party	Key FP-Related Positions*
France	Front National (FN) / National Rally	Abolish the Euro. Renegotiation of existing international treaties for full French sovereignty. Annual limit to immigrants. Abolishment of <i>jus soli</i> principle. Russia as a strategic partner. Against Turkey joining the EU.
Germany	Alternative for Germany (AfD)	Abolishment of the Euro. For national legislation only. EU as a single market for sovereign states. Strict control of immigrants and refugees. Germany should not carry the burden on its own. Friendly relations with Russia. Against Turkey's membership to the EU.
Greece	Popular Association (Golden Dawn)	Anti-EU. Anti-austerity. A historical hostility with Turkey. Very critical of global financial institutions and civil society. Against any immigration. Cyprus is a part of Greece. Anti-Islamism.
Hungary	Hungarian Civic Alliance (FIDESZ)	Wants sovereignty back. Stop immigration. "Eastern opening" doctrine of Orbán. Personal ties with Putin. Commitment to NATO.
Hungary	The Movement for a Better Hungary (JOBBIK)	Renegotiate the treaties with the EU or leave. A Polish-Hungarian-Croatian alliance against the Western European countries. Strict citizenship controls. Economic openness but towards the East. Russia as a strategic partner. Against cooperation with the USA. Securing the rights of Hungarian minorities living abroad.
Italy	Northern League (LN)	Leave the Eurozone. National decision-making on immigration policy. Against sanctions against Russia as it should be an essential partner. Stronger transatlantic cooperation, especially in the fight against terrorism and Islamic extremism. Against Turkey's EU accession and Kosovo's recognition.
Netherlands	Party for Freedom (PVV)	Leave the EU and Euro. If still in the EU, then abolish the EP. Abolish Schengen. Anti-Islamism. Strict control of immigration and refugees. In favor of NATO but without Turkey. Against common EU FP.

Country	Party	Key FP-Related Positions*
Poland	Law and Justice (PiS)	More Europe means less Poland. EU membership only for the benefit of Poland. Poland should control borders. Closer relations with Russia, the US, and NATO, but for an independent foreign and security policy.
Sweden	Sweden Democrats (SD)	Eurosceptic. Anti-immigration. Against multiculturalism. For Europe of nation-states. Against Euro, EP, and EC. For only trade and economic relations with European states. Against NATO membership of Sweden. Critical of Russian aggression in the region. Against Turkey joining the EU.
Switzerland	Swiss People's Party (SVP)	Against any form of integration with the EU. Opposed to Swiss membership in the UN. No Swiss troops abroad. Protection of neutrality for the preservation of national interest and fatherland.
United Kingdom	UK Independence Party (UKIP)	For Brexit. Cooperation with the EU only on selected issues. Strict control of immigrants and refugees. Critical of foreign interventions. Positive stance towards Putin.

*Positions for nine parties were retrieved from the European Policy Center's (2016: 58-72) report on European populists. Others have been concluded based on the collected speeches and further research.

CHAPTER III: FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS AND THE CONTRIBUTION OF OPERATIONAL CODE ANALYSIS

Following the previous chapter on the populism literature, this chapter will focus on the second set of literature composing the overall framework of this study, which is foreign policy analysis (FPA), and the place of the operational code approach within this broad academic field. As one of the cognitive approaches to FPA, operational code analysis is valuable in understanding the foreign policy beliefs of leaders, which play an essential role in limiting or shaping their rationality. To realize the aim of this chapter, the connection between a leader's mind model and his or her behaviors and speech acts will be first reviewed. Then, the chapter will conclude with a review of the operational code analysis literature as one of the approaches understanding the actions and words of leaders as outcomes of their mind maps.

3.1 Foreign Policy Analysis and Leadership Studies

FPA emerged as a subfield of the discipline of international relations (IR) in the late 1950s. Although the history of the study of foreign policy can be taken back to the very first years of nation-states, and although the IR discipline used to include many studies on the foreign policies of states, as a distinct field, FPA only emerged after the Second World War (Hudson & Vore, 1995). Specifically, Hudson (2007: 12) defines the field as “the subfield of international relations that seeks to explain foreign policy, or, alternatively, foreign policy behavior, with reference to the theoretical ground of human decision-makers, acting singly and in groups.”

Therefore, FPA is a challenge to the most theoretical work in IR, which “gives the impression that its ground lies in states” (Hudson, 2005: 2). Classical IR theory

applies a 'black-box' or 'billiard ball' model to explain state behavior focusing primarily to the effect of broader forces behind the state behavior at the systemic, societal and organizational levels. Among these broader forces, one can create a long list, which includes balance of power, alliances, power-seeking, domestic politics, regime types and international institutions. Because of this focus on the broader factors, major IR theories have ignored the role of the individual decision-maker completely or they have attributed a minimal role.. In other words, major IR theories are actor-general theories for the sake of parsimony, whereas FPA is an agent-oriented and actor-specific approach in which the actors cannot be the states but instead are human decision-makers, since "states are abstractions and thus have no agency" (Hudson, 2005: 2). Eschewing the grand theories and broader systemic explanations of the structural theories of IR, the FPA discipline prefers to open up the black box of the state so that mid-range explanations of the actors' behaviors in IR becomes possible.

Surely, leaders have always been important actors in the eyes of history writers and the biographies of these 'great men' are believed to tell most of world history. The underlying motive behind this belief has been the understanding the top-level decision makers as having the capacity to change the direction of the world politics. Among these great men, Napoleon, Churchill, and Bismarck can be given as key figures in the European context. For instance, if the researcher wants to understand German foreign policy before and in the aftermath of German unification in the 19th century, he or she cannot do so without analyzing the biography of Otto von Bismarck including his leadership type, background, beliefs, and images of the other actors.

While these biographical studies are valuable to grasp the lives and policies of these leaders, they are far from being scientific and theoretical. They are mostly based on anecdotes whose validity cannot be proven by scientific methods, and their writing style is highly subjective since there is little empirical data. The arguments about the leaders in these biographical studies are inferences made by looking at events retrospectively, as the decision-making process of those events cannot be known by the author. Modern psychological analyses of these leaders differ from those biographical studies in the sense that they aim to be systematic through specific

methodologies that can be replicated for other leaders. However, the underlying motive is still the same: who these leaders are and how they perceive the political universe have an effect on their behaviors.

Looking at the history of studies on foreign policy decision-making, in the period before the 1950s, the study of foreign policy was mostly descriptive, without any attempt to theorize and generalize the findings (Levy, 2003). Therefore, it is possible to argue that between the atheoretical and mostly biographical works on foreign policy before the 1950s and the majority of IR studies, which sacrifice closeness to reality for the sake of parsimony, FPA locates itself in a mid-range position. Taking this position into consideration, FPA provides “the concrete theory that can reinvigorate the connection between IR actor-general theory and its social science foundation” (Hudson, 2005: 2). In other words, within the structure-agency debate, FPA has put “a stronger emphasis on agency than is found in IR,” and it has directed its focus towards “the process of foreign policy formulation, the role of decision-makers and the nature of foreign policy choice” (Alden & Aran, 2016: 4).

In the literature, three early works are considered as paradigmatic in the first years of the field, paving the way for further study opportunities and paths. These early works are *Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics* by Richard Snyder, Henry Bruck, and Burton Sapin (1954), *Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy* by James Rosenau (1966), and *Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics* by Margaret and Harold Sprout (1956). What is common to these three works is their critique of realist IR theory. However, their critique was not from a normative point of view, nor was it a challenge to the underlying assumptions of realist IR theory. Instead, these pioneers were working to develop a methodology that would allow the researcher to include the real agents of international relations, which are decision-makers.

Each of these works has opened fertile paths in the literature with an emphasis on the necessity to dig deeper into the minds of individual decision makers and their cognitive and psychological features. The origin of this necessity is the understanding that "state action is the action taken by those acting in the name of the state. Hence, the state is its decision-makers" (Snyder, Bruck and Spin 1969: 202).

Though it has taken some time to develop systematic tools to study the minds of political leaders, the literature has reached to a point where leader's personal attributes can be studied with theoretical and empirical tools.

Either on a single leader or a large number of leaders, these studies investigated the cognitive maps of leaders including the beliefs and perceptions or they focused on their personality traits. Basically, these studies have two different methodologies. The first one is to qualitatively investigate the primary sources to describe the leader's background so that his or her behaviors can be better understood. The second approach utilizes quantitative tools to measure the beliefs and personality traits of the political leaders.

The qualitative studies have focused on the importance of historical analogies as an explanation of their decisions (Hemmer, 1999; Khong, 1992; Jervis, 1976), the role played by the leader's image of itself and the universe in which he or she acts (Blanton, 1996; Hermann, 1986; Holsti, 1970), and the role of interpersonal style on political behavior (Etheredge, 1978; Shepard, 1988).

On the other hand, quantitative studies on the political leaders have focused on measurements of beliefs and personality traits with the help of statistical models. In this sense, quantitative approaches have contributed to the field immensely as reliable measurements, generalizations and comparisons have become possible for the researcher. Cognitive elements such as beliefs, operational codes and perceptions, as well as the elements of the leader's personality such as emotions and unconscious impulses have been studied by this vein of literature to develop tools to quantitatively measure these elements.

Like any individual, a leader's mind has a complicated flow. The leader's initial contact with the physical world initiates the process of perception, which are applied a filter by the mind so that the unimportant or unnecessary details can be eliminated. These filters could be a leader's biases, stereotypes or heuristics. This process of filtration is called cognition and it is a widely individual process, as each leader would have different biases, stereotypes and heuristics. Therefore, it is ordinary that these filters could lead to different and even contradictory understanding of the same

physical reality, or they can even result in fallacies such as the wrong estimation of the probabilities or overconfidence despite of the imperfect information. It should be also noted that individual process of cognition cannot determine the attitude on its own, but it is also shaped or limited by the situational factors such as others' presence in the scenario, time constraints, attributed norms and roles, and the stakes.

As well as the cognition, a leader's mental model of the world which includes the beliefs, values and memories, and which is also shaped by the personality traits of the leader also plays a role in the formation of the attitudes. If one understands the behavior and speech act of a leaders as the result of his or her attitudes, then it can be concluded that any change in the mind model of the leader such a biases, values, beliefs or the situational factors will also change the behavior and the speech act of the leader.

For a researcher who aims to conduct a psychological analysis of a political leader, there are critical challenges. For example, the most crucial difference between performing a traditional psychological examination and a psychological analysis of a political leader is the distance between the object of study and the researcher. Unlike conventional analysis, researchers working on political leaders very rarely have the chance of direct access to a leader. Such a distance is a severe challenge for using psychology in leadership studies. Therefore, researchers have turned to the assumptions and methods of several academic fields, including psychology, political science, and speech communication, to “develop new techniques and assessment strategies to analyze the psychological characteristics of leaders ‘at a distance’” (Walker, 2000: 512). Indeed, the essential assumption of these researchers is that what a leader says and how the leader says it are valuable, and the researcher can assess speeches and styles to develop knowledge about a leader’s psychological characteristics. Standardization of assessment methods also enables the researcher to make meaningful comparisons among leaders and to find specific patterns of leadership. Operational code analysis is one of the robust examples of such efforts within the literature of FPA.

3.2 Operational Code Analysis

Taking the core argument of the cognitivist literature that leaders' beliefs are essential factors in explaining world politics as its starting point, operational code analysis is an approach within the literature of foreign policy and international relations that utilizes an at-a-distance method. This method includes, firstly, the collection of public speeches, interviews, and writings by leaders (Schafer & Walker, 2006b; Walker, 2000; Walker, Schafer, & Young, 1998) and, secondly, their analysis through content analysis procedures. In this respect, there are two key links assumed by operational code analysis: The first one is the causal link between leaders' foreign policy beliefs and their foreign policy decisions (George, 1969; Schafer & Walker, 2006b; Walker, 1983) and the second one is that leaders' public speeches can be taken as representations of their foreign policy beliefs.

The origins of operational code analysis go back to the work of Nathan Leites on the Soviet Politburo (1951, 1953). What Leites did was to conceptualize the Politburo's political beliefs, motives, and goals. Sixteen years after Leites' efforts, and following a long period of neglect of his work, operational code analysis became more popular among scholars during the 1970s thanks to Alexander George's revisiting of Leites' works. George (1969) analyzed Leites' works, omitted the primarily descriptive and psychoanalytical parts, and categorized his results about the cognitive processes of Soviet Politburo members using a series of questions about their philosophical and instrumental beliefs. In other words, George purified Leites' work and re-presented its gist in a way proper and feasible for the study of foreign policy and international relations in a rigorous manner.

In this categorization, philosophical beliefs represent underlying assumptions and premises about the nature of the political universe. In other words, the philosophical beliefs of a leader show how that leader perceives other actors in the international arena, such as their levels of cooperation and conflict, or their role in historical developments. On the other hand, instrumental beliefs focus on the leader's Self and refer to the instruments of power exercised to achieve individual political goals. In other words, questions on philosophical beliefs enable the researcher to examine a leader's perception of the role of the 'Other' that he or she confronts, while the instrumental questions make it possible to draw conclusions about a leader's

perception of Self, such as the optimal tools for achieving political goals. The questions developed by George (1969) are as follows:

Philosophical Questions

P-1. What is the ‘essential’ nature of political life? Is the political universe one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one’s political opponents?

P-2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s fundamental political values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic or must one be pessimistic on this score, and in what respects the one and/or the other?

P-3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?

P-4. How much ‘control’ or ‘mastery’ can one have over historical development? What is one’s role in ‘moving’ and ‘shaping’ history in the desired direction?

P-5. What is the role of ‘chance’ in human affairs and in historical development?

Instrumental Questions

I-1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?

I-2. How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?

I-3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?

I-4. What is the best ‘timing’ of action to advance one’s interests?

I-5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s interest?

To focus on the core of operational code analysis, what George (1969) did was narrow down different aspects of the exercise of power either by the Self (instrumental beliefs) or by the Other (philosophical beliefs). These aspects are risk orientation, predictability, tactics, strategy, conflict, cooperation, and hostility. All of these aspects are embedded in several operational code beliefs. For example, revisiting the origin of operational code analysis, Leites (1951, 1953) identified three aspects of power regarding Lenin’s operational code:

- (i) the cognitive aspect, which is the interest in who controls whom—also known as ‘kto-kovo,’ as coined by Lenin in Russian;
- (ii) the emotional aspect, which is the fear of annihilation; and
- (iii) the motivational aspect, which is the principle of the pursuit of power.

In other words, power in its various forms and its exercise by leaders is at the core of operational code analysis. The centrality of power is valid both for Leites' works in the 1950s and for the modern operational code analysis indices developed by Walker, Schafer, and Young (1998) to answer the ten questions listed above. Their Verbs In Context System (VICS) of content analysis identifies the primary means of exercising social power (rewards/punishments, promises/threats, and supporting/opposing statements), and these primary means are then retrieved and aggregated statistically. Such a content analysis enables the researcher to construct VICS indices of cooperation/conflict, strategies/tactics, and historical control (Walker, 2000).

Based on combinations of answers given to George's ten questions, Holsti (1977) contributed to the theoretical development of operational code analysis further by constructing a leadership typology. In this typology, there were six types of leadership, later reduced to four by Walker (1983). The revised typology by Walker (Figure 2) is mainly based on the master beliefs of the operational code construct (P-1, I-1, and P-4), namely the leader's belief (P-1) about the nature (either temporary or permanent) and the source of conflict (the individual, society, or international system), plus (I-1) the leader's own (the Self's) belief regarding the best approach to strategy, as well as (P-4) their belief regarding control over historical development.

Until the 1990s, operational code studies would hand-code the public speeches and texts of leaders. A critical stage for the literature was reached in the late 1990s as there were increasing efforts to develop a quantitative operational code research agenda (Walker, Schafer, & Young, 1998). The development of the VICS was a turning point that allowed the researcher to make at-a-distance inferences in a more structured and replicable way than the previous qualitative research. A natural language processing program (Profiler Plus) was developed, and this program creates its own numerical indices for each belief system, allowing analysts to make "direct, meaningful comparisons across our subjects and conduct statistical analyses that allow for probabilistic generalizations" (Schafer & Walker, 2006b: 27). Automation introduced by this program was different from the previous research agenda, in which each researcher created a Self/Other dictionary of the leader and hand-coded

their subject's public speeches, which made it difficult to compare results for each world leader reliably.

<u>TYPE A</u> <u>Settle>Deadlock>Dominate>Submit</u> Philosophical: Conflict is temporary, caused by human misunderstanding and miscommunication. A 'conflict spiral,' based on misperception and impulsive responses, is the major danger of war. Opponents are often influenced in kind to conciliation and firmness. Optimism is warranted, based on a leader's ability and willingness to shape historical development. The future is relatively predictable, and control over it is possible. Instrumental: Establish goals within a framework that emphasizes shared interests. Pursue broadly international goals incrementally with flexible strategies that control risks by avoiding escalation and acting quickly when conciliation opportunities arise. Emphasize resources that establish a climate for negotiation and compromise and avoid the early use of force.	<u>TYPE C</u> <u>Settle>Dominate>Deadlock>Submit</u> Philosophical: Conflict is temporary; it is possible to restructure the state system to reflect the latent harmony of interests. The source of conflict is the anarchical state system, which permits a variety of causes to produce war. Opponents vary in nature, goals, and responses to conciliation and firmness. One should be pessimistic about goals unless the state system is changed, because predictability and control over historical development are low under anarchy. Instrumental: Establish optimal goals vigorously within a comprehensive framework. Pursue shared goals, but control risks by limiting means rather than ends. Act quickly when conciliation opportunities arise and delay escalatory actions whenever possible. Resources other than military capabilities are useful.
<u>TYPE D-E-F</u> <u>Dominate>Settle>Deadlock>Submit</u> Philosophical: Conflict is permanent, caused by human nature (D), nationalism (E), or international anarchy (F). Power disequilibria are major dangers of war. Opponents may vary, and responses to conciliation or firmness are uncertain. Optimism declines over the long run and in the short run depends on the quality of leadership and a power equilibrium. Predictability is limited, as is control over historical development. Instrumental: Seek limited goals flexibly with moderate means. Use military force if the opponent and circumstances require it, but only as a final resource.	<u>TYPE B</u> <u>Dominate>Deadlock>Settle>Submit</u> Philosophical: Conflict is temporary, caused by warlike states; miscalculation and appeasement are the major causes of war. Opponents are rational and deterrable. Optimism is warranted regarding realization of goals. The political future is relatively predictable, and control over historical development is possible. Instrumental: One should seek optimal goals vigorously within a comprehensive framework. Control risks by limiting means rather than ends. Any tactic and resource may be appropriate, including the use of force when it offers prospects for large gains with limited risks.

Figure 2: The revised Holsti typology (Walker, 1983)

Another important tool for operational code researchers is the opportunity to compare an individual leader or a group of leaders to the average world leader, which is calculated via the scores of 164 speeches by a norming group of world leaders (Malici & Buckner, 2008). Based on the comparison with this norming group, a

researcher can make predictions about the likelihood of a particular leader's strategies for conflict or cooperation (Walker, Malici, & Schafer, 2011). In this way, the researcher can draw conclusions such as the individual leader's belief about the nature of the political universe being more cooperative/conflictual than the average world leader's or that the leader analyzed believes that he/she has more control over the historical development of events than the average world leader.

Drawing from the methodological development of operational code analysis, this theoretical approach depicts specific patterns of foreign policy beliefs through a leader's public statements and allows inferences to be drawn about the leader's type of operational code (Schafer & Walker, 2006b; Walker, Schafer, & Young, 1998). In modern operational code studies, it is possible to infer a leader's preferences regarding the outcomes of settlement, deadlock, domination, and submission (and difference preference orderings of these outcomes), as seen in Figure 2, for Self and Other based on the master beliefs in operational code analysis (P-1, I-1, and P-4).

For P-1 (Other) and I-1 (Self) scores regarding cooperation or conflict strategies, a researcher analyzes whether these scores for an individual leader are below ($<$) or above ($>$) the norming group's mean score. For P-4a (Self) and P-4b (Other) historical control scores, there are three options: A leader's score can be one standard deviation below ($<$) or above ($>$) the norming group's P-4 scores, or they can be within ($=$) one standard deviation. For example, if a leader's I-1 score is negative ($-$) and his P-4a score is at least one standard deviation below ($<$) the norming group's P-4a score, it is inferred that his approach to strategy is conflictual and the leader attributes less historical control to Self than to Other. Then the corresponding inference from the theory of inferences (TIP) is that the leader's ranked order of outcome preferences for Self is Dominate $>$ Settle $>$ Submit $>$ Deadlock, which is the strategy associated with the game of chicken in game theory. This outcome preference ranking is Proposition (4) in Table 3 below, which also contains the remaining propositions in the TIP.

Table 3: An Expanded Theory of Inferences about Preferences

Self and Other values and preferences order in a 2×2 strategic game
(1) If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (+, <), then Settle>Deadlock>Submit>Dominate (Appeasement)
(2) If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (+, =), then Settle>Deadlock>Dominate>Submit (Assurance)
(3) If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (+, >), then Settle>Dominate>Deadlock>Submit (Stag Hunt)
(4) If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (−, <), then Dominate>Settle>Submit>Deadlock (Chicken)
(5) If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (−, =), then Dominate>Settle>Deadlock>Submit (Prisoner's Dilemma)
(6) If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (−, >), then Dominate>Deadlock>Settle>Submit (Bully)
A “+” indicates above and “−” indicates below the norming mean. <, >, and = indicate below, above, and within the norming average range, respectively, which is $P4a \pm 1 \text{ SD}$. Norming scores for $N=164$ are $P-1=+0.30$, $SD=0.29$; $I-1=+0.40$, $SD=0.43$; and $P-4a=0.22$, $SD=0.13$. Norming averages are drawn from Schafer and Walker (2006b), courtesy of Mark Schafer. For another study using the same norming sample, see Malici and Buckner (2008) and Malici (in Walker, Malici, and Schafer 2011). Source: Schafer and Walker (2006b).

Using six TIP propositions given in Table 3, it is possible to make logical inferences about a leader's foreign policy behaviors, i.e., what he/she aims to achieve and what he/she considers as a feasible political outcome inferred from the intersection of the outcome preferences as a 2×2 game from the Self and Other beliefs in a leader's operational code. Causal links between key beliefs and outcome preferences made with these propositions are scientifically rigorous and relatively consistent with mainstream game-theoretical formal models based on the idea of balance-of-power thinking (Schafer & Walker, 2006b).

The studies utilizing operational code analysis have mostly focused on heads of states, such as US presidents (Renshon, 2008, 2009; Schafer & Crichlow, 2000; Walker, 1995; Walker, Schafer, & Young, 1998; Walker, Schafer, & Young, 1999), British prime ministers (Dyson, 2006; Schafer & Walker, 2006a), German chancellors (Malici, 2006), Israeli prime ministers (Crichlow, 1998), Chinese leaders (Feng, 2005), Cuban and North Korean leaders (Malici, 2011; Malici & Malici, 2005), Russian leaders (Dyson & Parent, 2018), and Islamist leaders (Özdamar,

2017; Özdamar & Canbolat, 2018). Studies have also been conducted on foreign policy decision-makers other than heads of states, such as Holsti's (1970) work on Dulles and Starr's (1984) work on Kissinger. Recently, with the rise of global terrorism, more attention has been paid to the leaders of terrorist groups (Jacquier, 2014; Walker, 2011).

3.3 Conclusion

Before continuing with the research design and the methodology of this study, this chapter has provided a brief review of the leadership studies and operational code analysis literature. Operational code analysis is a part of the cognitive approaches to FPA and it has evolved and improved by significant levels since its first use by Leites in the 1950s. Since then, the research program has developed itself in terms of theorization, methodology, and case selection. As the recent methodological developments within the operational code analysis research program have equipped researchers with new tools of analysis, the following methodology chapter also aims at showing how operational code analysis can contribute to our understanding of foreign policy.

CHAPTER IV: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The fundamental assumption of this dissertation is that the beliefs of political leaders are important determinants of the foreign policymaking of a state. Concerning this, it is assumed that a causal mechanism can be established between the foreign policy beliefs of leaders and foreign policy decisions and actions of a country. Therefore, focusing on the individual level of analysis, this study asks several research questions regarding the foreign policy beliefs of the EPRR leaders.

Content analysis is the primary method used in this study as operational code analysis utilizes an automated content analysis method called the VICS, introduced by Walker, Schafer, and Young. Thanks to the increasing number of automated software programs such as Profiler Plus and ATLAS.ti and also to the availability of Internet sources, content analysis is much easier, and it requires much less time than in the past (Hermann, 2008: 151). Through content analysis, a researcher can develop “a set of procedures to make inferences from text” (Weber, 1990: 19). Any material that is used to communicate a message could be the focus of content analysis, such as speeches, interviews, press conferences, books, newspapers, or party programs. However, if the main goal is to study the speaker of a text directly, as is the case in this study, then it is crucial to analyze the full text as spoken by the leader, instead of how it is transferred to media outlets. As Holsti (1969: 32) argues, a leader’s “inner feelings are accurately reflected in what they say,” and content analysis studies the words spoken to understand these inner feelings.

In this chapter, the research design of this study will be presented. Because the theory and the method of operational code analysis are highly nested, to avoid

repetition, only the methodological components of operational code analysis are included in this chapter.

4.1 Research Design

4.1.1 Selection of Topic

The starting point of any research is the selection of a topic. Singleton and Straits (2005: 43-44) argue that five factors explain the origin of most research topics: The structure and state of the scientific discipline, social problems, personal values of the researcher, social premiums, and practical considerations.

Among these five factors, the first two have been prominent in the selection of the topic of this research, which is the foreign policy beliefs of EPRR leaders. My long journey as a student of IR has brought me to a point where I give more credit to the individual level of analysis than other levels of analysis. Therefore, FPA's agent-oriented and actor-specific approach, which studies the real human decision-makers instead of the abstractions at the state and systemic levels, can be understood as the first factor of choosing this topic.

Secondly, most social scientists, such as Durkheim, Marx, and Weber, have been concerned about the social problems of their days or rising social issues such as industrial revolution and immigration. Similarly, the rise of populism and the populist radical right in the world, and especially in Europe, is a timely and 'hot' topic that attracts the attention of many social scientists of the 21st century. Until recently, populist radical right leaders have been ignored by FPA as they have been considered as marginal members of the political arena, with minimal influence or potential on foreign policy issues. However, the recent successes of these leaders in taking office, influencing policymaking, and getting into parliament have shown that these leaders should also be considered as direct or indirect foreign policy actors. For this reason, contributing to the filling of this gap in the literature on the populist radical right is the second factor for choosing this topic.

4.1.2 Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis can be understood as the answer given to the questions of who or what is described or analyzed in research. Accordingly, the unit of analysis in this research is the European populist radical right leaders. However, throughout the study, not only individual EPRR leaders but also their aggregation are analyzed. Therefore, EPRR leaders, both individually and as a group, constitute the unit of analysis of this study. On the other hand, it should be noted that the ProfilerPlus program does not provide scores for the leaders, but for the individual texts. For that, the scores for each EPRR leader is the aggregate of the scores retrieved for the individual texts by the leader. Accordingly, while the unit of analysis of the study in general is EPRR leaders, the unit of analysis for the measurement is the individual texts by EPRR leaders.

4.1.3 Variables

The foreign policy decision/behavior of a leader is described as the dependent variable of this study. In other words, variations in foreign policy decisions or behaviors of an EPRR leader are thought to be dependent on or influenced by other independent variables. The independent variables of this study are the operational code beliefs of EPRR leaders. In other words, the operational codes of these EPRR leaders in the period between 2013 and 2017 will be utilized in understanding their foreign policy decisions and behaviors. Their operational codes have been retrieved from their public texts related to foreign policy issues. More specifically, the Profiler Plus program is used to present the operational codes of the EPRR leaders, thanks to its capacity to provide numerical measurements. The relationship between the independent and dependent variables of this study is a causal one, and it assumes that the foreign policy beliefs and operational codes of an EPRR leader cause the foreign policy decisions and behaviors of that leader.

4.1.4 The Puzzle and Research Questions

The rise of EPRR parties and leaders is a fact in Europe. Another fact is the role of foreign policy issues in this rise. However, despite this role of foreign policy, not only the populist radical right literature but also the FPA literature has not yet given a sufficient level of attention to the foreign policy beliefs of EPRR leaders. Therefore, this study aims to utilize FPA's analytical tools to develop a comprehensive

understanding of the foreign policy beliefs of EPRR leaders. In a nutshell, the puzzle of this study is to locate the EPRR leaders on the map of world leaders and to seek (i) internal patterns among EPRR leaders, (ii) significant differences compared to the average world leader, and (iii) an explanation of the underlying causes of the lack or presence of such patterns and variations.

To do so, the focus of the research has been narrowed down to the following research questions:

- What are the philosophical and instrumental foreign policy beliefs of EPRR leaders?
- Is there a shared pattern among EPRR leaders in terms of their foreign policy beliefs?
- How do the operational codes of these EPRR leaders differ in comparison with the average world leader?
- What are the underlying reasons for the presence/lack of a shared pattern among EPRR leaders?
- What are the underlying reasons for the presence/lack of a significant difference between EPRR leaders and the average world leader?

4.1.5 Hypotheses

In line with the abovementioned research questions, five hypotheses are formulated. These hypotheses are derived from the literature on the populist radical right (Liang, 2007; Mudde, 2004; Taggart, 2000), and they focus on whether EPRR leaders are significantly different from average world leaders in terms of their foreign policy beliefs. The first three of these hypotheses forecast different beliefs, namely the nature of the political universe (P-1), the control over historical development (P-4), and the strategic tools to be utilized for achieving goals (I-1). The fourth hypothesis tests populism's thin-centered ideology through EPRR leaders' foreign policy beliefs. The final one expresses an expectation about the strategic culture of the EPRR leaders. These hypotheses are given below, and they are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.

- Hypothesis 1: EPRR leaders' foreign policy beliefs on the essential nature of political life, measured by the average of nine leaders' P-1 scores in the operational code construct, are more conflictual than the average of world leaders.
- Hypothesis 2: EPRR leaders' foreign policy beliefs on the Self's control over history, measured by the average of nine leaders' P-4 scores in the operational code construct, are lower than the average of world leaders.
- Hypothesis 3: EPRR leaders' foreign policy beliefs about strategic orientation, measured by the average of nine leaders' I-1 scores in the operational code construct, are less cooperative than the average of world leaders.
- Hypothesis 4: As populism is a thin-centered ideology (Mudde, 2004), it is expected that EPRR leaders do not have a shared pattern in terms of their foreign policy beliefs as measured by operational code master beliefs (P-1, P-4, and I-1).
- Hypothesis 5: As realists, EPRR leaders are expected to perceive the political universe as more conflictual (P-1) and choose less cooperative instruments to achieve their political goals (I-1).

Chapter 5 revisits these hypotheses and discusses whether or not they are met as a result of the data processing and analysis. Chapters 6 and 7 present detailed interpretations of the results with the assistance of the related literature, such as that on European integration, electoral politics, and socialization.

4.1.6 Selection of Leaders

There are various reasons for selecting these nine specific leaders. First of all, these leaders are generally regarded as populist radical rights both in scholarly work and in policy circles. A summary of their stances in different policy areas is given in Table 2 in Chapter 2. Second, these leaders have been active in politics to varying degrees, both at the national and European levels, as shown in Table 4. Finally, the research method made it necessary to consider the availability of texts and speeches in English. For this reason, I had to omit leaders such as Jarosław Kaczyński since there

were not enough public speeches available in English. Therefore, these nine leaders constitute the universe of EPRR leaders whose texts were available.

Table 4: List of EPRR Leaders, Their Parties, and Their Most Recent Vote Shares

Country	Party	Leader	% Vote*
France	Front National (FN)**	Marine Le Pen	21.5 (2017)
Hungary	Hungarian Civic Alliance (FIDESZ)	Viktor Orbán	54.45 (2019)
Netherlands	Party for Freedom (PVV)	Geert Wilders	13.1 (2017)
United Kingdom	UK Independence Party (UKIP)	Nigel Farage	12.6 (2015)
United Kingdom	Conservative Party (CON)	Boris Johnson***	42.3 (2017)
Sweden	Sweden Democrats (SD)	Jimmie Åkesson	17.5 (2018)
Germany	Alternative for Germany (AfD)	Frauke Petry	12.6 (2017)
Austria	Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)	Norbert Hofer	46.7 (2016)
Greece	Popular Association (Golden Dawn)	Nikolaos Michaloliakos	9.4 (2014)

* According to the highest vote that the party got in national or EP elections since 2010.

** In 2018, FN was rebranded as “National Rally” as part of the de-demonization strategy by Marine Le Pen.

*** Despite the Conservative Party not being considered a populist political party, Boris Johnson can be considered a populist leader.

4.1.7 Data Collection

Collected public texts and speeches by EPRR leaders allow us to calculate means and standard deviations for each leader. Among these texts, there are speeches, interviews, press statements, op-ed articles, and panel discussions. These collected texts span the period between 2013 and 2017 and the majority of them are from 2016 and 2017. A variety of sources were used to access the texts, such as international news websites (Spiegel, CNN, BBC, Newsweek, WSJ, DW, and BILD), official websites of the political parties, personal blogs of the leaders, and government websites in cases of Orbán and Johnson. For some leaders such as Marine Le Pen, Frauke Petry, and Norbert Hofer, it was difficult to find texts in English, which led me to look for alternatives. Speeches and interviews of these leaders that were not

transcribed into text but only published as video were transcribed. This method made it possible to obtain a satisfying number of texts for these leaders, as well.

Four criteria were taken into consideration for text selection. Walker et al. (1998: 182) proposed the following criteria for selected texts: “(1) the subject and object are international in scope; (2) the focus of interaction is a political issue; (3) the words and deeds are cooperative or conflictual.” Moreover, the minimum number of verbs contained by the text should be at least 15 (Schafer & Walker, 2006b). Although the criterion of a minimum length of 1500 words was applied in earlier works, Schafer and Walker (2006b: 51) state that although this criterion “often works, the value that matters most for computing VICS indices is the number of utterances in the speech act that are coded by VICS.” Fulfilling these criteria, 116 speeches were coded for nine leaders. The minimum, maximum, and total numbers of words and verbs for each leader are given below (Table 5). Therefore, the dataset satisfies all requirements in the literature that are necessary to conduct rigorous analysis.

As the English dictionary in Profiler Plus is used, for non-English speaking leaders (i.e., those other than Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage), there have been important limitations. For the speeches or interviews directly conducted in English for international news channels or newspapers, the setbacks were (i) how well the leader could express himself/herself in a language other than the mother tongue and (ii) if speaking to international audience makes a difference in the words he/she chooses to use. For the speeches or interviews translated into English from their original language, the setbacks are related to the translation itself, such as the word preferences of the translator, or the original meanings lost in translation.

Table 5: Minimum, Maximum, and Total Number of Words and Verbs for Each Leader

	No. of speeches	Words			Verbs		
		Min	Max	Total	Min	Max	Total
Le Pen	10	576	5,286	22,695	19	183	790
Orbán	26	595	6,210	52,984	24	140	1,647
Wilders	20	509	3,544	27,626	23	144	1,164
Farage	21	335	1,881	14,813	17	54	509
Johnson	8	678	5,656	14,407	23	160	447
Åkesson	6	657	1,322	5,770	15	45	184
Petry	7	578	2,676	11,192	22	70	347
Hofer	5	575	1,489	5,542	21	43	168
Michaloliakos	13	583	1,100	11,101	19	38	347
Total	116	335	6,210	166,13	15	183	5,603

A full list of the texts with their word and verb count as well as the date, source, and type of the text is given in Appendix C.

4.1.8 Data Processing

This study and other operational code analysis studies test their hypotheses through content analysis conducted by the Profiler Plus software and statistical significance tests. Profiler Plus is a specific content analysis program that codes leaders' verbs in public speeches with the VICS, which is based on George's ten operational code questions and provides scores for each question. I used the online version of Profiler Plus provided by Social Science Automation on the www.profilerplus.org website (last access: 03.08.2017). Having the P-1, P-2, I-1, and I-2 scores through the online version of the software, I calculated the other scores using the formulas provided by Michael D. Young. A detailed table of the scores for each text is provided in Appendix A.

Thanks to the use of this automated system instead of hand-coding, the results' reliability is high. This strong reliability enables us to compare the scores for the selected leaders with the norming group scores acquired by the same automated system (Shafer & Walker, 2006b). The operational code research program does not provide regional or subgroup norming samples. Therefore, this paper compares the EPRR leaders only to the norming group of world leaders without any categorization. For the sake of external reliability, or in other words, in order to make a comparison

with the norming group, I did not create an updated Self/Other dictionary for each leader but stayed loyal to the classical dictionary provided by the software. Revising the Self/Other dictionary of the software could be a useful effort to increase the internal validity of a study based on operational code analysis. In this way, it would be possible to cope with the limitations of the software. However, for this research, to find shared patterns among the EPRR leaders and to compare them to the average world leader, the classical dictionary provided by the software itself was used.

4.1.9 Data analysis and interpretation

Following the data processing, the Profiler Plus program provides scores for each philosophical and instrumental belief in the operational code construct. However, on their own, these scores do not provide a strong basis for judgment. Therefore, the researcher has to contextualize the numerical information retrieved from the program, meaning that he or she has to put the scores into a specific perspective by comparing them with the scores of other leaders. Operational code analysis literature provides a norming group score that defines what is more usual among world leaders. The norming group in operational code analysis is technically a comparison group rather than a control group, i.e., it was not sampled randomly from a defined population nor systematically stratified to be representative as statisticians use the terms ‘random’ or ‘representative.’ It is instead what field researchers in comparative politics and anthropology would call a snowball sample, in which the individual texts were collected sequentially from the previous operational code studies of leaders and scores were calculated in a meta-analysis of their aggregated cumulative VICS indices.

The sample of world leaders is representative of a variety of texts from leaders in a variety of regions and historical eras. In other words, the norming group scores, which are taken from Malici and Buckner (2008), do not solely represent the leaders of the new millennium but of a variety of historical eras, which makes it time-independent. Based on this variety in terms of historical periods, it can be argued that the publication date of the norming group data does not pose a problem for the dataset being used in this dissertation.

Furthermore, the scores for the VICS indices are baseline scores from which deviations can be detected in subsequent samples by comparing the scores across samples. The overall effect of the comparisons is to provide a common perspective from which to compare the scores from studies of leaders using the same methods (automated VICS software). In addition to inferring whether the differences occurred by chance or not (statistical significance), the direction of the deviations from the scores of the baseline sample is assessed for theoretical significance. The statistical significance test assesses whether the differences are real (did not just occur by chance); the theoretical significance assesses whether the variations occurred in the direction inferred from the theory (in this case, the theory and hypotheses from the literature review on the populist radical right).

Finally, the phrase ‘average world leader’ refers to the average scores of the number of texts of world leaders in the sample rather than the number of world leaders, i.e., $n=164$ refers to the number of texts (public statements) and not the number of leaders in the norming group. In other words, the norming group’s unit of analysis is a group of texts and not a group of leaders, so the VICS scores are technically the average scores for the group of texts and not the group of leaders. In a statistical test comparing a leader’s scores with the norming group scores, we are comparing the average score of the leader’s texts with the average score of the norming group’s texts (Malici and Buckner, 2008).

While Chapter 5 contextualizes the operational code scores of the EPRR leaders in comparison to the average world leader, Chapters 6 and 7 interpret the findings of Chapter 5 through an in-depth reading of the texts. These two chapters contextualize the findings with the assistance of relevant literature, such as that on European integration, electoral politics, and socialization. In Chapter 6, where EPRR leaders’ beliefs about the political universe and the political Other (corresponding to the P-1 score) are discussed, the lack of shared patterns among EPRR leaders is explained in relation to the presence or lack of geopolitical and cultural othering in the discourse of the individual EPRR leader. To do so, I identified the several actors in these texts that are signified as Other by the related EPRR leader. These actors signified as Other, and the ways in which the EPRR leaders portray them, provide important insights that complement the overall findings of Chapter 5. In Chapter 7, the texts are

revisited in detail to identify the political strategies implemented or to be implemented by EPRR leaders, which further develops the findings of the I-1 scores of EPRR leaders in Chapter 5. These qualitative approaches to the same texts, which are automatically analyzed by Profiler Plus, allow us to see the same subject from different angles and to deepen our understanding of it.

4.2 Conclusion

On one level, this study is an explanatory study with the causal mechanism it establishes between the foreign policy beliefs and the decisions of leaders. However, on another level, due to the newness of the topic and the high number of leaders analyzed in this study, it could be argued that this research is an example of an exploratory study (Singleton & Straits, 2005: 68). With a smaller sample, it could have been possible to go deeper into the psychobiographies or key life transitions of these EPRR leaders. First calculating and then comparing the operational code scores of EPRR leaders, this study contextualizes the findings at the societal, national, and international levels. As a result, the study enables us to understand the foreign policy beliefs of the EPRR leaders at these levels, to test the fundamental assumptions of the populist radical right literature in foreign policy, and to set the scene for further research bridging the FPA and populist radical right literatures.

CHAPTER V: A GENERAL ANALYSIS OF THE OPERATIONAL CODES OF EPRR LEADERS¹

Being the first of the three empirical chapters of this study, the present chapter basically aims at answering several questions regarding the operational codes of the EPRR leaders, such as the level of hostility and cooperation in their foreign policy beliefs. This includes both their philosophical beliefs about the political universe as well as the tools to be utilized in achieving their goals. Based on their master beliefs (P-1, I-1, and P-4), their leadership types are also discussed in this chapter, together with their generic preference orderings in a strategic interaction game. These questions are answered according to five hypotheses, which are explained in detail in the next section.

The chapter is organized into three main parts. The first part includes the introduction of the hypotheses with specific discussions from the populist radical right and operational code analysis literature. The results of the operational code analysis are presented in the second section, where the master operational code beliefs of the individual EPRR leaders, as well as the average EPRR leader, are portrayed with several tables and figures. These tables and figures will help the reader to make a comparative analysis both among the EPRR leaders and between the EPRR leaders and the average world leader. Finally, in the third section, the hypotheses will be revisited with a discussion on whether or not the results support them. This chapter can be understood as a basis for the following two empirical

¹ A revised version of this chapter has been published as an original article in the *European Journal of International Relations* (see Özdamar & Ceydilek, 2019). In the published version, a similar sample was used, only omitting Boris Johnson and Nikolaos Michaloliakos. Also, the published version does not include the game-theoretical discussions that are presented in this chapter.

chapters, which will look at the EPRR leaders' P-1 and I-1 beliefs in much more detail.

5.1 Hypotheses

The EPRR leaders' belief systems work from a Manichean perspective, "in which there are only friends and foes. Opponents are not just people with different priorities and values; they are evil" (Mudde, 2004: 544). This evilness also leads the EPRR leaders to consider their opponents in the political struggle as illegitimate (Mudde, 2004: 553). Nativism, as one of the three main components of the EPRR parties (together with authoritarianism and populism), contributes to this Manichean outlook in the conduct of political affairs. The populist radical right establishes and maintains its thin-centered ideology upon the argument that they work for the benefit of the 'rightful' and 'true' members of the community at the expense of a variety of political Others.

For this reason, the EPRR leaders perceive political life as a much more conflictual arena, and this belief is valid for their foreign policy beliefs as well. Liang (2007: 8) argues that fear has an influential role for EPRR leaders and parties, deriving from multifaceted globalization, which is supposed to threaten national cultures. Moreover, the enemies of the nation do not function individually; they are "increasingly seen as part of global networks themselves, be it radical Islamist groups, US-Israeli conspiracies, or elitist Eurocrats" (Liang, 2007: 27).

In the European case, these stigmatized political Others include the Roma people, Jews, immigrants, and Muslims in domestic politics. In foreign policy discourse, the political Others also vary contextually and geographically, including the United States, Germany, the European Union, China, Turkey, Muslim countries, and terrorist groups. Therefore, the following is hypothesized:

Hypothesis 1: The EPRR leaders' foreign policy beliefs on the essential nature of political life, measured by the average of nine leaders' P-1 scores in the operational code construct, are more conflictual than the average of world leaders.

As an immediate consequence of their Manichean understanding of the political universe, Others in politics have significant importance in the historical development of events for the EPRR leaders. As Taggart (1996: 33) points out, populists “may not know who they are, but they know who they are not.” Their personal identification and expression are mostly through dichotomies with political Others, such as establishment parties, the EU, Eurocrats, the United States, Muslims, and immigrants. They pass the buck to these actors and blame them for the current ‘unwelcome’ situation at home and abroad. By extension of such attitudes, conspiracy theories are widely circulated by the EPRR leaders, leading them to call the Maastricht Treaty an “infamous Treaty of Troy” or to define the EU as a “Soviet Union of Europe as a nest of freemasons and Communist bankers” (Liang, 2007: 12). Despite having promised to change it if they take office, they do not attribute much of a role to themselves in terms of having control over the historical development of politics. Therefore, the second hypothesis is as follows:

Hypothesis 2: The EPRR leaders’ foreign policy beliefs on the Self’s control over history, measured by the average of nine leaders’ P-4 scores in the operational code construct, are lower than the average of world leaders.

Since the mid-20th century, cooperative strategies have dominated European politics as the European Union has evolved into being the most, and maybe the only, successful example of a supranational organization because of the significant level of sovereignty transfer from the member states (Sandholtz & Sweet, 1998). The cooperation that had started around a few economic issues deepened and broadened thanks to new fields of cooperation and integration in fiscal, legal, monetary, and political areas. However, as EU institutions widened their control over national decision-making and implementation institutions, a problem of a democratic deficit emerged (Meny & Surel, 2002; Benz & Papadopoulos, 2006). This democratic deficit can be considered as one of the main reasons for the rise of the populist radical right in Europe, as these parties and leaders stress the loss of their national sovereignty with a total or partial rejection of such supranational tools. Emphasizing the advantage of unilateral action in international relations as opposed to the EU’s multilateral attitude, the EPRR leaders offer solutions at the national level to many

problematic issues such as immigration, foreign aid, terrorism, and relations with Russia. Therefore, the third hypothesis is formulated as follows:

Hypothesis 3: The EPRR leaders' foreign policy beliefs about strategic orientation, measured by the average of nine leaders' I-1 scores in the operational code construct, are less cooperative than the average of world leaders.

According to Leites (1951, 1953), the Bolshevik cadres resembled an in-group in terms of their foreign policy belief systems because of their strict organizational structure and ideological loyalty. The literature on populism differs on this topic. It is true that despite all these differences, as Liang (2007: 27) points out, the populist radical right in Europe has "created a transnational network which is supported by a collective identity and international compatible ideologies" and that these movements' and leaders' "collective identity is perpetuated by a racial and a cultural community based on Greek, Roman and Christian civilizations." However, compared to conventional ideologies, the role played by such a transnational network is limited in terms of creating an in-group resemblance among the EPRR leaders.

As discussed in Chapter 2, there is great doubt about populism's ideological coherence, unlike ideologies such as Marxism or liberalism. Cas Mudde (2004: 544) defines populism as a "thin-centered ideology," which "can be easily combined with very different (thin and full) other ideologies, including communism, ecologism, nationalism or socialism." The concept itself is a difficult and slippery one (Taggart, 2000: 2). Laclau (1977: 143) has a similar approach, as he defines populism as "a concept both elusive and recurrent." This slippery, elusive, and thin-centered nature is because of populism's lack of the same level of intellectual refinement and consistency. For this reason, populism can be described through "a parasitic relationship with other concepts and ideologies" (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2014: 379).

Populism can have this parasitic relationship with a right or left ideology, as can be witnessed in the European case. On the left of the political spectrum, Podemos and Syriza have been the most successful examples recently, while the populist right is the dominant version in the rest of Europe. Moreover, apart from the left and right division of populism, the national contexts of each EPRR leader are different from

each other, which gives them different positions in the political spectrum. These leaders are not members of a centralized and homogeneous political organization, but only representatives of a particular category based on similar political developments across Europe. Therefore, populism does not have a strict organizational structure that can impose a top-down character, eventually accomplishing an “identity transformation” (George, 1969: 194). These leaders are all from different countries, with disparate cultural, historical, and biographical backgrounds. National, cultural, and geographical differences still matter, leading to substantial differences among these EPRR leaders. Therefore, the fourth hypothesis is as follows:

Hypothesis 4: As populism is a thin-centered ideology (Mudde, 2004), it is expected that EPRR leaders do not have a shared pattern in terms of their foreign policy beliefs as measured by operational code master beliefs (P-1, P-4, and I-1).

The fifth and final hypothesis aims at locating the EPRR leaders within the spectrum between realist and idealist strategic cultures. Even though the literature on populism argues that these parties and leaders are often isolationist and neglect developments outside of their national borders (Taggart, 2000: 121-122), they are also interested in foreign policy and international relations. Most basically, these leaders want to strengthen the national borders and the sense of integrity within these borders of the heartland. Therefore, foreign policy’s function should be “protecting sovereignty of the own state and the welfare of the own people” (Mudde, 2002: 177), corresponding to the fundamental elements of realist theory, namely security, sovereignty, and national interest (Morgenthau, 2006).

As Berezin (2009: 11) puts forward, “rightwing populism poses a challenge to prevailing social science and commonsense assumptions about transnationalism and cosmopolitanism,” including occasional rejections of neoliberalism, free-market culture, and the deepening/broadening of European integration. As EPRR leaders stress sovereignty as opposed to European integration, they offer a looser intergovernmental alliance instead of supranational arrangements under names such as “Europe of fatherlands” and “Europe of nations” (Balfour et al., 2016: 29). Concisely, the EPRR leaders aim at a return to the so-called ‘origins’ of international relations: the ‘good old days’ when nation-states used to act with full sovereignty in

the international arena to maximize their national interests only through unilateral instruments. This desire is best illustrated by these leaders' views of Russia. As Chrysogelos (2011: 17) argues, as opposed to a civilizational and liberal alliance with the US, populist radical right parties of Europe "promote a cozy relationship between the EU and Russia; play down issues of human rights and democracy; see Russia as a strategic asset for Europe, implying that it could replace the US as an ally; and highlight Russia's advantages, such as its energy sources." Therefore, human rights and democracy are norms that should be secondary to Russia's strategic importance, which can contribute to the national interest of European countries.

Operational code analysis also deals with the strategic cultures of the leaders, and it is capable of depicting their leanings towards one of these two strategic cultures. For instance, Walker and Schafer (2007) investigated Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson's operational codes to find out which strategic culture they resembled. Specifically, the scores for P-1 and I-1 can be interpreted for such an end. While lower P-1 and I-1 scores enable the researcher to position the leader closer to the realist camp, higher scores will be explained in line with idealism. Therefore, the final hypothesis is as follows:

Hypothesis 5: As realists, EPRR leaders are expected to perceive the political universe as more conflictual (P-1) and choose less cooperative instruments to achieve their political goals (I-1).

5.2 Results: Where to Locate the EPRR Leaders?

Table 6 presents the scores for each leader's P-1, I-1, and P-4 master beliefs together with the group mean for each score, the norming group's scores, and statistical significance levels. Appendix B contains this information for the remaining operational code beliefs. Results and conclusions about the hypotheses regarding P-1, I-1, and P-4 are discussed below.

The EPRR leaders have diverse scores for the first master belief, i.e., how they perceive the nature of political life. Orbán (P-1=0.413), Petry (P-1=0.348), and Hofer's (P-1=0.643) P-1 scores present a friendlier political universe than those of

the rest of the EPRR leaders, as well as the average of world leaders ($P-1=0.301$). The other six EPRR leaders have lower $P-1$ scores, meaning that their scores for the nature of the political universe are more hostile than those of the world leaders' norming group. The $P-1$ results of Le Pen ($P-1=0.068$), Orbán ($P-1=0.413$), Wilders ($P-1=0.063$), Farage ($P-1=0.178$), Åkesson ($P-1=0.044$), and Michaloliakos ($P-1=0.009$) are significantly lower than the average of world leaders. These lower scores mean that they perceive a significantly more conflictual political world than the other EPRR leaders and the world norming group. Johnson ($P-1=0.279$) also perceives a conflictual world, but his result is not statistically significant. The mean of the $P-1$ variable for the nine leaders ($P-1=0.213$) is lower than the average world leaders' mean ($P-1 = 0.301$) and this difference is statistically significant. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is confirmed: The EPRR leaders' foreign policy beliefs on the essential nature of political life are more conflictual than those of the average world leader.

Second, except for Michaloliakos ($P-4a=0.09$), all EPRR leaders' scores for historical control are higher than the norming group's average ($P-4a= 0.224$), contrary to expectations. It was hypothesized that as populist leaders have a Manichean discourse splitting us vs. them, the people vs. the elite, and we vs. Other, blaming the latter for all problems, they would attribute historical control to the political Other. Contrary to these expectations, populist leaders show a different picture in terms of $P-4$ scores. Only Greece's Michaloliakos conforms to Hypothesis 2. Hofer ($P-4a=0.578$), Wilders ($P-4a=0.277$), Orbán ($P-4a=0.538$), Åkesson ($P-4a=0.463$), and Petry ($P-4a=0.326$) positively differ from the norming group with statistical significance. Le Pen ($P-4a=0.273$), Farage ($P-4a=0.266$), and Johnson's ($P-4a= 0.276$) scores also represent a higher sense of historical control, but without any statistical significance. The mean $P-4a$ score for the nine EPRR leaders is also significantly higher than that of the average world leaders ($P-4a=0.338$), meaning that, on average, they have a higher sense of historical control. Therefore, the second hypothesis predicting a lower sense of control for the EPRR leaders is rejected; only one leader has a significantly lower $P4$ score compared to the norming group, and the mean for these nine leaders is significantly higher than the norming group's score.

In terms of strategic orientation measured by $I-1$ scores, the EPRR leaders show a mixed picture. Only the leader of Golden Dawn, Michaloliakos ($I-1=-0.083$), is less

cooperative than the norming group with statistical significance ($p < 0.001$). Le Pen ($I-1 = 0.193$), Wilders ($I-1 = 0.27$), and Petry ($I-1 = 0.274$) also have lower $I-1$ scores, showing that their strategic orientations are less cooperative than that of the average world leader ($I-1 = 0.401$); however, their scores are not statistically significant. All other EPRR leaders have higher $I-1$ scores, signaling a more or less cooperative approach to foreign policy instruments, but without statistical significance, except for Hofer ($I-1 = 0.81$), who is significantly more cooperative ($p = 0.018$). The mean for the $I-1$ scores of the nine EPRR leaders is 0.385, which is slightly lower than that of the average world leaders. The third hypothesis, by which it is expected to observe a less cooperative approach in fulfilling their specific political goals, is thus rejected in a statistical significance test. However, when the EPRR leaders are grouped into two clusters according to their $I-1$ scores, either below or above the norming group score independently of the statistical significance, it is observed that the group with lower $I-1$ scores differs from the norming group with higher statistical significance than the group with higher $I-1$ scores (Table 7). This analysis, based on two clusters, demonstrates divisions among the EPRR politicians that could serve as a topic for future research.

Two figures (Figure 3 and Figure 4) below locate the EPRR leaders' Self and Other images on a Cartesian coordinate system in which the horizontal axis corresponds to the $P-4$ score, varying from 0 to 1, and the vertical axes correspond to $P-1$ and $I-1$ scores, ranging from -1 to 1. Respectively, the intersection of $I-1$ and $P-4a$ scores provides the Self image of the leader, while the intersection of $P-1$ and $P-4b$ scores provides the Other image. Each quadrant shows a leadership typology, as summarized in Figure 2.

Table 6: P-1, P-4 and I-1 Scores of the EPRR Leaders Compared to Norming Group's Scores

		Norming group n=164	Marine Le Pen n=10	Viktor Orbán n=26	Geert Wilders n=20	Nigel Farage n=21	Boris Johnson n=8	Jimmie Åkesson n=6	Frauke Petry n=7	Norbert Hofer n=5	Nikolaos Michaloliakos n=13	Average n=116
P-1	Nature of political universe (conflict/cooperation)	0.301	0.068** (0.0071)	0.413* (0.027)	0.063*** (0.0002)	0.178* (0.032)	0.279 (0.4155)	0.044* (0.0175)	0.348 (0.333)	0.643** (0.0044)	0.009*** (0.0003)	0.213** (0.00725)
P-4	Historical development (low control/high control)	0.224	0.273 (0.1179)	0.538*** (0.000)	0.277* (0.04705)	0.266 (0.094)	0.276 (0.1305)	0.463*** (0.000)	0.326* (0.02)	0.578*** (0.000)	0.09*** (0.00015)	0.338*** (0.000)
I-1	Strategic approach to goals (conflict/cooperation)	0.401	0.193 (0.0664)	0.518 (0.092)	0.27 (0.09715)	0.481 (0.218)	0.559 (0.1524)	0.503 (0.2833)	0.274 (0.22)	0.81* (0.018)	-0.083*** (0.00075)	0.385 (0.37635)

a. The p-values are given within parentheses under each score, calculated via two-sample t-test. Means and standard deviations for the norming group are taken from Akan Malici.

b. Statistically significant differences from norming group are at the following levels (one-tailed test):

***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05

Table 7: Comparison of the EPRR Leaders with Higher and Lower I-1 Scores

		Norming group	Leaders with higher I-1 score	Leaders with lower I-1 score
		n=164	n=66	n=50
I-1	Strategic approach to goals (conflict/cooperation)	0.401	0.531* (0.0161)	0.179** (0.0011)
a. The p-values are given within parentheses under each score, calculated via two-sample t-test. Means and standard deviations for the norming group are taken from Akan Malici.				
b. Statistically significant differences from norming group are at the following levels (one-tailed test):				
		***p<0.001	**p<0.01	*p<0.05




Figure 3: EPRR Leaders' Scores for Self Based on Their I-1 and P-4a Scores




Figure 4: EPRR Leaders' Scores for Other Based on Their P-1 and P-4b Scores

There are several conclusions to be drawn from these figures. Except for Orbán, Hofer, and Michaloliakos, the Self perceptions of all other EPRR leaders are Type A, meaning that they believe that conflict is temporary in the political universe, the future is predictable, and control over the future is possible. Orbán and Hofer's scores for Self place them into Type C, which suggests that these leaders also consider conflict as temporary. Therefore, only Michaloliakos' Self image is located in the lower part of the coordinate system, showing that his Self image is an example of a Type DEF leader. This overall picture shows that eight out of these nine EPRR leaders refrain from utilizing coercive tools in achieving their foreign policy goals. Instead, they prefer tools that can be considered as cooperative.

Except for Orbán and Hofer, the Other images of all other EPRR leaders are located in the Type C quadrant of the system. Orbán and Hofer's Other images are also positioned in the Type A quadrant. Therefore, none of the EPRR leaders are located in the lower half of the Cartesian system, as none of them have negative scores for P-1. It can be thus concluded that none of the EPRR leaders perceives the political universe as conflictual, while they believe that the Other is highly able to control historical developments. Also, the mean of all EPRR leaders placed the Self image in the Type A quadrant and the Other image in the Type C quadrant.

Once the origin point is shifted from 0.5;0 to the norming group's values, the updated figure can provide a better picture for understanding the relative positions of Other and Self images of the EPRR leaders in comparison with the average world leader. The average world leader scores are used as the origin in the following figures, and the scores for each leader are transformed into distances above or below their respective norming group scores, which allows us to make a comparative analysis of the leaders. The figures below illustrate the positions of the EPRR leaders and their averages in terms of their master beliefs.




Figure 5: Self's Location from the Norming Group Mean

As Figure 5 shows, the Self images of Hofer, Johnson, Åkesson, Orbán, and Farage reflect Type C leadership, while Wilders, Petry, and Le Pen's Self images are Type B. Michaloliakos' position in the Type DEF quadrant is more explicit in this transformed figure. The upper quadrants represent a more cooperative approach in world politics, while the lower quadrants are associated with a more conflictual outlook in political affairs relative to the norming group. Accordingly, while five out of the nine EPRR leaders' Self images and strategic orientations are more inclined towards cooperative strategies, analysis of Wilders, Petry, Le Pen, and Michaloliakos reveals a more conflictual strategic outlook. The average location of all nine leaders is in the lower right quadrant associated with Type B.

Similarly, in Figure 6, with the revised origin, it is observed that Johnson, Farage, Wilders, Åkesson, and Le Pen's Other images are more hostile than the average world leader's Other image in foreign policy. In other words, these leaders perceive a hostile political universe and DEF type leadership for Others. Michaloliakos perceives an even more hostile political universe and Type B leadership from Others. Figure 6 shows that Hofer, Orbán, and Petry's Other images are relatively friendly, located in the upper left quadrant associated with Type A. The average of all nine EPRR leaders is located in the Type DEF quadrant.




Figure 6: Other's Location from the Norming Group Mean

In these two figures, it is observed that there are two clusters below and above the horizontal axis, i.e., according to I-1 and P-1 scores. While for the I-1 scores, Farage, Johnson, Åkesson, Hofer, and Orbán have higher, more cooperative scores than the norming group, Wilders, Le Pen, Petry, and Michaloliakos' scores are lower, hence subscribing to less cooperative instruments. In other words, the EPRR leaders are fairly

divided in terms of their instrumental approaches. Similarly, in terms of P-1 scores, the EPRR leaders are dispersed across several clusters instead of clustering in one quadrant. Hofer, Orbán, and Petry perceive the political universe as more friendly; Åkesson, Johnson, Farage, Le Pen, Wilders, and Michaloliakos have lower P-1 scores, meaning that they consider the Other in the political universe as more conflictual. As opposed to such diversity in P-1 and I-1 scores, it is possible to observe a shared pattern according to the P-4 scores. All the EPRR leaders, except Michaloliakos, have higher P-4a scores, which means that these leaders have a belief that they are the ones with control over historical development rather than the political Other.

These results help us to see that illustration of a strictly shared pattern in terms of the EPRR leaders' foreign policy beliefs is difficult, fundamentally confirming the fourth hypothesis. The EPRR leaders' foreign policy beliefs vary widely, as best illustrated by the diametrically opposite positions of Michaloliakos and Hofer and the others scattered in between, at different points in the analytical space. The next chapter will discuss this issue in more detail and will argue that temporal vs. geopolitical othering differentiation is at the heart of these dispersed and even conflicting positions. A higher sense of historical control (P-4a) is the only pattern among the EPRR leaders in terms of their foreign policy beliefs, except for Michaloliakos. Therefore, defined as a "thin-centered ideology" (Mudde, 2004: 543; Pauwels, 2014: 18), the populist radical right lacks a shared pattern in its foreign policy beliefs, as well.

Regarding the final hypothesis, it is expected that the EPRR leaders exhibit a leadership style consistent with a realist strategic culture. In line with the belief system typology of Holsti (1977) and Walker (1983), leaders of an idealist strategic culture would be Type A and Type C leaders with higher P-1 and I-1 scores and a leadership style of erratic, pragmatic, or dogmatic cooperation. However, leaders with a realist strategic culture are expected to be Type B and Type DEF leaders with lower P-1 and I-1 scores and a leadership style of erratic, pragmatic, or dogmatic conflict (Walker, Malici, & Schafer 2011). The horizontal lines in Figures 3 and 4 can be considered as demarcation lines between idealist and realist strategic cultures (Walker & Schafer, 2007). Then, it is

possible to make the following inferences in Table 8 about each leader's leadership style and corresponding strategic orientation.

Table 8: Leadership Styles and Game Strategies from TIP Propositions

Prop. 1. Erratic Cooperation (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (+, <): Appeasement Strategy.
Prop. 2. Pragmatic Cooperation (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (+, =): Assurance Strategy.
Prop. 3. Dogmatic Cooperation (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (+, >): Stag Hunt Strategy.
Prop. 4. Erratic Conflict (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (−, <): Chicken Strategy.
Prop. 5. Pragmatic Conflict (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (−, =): Prisoner's Dilemma Strategy.
Prop. 6. Dogmatic Conflict (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (−, >): Bully Strategy.
The TIP propositions and game strategies above are taken from Table 3. Names of leadership styles are taken from Walker, Malici, and Schafer (2011: 77). The symbols (+ and −) in these propositions represent the deviations in VICS index scores of the I-1 and P-I indices above (+) and below (−) the mean in Table 6 for the norming group of world leaders. The symbols (> and <) represent the VICS scores of the P-4a and P-4b indices above (>) or below (<) the standard deviation for the norming group while the symbol (=) represents VICS scores less than one standard deviation above or below the P-4 mean indices for the norming group in Table 6.

For P-1 (Other) and I-1 (Self) scores regarding cooperation or conflict strategies, a researcher analyzes whether these scores for an individual leader are below (−) or above (+) the norming group's mean score. For P-4a (Self) and P-4b (Other) historical control scores, there are three options: A leader's score can be one standard deviation below (<) or above (>) the norming group's P-4 scores, or it can be within (=) one standard deviation. For example, if a leader's I-1 score is negative (−) and his P-4a score is at least one standard deviation below (<) the norming group's P-4a score, it is inferred that his approach to strategy is conflictual and the leader attributes less historical control to Self than to Other. Then the corresponding inference from the TIP is that the leader's ranked order of outcome preferences for Self is Dominate>Settle>Submit>Deadlock, which is the strategy associated with the game of chicken in game theory. This outcome preference ranking is Proposition 4 in Table 8 above, which also contains the remaining propositions in the TIP.

Based on these results and the typology in Table 8 of leadership styles and strategies associated with idealist and realist strategic culture, Table 9 shows that six out of nine leaders (Le Pen, Wilders, Farage, Johnson, Åkesson, and Michaloliakos) are represented by conflictual leadership styles and strategies attributed to Other. Four out of nine leaders (Le Pen, Wilders, Petry, and Michaloliakos) in Table 9 are also part of the realist strategic culture with conflictual leadership styles and strategies attributed to Self. Although there is no widely shared pattern of leadership among these leaders, the average scores of these nine leaders identify them as located, on average, in a prisoner's dilemma game in Table 19 with leadership styles and strategies of pragmatic conflict attributed to Self and Other from Table 8. Therefore, the final hypothesis is largely confirmed: The EPRR leaders, as a whole, see a conflictual political universe and are strategically less cooperative in their strategies than the average world leader in the norming group.

Table 9: Leadership Types of EPRR Leaders Based on Their Master Beliefs

Leader	I-1, P-4a (Self)	Style	P-1, P-4b (Other)	Style
Marine Le Pen	– , =	Prag. Conf.	– , =	Prag. Conf.
Viktor Orbán	+ , >	Dog. Coop.	+ , <	Err. Coop.
Geert Wilders	– , =	Prag. Conf.	– , =	Prag. Conf.
Nigel Farage	+ , =	Prag. Coop.	– , =	Prag. Conf.
Boris Johnson	+ , =	Prag. Coop.	– , =	Prag. Conf.
Jimmie Åkesson	+ , >	Dog. Coop.	– , <	Err. Conf.
Frauke Petry	– , =	Prag. Conf.	+ , =	Prag. Coop.
Norbert Hofer	+ , >	Dog. Coop.	+ , <	Err. Coop.
N. Michaloliakos	– , <	Err. Conf.	– , >	Dog. Conf.
Average	– , =	Prag. Conf.	– , =	Prag. Conf.

5.3 Discussion

Unlike other ideologies such as Marxism or liberalism, the results have shown that populism lacks an institutional and centralized structure that could play a shared identity formation role among the proponents of the ideology. Leites (1951, 1953) was able to find a shared operational code pattern among Bolshevik cadres since the fundamental

tenets of Bolshevism were strict and implemented in a top-down structure. However, neither populism nor the populist radical right seems to have a ‘handbook.’ Apart from specific shared characteristics such as nativism and authoritarianism, radical right populism does not necessarily lead to commonalities among leaders in foreign policy beliefs. Such disparity can be understood better when the characteristics of Other in EPRR leaders’ discourses is investigated in more detail, which can be found in the following chapter. Several attempts by these leaders and parties to meet to form a European network of radical right populism have occurred, such as in Vienna in 2005 or Koblenz in 2017. It is also a fact that they are motivated to create a Europe-wide synergy in which they find potential for electoral success. However, this chapter concludes that EPRR leaders, despite all these efforts, do not share a pattern of foreign policy perceptions and tools. This conclusion shows that populism as a thin-centered ideology has a limited influence on the foreign policy beliefs of the EPRR leaders.

This point is best illustrated by the foreign policy beliefs of Norbert Hofer and Nikolaos Michaloliakos, as they represent entirely different leadership profiles. Hofer’s scores represent a more friendly and cooperative approach than the average of world leaders. His leadership style is defined as dogmatic cooperation with a firmer belief in historical control than the average world leader, which makes him prone to exploit rather than reciprocate cooperation from others who pursue an erratic strategy for cooperation in his worldview. Nikolaos Michaloliakos, the leader of Golden Dawn in Greece, represents significantly lower P-1 and I-1 scores, showing that his foreign policy attributions are more conflictual and less cooperative than the norming group. His lower belief in historical control than the norming group of world leaders makes him attribute to Self an erratic conflictual leadership style prone to bluffing while his worldview attributes a leadership style of dogmatic conflict and a bully strategy to Other. Five of the leaders do not attribute a consistent pattern between Self and Other while the other four leaders do. Within the scope of this chapter, it is concluded that the EPRR leaders conform to the “thin-centered” characteristic in foreign policy as well.

Implications of these results and their strategic consequences for European politics are illustrative. Operational code analysis studies also allow the depiction of foreign policy decision-makers' subjective preference orderings for the political outcomes between Self and Other in terms of settlement, submission, domination, and deadlock. These preference orderings are then placed within a game-theoretic analysis to predict a leader's behavior. Based on the "Expanded Theory of Inferences about Preferences" (see Table 8), both Self and Other have the same preference ordering for the average EPRR leader, which is Dominate>Settle>Deadlock>Submit. The intersection of this preference ordering attributed to both Self and Other constructs the prisoner's dilemma game, in which Self and Other each prefer domination as the highest-ranked outcome (4), followed in order by settlement (3), deadlock (2), and submission (1). This game is shown in Table 10 and has deadlock as the rational solution for both players in a single play of the game.

Table 10: Average EPRR Leader's Prisoner's Dilemma Game

	CO	<u>CF</u>
CO	3,3	1,4
<u>CF</u>	4,1	2,2*

Self's choices are rows, and the Other's are columns. Outcomes for Self and Other in each cell are ranked from the highest (4) to the lowest (1) for each player. Nash myopic equilibria are asterisked. Brams' non-myopic equilibria are in bold. Dominant strategies are underlined. CO = Cooperation; CF= Conflict.

If played with simultaneous moves by Self and Other, this game has no cooperative solution as a stable equilibrium. If the initial state is deadlock (2,2) with sequential moves by Self and Other, then there is also no cooperative solution for the game. If the initial state is either dominate (4,1) or submit (1,4), and if the player with the lower-ranked outcome communicates with the other actor before the game, threatening to move to deadlock (2,2), then settlement (3,3) emerges as a solution in repeated plays of the game. Also, if the initial state of play is settlement (3,3) and the game is iterative (repeatedly played), then settlement is a stable equilibrium solution. The condition of repeated play is necessary for (3,3) to be a stable equilibrium, because repeated play and

pre-play communication between the players provides each player with “threat power,” or the ability to credibly threaten to move from (1,4) or (4,1) to (2,2) in the event that the other player defects from (3,3) (see Brams, 1994: 121-130).

Therefore, it is concluded that despite the difficulty in finding a shared pattern, the mean scores of the nine EPRR leaders’ operational codes could create a certain level of concern. This concern is well-founded, as illustrated by the subjective game of the average EPRR leader between Self and Other. Once they take office, EPRR leaders in Europe have the potential to play a prisoner’s dilemma game in the international arena, which represents a mutually suspicious setting in which a rational alternative is to defect and not cooperate in the absence of a credible threat of punishment by others.

5.4 Conclusion

Most importantly, this chapter concludes that the thin-centered characteristic of populist ideology is correct, as the populist radical right does not lead to a unified pattern of a foreign policy belief system. Second, there are certainly some EPRR leaders with more conflictual foreign policy beliefs compared to the average world leaders, especially in terms of their beliefs about the nature of the political universe. Also, the mean scores of the nine EPRR leaders represent a more conflictual leader profile.

The following two chapters aim at analyzing the Other and Self perceptions of the EPRR leaders at a deeper level and qualitatively elaborating on the quantitative results of this chapter. In the next chapter, who the Other is for the EPRR leaders and how the EPRR leaders consider these political Others (conflictual or cooperative) will be discussed. In the following chapter, the instruments to be utilized by the EPRR leaders in foreign policymaking will be discussed with particular attention to the underlying reasons for their not-necessarily-conflictual foreign policy instruments.

CHAPTER VI: RETURN OF GEOPOLITICAL OTHERS TO EUROPE: EPRR LEADERS AS AN OUTCOME AND TRIGGER OF THIS RETURN

The end of the Cold War is a turning point for almost all aspects of international relations, and Europe is not an exception to this. The period after the fall of the Berlin Wall has often been described as a ‘return to geopolitics’ in the old continent, which has come with the replacement of the self-reflexive ‘temporal Other’ (Europe’s own past) with geographical and cultural Others. EPRR leaders can be considered as an outcome of this transition but also as its trigger. Operational code analysis and specifically the P-1 master belief could provide valuable insight into understanding how EPRR leaders perceive the political universe, i.e., the other actors.

As discussed in the previous chapter, P-1 in operational code analysis is one of the master beliefs measuring how conflictual or how cooperative the political universe is. To sum up the P-1 scores of the EPRR leaders, there are diverse views among these leaders in terms of the first master belief, i.e., how leaders view the nature of political life. Orbán (P-1=0.413), Petry (P-1=0.348), and Hofer’s (P-1=0.643) P-1 scores present a friendlier political universe than those of the rest of the EPRR leaders as well as the average of world leaders (P-1=0.301). The other six EPRR leaders have lower P-1 scores, meaning that their scores for the nature of the political universe are more hostile than the world leaders’ norming group. Le Pen (P-1=0.068), Orbán (P-1=0.413), Wilders (P-1=0.063), Farage (P-1=0.178), Åkesson (P-1=0.044), and Michaloliakos’ (P-1=0.009) philosophical belief results are significantly lower than the average world leader’s. This

means that they perceive a significantly more conflictual political world than the other EPRR leaders and the world norming group. Johnson ($P=0.279$) also sees a conflictual world, but his result does not reach statistical significance. The mean of the P-1 variable for the nine leaders ($P=0.213$) is lower than the average world leaders' mean ($P=0.301$) and this is statistically significant.

Based on the quantitative results of the previous chapter, this chapter presents a discussion on how EPRR leaders consider the 'Other' (conflictual or cooperative) in the foreign policy environment. In the first section, a detailed answer will be given to the question of who the Others are for these EPRR leaders. Appealing to the literature on the European integration, this chapter will conclude with a discussion that the EPRR leaders can be considered as both a sign and a trigger of the "return of geopolitics to Europe" (Guzzini, 2012). This discussion will be presented through the "temporal" vs. "cultural and geopolitical" othering division of Thomas Diez (2004), in which the majority of the EPRR leaders are proponents of "cultural and geopolitical" othering with examples of Islam, Turkey, immigrants, refugees, etc. In this final section, the positions of EPRR leaders in comparison to the average world leader will be discussed with specific references to the literature on the populist radical right in Europe. A potential correlation will be presented between (i) the dominance of Others originating from the nativism component of the populist radical right and (ii) having a more conflictual belief about the political universe.

6.1 Who Are the 'Others' for EPRR Leaders?

6.1.1 Geert Wilders: Islam and the Appeasers

There is no clash of civilizations but a clash between our civilization and barbarity (Wilders, 2015h).

Table 11: Comparison of Wilders' P-1 Score to the Norming Group and the Average of EPRR Leaders

	Norming group n=164	Geert Wilders n=20	Average EPRR n=116
P-1 Nature of political universe (conflict/cooperation)	0.301	0.063	0.213

Geert Wilders' party PVV is a one-man-band: The only official party member is Geert Wilders, and the party is dependent on his charisma. PVV has also had one of the best electoral successes among the EPRR parties, with a vote share of over 13 percent in the general elections of March 2017. According to Vossen (2016: 65-110), the following four pillars can help to understand Wilders' political thinking:

- Understanding Islam not as a religion but as a political ideology that is bringing and will continue to bring terrorism and totalitarianism to the European continent;
- Populism in the sense of a total critique of the political elite;
- Nativism or nationalism, which is the basis of his anti-EU position;
- Law and order.

Based on 20 speeches, interviews, and articles by Geert Wilders, the Others shaping his foreign policy beliefs can be grouped into two clear-cut categories. The first has its roots in the nativism component of the populist radical right and is linked with Wilders' extreme antipathy towards the religion of Islam. Within this category, different Others arise depending on their level of fanaticism, from ISIS to European jihadis, from the Islamic culture to the Islamic population in Europe, etc. There are also national groups within this general category of Islam, especially the Turks and Moroccans living in the Netherlands. Predominantly Muslim-populated states can also be placed in this category, namely Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iran, and Pakistan, each for different reasons, which will be discussed below. The Self defended by Wilders (2015c) as opposed to these Others comes into existence as "our Western culture based on Christianity, Judaism and humanism," including European and North American countries, as well as the state of Israel

For Wilders (2015b), Islam is an existential threat against the “free West” and the Judeo-Christian and humanist civilization in Europe, America, and Israel. Islam, defined as the “sick ideology of Allah and Mohammad,” is a Trojan horse conquering the world. It is an ideology of tyranny, intolerance, hatred, and violence, causing terror and misery in the free West. As a political leader who gives a significant level of importance to the transnational cooperation of the “true patriots” in the Western world, Wilders bases his arguments on a mostly civilizational discourse. He explicitly and repeatedly says that “our civilization is far superior to any other civilization on earth,” including the foreign and barbaric Islamic culture, and hence “immigrants have to adopt our values,” not vice versa (Wilders, 2014c).

Talking about the current “Islamic invasion” of the West, he continually refers to the past and especially to the year of 1683, when the Europeans stopped the Ottoman Empire’s penetration into the European continent at the gates of Vienna. What Wilders (2015c) concludes through this reference is a spirit of “we can do it again!”

Wilders draws another historical reference between the totalitarian ideology of Islam/the Islamic State and the totalitarian regimes of the past, including Nazi and Soviet rules. One function of this historical reference is to show that the fact that it is only a small minority of Muslims committing these terrorist attacks cannot be a justification for the ideology as a whole. For Wilders (2015f), in Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union, it was again only a minority committing the crimes, but the majority was allowing it to happen. Another reason for this reference is the anti-Semitism of the Islamic State, whose sympathizers paraded in the city of The Hague and shouted “death to the Jews” in the very heart of the Netherlands (Wilders, 2014a).

While acknowledging the right of immigrants to reside in the Netherlands as long as they fully assimilate into the Dutch society and way of living, Wilders often links immigrants with illegality, violence, crime, robberies, and jihad. Moroccans and Turks living in the Netherlands are the nationalities regularly referred to by Wilders. In almost all of his texts, Wilders mentions surveys conducted with Muslim populations in the

Netherlands or other European countries. These surveys show that a majority of them approve of violence against a Christian, consider the jihadis in Syria heroes, or endorse the violence by Hamas against Israel, which is the West's "ally and the only democracy in the Middle East" (Wilders, 2014c).

At the state level, Wilders rarely targets other states. In those rare cases, he either says that the Netherlands is not Pakistan, to stress the difference and superiority of Dutch culture, or he associates some of the Muslim-populated suburbs in the Netherlands with the cities of Muslim-populated countries to signal the level of Islamic transformation. In some other cases, Wilders points out that ultra-rich Arab states such as Qatar do nothing to accommodate refugees and only welcomed 46 of them. Also, he mentions Iran, which should never be trusted, as an Islamic criminal regime threatening the security of Israel and the entire West. Finally, in an article on the website of Breitbart London, a far-right news website, Wilders (2016d) openly proposed to "dump Turkey" out of Europe and out of NATO, as Turkey is a Trojan Horse within the Western alliance. His sharp stance regarding Turkey is not surprising given the fact that he left his previous political party (VVD) in 2004 as a result of a political conflict regarding Turkey's future membership in the European Union.

The second group of Others in Wilders' texts originates from the populism component of the populist radical right and targets the political elites at national, continental, and global levels. Linked with the first group of Others, these political elites are the ones implementing the wrong policies in the fight against immigration and terrorism and the ones oppressing the voice of the 'true' patriots in the name of political correctness. At the national level, they include the Dutch cabinet and the Prime Minister. At the European level, they include Brussels, Eurocrats, and the political leaders of the establishment, namely David Cameron and Angela Merkel, and at the global level former American president Barack Obama.

According to Wilders (2015i), while politicians act via "dark instincts and unjustified fears," the rising politicians within the Patriotic Spring are the voice of the ordinary

people and operate via rational choices. Instead of taking necessary measures to fight against the Islamization of the West, authorities do nothing and fail their duty. Moreover, they accuse the patriotic voices in society of hate speech and take them to court. In this respect, they are betrayers and hypocrites, preventing patriots from defending freedom.

As a follow-up to the abovementioned historical reference to the Nazi era, Wilders consistently labels political leaders as appeasers. These leaders foolishly appease Islam's invasion of Western civilization, making concessions in the name of multiculturalism. These politicians are "selling out their nation, ignoring the wishes of its citizens, and acting like politically correct appeasers and cowards" (Wilders, 2016a). Wilders' typical examples are Barack Obama, Angela Merkel, David Cameron, and Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte. They are acting in the same way the European leaders did in the 1930s against Hitler, which makes them cowardly and foolish, according to Wilders.

Several other 'Others' in Wilders' texts correspond to the European Union, including Brussels, the EU elite, and Eurocrats. The European Union, for Wilders, "is robbing us of our national identities, our nation-states" (Wilders, 2015g), and it also prevents the Europeans from benefiting from a real democracy with its "fake parliaments":

People are sick and tired of seeing their nations lose. They are fed up with how the political and media elites are weakening their country. They want to regain their national sovereignty from supranational organizations such as the European Union. They want to get rid of the fake parliaments that sell out the national interests because they no longer stand for what the majority of the people want. They want brave and patriot politicians in the legislatures. They also want more direct democracy, so that the people can correct those who misrepresent them (Wilders, 2016a).

Switzerland is a perfect model for Wilders, which is a truly European state being able to stay outside of the European Union and hence being fully sovereign and able to control its national borders. Switzerland is also a perfect example of direct democracy with regular binding referendums, proving that "the Swiss never sold out their interests to Brussels" (Wilders, 2015i). The title of the PVV's electoral manifesto in 2012 is self-explanatory for Wilders' opposition to the EU: "Their Brussels, our Netherlands."

To summarize, Geert Wilders is the embodiment of what Diez means by the return of geopolitics to Europe. Wilders (2016a) directly criticizes the period in Europe when Europe’s own past became the primary Other of European identity with these words:

For decades, Westerners have been told by their elites that multiculturalism was a virtue and patriotism a thing of the past. The values of the middle classes with their common sense, rooted in the traditions and morals passed down by their parents, were undermined and ridiculed by the mindless political correctness of the educational system, the government apparatus, and the mainstream media. The economic prosperity of the people was squandered by high taxes, foolish monetary experiments, and bailouts for foreign countries. “Our nation first” became “our nation last” .

On the other hand, what is proposed by Wilders is a geopolitical framework that portrays Islam as an existential threat to Western freedoms and Judeo-Christian civilization. Islam is also a threat to the Atlantic partnership between the United States and Western Europe. Defining this as a matter of survival, Wilders (2016c) argues that

It is our duty to limit this threat. It is our mission as patriots to protect our nations. The first measure we must take to stop Islam, reduce the risk of terrorism and save our civilization, is to stop all immigration from Islamic countries.

6.1.2 Viktor Orbán: The End of Liberal Non-democracy and the Protector of the ‘Realm’

Europe seems like an old woman who is shaking her head in shock reading the threatening news—but at the same time she forgets to close the door of her house (Orbán, 2016g).

Table 12: Comparison of Orbán’s P-1 Score to the Norming Group and the Average of EPRR Leaders

	Norming group n=164	Viktor Orbán n=26	Average EPRR n=116
P-1 Nature of political universe (conflict/cooperation)	0.301	0.413	0.213

As the only head of state among the EPRR leaders analyzed in this study, Viktor Orbán has a unique chance to speak in the name of his country and his people. However,

bureaucratic limitations and the common courtesy of diplomatic relations have a significant level of influence on the content and the tune of Orbán's speeches.

The most prominent Other in Orbán's foreign policy speeches is the invisible coalition of "liberal non-democracy," consisting of the Brussels elites and international civil society. Although he rejects the label of 'populist,' populist elements are easily tracked in his speeches, and a "democratic counter-revolution" launched by the people against "liberal non-democracy" is the cornerstone of his political thinking (Orbán, 2016u).

Brussels is the constant reference made by Orbán in his speeches at national and European levels: It is a hub of "chaos" and "disorder," attacking the member states to make them implement policies that are not desired or approved of by the people. A value-oriented foreign policy is an example of such efforts of dictation, against which Orbán supports a pragmatic foreign policy. He repeatedly says that the "European Union is not Brussels," but it is Bratislava, Bucharest, Budapest, Paris, Warsaw, etc., to stress the necessity of a transfer of power from the Eurocrats to the free nations (Orbán, 2016s).

For Orbán (2016i), the fundamental threat to Europe's future is not the migrants who want to come to the continent; the real danger originates from "Brussels' fanatics of internationalism" who place themselves "above the law" and who dictate to the European nations "the bitter fruit of its cosmopolitan immigration policy." Brussels is not alone in this regard, and other components of the coalition of liberal non-democracy, such as international civil society and global media, also promote the same sick ideals, according to Orbán. Non-governmental organizations working for the benefit of immigrants and refugees are ignominiously called "implacable human rights warriors" (Orbán, 2016i) by Orbán as they are allegedly supporting a world without borders and claim that movement across borders is an unconditional human right. George Soros and his Open Society Foundation are the usual suspects in the same manner (Orbán, 2016o). In the latest US presidential elections, the support of Hillary Clinton for international civil society was a factor for Orbán's position in favor of Trump (Orbán, 2016u).

In a way, Orbán's populist opposition to liberal non-democracy is an effort to create another temporal Other: He refers to recent European politics as a turning "back to the reality" from an era of political correctness that proposes a gray and uniform approach to all questions. It is a transition from the arrogant idea of educating the ignorant middle class to accepting them as they are and caring for the views of "real people." Although there are Others in Orbán's foreign policy discourse originating from his nativist/nationalist stance, which will be discussed below, the invisible international coalition of "liberal non-democracy" is more dominant, and it shows the prominence of the populism component over the nativism/nationalism component in the case of Orbán.

Orbán's position vis-a-vis Europe is ambivalent and at the same time strategic: Orbán, on the one hand, is proud of being a member of the European Union, which is a community of free and Christian nations. He repeats that Europe is currently "rich but weak" (Orbán, 2016m) and proposes several changes in the ideological, political, and economic positioning of Europe in the 21st-century world. In other words, he does not only consider Hungary a proud member of the EU but also claims agency in the reshaping of European politics. When Orbán wears his European costume, the rest of the world, namely the US, China, Russia, and Turkey, who have increased their power capabilities relative to European power, emerges as an Other in his foreign policy:

We are continually losing importance, and we are declining in numbers in comparison to the total world population and also in comparison to the earlier Europe. Our share in world trade and the global GDP continues to decline. In our European democracy and our economic and social system more and more people lose their European self-confidence because they see that those who set up their economy and society differently than we do are more successful in ever growing numbers than we are (Orbán, 2012).

On the other hand, several subgroups within the EU are constant references for Orbán to display the success of Hungary and other Central European countries. The Visegrád Group (V4), consisting of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, is a serious foreign policy initiative for Orbán. The V4's function is basically to increase the cooperation among these four countries and balance the power distribution within the EU, something that these countries cannot do on their own. These countries stand

together, have joint positions, and deepen their cooperation, which, for Orbán, contributes to the power capabilities of the individual states in their relations with other European Union countries as well as non-European countries.

In the promotion of Central European and V4 countries, Orbán starts with the stagnation and the standstill in Eurozone Europe. The Eurozone countries, according to Orbán, “have given up the modern market economy’s most important economic policy instrument: valuation of currency in either direction, which determines the value of their money. Instead, they have linked their fates” (Orbán, 2016o). Although these countries are richer thanks to several historical advantages, their economies are stagnating. On the contrary, the non-Eurozone countries still have the chance to control their currency, and they have been doing better than the European average in terms of economic growth. In a meeting with Chinese officials, Orbán claimed that the European economic growth engine is in Central Europe.

Economic performance is not the only aspect for which Orbán creates a duality between Hungary and the core of Europe. The policy debates over how to stop or control mass migration to Europe is another arena for Orbán. Except for his speeches at the European People’s Party Congresses, he manages to stay calm regarding the sociocultural characteristics of the migrants, preferring to talk about technical details on how to solve the problem. Orbán (2016g) argues that the solution already exists, as the Schengen Treaty already urges member states to protect the Schengen borders, and as one of the countries at the Schengen border and being on the route of the migrants, Hungary has done a great job “almost without any financial support from Brussels.” The reason why there are not hundreds of thousands of migrants in Europe is the fact that “Hungary protects the EU’s southern border” (Orbán, 2016g). In this manner, Orbán also compares Hungary’s efforts to protect the Schengen border to the Greek case. While Hungary fully protects the southern edge of the Union, Greece completely fails to protect its borders. Orbán notes that Hungary has offered assistance in border protection to Greek officials, but the offer has been rejected.

The Hungarian leader argues that while Hungary has always proposed the wisest and most realistic solution to the migration problem, and while Hungary has done a great job in protecting the southern border of the Schengen area, the core European countries have ignored the Hungarian efforts. Instead, they implemented a cosmopolitan immigration policy. Germany and Angela Merkel have been the leaders of such policy, with Merkel's "welcome policy" and proposition of a "mandatory relocation quota." According to Orbán (2016g), of course, Merkel is free to decide which policy will best serve her own country's interests, but she cannot dictate such a policy for other states with a "coarse, rough and aggressive" voice. In one of his speeches, Orbán also refers to the year 1848 and the Hungarian Revolution against the Habsburgs, which resulted in Hungarian independence. This historical reference is followed by a call to stand up against faceless world powers that "will eliminate everything unique, autonomous, age-old and national" (Orbán, 2016o).

To conclude, whether it is temporal, originating from his populism, or geopolitical, arising from his nativism/nationalism and pragmatism, the Other in Orbán's foreign policy discourse is not from outside Europe. It is a European Other. From a temporal angle, the period of liberal non-democracy (which still survives but is highly challenged) is the primary target in Orbán's speeches and interviews. This period corresponds to what Diez refers to as the period of temporal othering in Europe after the Second World War. However, Orbán rejects this specific interpretation of European history that expects the future to be a period in which the Europeans "march from the religiosity to the secularization of religion, from the traditional family model to the direction of different family models, and from the nations toward internationalism or cultural integration" (Orbán, 2012). Orbán predicts the future in the opposite direction, thanks to the democratic counter-revolution launched by the people.

Likewise, the geopolitical Other in Orbán's foreign policy discourse is also from within: It is the other Europe, the core Europe, the Eurozone Europe. Strategically, Orbán tells the narrative through the dichotomy between the stagnating core of Europe and dynamically growing Central Europe, of which Hungary is a preeminent member. At

every opportunity, Orbán also speaks in the name and for the benefit of other Central and Eastern European countries such as Bulgaria, Ukraine, Romania, and Serbia, shrewdly declaring himself the leader and even protector of Central and Eastern Europe.

6.1.3 Marine Le Pen: The Magic of the ‘Re-’ Words

There is a revolution going on. A revolution of nations. Actually it is the great return of nations. A great return of the peoples of the world and the return of democracy. It is not the end of the world; it is the end of a world (Le Pen, 2017b).

Table 13: Comparison of Le Pen’s P-1 Score to the Norming Group and the Average of EPRR Leaders

	Norming group n=164	Marine Le Pen n=10	Average EPRR n=116
P-1 Nature of political universe (conflict/cooperation)	0.301	0.068	0.213

Marine Le Pen’s Front National (FN) is “the oldest and the most successful one among the so-called extreme right parties in Western Europe” (Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, & Bornschier, 2006: 936). FN was established in 1972 under the leadership of her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen. With several ups and downs until the new millennium in terms of electoral success, FN had always been isolated in French politics because of the anti-Semitic discourses by party officials and especially by Jean-Marie Le Pen. According to Mayer (2018), anti-Semitism is one of the three legacies of the radical right in France starting from the French Revolution, the other two being traditionalism and nationalism.

From the late 1990s, Jean-Marie Le Pen increasingly installed his youngest daughter, Marine Le Pen, into the party’s central committee. The staging of Marine Le Pen’s surge within the party included her services in the legal department, with the communications team in electoral campaigns, as vice president of the party, and as a member of the EP. In 2012, she was elected as the new president of FN, with 67.6 percent of the members’ votes. Restoration of the party, expansion of the electoral audience, and de-demonization of the party (Dézé, 2015, as cited in Stockemer, 2017: 51) were the three pillars of her

vision as the new party leader. She asserted that FN should be considered as almost a mainstream party that should not be isolated because of unfounded criticisms of racism, anti-Semitism, and extremism.

She has pushed the de-demonization strategy to its limits, even including the expulsion of her father from the party in 2015 because of his chronic anti-Semitic and racist discourses, and even changed the party name to The National Rally in 2018. She has partially succeeded in her goal and reached the party's peak in the 2015 regional council elections with a vote share of 27.1 percent, followed by a vote share of 21.3 percent in the 2017 presidential elections. Even if the increase in electoral performance showed that she was doing well in the fight against the isolation of her party among the French public, she still failed in her efforts against this isolation as the second round of presidential elections in 2017 demonstrated. Therefore, it is clear that Marine Le Pen has expanded the electoral audience of her party, but not at a level sufficient to take office.

Looking at the ten speeches by Marine Le Pen analyzed in this study, it is possible to see a strong emphasis on Islamist terrorism and Islamist fundamentalism. Instead of targeting Islam as a whole, like Wilders does, Le Pen is cautious to distinguish these extremist elements from Islam, saying that Islamist terrorism is the cancer of Islam. The barbarians mobilized through the armed ideology of ISIS, according to Le Pen, threaten the freedoms, security, and rule of law in Europe without waving a national flag. What is crucial in her position against Islamist terrorism is her reframing of it in the name of democracy and republican values. This reframing is essential because it has a function to demonstrate the renovation of the party: Islamist terrorism threatens the freedoms and rights of women, gays, and Jews, and as the FN, this is the very reason why they discredit it.

Mass and anarchic immigration is a free ticket for terrorists into Europe according to Le Pen. Such masses arriving in Europe each year make it infeasible to realize successful assimilation and lead to sectarianism in society:

FN has always fought relentlessly against all forms of communitarianism. It has always rejected even the idea of communities at the heart of the

Republic, which is one and undivided in terms of its constitution. It is true that it is a particularly French thing, with communitarianism being more easily accepted in Anglo-Saxon law. Thus, because the words have a general meaning and then a political one, I never speak of Christian, Jewish or Muslim communities, but of French citizens of the Christian, Jewish or Muslim faith (Le Pen, 2015).

Le Pen's republicanism leads her to combat against communitarianism, sectarianism, and also multiculturalism because she believes that multiculturalism "brings multi-conflicts" (Le Pen, 2016d). Communitarianism, for Le Pen (2015), provides a pool from which Islamic fundamentalism recruits its combatants of tomorrow against France, and "the only community that exists in France is the national community."

Le Pen is a huge critic of the European Union, but unlike Orbán or Wilders, her opposition to the EU is not solely related to the recent immigration policy imposed by Brussels. Her rejection of the EU as it is, or as a "European Soviet Union" in her own words (Le Pen, 2016b), is deeply correlated with the historic rivalry between France and Germany. The usual strictures on the European Union, similar to other EPRR leaders, are still apparent in Le Pen's speeches: The European Union is a totalitarian and anti-democratic monster, selling a utopia that corresponds to the dissolution of nation-states. This "monster" is responsible for the suffering in Europe and is a major threat against the sovereignty of the states (Le Pen, 2016b). "A bunch of miserable technocrats" (Le Pen, 2015) in Brussels push for the submission of national governments to make these governments nothing but their puppets, "poking a knife on your ribs and oblig[ing] you to go where you do not want to go" (Le Pen, 2017b). Le Pen (2016d) calls the impositions by the nonelected oligarchy in Brussels "the Brussels Wall": a wall jailing people within it and imposing policies on them to which they do not aspire. For Le Pen (2016e),

The Brussels Wall will have come down, just like the Berlin Wall came down, and the EU, this oppressive model, will have disappeared, but the Europe of free nations will be born, and I believe this is what many Europeans are yearning for today.

Just like Brussels has a baton to bully the European states, there is also a “German whip” (Le Pen, 2015) with similar use, as put forward by Le Pen. As the creator of the EU, according to Le Pen, treaties of the EU also serve German interests. Le Pen considers the Euro as an inherently German currency and accepts that in the current situation, Germany is the economic heart of Europe, but the rest of the Eurozone is the weakest economic zone in the world. In response to this, Le Pen (2016b) notes that France is the political heart of Europe and argues that “what is happening [in France] today foreshadows what will happen in the rest of Europe in the coming years: the great return of the nation-state, which they wanted to obliterate.”

Le Pen frequently states her respect for Merkel as she is simply pursuing the best interests of her own country. If a common currency in Europe under the control of Germany is for the best interest of Germany, it is reasonable that Merkel plays the game in this way. What pains Le Pen is the imposition of particular policies on other countries by Merkel and the weakness of French politicians to renounce them.

This respect, however, does not stop Le Pen from using words such as “toxic” against Merkel: “She let 1.5 million migrants in. Isn’t that toxic? She imposes austerity to all the nations of Europe. Isn’t that toxic? She is the one who is toxic” (Le Pen, 2017c).

Unquestionably, Le Pen (2017c) believes in the total incompatibility between herself and Merkel and even describes herself as “anti-Merkel”:

Well, we may have some things to talk about with Theresa May. But with Mrs. Merkel... With Mrs. Merkel, things are very clear. We are in total opposition. I am the anti-Merkel. I am opposed to her on economic policy, monetary policy, migrant policy. It’s clear we are in total opposition.

The Euro is not only a currency serving German interests; it is also the currency of the banks and multinational corporations. From Le Pen’s (2016f) point of view, the current global and European political systems give a “*carte blanche*” to these big financial powers, while such privileges do nothing but kill the European economies. These global financial powers manufacture an artificial panic about a possible abolishment of the common currency and interfere in the national politics of the member states. As the archenemy of the Euro, Le Pen explains why she received a loan from a Russian bank,

saying that she had not been given credit for her presidential election campaign by any European bank because these financial powers are afraid of her. Once and if she takes office, Le Pen guarantees to return to the national currency.

Russia was a severe test for Le Pen throughout her campaign for the 2017 presidential elections, as the criticisms about her getting a loan from a Russian bank illustrate. In a period in which the European Union was applying strict sanctions against Russia, Le Pen (2016b) defended an interest-based foreign policy instead of a value-based foreign policy and argued that “we have no lesson to teach Russia if we concurrently roll out the red carpet to Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and China.” For Le Pen (2016d), since the fall of the Berlin Wall, Russia is a European country with which France “should have good diplomatic, strategic and commercial relations” and France “shouldn’t deprive [itself] of such links because Washington doesn’t agree.” From Le Pen’s (2016b) point of view, the Russian nation is a great nation, and Vladimir Putin is a leader who deserves respect because “because he doesn’t allow decisions to be forced upon him by other countries.” Le Pen also says that the worries about a possible military attack by Russia against Europe bring a smile to her face as Russia is not the enemy of Europe and does not pose a threat for Europe.

In parallel with her understanding of Russia in the 21st century, Le Pen also questions the continued existence of NATO. In a post-Cold War world where the *raison d’être* of NATO has disappeared, it is an obsolete and ambiguous organization that has turned into “a tool for ensuring that countries that are part of it comply with the will of the United States” (Le Pen, 2016e). Although the election of Donald Trump is a clearly positive development in US politics, according to Le Pen (2017c), the previous US administration under the presidency of Obama particularly “put the Berlin Wall on wheels and pushed it back to Russia’s borders” and forced the European countries to enter a new Cold War with Russia. Such a policy was for the interest of the US, but it was not definitely for the interest of European countries. Also, by arming countries on the Russian border through NATO, the US has made provocations against Russia, which naturally caused a reaction from the Russian side. This is how Marine Le Pen (2017c)

understands the crisis between Russia and Ukraine, saying that it is a fact that “Ukraine is part of Russia’s sphere of influence just like Canada is part of America’s sphere of influence.”

To conclude, although there are elements of populism in Le Pen’s foreign policy discourse—especially in her criticisms against Brussels—French nativism is the principal component of her discourse. This nativism is either against the sectarianism that welcomes mass migration and parallel societies or against conventional foreign policy Others, mainly Germany, but also the US. Le Pen can be best described as a republican at home and a realist in the international arena, which makes her criticize Brussels/US-led liberalism and multiculturalism, resulting in a value-based and dependent foreign policy. What she offers is a return of nations and sovereign states with people and with frontiers: It is a return to national currencies and a sustainable level of immigration. It is about regaining the control of people’s own countries, own destinies, own independence, and own liberty. It is about reinforcing security, borders, the rule of law, and economic patriotism. In short, what Le Pen offers is a return to the old world of sovereign states, and this will be a revolution of nations. Le Pen is a republican and realist, and she believes in the power of the ‘re-’ words.

6.1.4 Frauke Petry: “Make Germany Respected Again!”

Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) is often accused of being a party that wants to go back to the past. It depends on which past is meant by that. There was once a Federal Republic of Germany without Islamic terror and without exploding crime rates. A past in which a woman being dragged behind a car by a rope would have been unthinkable (Petry, 2016f).

Table 14: Comparison of Petry’s P-1 Score to the Norming Group and the Average of EPRR Leaders

	Norming group n=164	Frauke Petry n=7	Average EPRR n=116
P-1 Nature of political universe (conflict/cooperation)	0.301	0.348	0.213

The Alternative für Deutschland (AfD, Alternative for Germany) was founded in 2013 as a single-issue party only seven months before the general elections, focusing on the Euro crisis. Merkel can be considered as the party's eponym, as a 2011 speech in which she argued that Germany had no alternative other than supporting the Euro was the origin of the party's name. Grimm (2015: 265) describes the AfD program as a Eurosceptic one, in which criticism is directed at "the fiscal and monetary regime of the European Union (EU) and the failures of the Maastricht Treaty in establishing the EMU." From a Eurosceptic but pro-European point of view, the AfD considered the Euro as a troublemaker within the Union because it "has split Europe into donor and debtor countries" and hence "created social and political tensions within and among member states" (Grimm, 2015: 265). Such tensions are serious obstacles to peaceful European cooperation according to the AfD. On the other hand, things were not only bad for the EU but also for Germany because the Euro bailout program pursued to help EU countries in crisis recover from bankruptcy was imposing an enormous burden on Germany and, therefore, the German people.

In its first elections, the general elections of September 2013, the AfD was almost able to enter the Bundestag, receiving 4.7 percent of the vote. The party had better results in the EP elections in May 2014 (7 percent) and took a notable number of seats in the local parliamentary elections in autumn 2014 in several states, including Saxony and Brandenburg. In 2015, Frauke Petry, who had been the AfD's co-spokesperson and head of the state party in Saxony, was elected as the new party leader. This leadership change in the party is considered as an ideological shift to the right (Berning, 2017), as moderate members left the party and the European refugee crisis emerged as a second pillar for the party in addition to the Euro. Frauke Petry's speeches analyzed in this study include her objections against Brussels and the Merkel administration because of their policies on common currency and mass migration.

In her analyzed speeches and interviews, Petry (n/d) maintains her party's stance against the Euro as she says that the common currency of the EU has been "dead for a long time." However, the European Central Bank is still floundering to keep the failed Euro

alive. For this reason, the European Central Bank is one of the enemies of the German nation from which they should take their country back.

Regarding migration, Petry admits that Germany has been a melting pot for a very long time, but she claims that her and her party's objections about immigration represent questions of time, numbers, and the arbitrariness of Merkel and Brussels. For Petry, it should be the people of a country who should decide which sort of migration they want to accept, and the German people do not want illegal and mass immigration, which will lead to a clash of cultures. The reason for this belief is that, according to Petry, Islam has components that are not compatible with German culture, rules, and regulations, such as Sharia law. On the other hand, she gives credit to the fully integrated Muslim citizens and considers them as a part of Germany. Therefore, at the very least, assimilation to a certain degree is necessary so that it will be possible to eliminate the "clans and gangs who moved [to Germany] and are terrifying entire neighborhoods" (Petry, 2016f).

In early 2016, Petry had difficult times following an interview with a regional newspaper in which she said: "I don't want this either. But the use of armed force is there as a last resort" (Petry, 2016a). In almost all of her following interviews, this statement was the first thing she was asked about. She defended herself, saying that she was only quoting a German law that still exists, which warrants the use of weapons in cases of illegal border crossings.

There are two focal points of the AfD's criticisms concerning the Euro and migration: Brussels and the Merkel administration. Petry is not for the abolishment of the European Union or for leaving it. However, she says that a new vision of Europe is essential, which will not ask for more harmonization but will rather allow nations to be sovereign regarding national questions such as immigration policy. The Eurocrats in Brussels, according to Petry, wants an entire continent to submit to their centralized regime. A centralized strategy against Russia, for example, is not in the interests of Germany, and sanctions will damage relations between Germany and Russia. Therefore, according to

Petry, while Russia should be a priority partner for the benefit of the German people, the centralized EU strategy backed by the US does not allow this.

On the other hand, Petry (2016f) argues that it is not only Brussels Eurocrats but also Germany's currency and migration policies that are destroying European solidarity and leading to reactions from member countries in the direction of returning to their nation. Merkel is at the heart of these criticisms as a leader with "grotesque politics": She invites all potential migrants to Europe without consulting the parliament, the German people, or other EU countries. Merkel does not distinguish between real refugees and economic immigrants. She promotes the so-called "Turkey deal" to control the immigrant waves into Europe but allows Erdoğan to blackmail all of Europe (Petry, 2016d). She even dares to dictate moral requirements to Donald Trump, whose election was a declaration of war against the establishment according to Petry. The AfD leader also maintains that Merkel's policies have turned Germany into a "madhouse of Europe," and it is possible to make Germany "a once again respected member of the community" (Petry, 2016f).

To conclude, the two Others in Petry's political universe are Germany under the Merkel administration and Brussels. However, these Others have an ambivalent character as Petry does not place herself as an exact opposite of them: She does not reject the European Union project and feels a sense of belonging, but she offers amendments in terms of a common currency and immigration policy. On the other hand, Petry makes criticisms of Merkel's Germany, the same as those made by France's Marine Le Pen. As a German politician, therefore, Petry's foreign policy beliefs are self-reflexive and reflect an insider's suspicions about her own country's foreign policy and about an organization to which she has a sense of belonging. There are no apparent political opponents such as a particular country in her foreign policy belief set. Muslims and immigrants are dominant in her discourse, but they are not considered as a foreign policy Other; they only represent a topic of debate pursued with the abovementioned two Others, Brussels and Merkel.

6.1.5 Nigel Farage: The Polemical Voice for a ‘Self-Governing Normal Nation’

The biggest problem you’ve got, and the reason, the main reason the United Kingdom voted the way that it did, is because you have by stealth, by deception, without ever telling the truth to the British, or the rest of the peoples of Europe, you’ve imposed on them a political union (Farage, 2016g).

Table 15: Comparison of Farage’s P-1 Score to the Norming Group and the Average of EPRR Leaders

	Norming group	Nigel Farage	Average EPRR
	n=164	n=21	n=116
P-1 Nature of political universe (conflict/cooperation)	0.301	0.178	0.213

The radical right in the United Kingdom had been believed to be doomed to failure until 2010 because of the political culture, electoral system, and legacy of fascism. However, the collapse of the previous generation of the extreme right in the UK with its commitment to “crude biological racism, anti-Semitism, and a thinly disguised hostility toward liberal parliamentary democracy” coincided with the rise of the UK Independence Party (UKIP) (Goodwin & Dennison, 2018: 1-2). The overall goal of UKIP was Britain’s exit from the European Union when the party was founded in 1993. In the 1999 EP elections, the party got 7 percent of the vote, sending three of its candidates to Brussels. Nigel Farage was one of these three, with the same goals and objectives that he has still today: “I came in here in 1999 and sat at the back, and there were only three of us in the whole building who thought our Member State should leave the European Union” (Farage, 2016e).

The new century and especially the 2010s brought increasing dissidence in the British public as “anxieties over the financial crisis dissipated...amid increased immigration from the eastern member states of the again enlarged EU” (Goodwin & Dennison, 2018: 12). On the demand side, such dissidence was utilized by UKIP leaders and especially by Farage, which led to substantial electoral gains, the biggest one being the victory in the 2014 EP elections. UKIP secured 27.5 percent of votes and 24 seats in Brussels.

Since then, calls for leaving the European Union have been made more strongly. UKIP was one of the founding members of the Vote Leave campaign in the United Kingdom. Their campaign had real success, gaining the votes of 51.89 percent, and Nigel Farage was the ‘star’ (figuratively but also literally as Farage has his own radio show) of the whole election campaign.

The twenty-one speeches by Farage analyzed in this study cover the periods before, during, and after the Brexit campaign. They are mostly speeches by Farage in the European Parliament, where he was speaking to his antagonists. His words under the roof of his archenemy are critical for understanding his perceptions of the political universe. For Farage (2015e), leaving the EU is the utmost important goal, as it is an “increasingly authoritarian” institution imposing laws and regulations on the member states. Brussels, where these laws come from, is a place of “bully boys” (Farage, 2015d) disregarding the democratic demands of the European people. It has an anthem, a flag, and a president transforming the European way of living into “living inside the USSR” (Farage, 2015e), and Farage (2014a) does not “want to be trapped inside this museum.” Therefore, first of all, leaving the EU is a matter of national renewal: getting the borders back, getting the parliament back, getting the national money back, and getting the fisheries back.

Although the UK is not a part of the Eurozone, the Euro and the Euro crisis are still at the top of Farage’s criticisms of the EU. He argues that the Euro has put up a new Berlin Wall in Europe between the northern and southern countries. It has always been the wrong currency for Mediterranean countries. The natural consequence of the imposition of the Euro by Brussels resulted in poverty in those countries, which was then followed by the bailout programs. However, these bailouts were not for the Greek people, but rather for bailing out the French, German, and Italian banks, and the establishment politicians work for “big money, the big businesses and Goldman Sachs” (Farage, 2016d).

For Nigel Farage, unlike the other EPRR leaders analyzed in this study, as a politician from a non-Schengen country, it is possible to see that the immigrants from the Eastern European countries who have gained the right of free movement attract more of his attention than the immigrants from the usual states of origin such as Syria, Afghanistan, or sub-Saharan African countries. Farage consistently shares his discomfort about the Bulgarian and Romanian citizens who migrate to the UK, with several references to the high crime rates among them: “London is already experiencing a Romanian crime wave. There have been an astounding 27,500 arrests in the Metropolitan Police area in the last five years. Ninety-two percent of ATM crime is committed by Romanians” (Farage, 2013).

In addition to his discomfort about these “foreign criminal gangs” (Farage, 2013), Farage is also annoyed that Bulgarian and Romanian men come to the UK alone, without their families, but are considered eligible for the child benefits provided by the British government. They also send the money they earn in the UK back to Romania or Bulgaria, which is a loss of wealth for the UK. For this reason, Farage is against an unconditional open-door policy regarding Bulgarian and Romanian citizens.

For Farage, allowing the former communist countries into the Union was one of the biggest mistakes of the EU, together with the Euro project and increasing authoritarianism. Some of these former communist countries have “human rights records that are frankly shocking and abysmal and [there are] others in which corruption is so rife that these countries have not made the transition to being full Western democracies” (Farage, 2016e). Allowing these countries naturally created a significant level of anger in Britain and other Northern members. According to Farage (2016e), this anger has paved the way for “the rise of parties that some may consider to be deeply unpleasant, but that is what happens when you take control out of people’s lives.”

Not being a Schengen country, the UK has the chance and the capability to decide on its own migration regime for immigrants coming from non-EU countries, and Farage (2014c) considers Islamist extremism as “the biggest threat and crisis to our way of life

that we have seen for over 70 years.” This threat comes to Europe through uncontrolled immigration and human trafficking. For Farage, however, the guilt belongs to the Europeans as the previous foreign policy mistakes of the Union, such as bombing Libya and paving the way for a failed state, have caused the crisis, and the European Union, under the influence of Merkel, has welcomed this migration flow. Furthermore, instead of fighting against Islamist extremism, according to Farage, the EU has preferred to target Russia, which fights against extremists in Syria.

Putin’s Russia receives considerable space in Farage’s speeches, like other EPRR leaders. Farage (2014c) also believes that the enemy of Europe is not Russia and understands the Russian annexation of Crimea as a natural reaction:

This EU empire, ever seeking to expand, stated its territorial claim on Ukraine some years ago. Just to make that worse, some NATO members said they would like Ukraine to join NATO. We directly encouraged the uprising in Ukraine that led to the toppling of President Yanukovich; that led in turn to Vladimir Putin reacting; and the moral of the story is: if you poke the Russian bear with a stick, do not be surprised when he reacts.

Therefore, according to Farage, the case of Putin and Russia is an excellent example to illustrate the failure and arbitrariness of the European Union. This arbitrariness originates from Angela Merkel and her authority over other heads of EU states. “When Ms. Merkel speaks the other Heads of State obey” (Farage, 2014a), says Farage, and he believes that Merkel has given “rocket boosters” to the EU’s failure with the EU’s common asylum policy (Farage, 2015f). Another failure caused by Merkel was the so-called “Turkey deal,” which gave Turkey and Erdoğan the chance to blackmail Europe (Farage, 2016c). According to Farage, the possibility of providing visa-free travel rights to Turkish people in exchange for accommodating the refugees in their country is a severe mistake. Farage argues that the facts that Turkey has borders with Iraq, Syria, and Iran; that it is poorer than any other country in Europe; and that it is increasingly becoming Islamist and authoritarian under the rule of Erdoğan should have been reasons for rejecting such a deal. Instead, according to Farage, European “bosses” preferred to bow before Erdoğan (Farage, 2016d).

In a nutshell, Farage considers the EU as the antithesis of democratic principles and as the source of the misery and poverty in Europe, serving the interests of big politics and big money, not the ordinary people. The Brexit campaign and the referendum process was a “battle of people versus the politicians,” and the people’s will won the battle (Farage, 2016d). The Brexit decision shows the will of the people, who have been oppressed for the last years, to be an independent and “self-governing normal nation” (Farage, 2016g).

6.1.6 Boris Johnson: The Curious Case of a Liberal Cosmopolitan but Eurosceptic Man

I believe we would be mad not to take this once in a lifetime chance to walk through that door because the truth is it is not we who have changed, it is the EU that has changed out of all recognition. And to keep insisting that the EU is about economics is like saying the Italian Mafia is interested in olive oil and real estate. It is true but profoundly uninformative about the real aims of that organization”(Johnson, 2016b).

Table 16: Comparison of Johnson’s P-1 Score to the Norming Group and the Average of EPRR Leaders

	Norming group n=164	Boris Johnson n=8	Average EPRR n=116
P-1 Nature of political universe (conflict/cooperation)	0.301	0.279	0.213

Boris Johnson differs from the other leaders analyzed in this study in terms of not being a member of a populist radical right party. The Conservative Party of the UK is an example of parties having Eurosceptic factions while overall supporting European integration (Taggart, 1998: 368). As a member of the Conservative Party, Johnson has had a restless and popular career, including journalist, historian, Member of Parliament, Mayor of London, and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. Therefore, he may even be considered an ‘establishment’ leader. Still, in 2016, he was a prominent figure in the Vote Leave campaign run to withdraw the UK from the European Union, known as Brexit. He was the most formidable candidate for the prime ministry following David Cameron, but he could not succeed, and he became Foreign

Minister in Theresa May's cabinet. However, with criticism of May in the post-Brexit UK, Johnson resigned from his position.

The eight speeches by Boris Johnson analyzed in this study were given between April 2016 and April 2017. Five of them are from the campaign days for the British withdrawal from the EU, including a victory speech on the day of the referendum. The other three speeches were given as Foreign Secretary in the following months. Not surprisingly, based on these speeches, the significant Other in Johnson's political universe is the European Union.

For Johnson (2016a), the EU is "day by day becoming a federal superstate," but it does so with a substantial democratic deficit and without proper accountability to the people. In every crisis, the response by Brussels is "more Europe": It becomes more centralized, more interfering, and more anti-democratic. Johnson (2016b) argues that almost 60 percent of the laws that pass through Westminster are sent from Brussels, which is an "anti-democratic absurdity." In its current form, Brussels has its foreign ministers and its series of EU embassies around the world, and it even develops its own defense policy. These developments prove that the EU is "a million miles away from the Common Market that the UK signed up for in 1973" (Johnson, 2016a).

In economic terms, the EU is also problematic for Johnson. He argues that the UK contributes 20 billion pounds to the EU budget each year. The EU bureaucrats use half of this amount in the UK, and they do not even see the other half. Furthermore, it is regrettable that the UK has been unable to make free trade agreements with the world in the last 42 years, Johnson complains. The UK has lost control over its trade policy: Brussels and the Eurocrats control it. Even worse, such authority and the European single market do not yield positive results for the economies of the EU countries. Johnson (2016c) notes that the EU countries have been "outperformed for growth compared to other OECD countries."

The control over borders has also been lost to Brussels. Johnson presents himself as a supporter of immigration, but in a controlled way. According to Johnson, one of the most basic powers of the state is to be able to decide who has the right to come, to live, and to work in your country. As in the case of Farage, the problem of migration for Johnson is also twofold: The mass migration from the Central and Eastern European members of the EU, thanks to the free movement principle, and the mass migration from the Middle East, which increases the terrorist threat in Europe and the UK. While the first is mostly related to economic concerns such as decreasing wages (the reason why big UK companies are for remaining in the UK) and increasing unemployment, the second one involves security concerns.

In his campaign against the Remain vote, Johnson summarized their arguments in three categories. The first one is the economy-based argument, which suggests that the UK without membership in the EU will have significant economic problems. This kind of argument allowed Johnson to express his ideas about the greatness of the UK: Britain is a powerful country, being the fifth biggest economy in the world. It is a world leader in most of the 21st-century sectors. Its capital is also the capital of the world in many ways.

The second argument by the Remainers is that British membership in the EU is essential for peace in Europe: They claim that the “EU is associated with 70 years of stability, and we need to stay in to prevent in shorthand German tanks crossing the French border” (Johnson, 2016b). Here, Johnson expresses his belief that Europe has changed dramatically since the Second World War, and there is also NATO for guaranteeing peace and stability in Europe.

The third argument of the Remain campaign is the one equating EU membership with being European. Johnson is very uncomfortable with this claim of a monopoly on liberal cosmopolitanism by the Remain side. He rejects such a monopoly and stresses that leaving the EU will not mean that the UK will be in any way less European because the UK is a part of Europe. He defines himself as a liberal cosmopolitan and as a child of Europe (Johnson, 2016b). He further argues that in the current situation, it is not the EU

but Brexit showing respect for the principles of European liberalism, and most importantly democracy. Johnson states that the UK's commitment to all kinds of European cooperation will continue, but at an intergovernmental level. For Johnson, for example, a field of collaboration that will continue after Brexit is the European sanctions against Russia. Unlike the other leaders analyzed in this study, Johnson is an anti-Russian politician, focusing on Russia's support for the Assad regime in Syria, which commits serious war crimes (Johnson, 2016f).

To conclude, Boris Johnson is a prominent figure, especially in the success of the Brexit campaign, as his involvement in the campaign neutralized the marginalizing effect of UKIP and Nigel Farage. In the times of the Brexit debate, Johnson clearly, repeatedly, and enthusiastically spread his anti-EU stance to the British public. His antagonists in foreign policy have been the EU and the Brussels elites together with their supporters at the national level, such as "fat cat lobbyists" and "fat cat businesses," in his own words (Johnson, 2016c). Being a member of an established party but also being the voice of the Eurosceptical faction in that party, he bases his rejection on the grounds of democracy and economy, without the dominance of nativist sentiments.

6.1.7 Jimmie Åkesson: Geopolitics Strikes Back!

People have grown up in Sweden but who do not belong. People who physically are present here in Sweden but mentally they are present somewhere completely different. They've never had a chance in fact of belonging. ... And that is a betrayal. It's an extensive betrayal which will have a price tag (Åkesson, 2016b).

Table 17: Comparison of Åkesson's P-1 Score to the Norming Group and the Average of EPRR Leaders

	Norming group	Jimmie Åkesson	Average EPRR
	n=164	n=6	n=116
P-1 Nature of political universe (conflict/cooperation)	0.301	0.044	0.213

Of all the leaders analyzed in this study, Jimmie Åkesson of Sweden is the youngest member of the dataset. Born in 1979, Åkesson assumed the office of his party, Sweden Democrats, in 2005 and has been a member of the national parliament of Sweden since 2010. Åkesson's party leadership was a result of efforts to polish the party's image in Swedish society (Widfeldt, 2018: 6). Since then, the party achieved parliamentary entry in 2010 and became the third-biggest party in the 2014 elections. In the recent national polls, SD was again the third-biggest party but increased its votes from 12.9 percent to 17.5 percent and its seats from 49 to 62 compared to the 2014 elections.

For Åkesson, immigration is the number one topic on his party's agenda. Not in total number, but in terms of the average number of immigrants per capita, Åkesson (2017) argues that the most significant amount of immigrants now resides in Sweden. He is concerned about the number of Arab people and Arabic signs everywhere in the city of Malmö (Åkesson, 2015b). Åkesson has a similar tone to Geert Wilders' in sharing his discontent about the migrants: The rates of sex crimes have increased; anti-Semitism has increased; people cannot walk the streets with a feeling of security; artists are accused of insulting Islam and receive death threats; the unemployment rates are high among migrant groups; and now Muhammad is the most common name for baby boys in Malmö, the third biggest city of Sweden.

Åkesson argues that there have been serious mistakes at the national and European levels in migration policy. At a time when ISIS has declared war on Europe, the establishment has continued to implement an open door and melting pot strategy instead of trying to help these people in areas closer to their home countries (Åkesson, 2015a). Therefore, according to Åkesson, migration policy should be a national policy of closing the borders, and it should not come from Brussels. It is apparent that the EU cannot protect its outer borders.

Åkesson rejects the standard arguments in defense of the EU, that without the EU, the risk for international conflict will increase; without the EU, Sweden will become an isolated state with minimal contact with the outside world; and without the EU, Sweden

will not be able to cooperate with other European countries or solve common problems across borders. Åkesson calls the Europeans friends and says that friends will still want to cooperate, have dialogues, and work together, but without selling their freedom to Brussels. He identifies his and his party's position vis-a-vis the EU as "national-conservatism," which seeks for Sweden to remain as an independent nation-state, without receiving most of its laws from Brussels (Åkesson, 2015a). In short, like other EPRR leaders, Åkesson also rejects the trend of more and more decision-making and lawmaking power being transferred to Brussels and the fact that EU legislation dominates national law. Therefore, he expresses his belief in the necessity of European integration, but without the EU.

In addition to the usual Others of the EPRR parties and leaders, such as the EU and migrants, Jimmie Åkesson has two additional Others in his discourse: Russia and NATO. Åkesson is very generous in expressing his dislike of Russia and Putin. He questions the "Putinism fetishism" in the Swedish parliament and reminds his audiences that he had warned about Putin's aggression several times (Åkesson, 2016b). He criticizes the establishment parties who dismantled the Swedish Armed Forces as they thought that there was no longer a threat to Swedish national security. Now, considering Russian aggression, the same parties and politicians are seeking NATO membership, Åkesson argues. Åkesson is skeptical about NATO, as well. He is open to cooperation with NATO but rejects the possibility of accession to NATO or NATO bases and troops on Swedish soil through another scheme such as a host country agreement (Åkesson, 2016b). Åkesson believes that such a scenario has the potential to increase the risk of a Russian attack against Sweden.

To conclude, Åkesson is a very typical EPRR leader in terms of his rejection of the EU and immigration. It is possible to see the same arguments and the same tones in this discourse among other EPRR leaders. However, the case of Russia and NATO contributes to the influence of geopolitics on Åkesson's discourse. In other words, besides the economic and societal security concerns about immigration, national

security, in a very conventional understanding, is also an essential component of his foreign policy beliefs.

6.1.8 Norbert Hofer: A Proud Child of the Austrian Neutrality

I do not want Brussels to decide about pubs in Austria or in Germany or in Italy. It is not important. But we have to talk about a proper way to have a stronger economy. And we have to talk about how to secure the border of Europe (Hofer, 2016d).

Table 18: Comparison of Hofer's P-1 Score to the Norming Group and the Average of EPRR Leaders

	Norming group n=164	Norbert Hofer n=5	Average EPRR n=116
P-1 Nature of political universe (conflict/cooperation)	0.301	0.643	0.213

Excluding Hungary's Orbán, Norbert Hofer is the EPRR leader who has come closest to being the president of his country. Although Austria's presidency is mostly ceremonial, Hofer lost dramatically to his opponent Alexander Van der Bellen, the candidate of the Austrian Green Party, in the 2016 presidential election. In the first round of the polls, Hofer received 35 percent of the votes, which had him competing with Van der Bellen in the second round. In the second round, it was Van der Bellen who got the majority of the votes with a share of 50.3 percent. However, due to voting irregularities, the second round of voting was annulled by the constitutional court. Elections were re-held, Hofer's share of the votes decreased to 46 percent, and he lost the chance of assuming office.

Similar to the other EPRR leaders, the European Union and immigration are the dominant themes in his foreign policy discourse. Despite being against a possible Öxit, Hofer is for the reform of the EU. Except for the issues of security, economy, and energy, which need even more cooperation, Hofer (2016d) supports the principle of subsidiarity in other fields such as agricultural policy. He argues that Brussels should not decide about everything occurring within the member states, such as pubs. He is opposed to strategies that will turn the EU into the United States of Europe, as they will

not work. Although Hofer is not for leaving the EU, there may be cases in the future that will require extreme measures, in which the Austrian people should decide. The number one example of such cases is the potential membership of Turkey. Hofer (2016a) argues that Turkey's membership will make it impossible for the EU and for its member countries, including Austria, to have a positive future.

Mass migration is an issue that the EU has been unable to find a solution to thus far. Being a small country, Hofer argues, Austria is having trouble managing the incoming masses. He notes that Austria has historically always been supportive of people looking for shelter, as the examples of the Hungarians in 1956 and Yugoslavians in 1990s show (Hofer, 2016a). However, the numbers are now vast and beyond the capacity of the Austrian state, creating fear among society including concern about jobs and anxiety about cultural identity, Islamization, and terror. He also points to the role of welfare support in states like Austria, Germany, and Sweden as a factor attracting migrants. The welfare support system is the reason why migrants do not go to countries like Italy or Portugal, where they will not be provided such support (Hofer, 2016b). Hofer (2016a) also rejects being called a demagogue because of his stress on the homeland and borders, arguing that it is not demagoguery but rather realism..

He criticizes the steps taken by the EU so far, such as the EU-Turkey deal, which was a mistake according to Hofer. Angela Merkel's welcoming of the immigrants was also a failure because Austria is not able to welcome such a vast number of people coming from North Africa. As opposed to these policies, Hofer (2016b) presents a so-called 'humanitarian' solution to the immigration problem. He definitely supports stricter controls in the EU and along national borders, though not wholly closing them. In order to be able to identify who is a real refugee and who is a migrant, and in order to stop refugees from dying in boats in the Mediterranean, Hofer suggests the following: The EU should establish safe zones in North Africa with good quality of living, should investigate the refugee status in these zones, and then should officially transfer these refugees to Europe in safe conditions.

On the other hand, in Hofer's foreign policy discourse, there are more actors in the political universe to cooperate with than to compete with. The first one of these is the so-called Visegrád Group, which he defines as a "Union within the EU" (Hofer, 2016c). Becoming a member of this group will strengthen Austria's position within the EU. Another actor to cooperate with is Russia, which is a point of disagreement between Hofer and EU policies overall. Hofer argues that the sanctions against Russia must be ended, and friendship should be built with Russia. Russia was vital for Europe in the Second World War and afterward for Europe, and now peace and freedom in Europe are not possible without the friendship of Russia, according to Hofer (2016d). A third foreign policy actor to cooperate with is the Central European countries, which share the same basic cultural ideas and the same Christian values as Austria. He states that this is definitely not about resurrecting the Austrian Empire but rather using every opportunity for fruitful cooperation among these countries (Hofer, 2017). Finally, China is another actor in the political universe to cooperate with. Chinese investments should be brought to Europe, Hofer (2017) argues, but there is a need to be cautious about not compromising on European values within the cooperation with China.

To conclude, despite being an EPRR leader, Norbert Hofer is a child of the Austrian neutrality tradition. Even if he has severe problems with the EU and the overall migration issue, he can present his criticisms in a solution-oriented manner and with politically correct discourses. The actors to cooperate with in the international arena are given more attention than the actors to be criticized. He repeatedly stresses the importance of Austrian neutrality for him and the Austrian people and offers mediation in the Syrian crisis and US-Russia relations (Hofer, 2016c). Therefore, Hofer differs from some factions in the Austrian populist radical right, which argue that neutrality in the aftermath of the Second World War was not a voluntary choice but rather an imposition on Austria and resulted in the illusion that Austria does not have real and potential threats in foreign policy (Virchow, 2007: 57-58). For this reason, it is not a surprise that Hofer is the one with the most cooperative belief about the nature of the political universe in terms of his P-1 score.

6.1.9 Nikolaos Michaloliakos: Surrounded by Enemies

And around our Homeland there are assembled all the enemies, they distribute her parts with a disastrous policy, the policy of memoranda and this is the era of the fake political establishment that must leave and this is what we are fighting for (Michaloliakos, 2017b).

Table 19: Comparison of Michaloliakos' P-1 Score to the Norming Group and the Average of EPRR Leaders

	Norming group	Nikolaos Michaloliakos	Average EPRR
	n=164	n=13	n=116
P-1 Nature of political universe (conflict/cooperation)	0.301	0.009	0.213

Greek leader Nikolaos Michaloliakos is the most controversial leader among the analyzed leaders in this study as he is closer to the neo-Nazi and anti-Semitic extreme right. He has been in jail many times, the first being after a protest outside the British embassy in Athens against the British attitude in the Cyprus crisis. His party, Golden Dawn, which he founded in 1985, only reached its peak in the 2012 elections under the heavy influence of the Greek crisis. This proves that “beyond its economic dimension, its political and ideological facets culminated into a broader crisis of the nation-state” (Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou, 2015: 15). Golden Dawn has won 18 seats in the parliament.

Michaloliakos is an old-fashioned populist radical right leader in the sense of being obsessed with conspiracy theories and seeing another state as a clear enemy in his foreign policy belief set. He shares the discomfort of the other EPRR leaders about the European Union, the political establishment, and immigration, but the true existential threat comes from the historical enemy of Turkey. With several historical references, quotes from essential Greek historians, stress on the Lausanne Treaty, and references to Greek independence in 1821, to Cyprus, and to Eastern Thrace, he dates the Turkish threat back to the year of 1071: it is “since the battle of Manzikert (August 16 of 1071 A.C.) till today, that Turks are threatening us” (Michaloliakos, 2017b).

On Michaloliakos' obsession with the 'Turkish threat' lies his belief that history is a circle. The Turks, who enslaved the Greeks and the Greek homeland for centuries, again seek to occupy Greece under the "sultanate" of Tayyip Erdoğan, according to Michaloliakos. Erdoğan and the new Ottomans are challenging the sovereignty of the Greeks; they want the Greek land and the Greek sea. They manipulate the Muslim minority in Western Thrace against the Greeks. However, Michaloliakos and Golden Dawn stand up against becoming "the satellite of Turkey" or "a province of Turkey" (Michaloliakos, 2014).

On the other hand, the political establishment in Greece "continues the disastrous policy of defeatism" (Michaloliakos, 2014) and responds only with empty words of Greco-Turkish friendship, which does not exist and is deceitful (Michaloliakos, 2017b). The establishment politicians' only concern is material profit, not national ideals. While Athens continuously backs down in the name of a defeatist policy and the European dream, NATO and the EU try to please Erdoğan, according to Michaloliakos. Europe is a "two-headed beast" according to Michaloliakos (2016c), with those heads being liberalism and the new left. This beast promotes "political correctness" to suppress realities. Even if the European countries are called 'allies' of Greece, Michaloliakos rejects that label and claims that they have betrayed Greece.

Under the shadow of the Greek economic crisis, not surprisingly, the Euro and the bailout are repeated themes in Michaloliakos' foreign policy discourse. These are the impositions of "the Europe of the loan sharks" (Michaloliakos, 2016e), and as a result of the devastation brought about by the common currency, Greece will remain a debt colony without national sovereignty. According to Michaloliakos, the Euro only benefits Germany and its satellites and the European neoliberals. For this reason, Michaloliakos (2017c) calls for a national renaissance: "the return to the national production, the economic nationalism and the public protection of the Greek products and more importantly of the Greek workers." His distrust of the international political universe is so deep that he makes an analogy between the Turkish "invasion" of Cyprus in 1974 and

Kuwait's invasion by Saddam Hussein and "proves" the double standard of the UN (Michaloliakos, 2016b).

One of the biggest mistakes by the Greek governments has been to ignore Russia as a potential ally for the sake of fake friendships with Europeans and Americans. Michaloliakos (2016e) argues that "a Europe with Russia would be crucial" for the Greeks because this will allow them to have hundreds of millions of Orthodox citizens on their side. To regain national sovereignty and independence, Greece must search for allies, and this should be Orthodox Russia, with the geopolitical orientation of Hellenism.

To summarize, the political universe in the foreign policy belief set of Michaloliakos is full of enemies, and therefore the international arena is a highly conflictual arena. In addition to the main enemy of Turkey, which is believed to be pursuing a "new occupation" (Michaloliakos, 2017f), the European Union and international society as a whole, including the UN and global civil society, are posing threats against Greece. Trump's success in the USA gave hope to Michaloliakos as it was a victory against the tyranny of the "politically correct culture" of neoliberalism and the left (Michaloliakos, 2016c). Therefore, based on this in-depth reading of his texts, the conclusion obtained via operational code analysis that Michaloliakos has a highly conflictual score for his specific belief about the nature of the political universe is not surprising.

6.2 EPRR Leaders and Their Geopolitical Others

As argued in the title of this chapter, EPRR leaders can be considered as both an outcome and the trigger of the resecuritization trend in Europe, starting in the 1990s. The decade following the collapse of the Soviet Union re-introduced geopolitical and cultural Others in the foreign policymaking of the European states, which had been replaced or subordinated by the idea of "a revolt against Europe's own past" (Weaver, 1998: 90). The temporal and self-negating othering in Europe had been at the core of the establishment of a security community with the aim of not allowing the past to be Europe's future. Such a self-transforming argument has been utilized in the creation,

deepening, and widening of European integration, identifying itself as a peace project. According to Weaver (1998: 100), the fragmented past of Europe has dominated European security rhetoric. As a natural follow-up of this idea, “those further away from the center are not defined as anti-Europe, only as less Europe.”

However, as Diez (2004: 319) argues, since the 1990s, geographic and cultural othering started to regain importance in Europe, “marking a return of geopolitics in European identity constructions and undermining the notion of European integration as a fundamental challenge to the world of nation-state.” Self-reflexive temporal othering in Europe has coexisted with spatial Others in contemporary European politics as argued by several scholars (Diez, 2004; Rumelili, 2004; Browning, 2003; Joenniemi, 2008). Since the 1990s and the new millennium, Islam and related actors such as Turkey have been significant geopolitical and cultural Others in the political rhetoric and media headlines. The geopoliticization of European identity in the late 1990s and 2000s is a result of firstly the politicization of European identity (because of the expansion of NATO and the EU) and secondly the securitization of European territory (because of the increasing numbers of refugees, migrants, and terrorist attacks).

The rise of the populist radical right in Europe starting from the same date as this geopoliticization of European identity is not a coincidence as the re-emergence of geopolitical Others is not only an underlying cause for the rise of EPRR parties and leaders. The increasing role of the EPRR leaders and their policies also strengthened the idea that geopolitical Others are back in the continent. In this section, the nine EPRR leaders analyzed individually in the previous sections will be revisited within this context. It will be concluded that most of the EPRR leaders have dominant geopolitical and cultural Others in their foreign policy discourses, and these leaders are the ones whose beliefs about the political universe are more conflictual than those of the average world leader, as discussed in Chapter 5.

As Mudde (2007: 22) argues, there are three components of the populist radical right, namely nativism, populism, and authoritarianism. Among these components, nativism

and populism are capable of producing ‘Others’ in both the domestic and international arena, whereas the Others constructed through the authoritarianism component are mostly in the domestic sphere. Looking at the EPRR leaders analyzed in this study, it is possible to identify Others in their beliefs about the political universe originating from both nativism and populism to varying degrees. The overall argument of this section will be that those EPRR leaders having Others in the international arena originating from nativism are examples of the geopolitical othering in Europe and are more conflictual than the average world leader. On the other hand, those EPRR leaders for whom nativism is not the dominant source of othering are more cooperative than the rest of the EPRR leaders and the average world leader. For this reason, it is possible to understand the leaders with more conflictual beliefs about the political universe as a continuation of the transition from self-reflexive temporal othering to geopolitical othering. These conclusions are in line with Diez’s (2004:320) original claim that “otherings between geographically defined political entities tend to be more exclusive and antagonistic against out-groups than otherings with a predominantly temporal dimension.” Below, the nine EPRR leaders are revisited with a focus on the dominant source of othering.

The first group of EPRR leaders is the group with a P-1 score significantly lower than that of the average world leader: Wilders, Le Pen, Åkesson, Michaloliakos, and Farage. For the Dutch leader Geert Wilders, the picture is crystal-clear. Although he makes criticisms against the establishment at national and European levels, the dominant source of othering is his nativism. Wilders poses a total rejection of Islam and establishes a conflict based on civilizational differences and even hierarchies. He often defines the relationship between the West and Islam as a war-like situation (Stavrakakis, Katsambekis, Nikisianis, Kioupiolis, & Siomos, 2017: 428). Therefore, geographical and cultural otherings are more important in the foreign policy discourse of Wilders. Specifically speaking about Wilders, anti-Islamism is more critical than populism for him, but the subordination of populism to nationalism might also be valid for many other populist radical right leaders in Europe (Stavrakakis et al., 2017: 429).

Le Pen, who plots within the graph at almost the same spot as Wilders, also criticizes the EU and the establishment based on a democratic deficit, but she mostly targets the EU and Germany based on nationalist grounds. The Euro and the immigration policy imposed by Merkel and Germany on the other member states are the two pillars of her nativism upon which she builds her policies, republican at home and realist in the international arena. Sweden's Åkesson is a leader with a long and diverse list of Others originating from nativism, such as Islam, Russia, and NATO. While he rejects immigrants with almost the same discourse with Wilders, he clearly states his discomfort about Russian aggression on the one hand and the possibility of NATO membership as a defense mechanism against Russian aggression on the other. Greece's Michaloliakos is the leader with the most conflictual P-1 score, which is not a surprise considering the total dominance of geopolitical and cultural Others in his foreign policy discourse. The historical 'enemy' of Turkey dominates and affects all other foreign policy issues in his discourse.

Finally, Nigel Farage puts enormous importance on the clash between the EU and the British establishment on the one hand and the British people on the other. In this sense, populism is much more present in his foreign policy discourse compared to the elements of nativism. There is a thin line between criticizing the EU based on nativism or populism, as these two perspectives are tightly intertwined with each other. However, in the British case, which is also valid for Boris Johnson, such a radical disintegration is much more rooted in nativism than populism. A recent report by the Warsaw Institute also points out that "the United Kingdom needed to face two geopolitical threats: on the one hand, the ever-growing restrictions for its sovereignty from the European Commission and the Court of Justice and the leading role of both Germany and France in taking European strategic decisions and integration processes on the other" (Grosse, 2019: 4).

Criticizing the EU and the Brussels elites for particular policy areas from within can be interpreted as a predominantly populist reaction, but if the same criticism is made for leaving the Union in the name of returning to the nation, it becomes a reaction rooted in

nativism. In other words, although the same slogans and the same criticisms can be considered as being against the democratic deficit and over-bureaucratization of the EU, they also construct a battle between the nation and a monstrous superstate. Moreover, apart from the EU, there are different geopolitical Others in Farage's discourse, such as Muslims and immigrants from Romania and Bulgaria. For these reasons, even if Farage is one of the most apparent populist leaders, within the context of Brexit, nativist elements are much more important and dominant in his discourse.

Boris Johnson, who was another influential figure in the Brexit campaign, also has a more conflictual P-1 score than the average world leader despite not differing at statistically significant levels. As discussed above, otherings in Johnson's discourse are mostly based on the democratic and economic setbacks of EU membership instead of nativist sentiments. Johnson also devotes extra effort to proving his positive position regarding liberal cosmopolitanism. Therefore, one may argue that the populist elements are much more dominant in Johnson's foreign policy discourse than the nativist elements. Although it seems that Johnson is an example refuting the initial claim, the role of the Brexit campaign as discussed above for Nigel Farage and the role of his anti-Russian discourse cannot be ignored. Therefore, although it would be expected to see Johnson above the horizontal line corresponding to the level of P-1 scores of the average world leader because of his affiliation with a center party, his support for liberal cosmopolitanism, and the dominance of populist sentiments, the results show that his foreign policy beliefs regarding the political universe are non-significantly lower than the norming group's because of the context of Brexit.

Looking at the leaders above the horizontal line corresponding to the level of P-1 score for the average world leader, it is possible to understand Hofer, Orbán, and Petry as having more cooperative beliefs about the Other in the political universe. Within the context of the above-discussed differentiation between Others originating from nativism and from populism components of the populist radical right, it will be argued that these three leaders' foreign policy otherings are not dominated by geopolitical and cultural factors. This is not to say that these factors are absent from their discourses, but instead,

otherings originating from populism find more place in their texts and speeches. Also, for each leader, there are specific reasons why they are not and cannot be conflictual: For Hofer, it is the legacy of Austrian neutrality; for Orbán, it is the institutional constraints on him as the only ruling EPRR leader; and for Petry, it is her nationality.

As seen in Table 6, Norbert Hofer is the EPRR leader with the highest P-1 score, significantly and positively differing from the average world leader and the average EPRR leader. Migration and refugees are visible in his texts and speeches, but not as foreign policy Others. Rather, these appear as technical issues that should be dealt with by the EU. As a totality, the EU is not an Other for Hofer; it is a union to which he has a feeling of belonging. In Hofer's discourses, there are political Others within the EU, such as the Brussels elites and Angela Merkel, because of their non-democratic actions. However, with a clear statement against the possibility of Öxit, the Union rises as an Other originating not from nativism but from Hofer's populism. Geopolitical actors such as the Visegrád Group, China, or Russia are present in Hofer's discourse as actors to cooperate with rather than as sources of conflict.

The second EPRR leader with a higher P-1 score than the norming group is Hungary's Orbán. Orbán himself states that he is against liberal non-democracy and all of its components, such as international civil society, the Brussels elite, and global media. Except for a few speeches, Orbán uses technical language in discussing migrants, without many references to the ethnic, religious, or cultural qualities of the incoming masses. Like Hofer, Orbán also criticizes Brussels for its imposition of a cosmopolitan immigration policy. Nativism/nationalism is undoubtedly an essential pillar of Orbán's foreign policy, but his foreign policy discourse still includes more Others originating from the populism component of EPRR. Although rare, the geopolitics-based Others in Orbán's speeches are from within Europe, to which Orbán has a sense of belonging, such as the core Europe or the Eurozone Europe. Together with the bureaucratic constraints induced by his tenure in office, the fact that the Other is almost always from within is a factor in his understanding of the political environment being a cooperative one.

Frauke Petry is the last EPRR leader with more cooperative beliefs about the political universe. For Petry, there are several geopolitical and cultural Others, such as Muslims and Turkey, but neither of these is a direct foreign policy Other. Instead, they are points of criticism for her in the challenge against Merkel-oriented Brussels. Both Merkel and the Brussels elites are the obvious Others in Petry's speeches because of their ignorance about what the European people want. Therefore, the democratic deficit caused by the Brussels elites under the protectorship of Merkel is the principal component of Petry's populist radical right stance. She does not reject the EU but asks for amendments. For this reason, the EU cannot be considered as a geopolitical Other for Petry. Also, Germany, which is constructed as a geopolitical Other by France's Le Pen for imposing its interests on the other member states through EU mechanisms, cannot be considered as a geopolitical Other for Petry although she criticizes Merkel for the very same reasons. As a German politician and as a leader with pro-EU sentiments, Petry's foreign policy Others are self-reflexive and based on her beliefs about her own country's current foreign policy and about the EU, which she does not want to leave but to improve.

To conclude this section, as shown in Figure 7, the following argument can be made: even if populism is an essential element of the EPRR leaders' foreign policy discourses, it is not the core feature in most cases. For six out of nine EPRR leaders analyzed in this study, it is observed that nationalist, xenophobic, anti-immigrant, and exclusivist elements have priority in the discourses of these leaders. Based on P-1 scores, the operational code analysis of these leaders also supports the positive




Figure 7: The relationship between nativism and othering for the EPRR leaders

correlation between nativist elements and a more conflictual belief about the political universe. For Wilders, Le Pen, Farage, Johnson, Åkesson, and Michaloliakos, nativist and exclusivist elements, and hence geopolitical othering, are much more dominant, which leads to a more conflictual belief about the political opponent in the political universe than the average world leader. On the contrary, for varying reasons, Hofer, Orbán, and Petry's foreign policy discourses are not dominated by nativist elements, which leads to a more cooperative belief about the political universe in comparison with the same norming group.

6.3 Conclusion

To summarize, this chapter has three main findings. Firstly, in terms of the P-1 score in the operational code analysis, regarding beliefs about the political universe (the Other as a conflictual or cooperative actor), there is not a shared pattern among the EPRR leaders. While some EPRR leaders have significantly more cooperative P-1 scores than the average world leader, there are also leaders with significantly lower P-1 scores and hence significantly more conflictual beliefs about the political universe. This point is best illustrated by the P-1 scores of Norbert Hofer and Nikolaos Michaloliakos, as they represent entirely different leadership profiles. Hofer's scores represent a more friendly belief about the political opponent than the average of world leaders. However, Michaloliakos is at the opposite end of the spectrum, having a more conflictual belief about the political opponent.

Secondly, looking at the average score of the analyzed EPRR leaders, it might be argued that their beliefs about the political universe are significantly more conflictual than those of the average world leader, which confirms the concerns about the rise of the populist radical right and the future of international relations in Europe.

Thirdly, there is a positive link between the dominance of geopolitical and cultural otherings and conflictual beliefs about the political universe. As discussed above, for six leaders who focus on geopolitical and cultural Others originating from nativism, such as Islam, Turkey, Germany, Russia, or the EU (understood as an organization to leave),

lower P-1 scores than the average world leader are observed. However, for Hofer, Orbán, and Petry, for whom otherings originating from populism are more dominant, more cooperative beliefs about the political universe than the average world leader are present.

Therefore, it is concluded that the dominance of nativism results in the dominance of geopolitical and cultural otherings, which translates into a more conflictual belief about the political universe and opponents in this universe. In addition to this proposition based on the logic of sufficient conditions, it can also be inverted into a proposition based on the logic of necessary conditions and conclude that the EPRR leaders without the dominance of nativism (for any reason) do not make geopolitical otherings, and therefore they do not have conflictual beliefs about the political universe. The reason for the lack of nativism's dominance can be the dominance of another stance, such as populism, or can be other specific situations, such as the legacy of Austrian neutrality in the Austrian case and the bureaucratic constraints on Hungary's Orbán.

CHAPTER VII: 'NOT-NECESSARILY-CONFLICTUAL' FOREIGN POLICY: EPRR LEADERS AND THEIR FOREIGN POLICY INSTRUMENTS

As discussed in the previous chapter, EPRR leaders are not only important actors in re-introducing geopolitical Others into the foreign policy of European countries, but their rise in the last two decades has also been boosted through the re-emergence of threats originating from these geopolitical Others. For most of the EPRR leaders and the average EPRR leader, the Other in the political universe is a conflictual actor, as indicated by the P-1 score in the operational code construct and as discussed individually in detail. Operational code analysis also enables the researcher to picture the leader's belief about the Self, i.e., whether the political leader has a belief in cooperative or conflictual tools in achieving his or her political aims. This chapter will cover the EPRR leaders' perceptions of Self and the preferred political tools in foreign policymaking, as measured by the I-1 score in the operational code construct.

In terms of the I-1 score, which measures the strategic orientation of a leader, the EPRR leaders' positions are dispersed. Michaloliakos ($I-1 = -0.083$) is the only EPRR leader with a more conflictual I-1 score than the norming group with statistical significance. Le Pen, Wilders, and Petry also have lower scores than the norming group, but without statistical significance. The other five EPRR leaders have higher I-1 scores, which shows that their foreign policy beliefs regarding the instruments to be used in foreign policy are more cooperative than those of the average world leader. The mean for the I-1 scores of EPRR leaders is slightly lower than the average world leaders but without statistical significance.

To elaborate on the quantitative findings of the foreign policy instruments of EPRR leaders, this chapter is organized into three sections. The first section provides a detailed analysis of the EPRR leaders' political instruments for issues such as European integration (Euro, Schengen, and immigration management) and sanctions against Russia. Given that only a few of the EPRR leaders analyzed in this study have actively participated in the official foreign policymaking of their countries, these instruments will be either in the form of current policies implemented or in the premises to be fulfilled once they take office.

In the second section, it is argued that, contrary to the common belief and presuppositions in public debates, EPRR leaders are not necessarily less cooperative or more conflictual in the instruments they utilize in their foreign policymaking. On the contrary, the average EPRR leader's belief about the Self is almost as cooperative as that of the average world leader. These conclusions will be supported both through the I-1 scores in the operational code construct and through in-depth analysis of the references to the Self and to policy instruments in texts by these specific EPRR leaders. The chapter will end with a discussion on the underlying reasons for these 'not-necessarily-conflictual' foreign policy instruments, namely socialization, mainstreaming, and cooperation among EPRR actors.

7.1 What EPRR Leaders Offer: Measures and Instruments

7.1.1 Geert Wilders: Stop Appeasing the Enemy and Hold the Door!

We will make our countries safe, sovereign, and great again (Wilders, 2016b).

Table 20: Comparison of Wilders' I-1 score to the Norming Group and the Average of EPRR Leaders

	Norming group n=164	Geert Wilders n=20	Average EPRR n=116
I-1 Strategic approach to goals (conflict/cooperation)	0.401	0.27	0.385

What an EPRR leader promises to do once he or she takes office starts with a harsh critique of what the establishment leader has been doing. This premise is also true for Wilders as he repeatedly targets the establishment leaders at the national and European levels. Frequently, Wilders reminds his audience of the failure of the appeasement policy implemented by European leaders against the rise of Hitler to make an analogy with current European policies on Islam and terrorism. Making the same mistakes again after 70 years, “our Western leaders” are again looking away and appeasing the evil, and this time, the evil is Islam. For Wilders, being taken to court many times on allegations of hate speech has always been a crucial point in the development of his mindset since he interprets these allegations as the establishment appeasing and even collaborating with the enemy, i.e., with Islam. According to Wilders (2015h), the establishment tries to deprive him of freedom of speech “because of cowardice, ignorance and political opportunism and false correctness.”

War against Islam and the related sub-issues, such as border control, homeland security, and migration management, are the core policy areas for Wilders. He argues that while the armies of Western countries bomb ISIS in Syria and Iraq, they should also pay attention to protecting the homeland. He questions the rationale behind the Dutch army’s presence in Mali or Afghanistan instead of protecting the homeland. As Wilders (2015b) considers Islam “the cause of the terror and misery,” he urges three measures: First, the Netherlands should put an end to immigration from Muslim countries. Secondly, there should be a domestic expelling of “all criminals of foreign nationality and, for those offenders who have dual nationality, deprive them of their Dutch citizenship, sending them back to the country of their other nationality.” Finally, the government should encourage the “non-Western immigrants” to go back to their countries of origin voluntarily (Wilders, 2014d).

Even if Wilders (2015c) accepts that refugees who flee their homes should be provided with safety, he stresses that “they should be accommodated in their region. Not here. Not in Europe.” It should particularly be the immensely rich Gulf States helping these people by giving them asylum or providing shelter in safe regions because “these

countries have a moral obligation to take in their fellow Muslims” (Wilders, 2015i). Regarding migration management, Wilders proposes to implement the Australian model: pushing the immigrant boats back and providing new ships with food and water if necessary, but never allowing a single illegal immigrant into the country.

Wilders knows that it is almost impossible to implement the abovementioned measures under the roof of the European Union and therefore proposes to reclaim the homeland from the EU. The Eurozone and the Schengen Treaty are the most harmful policies within the Union. Revoking the Euro and the Schengen Treaty will give national sovereignty and control of the Dutch national borders. He believes that Brexit will inspire many other European countries to take the same steps. For Wilders (2015g), there are two excellent and working models already in Europe. One is Switzerland: “in the heart of Europe, but not part of the European Union. Access to internal markets, but able to free trade with China, Japan, the booming markets of South East Asia.” The other one is the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which stands for “friendship and cooperation through free trade” without robbing anyone’s sovereignty (Wilders, 2015i).

While on the one hand rejecting supranational cooperation and the outcomes of European integration, Wilders (2014c) makes tremendous effort to establish a Western block “to fight for freedom and oppose Islam.” He travels a lot and speaks to local groups sharing his anti-Islam views. Therefore, leaving the EU does not translate into isolationism; it is a new door opening to a new form of cooperation among free nations to make their countries safe, sovereign, and great again.

7.1.2 Viktor Orbán: No Country for Idealism in Foreign Policy

We have to take Russia as it is, not as it is in our dreams. That's the Hungarian approach (Orbán, 2016u).

Table 21: Comparison of Orbán's I-1 Score to the Norming Group and the Average of EPRR Leaders

	Norming group n=164	Viktor Orbán n=26	Average EPRR n=116
I-1 Strategic approach to goals (conflict/cooperation)	0.401	0.518	0.385

Being the only head of state among the EPRR leaders analyzed in this study, Orbán can turn his words into deeds. Therefore, Orbán is living proof that populists will remain populists even if they take office, contrary to the false but appealing belief that populists can only succeed in opposition (Werner, 2017: 41). In the domestic arena, Orbán exercised all four features of populists in power as put forward by Werner (2017: 4): Hijacking the state apparatus, corruption, mass clientelism, and suppression of civil society. In foreign policy, on the other hand, Orbán uses a language of cooperation and diplomacy, but in his own unique way. Knowing that the size and the influence of Hungary will never lead to a significant role in Europe, Orbán (2016g; 2016u) argues that Hungary's role in international affairs is always bilateral and can only be strengthened through good relations within the Visegrád Group and only if "Berlin, Moscow, and Ankara are on our side – or are interested in Hungary's success and livelihood, even if we do not always agree on certain questions." In this regard, Orbán's foreign policy instruments will be discussed below according to particular subjects such as the Visegrád Group, border control and migration management, relations with Russia, and his understanding of the European Union.

To better understand Orbán's approach to foreign policy, three cases are very illustrative. The first is his praise for the OECD for not striving for a political role and not seeking "to take control of any country," unlike many other international institutions that declare themselves neutral but then impose a specific political position upon their

members (Orbán, 2016j). Secondly, in a meeting to strengthen relations with China, Orbán (2016r) criticized “the conventional Western way of thinking” for representing itself as “a superior ideal and culture.” Instead, Orbán (2016r) acknowledges that “each house has its own customs” and “Hungarians are not enthusiastic about the export of various political and economic systems” when they extend their level of cooperation with China. Finally, Orbán expresses a similar view on how Hungary approaches the Russian issue. Unlike Westerners, Orbán (2016u) argues, freedom is not the primary concentration of politics and democracy in Russia; it is instead the challenge “to keep together a country which is almost impossible to keep together.” For this reason, Hungary and the West “have to take Russia as it is, not as it is in our dreams” (Orbán, 2016u). In short, for Orbán, foreign policy should be based on realist expectations and interests as well as international law rather than cosmopolitan ideals, which may not fit for every country. While he expresses his approach towards China and Russia accordingly, he also expects to be treated in the same way by international society.

The Visegrád Group, which was founded in 1991 with a document signed by the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary, initially aimed at achieving membership in the European Union. In 2004, following the EU accession of these countries, the V4 Group updated its mission and extended its cooperation areas. For Orbán, the V4 is an essential strategic tool for Hungary given the limited power of the country individually. Therefore, it is only through standing together on major international issues that these four countries can achieve success at European and global levels. For Orbán (2016h), the V4 is a success story, whose cooperation is “an internationally recognized fact, its organizational expression is widely accepted, and it is a major reference point and resource for Hungarian diplomacy.” The V4 countries have regular bilateral meetings as well as periodical summits, in which the member countries develop shared positions in specific policy areas. Especially in their efforts in the European Commission, against the compulsory resettlement quotas for migrants, the V4 countries have stood together.

From the very beginning of the crisis, Orbán has been defending the idea that migrants should not be allowed into Europe. He is very proud of the “fence” that has been built

along Hungary's borders and the success in defending the Schengen borders. The idea of a fence is the only working solution for the EU. Orbán (2016o) argues that "we must take the migrants out of the territory of the EU." Contrary to the cosmopolitan idea that borders should be abolished, he supports their enhancement. He admits that the idea of a fence does not seem sympathetic, but everyone should accept that "the protection of the external border is not a thing of beauty, it is not a matter of aesthetics, and it cannot be done with flowers and cuddly toys" (Orbán, 2016k). Unlike other EPRR leaders analyzed in this study, Viktor Orbán (2016e) interprets the Schengen Treaty as not the source of the problem but as the solution to it: It already includes terms urging for the control of the external borders of the Schengen area. Here, control should be followed by the steps of identification, interception, and turning back. His positive attitude towards the Schengen Treaty can be interpreted as a defense against the criticisms by mostly the British, who are not comfortable with the vast number of free movers of Central European origin migrating to Britain.

The referendum held in Hungary in 2016 was an important policy tool for Orbán in his policymaking at the European level. Against the compulsory resettlement quota proposed by the European Commission, Orbán asked the Hungarian people in a referendum whose results could easily be predicted. Orbán (2016p) openly argued that the high turn-out and more than 90 percent votes for the rejection of the proposition represent a weapon that is "strong enough in Brussels." This referendum showed that it should be Budapest, not Brussels, who decides "on whom we wish to live together with" (Orbán, 2016p). In other words, it was a case when a populist leader played the majoritarian democracy card in foreign affairs.

Even if he criticizes the undemocratic steps taken by Brussels, Orbán (2016l) is definitely for Europe and the European Union, and he also recommends to Serbia that "on the whole, I cannot suggest to you a better alternative than trying to move as close to the European Union as possible." However, this is a rich but weak Europe, which needs essential repairs, most importantly for strengthening the role of national parliaments. The underlying idea should be that "the institutions are there for the Member States, not

the other way round” (Orbán, 2016k). National interests cannot be put behind European interests, and if nations are deprived of their character and ambitions, then this will prevent the European Union from making itself great again (Orbán, 2012). In short, the EU and Hungary’s membership are vital as long as they function at a level closer to intergovernmental cooperation than the supranational United States of Europe. This is why Orbán is not enthusiastic about joining the Eurozone, which means for him giving up one of the essential elements of national sovereignty (Orbán, 2016h).

Looking at bilateral relations, Orbán (2016a) always stresses the importance of improving relations based on mutual respect, which “is a scarce commodity in Europe today.” Among the analyzed texts of the Hungarian leader, there are several press statements that he made following his meetings with the Bulgarian, Polish, and Serbian prime ministers, as well as with the President of Russia and representatives of the Communist Party of China. In each press statement, Orbán (2016l) promotes Hungary as “a good choice for a partner” and the Hungarian side’s willingness to support economic relations.

Russia and China deserve a separate paragraph, as these two countries provide essential opportunities for Hungary to further its economic development. As discussed above, ideals and values should not be the determinants of relations with these two crucial states. Orbán urges for a normalization of relations between the European Union and Russia because he believes that “Russia is not Hungary’s enemy, but one of its partners. Russia is not threatening our country; it is offering the opportunity for cooperation as partners, which is a precondition for our economic success” (Orbán, 2016d). Sanctions against Russia following its invasion of Crimea are also criticized by Orbán, who instead favors the use of diplomatic tools such as the Minsk Protocol in the settlement of that dispute. The only reason why Hungary, despite its disagreements, supported and accepted the EU position was “because of the EU unity because unity on that delicate issue is valuable and important” (Orbán, 2016u). Orbán (2013a) is also proud of being the number one country in Central Europe in terms of foreign direct investments received from China. The cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European

countries should be improved as these are two dynamically developing regions in the world. The Central and Eastern European countries are doing better than the Eurozone countries in economic development, which is another source of pride for Orbán.

In summary, Orbán benefits from the majoritarian support he has been receiving from the Hungarian people and uses that support to raise an alternative voice within the EU, which is much more nationalist, pragmatist, and even rough, but still cooperative. In other words, unlike many other EPRR leaders, Orbán considers the EU as the best place to be and aims to reform it from within. However, Orbán's foreign policy is multi-dimensional, and it also aims at developing cooperation with global actors such as Turkey, Russia, and China.

7.1.3 Marine Le Pen: Back to the Basics of Conducting International Affairs

Foreign policy is not a question of good or evil. It is about realism, pragmatism, interests that need to be defended, concerns of security and the protection of our nationals. Morality and virtue struggle to accommodate themselves to the realities of the situation (Le Pen, 2015).

Table 22: Comparison of Le Pen's I-1 Score to the Norming Group and the Average of EPRR Leaders

	Norming group n=164	Marine Le Pen n=10	Average EPRR n=116
I-1 Strategic approach to goals (conflict/cooperation)	0.401	0.193	0.385

For Le Pen, the supranational authority of the European Union is responsible for most of the miseries at home and abroad. Interventions in the name of morality and virtue, carried out against stable and secular regimes in the Middle East, such as Saddam Hussein's Iraq, resulted in instability and chaos. Le Pen (2015) admits that Saddam was "an autocrat guilty of crimes against his own people," but still, his secular dictatorship "represented a shield against the progression of religious fundamentalism and its military arm, jihadism." However, the EU and the United States preferred to base their foreign policy on "ideological, conformist, far-fetched notions" instead of realist

principles. Here, the realist principles require a “less harmful” policy according to Le Pen (2015), which she justifies with reference to Churchill’s support of Stalin against Hitler: “If Hitler invaded hell, I would make at least a favorable reference to the devil in the House of Commons.”

The EU’s supranational operation is also the primary reason for the refugee and immigration crisis in Europe according to Le Pen. She promises to suspend the Schengen Treaty to “recover the command and the control of [the French] borders” (Le Pen, 2015) because the pressure exerted by “anarchic immigration” is so high that it prevents proper assimilation. Borders, for Le Pen, should be a filter, but certainly not a wall. Accordingly, the annual number of incoming immigrants to France should be decreased to 10,000 from 200,000. Le Pen (2017a) sympathizes with Donald Trump’s travel ban for some Muslim-populated countries to the United States, arguing that this is a matter of national security and no one should treat it as a scandal.

The other crucial EU-related issue for Le Pen is the Euro. As national currency is one of the vital elements of sovereignty, the lack of it allows others “to oppose on your economic policy, your immigration policy, your social policy” (Le Pen, 2016f). Besides, Le Pen argues that the Euro is used by the EU and Germany as a stick to impose political austerity on member states, weakening their national sovereignty.

As a result of her criticism of the EU based on Schengen and the Euro, Le Pen openly declares her willingness to “destroy the EU,” though not Europe. Her major election promise before the presidential elections of 2017 was to ask the EU to give back the following four sovereignties:

Legislative sovereignty: our laws are more important than EU directives.
Territorial sovereignty: we decide who comes and stays in our country, we want borders. Thirdly, economic and banking sovereignty: I have the right to promote economic patriotism if I so wish. And of course monetary sovereignty (Le Pen, 2016d).

Le Pen (2017c) believes that the failure to transform the EU into a Europe of nations through providing these four sovereignties to the member states again will leave the EU

open to a chaotic collapse. In such a scenario, Le Pen is determined to ask the French people whether or not they want to continue in the EU.

Le Pen (2016b) is in favor of a multipolar world, and in such a world, France will take “its position as the leader of non-aligned states, not with the US, not with Russia and not with Germany.” She rejects taking an anti-Russian position under the influence of Brussels or Washington and considers it “completely natural to maintain commercial and strategic relations with this great power, which is at [Europe’s] doorstep” (Le Pen, 2016f). Since Russia is neither a danger to nor aggressive against France, there is no reason to block the benefits of cooperation with this ally through “stupid sanctions” (Le Pen, 2017a). Le Pen (2016e) also proposes to leave NATO, which is another pillar of her ideal of a French non-alliance because, after the collapse of the USSR, NATO is nothing but “a tool for ensuring that countries that are part of it comply with the will of the United States.” In short, non-alliance in a multipolar world in which France seeks to defend its interests through negotiation, diplomacy, and trade is the key to Le Pen’s understanding of international relations.

The endeavor for economic patriotism is at the core of Le Pen’s vision in the international arena. If it is for the interests of the nation, Le Pen does not oppose the temporary nationalization of a company. She also argues that unmitigated free trade and the free market should be ended to preserve the national culture and local jobs. In public tenders, French companies should be prioritized; local authorities must use French suppliers. France should also refuse to sign the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which brings a “systematic interference of the US abroad” (Le Pen, 2017b).

Economic patriotism, Le Pen (2017b) argues, is not a complicated or difficult target to achieve, but instead, it is “basically quite simple, straightforward.” This understanding of ‘back to the basics’ of international economic relations contributes to the political power of Le Pen as she portrays herself as proposing the commonsensical and the obvious, instead of the pro-EU leaders who push European nations into catastrophic

situations in the name of supranational utopias. In short, in the international arena, unilateralism, non-alliance, and economic protectionism are the major strategies to be used by Le Pen once she is elected, all of which are apparent, right before our eyes, and go without saying.

7.1.4 Frauke Petry: ‘Harmonization? Not Anymore!’

We think that we should not harmonize anymore, as we’ve done over a couple of years. We should go back to national sovereign states still trading with each other (Petry, 2016d).

Table 23: Comparison of Petry’s I-1 Score to the Norming Group and the Average of EPRR Leaders

	Norming group	Frauke Petry	Average EPRR
	n=164	n=7	n=116
I-1 Strategic approach to goals (conflict/cooperation)	0.401	0.274	0.385

As discussed in the previous chapter, Petry portrays herself as a victim of propaganda because of her words ‘just’ quoting an existing German law about the possible use of weapons to protect the German borders. She is indeed for stricter control of the borders through a policy not dictated by Brussels but decided by the German people. Petry argues that the current German government is refusing to take responsibility for securing the national borders and not allowing the border guards to do their jobs. She proposes, “It’s us having to decide which sort of migration we want to accept in our countries” (Petry, 2016a). In other words, she is not very different from the EPRR family in terms of her stance against migration, but her politically incorrect and provocative words about shooting migrants to secure the border have made Petry be considered as a more extreme leader.

Regarding Russia, Petry believes that Germany should perceive Russia as a “priority partner” with whom relations should move forward. Petry and the AfD reject the EU policy of sanctions against Russia as well as NATO’s troops on the western border of

Russia. She argues that cutting the links between the German and Russian economies damaged the German economy, losing almost one percent of Germany's economic growth. Petry (2016d) talks about the negative effects of these sanctions, especially on the German people living in the east of Germany, as "many citizens, entrepreneurs, more sort of small and medium-sized companies...tell me that they suffer from these sanctions."

As the previous chapter has shown, Petry is not anti-EU. She is against the EU that has been imposed by Brussels and Merkel based on the "dead horse" of the Euro and an open-door policy for migration. Petry's criticisms are mostly against Merkel, whose policies destroy European solidarity, which is something valuable for Petry. According to Petry (2016c), the natural corrective to Brussels' centralization and the new vision required for Europe is "the idea of one's own nation." What Petry (2016b) means is not complete isolation but rather "working together in fields where it is necessary but being sovereign in national questions."

Petry is happy to be part of a new Zeitgeist. Trump's election, Brexit, and the rising of national voices in Austria, Belgium, France, and Sweden are components of this Zeitgeist and Petry reflects her own policies as a fight to get the country back from Merkel's government, from the Eurocracy in Brussels, from the European Central Bank, from clans and gangs of migrants, and from the liberal media landscape. She promises to do this within the newly changing atmosphere of Western politics, which puts the nation and national interest before centralized idealist policies.

7.1.5 Nigel Farage: Cooperation without EU? Possible and Desirable

What we want is a Europe of democratic nation-states, trading together, being friends together, but without the flag, without the anthem, without the Commission and without the European Parliament (Farage, 2015f).

Table 24: Comparison of Farage's I-1 Score to the Norming Group and the Average of EPRR Leaders

	Norming Group n=164	Nigel Farage n=21	Average EPRR n=116
I-1 Strategic approach to goals (conflict/cooperation)	0.401	0.481	0.385

Farage is one of the rare examples of an EPRR leader who has been able to turn words into deeds in the foreign affairs of the UK, and he has achieved this even without being the ruling leader of his country. Farage has been the flagman of the Brexit campaign, not only in the few years preceding the Brexit vote but starting from the very first day of his presence in the EP in 1999. Therefore, without any doubt, the UKIP-led Brexit campaign can be considered as the top foreign policy step by Farage, and it dominates his overall position regarding any other issue. Leaving the EU is a passage from the diseased political actions of the EU and of the UK as a member of the EU to ideal political actions, which are only possible if the UK fulfills its national renewal. For this reason, both Farage's criticisms against the EU and his presentation of what should be done instead are important indicators of his instrumental beliefs on foreign policy.

The Leave campaign is a perfect example of a majoritarian card played by EPRR leaders. In Greece, populist left played this card against the austerity measures imposed by the EU, and in 2016, Hungary voted against the EU's migration policies, as discussed in this chapter's section on Viktor Orbán. The EU is one of the worst examples of democratic governance, according to Farage, and what matters and what democracy requires is to directly ask what the British people want for the fate of their country. The emphasis on democracy is the first signifier of his foreign policy instruments: The actions of a state in the international arena should be decided or at least should comply with the will of the people, not the will of the Eurocrats.

Farage always framed the Leave decision not as a move towards isolationism, but, on the contrary, as an opportunity that would open the doors of the broader world to the British people. It was an opportunity to be able to conduct free trade and tariff

abolishment agreements with any country in the world without the oppressive regulations of the EU (Farage, 2016g). According to Farage (2016j), after Brexit, the UK will continue to cooperate with European countries, it will continue to be a European country, and it will maintain its existence as a NATO member and hence a vital ally of the Western countries.

On the contrary, Farage blames the EU for being authoritarian, expansionist, militarist, and conflictual in its foreign policy. It is authoritarian because it dictates a common foreign and security policy for member states (Farage, 2015f). It is expansionist because it tries to expand its sphere of influence through decisions bordering on stupidity, such as its pro-Ukrainian involvement in the Ukraine-Russia conflict (Farage, 2015a). This was stupid because it provoked Russia. Farage (2016e) argues that he is definitely not a fan of Putin, but he is “equally not very keen on going to war with Mr. Putin,” who is actually on Europe’s side in the real war against the real enemy of extremist Islam. Here, Farage reframes the current political conjuncture and argues that it is the Eurocrats who want conflict, but it is the Eurosceptics and Farage who wish to cooperate with Russia for the sake of protection of national interest. Libya was another example of such silly military mistakes by the EU according to Farage, where Farage (2015d) reminds the members of the European Parliament that he “stood here and said that bombing Libya would be a huge mistake,” which resulted in a failed state in Libya used by criminal gangs for human trafficking.

As a result, the repeatedly spoken words about the continuation and even improvement of the cooperation between the UK and other countries as well as the silly and expansionist foreign policy mistakes by the EU can be considered as the second signifier of Farage’s foreign policy instruments. In Farage’s (2016g) own words, “why don’t we just be pragmatic, sensible, grown-up, realist” and act in the international arena through cooperation based on pragmatic and realist expectations, not based on the centralized impositions of the Eurocrats?

7.1.6 Boris Johnson: The Value of Cooperation at an Intergovernmental Level

Can we build a new and prosperous relationship with the rest of the EU, based on free trade and intergovernmental cooperation? Yes, we can (Johnson, 2016a).

Table 25: Comparison of Johnson's I-1 Score to the Norming Group and the Average of EPRR Leaders

	Norming group n=164	Boris Johnson n=8	Average EPRR n=116
I-1 Strategic approach to goals (conflict/cooperation)	0.401	0.559	0.385

Boris Johnson is one of the most cooperative EPRR leaders in terms of the I-1 score of his operational code construct. As in the case of Nigel Farage, Brexit is the dominant theme in Johnson's texts, but it is not the only one thanks to Johnson's position as Foreign Secretary between 2016 and 2018. Therefore, his political instruments in foreign policy will be analyzed in two categories, according to the pre- and post-Brexit periods. In the Leave campaign for Brexit, as a member of the Conservatives, Johnson was an influential figure in mainstreaming the campaign and preventing the campaign from being considered as propaganda of the extreme parties. In general, the overall structure of his arguments is based on 'but' sentences: He is in favor of immigration, but in a controlled manner. He is for cooperation with European countries, but at an intergovernmental level. He supports Brexit, but this does not mean isolation from Europe. As it is also discussed in the previous section in which the political instruments of Nigel Farage were discussed, facing a referendum with only two options, these were the efforts to respond to the arguments by the Remain camp.

One word is continuously repeated in Johnson's texts in the period before the Brexit referendum: control. In a nutshell, Johnson argues that EU membership in its current form deprives Britain of control of its borders, immigration policy, trade policy, public policy, democracy, monetary policy, and public spending. Undoubtedly, immigration and border control are mentioned more often than any other policy area. EU membership, according to Johnson, leaves no other option to member states but to

implement the migration policy developed by Brussels. Therefore, taking control of many policy areas starting from the borders and immigration is the priority of Boris Johnson's political instruments. Johnson aims at leaving the supranational governance scheme of the EU but continuing the cooperation with the same actors at an intergovernmental level, as a state with full control of its borders, monetary policy, public policy, etc. For example, in terms of migration, Johnson presents himself as a pro-migration figure, but for controlled migration, which will allow the UK to accept immigrants on a merit-based basis.

Moreover, leaving this supranational governance body would enable the UK to widen its opportunities for international cooperation with other actors as the restrictions by Brussels would no longer be there. As opposed to the criticisms that Brexit is isolationist, Johnson (2016b) promotes Brexit as a chance for the UK to widen its trade relations with different parts of the world: "It is absurd that Britain has been unable for 42 years to do a free trade deal with Australia, New Zealand, China, India and America," Johnson says. Again, he emphasizes that Brexit is not a rejection of cooperation but rather a revision of the level, form, and scope of this cooperation. For Johnson (2016b), this is the correct form of collaboration, which makes Brexit "the great project of European liberalism." That is to say, Brexit is not a move away from liberal values; it is the required step towards the core values of liberalism. In this sense, Brexit is portrayed as a cooperative instrument by Johnson rather than giving up on cooperation.

Looking at the period after the Brexit decision, holding the title of Foreign Secretary, Johnson enjoyed the chance to be the official voice of the British government in international affairs. During his tenure, he harshly criticized Russia's actions, especially in Syria, which are "patently war crimes," and stated that they would "remain committed to all kinds of European cooperation – at an intergovernmental level," including the maintenance of sanctions against Russia for its actions in Ukraine (Johnson, 2016f). Likewise, Johnson emphasizes the increasing number of illiberal and authoritarian governments in Africa. He admits that "collective inaction" by international society has brought a severe price for the same global society, as is the case in Syria, and he issues

calls to “work together to alleviate their suffering, to help Syria’s neighbors and to prepare Syria for the moment when peace finally returns” (Johnson, 2017b).

In doing so, Johnson relies on both the hard power and soft power of his country. He admits that the role of hard power has changed in the 21st-century’s world. However, if the armed forces are given “clear and achievable missions,” Britain “can still be remarkably effective and with 2 percent of [Britain’s] GDP spent on defence we will be the leading military player in western Europe for the foreseeable future” (Johnson, 2016f). In addition to the changing but continuing importance of hard power, Johnson believes that soft power is also increasingly important, which corresponds to the “vast and subtle and pervasive extension of British influence around the world,” including the English language and literature, the BBC, and sports.

Therefore, with this in-depth reading of Johnson’s speeches in operational code analysis, it is no surprise that he is one of the most cooperative EPRR leaders in terms of the political instruments used or to be used in reaching goals in the international arena. Being at the core of his focus, Brexit is portrayed as an opportunity for the British people to have a better and more correct form of cooperation in their relations with other countries, instead of being a step towards isolationism or unilateralism in many policy areas such as trade and migration. Also, it is observed that Johnson promotes cooperation at an intergovernmental level in dealing with international crises such as those in Syria and Ukraine. For this reason, the content of Johnson’s speeches conforms to his I-1 results in the operational code construct.

7.1.7 Jimmie Åkesson: An Ambivalent Case

We should keep a light structure, to ensure cooperation between sovereign states. Some treaties are good, some others are bad. It will be difficult, but we will have to revise drastically the functioning of Europe. Anyway now, borders must be closed, and must remain closed for some time... (Åkesson, 2015a).

Table 26: Comparison of Åkesson's I-1 Score to the Norming Group and the Average of EPRR Leaders

	Norming group n=164	Jimmie Åkesson n=6	Average EPRR n=116
I-1 Strategic approach to goals (conflict/cooperation)	0.401	0.503	0.385

In terms of the I-1 score, Åkesson is one of the EPRR leaders with a more cooperative strategic approach to goals compared to the norming group, but without statistical significance. Taking into account his conflictual P-1 score and his over-emphasis of the role of geopolitics in his understanding of the political universe, it could have been expected that his I-1 score would be lower than that of the norming group. However, an in-depth reading of his texts proves the ambivalent position regarding his strategic orientation: Åkesson, on the one hand, emphasizes the need to increase the national defense capability of Sweden, the need to protect the borders unilaterally and to close borders for a while. On the other hand, he continues to refer to his and his party's commitment to maintaining cooperation with Europe and the world in terms of trade and war against terrorism, but without the centralized involvement of the European Union.

According to Åkesson (2016c), the massive migration flow in recent years is a result of the policies imposed by the European Union, and this proves that "the EU cannot be trusted with the task of protecting the outer borders" and "each country must, therefore, assume the responsibility of their own borders." This is a clear applied example of the unilateral thinking of the realist strategic culture: Åkesson argues that, first, the national borders cannot be open, but they should be protected. He even claims that the borders should be closed and stay closed for a while, i.e., "welcoming policy must stop" (Åkesson, 2015a). Secondly, national borders should be protected not through the legislation by Brussels but by the national authorities of the respective countries. Åkesson (2015a) wishes that "Sweden remains an independent nation-state" in a Europe constituted of nation-states, which he defines as "national conservatism."

Against the threats from the Russian side, Åkesson argues, it is a necessity to strengthen the national defense capability in cooperation with NATO, but without becoming a NATO member or without having NATO troops on Swedish soil. "I am not opposed to NATO. I am opposed to Swedish membership of NATO" (Åkesson, 2016b), he argues, and he attacks the pro-NATO parties in the Swedish parliament for "dismantling the Swedish Armed Forces" for 25 years. Therefore, the defense capabilities of Sweden should be increased without it becoming a member of NATO (Åkesson, 2016b). This is because the presence of NATO bases on Swedish soil could increase the risk of an attack, according to Åkesson. Concerning a potential security dilemma between Sweden and Russia, Åkesson (2016b) warns about the possibility of an increased risk of an attack by the potential enemy, i.e., Russia. This is another reason why Åkesson rejects NATO's presence in Sweden and seeks the strengthening of national defense capabilities.

Åkesson is well aware of the importance of cooperation and trade for Sweden, being a small country, which needs to sell its products. In addition to economic cooperation, he believes that the 'war' against Islamist terror also requires close collaboration with not only Western countries but also with the Muslim world. Establishing safe zones, conducting peacekeeping missions, and providing humanitarian aid are the pillars of this international cooperation.

In a gala organized by the Sweden Democrats and UKIP jointly in Stockholm under the name of the European Freedom Award, Åkesson (2016c), as the host, welcomed populist right leaders from all around the world by saying that

we are not only friends. We share something else. ... We want to cooperate. We want to engage in dialogue, we want to work together in order to solve common problems, but we want all that without selling our freedom or selling ourselves to Brussels.

Åkesson's primary point was that the argument provided by EU followers that the EU is the precondition for the continuation of cooperation in Europe is a fallacy. Instead, the EU is not capable of protecting its outer borders, and its economic project is also collapsing. As opposed to this fallacy, Åkesson (2017) argues that his party "wants to

put the security and welfare of Swedish citizens first” and the cooperation between his party and other like-minded parties in Europe is “proof that the EU followers are wrong” (Åkesson, 2016c).

7.1.8 Norbert Hofer: Gentle and Softer Struggle for Austrian Interests

The reason is always the war. It was the war in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya. It was blood for oil. Every time. This is the reason (Hofer, 2016b).

Table 27: Comparison of Hofer’s I-1 Score to the Norming Group and the Average of EPRR Leaders

	Norming group	Norbert Hofer	Average EPRR
	n=164	n=5	n=116
I-1 Strategic approach to goals (conflict/cooperation)	0.401	0.81	0.385

Just as he is the most cooperative EPRR leader in terms of his P-1 score, Austria’s Norbert Hofer has the highest I-1 score in comparison to his counterparts. Stressing the primacy of Austria’s national interests, Hofer continuously refers to the importance of cooperation at the regional, European, and global levels. Owing to the Austrian legacy of neutrality, the FPÖ leader even makes calls for peace talks between the parties of ongoing armed or unarmed conflicts. An in-depth reading of Hofer’s words conforms to the numerical values retrieved through Profiler Plus for him, as there is not even a small amount of conflictual attitude in his texts. In this section, his perception of the Self, i.e., the instruments to be used in foreign policy, are discussed with specific references to Hofer’s thoughts about what to do regarding the current status of the EU, the immigration/refugee crisis, Russia, etc.

Like any other politician, Hofer (2016a) also believes that the primary motivation of a leader should be “to act in the interest of their own country.” This is why he favors Orbán’s leadership style over that of Merkel, saying that “Viktor Orbán is a leader who represents the interests of his country strongly” (Hofer, 2016a). However, Hofer (2016a)

prefers to represent the interests of Austria in a softer and gentle style than that of Orbán. He notes that the fact that a leader acts in favor of his or her country's interests should not necessarily be at the expense of the interests of other countries. He believes an intelligent decision will work for the benefit of different parties in the international arena, whether in inter-state relations or relations between a member state and the EU.

Even if he formally opposed Austrian membership in the EU and voted against the accession in 1994, he does not seek an 'Öxit' as he believes that it will create severe damage to the economy. In terms of the level and the form of cooperation within the EU, Hofer makes a distinction between big and little things: Big things, such as economy, security, and energy, require further collaboration. However, on the other hand, little things like agricultural policy or regulations about pubs in Vienna should not be the business of the EU, and they should be dealt with individually by member states.

Hofer approaches the immigrant/refugee crisis issue from a benevolent point of view. As a "nation ready to help" and which has provided sanctuary to those in need (Hofer, 2016a), Hofer points out the necessity of defining the crisis correctly. According to him, what Europe has been witnessing is not a refugee crisis but a migration crisis, and it is possible to handle it, which the EU has been unable to do. Hofer's (2016b) road map to deal with the issue can be summarized as follows: (i) better control of the Schengen borders (Hofer purposefully refrains from using the word 'close'), (ii) supporting the neighboring countries of the Schengen area to this end, (iii) establishing safe zones in North Africa where these people will have humane living conditions, and (iv) making the necessary evaluations to find out who is a real refugee and who is just an economic migrant, and then helping the genuine asylum seekers to be officially and safely transported to Europe. Thus, even if Hofer's ultimate aim for the human flow into Europe is similar to that of the other EPRR leaders, which is to keep millions of people away from Europe, Hofer's approach and discourse are different in the sense that his starting point is the safety and the well-being of the migrants/refugees.

Cooperation is a popular word for Hofer. First, sympathizing with the V4 initiative among the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, Hofer clearly expresses his will to make Austria the fifth member of this regional organization for geographical and historical reasons. Noting that his willingness to collaborate with the V4 “has nothing to do with Habsburg nostalgia or monarchism,” Hofer believes that such regional cooperation will create benefits for Austria by strengthening its position within the EU. He believes that the V4 is already beneficial for the EU itself, as it plays an “inner-corrective” role. Secondly, for Hofer, Russia is an important partner to cooperate with, unlike the negative attitude of Brussels, including the sanctions. Hofer (2016d) repeatedly argues that the sanctions must be ended, as he believes that peace and freedom in the region are not possible without friendship with Russia. Thirdly, cooperation with China is essential for him. He argues that Europe should consider China’s willingness to invest in Europe but, of course, without any selling-out of Europe in terms of democratic and liberal values.

Hofer is proud of the neutrality of Austria in the past and its role as a mediator in international crises. Therefore, he is willing to “continue this tradition” to provide a fresh perspective in the Syrian peace negotiations or the relations between the USA and Russia. Due to his commitment to Austrian neutrality, it is not a surprise that he is the most cooperative leader among all EPRR leaders. Surely there are specific points of rejection by Hofer regarding further cooperation or enlargement (such as his rejection of the TTIP, Turkey’s membership, etc.), but his overall stance is an example of true cooperative leadership in the international arena. This stance is highly supported by his I-1 scores regarding the instruments to be used in foreign policy.

7.1.9 Nikolaos Michaloliakos: War is an Option for Greeks!

All these must end, but in order to end there is need for courage, faith, hard work and definitely a NATIONAL PLAN and alliances (Michaloliakos, 2017c).

Table 28: Comparison of Michaloliakos' I-1 Score to the Norming Group and the Average of EPRR Leaders

	Norming group	Nikolaos Michaloliakos	Average EPRR
	n=164	n=13	n=116
I-1 Strategic approach to goals (conflict/cooperation)	0.401	-0.083	0.385

As a natural consequence of Michaloliakos' extremely low P-1 score and conflictual beliefs about the political universe, he is also the EPRR leader with the lowest I-1 score, and the only EPRR leader with a lower I-1 score than the average world leader with statistical significance. Feeling the constant threat of Turkey, Michaloliakos' political tools are shaped by experiences from history and the failure of the recent Greek government.

Michaloliakos has two major criticisms of Greek policymakers in terms of the political instruments in foreign policy: Pacifism and the wrong allies. He argues that “the logic of the cowards” prevails in Greek foreign policy: “there is nothing we can do, we have no power” (Michaloliakos, 2017d). This was true for the Greek delegation in Lausanne, as he argues that the Lausanne Treaty was a victory for Turks but a defeat for Greeks. This was also true in the 1940s and 1950s when the Turkish government had “successful” propaganda in Western Thrace to Turkify the Muslims living in this region. This was also true for the Imia (*Kardak*) crisis between Turkey and Greece in 1996, and it is still true for the Greek policies against the constant threats by the Turkish government under the rule of Erdoğan and by the European Union. Therefore, Michaloliakos (2017b) rejects this ongoing pacifism by the Greek governments and claims a stronger agency for Greece in conducting its foreign policy.

This claim for stronger agency also includes a reminder that international civil society forces the Greeks to be “civilized people,” but there are not only civilized people in Greece but also real patriots. Also, if war is necessary, war is an option against Turkey “in order to reassure our national liberty and sovereignty” (Michaloliakos, 2016e). War

is not something to be afraid of, and the imposition of political correctness should not make the Greek people forget this option. On the contrary, Greek governments are disarming the country in the name of social prosperity, which will result in making Greece a hostage and satellite of Turkey.

Michaloliakos' second instrumental criticism is about the allies of Greece.

Michaloliakos (2016b) does not believe in cooperation, as he quotes Andreas Kalvos, a Greek poet: "The hand offered by a foreign nation is the hand of slavery and subjugation." However, for Michaloliakos, international alliances with like-minded and religiously similar countries and groups are still crucial for the sake of national interests. As the Euro crisis and the bailout imposed by the EU and especially Germany showed, the EU is not one of these groups with which Greece should establish an alliance. The EU policies transformed Greece into a "debt colony without national sovereignty" (Michaloliakos, 2017c). As a consequence of this perspective, he proposes to leave the Eurozone and return to the national currency.

On the contrary, Russia is one of these ideal allies, and Europe with Russia would be crucial for Greeks as Greeks would have hundreds of millions of Orthodox people on their side. Michaloliakos (2017f) is also very hopeful about the "materialization of the axis of Russia and Iran," which threatens Turkey. Therefore, he argues that for the survival of the Greek nation, the geopolitical orientation of Hellenism should be towards Orthodox Russia instead of an EU shaped by political correctness and open society. Besides Russia, Trump is another political actor to be followed and to be allied with as his success is a hope for the end of globalization and the domination of a new model of economic nationalism (Michaloliakos, 2017a).

In summary, an in-depth reading of Michaloliakos' texts confirms his conflictual I-1 results as he promotes a much more aggressive foreign policy against especially Turkey, which may even include the use of arms. He does not refrain from publicly calling for war. Also, his mind, shaped by several conspiracy theories, does not let him think about cooperation in the international arena. Instead, he is only supportive of alliances with

culturally and politically similar parties such as Russia and Trump's new United States. Given this, Michaloliakos could be expected to utilize conflictual tools if he gains power in the decision-making processes of his country's foreign policy.

7.2 EPRR Leaders: Socialization, Mainstreaming, and Cooperation

As shown by the I-1 scores of the EPRR leaders (except for Michaloliakos, none of the EPRR leaders have lower I-1 scores than the average world leader with statistical significance) as well as the in-depth reading of their texts, EPRR leaders are not necessarily more conflictual in terms of their beliefs about the instruments to be used in foreign policy. Instead, they want to return to the roots of modern international relations, where individual nation-states act with full sovereignty in the international arena, seek to maximize their national interests with unilateral tools, and only cooperate at the intergovernmental level. Therefore, it can be concluded that the widespread belief that EPRR leaders are conflictual by nature in terms of their instruments and measures in the international arena is not correct. They are not necessarily more conflictual than the average world leader, and the underlying reasons for this are multi-faceted:

- Socialization of the EPRR leaders in the European political culture, which has been cooperative since World War II.
- The fear of stigmatization as an extreme and marginal political party and leader.
- EPRR leaders already cooperating among themselves to maintain and strengthen their rise and eventually create a new consensus in Europe.

In the following sections, each of these three underlying reasons will be discussed.

7.2.1 Socialization into European Political Culture

According to Sigel, political socialization refers to the “process by which people learn to adopt the norms, values, attitudes, and behaviors accepted and practiced by the ongoing system” (cited in Freedman & Freedman, 1981: 258). In their formative periods, adolescents acquire and develop political orientations from their parents and major sociopolitical forces and events in the society in which they live (Beck & Jennings, 1991: 743). In the discipline of IR, socialization refers to the processes that result “in the

internalization of norms so that they assume their ‘taken for granted’ nature” (Risse, 1997: 16). Within the rationalist tradition, actors socialize with pre-defined identities and interests, and it merely refers to learning from the behavior of other actors and making cost-benefit analyses accordingly. In other words, actors emulate the successful foreign policy behaviors of other actors (Waltz, 1979: 77). However, for the constructivist approaches in IR, socialization holds a more prominent place. Actors’ identities and interests are constituted continuously through socialization, as opposed to the assumption of pre-defined identities and interests for the rationalist approaches. In other words, socialization affects the decisions and the behaviors of policymakers, not as a simple determinant of the cost-benefit and hence the decision-making process, but through profoundly changing the norms, ideas, and values of the actor (Beyers, 2010: 911).

On the other hand, from a Gramscian point of view, Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990: 289) argue that socialization is a process in which the state elites “internalize the norms and value orientations espoused by the hegemon and, as a consequence, become socialized into the community formed by the hegemon and other nations accepting its leadership position.” Schimmelfennig (2000: 111) defines international socialization as a “process that is directed toward a state’s internalization of the constitutive beliefs and practices institutionalized in its international environment.” Therefore, for Schimmelfennig (2000: 112), international socialization “generally refers to the socialization of states” and “it does not necessarily require personal internalization at the level of policymakers.”

The question of the level of analysis (whether international socialization occurs at the state or the individual level) is one of the points of debate despite many consensual assumptions in the literature (such as defining it as a social process directed towards the ideas emerging elsewhere, or an autonomous process rather than a compulsory one). Morin and Gold (2016: 5) argue that “the residual difference between a state and an individual perspective on international socialization is methodological rather than theoretical.” While the state perspective focuses on the policies of the states that are members of the same international organization or share similar geographic or cultural

backgrounds to find examples of socialization, the individual perspective uses interviews, participatory observations, and surveys as its data-collection method (Beyers, 2005; Checkel, 2003). These methods apply the individual perspective to better understand and document the cognitive variations of policymakers, which makes it a more proper approach within the scope of the present study.

Another useful capacity of the individual perspective on socialization is that it can distinguish between two levels or types of internalization. The first type of internalization is called acculturation or “type 1 internalization,” in which the individual does not need to believe literally in the norms promoted by the socializer. The second type is called persuasion or “type II internalization,” and it refers to the internalization of foreign ideas as “valid and legitimate” (Morin & Gold, 2016: 5). Type II internalization is much more stable and more profound than type I. Socialization in the rationalist approach and these two types of socialization at the individual level also correspond to three mechanisms that can operate in the shift from the logic of consequences to the logic of appropriateness, namely strategic calculations, role-playing, and normative suasion (Checkel, 2005).

As discussed in the previous chapter, Europe after World War II had a peaceful political atmosphere compared to its past. The widening and the deepening of European integration have contributed to this peaceful atmosphere. The EU has become successful in transforming the other European countries that wanted to become EU members through its conditionality mechanisms. Also, standing as a normative power, it has created a consensus in the continent on certain principles and norms such as the centrality of peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. These norms diffuse through the mechanisms of contagion, informational diffusion, procedural diffusion, transference, overt diffusion, and cultural filter (Manner, 2002).

Socialization through the EU’s transformative power is not only present at state and individual levels, but these presences are also mutually dependent. As argued by

Ikenberry and Kupchan, the state elite's socialization plays an essential role in the transfer of norms from one state to another or from one hegemonic power to a state. Admittedly, looking at the increasing number of 'illiberal' leaders within Europe and its periphery, it is argued that the EU's transformative capacity has been weakening in a rapidly shifting global order (Öniş & Kutlay, 2019). The EU's appeal is in a period of decline, as shown by the anti-EU movements' increasing success across the continent. However, it is important to not equate the anti-EU position to the total rejection of the Europe-wide consensus on certain principles and norms diffused by the European integration, as listed in the previous paragraph. Even if leaders have harsh criticisms of the EU and the Brussels elite, they still stress the centrality of peace and the importance of individual liberty, democracy, and rule of law. They even argue that it is the EU itself betraying these principle values, and their struggle is a corrective one in this regard.

Therefore, it is possible to argue that the EPRR leaders have been socialized into the European political culture that has been successfully created by EU-led forces in reaching the third stage of a norm's life cycle, i.e., internalization (the first two being norm emergence and norm cascade) (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Just as "few people today discuss whether women should be allowed to vote, whether slavery is useful, or whether medical personnel should be granted immunity during war" (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 895), the abovementioned norms promoted by the EU have also been internalized by almost everyone, even including the EPRR leaders. In the scope of the present study, Greek leader Nikolaos Michaloliakos can be considered as the tiny minority who still resists internalizing these values. Even though these EPRR leaders reject or harshly criticize the EU, they are still proponents of European civilization while they proudly declare their Europeanness, and at this point, the normative component of Europeanness is as crucial as its geographic and cultural component. To conclude, socialization of the EPRR leaders within the European political culture, which has been shaped by the fundamental norms and principles of the EU, is the first reason why EPRR leaders are not necessarily more conflictual than any other world leader.

7.2.2 Fear of Stigmatization

The radical right in Europe has gone through a “long process of modernization and moderation that has played an important role in the movement’s journey towards the mainstream” (Mulhall, 2019: 2). To gain a certain level of legitimacy in the mainstream political sphere (based on their goals, i.e., vote-seeking, issue-seeking, or office-seeking), these parties and leaders have adopted new strategies that are more compatible with liberal democracy. Such a new approach has included distancing themselves from their past and a re-modeling or at least re-phrasing of their ideologies and discourses. Their efforts to move from the fringes to the mainstream of the political sphere resulted in increased acceptance of these parties and leaders, bringing higher shares of votes in the elections. In this section, the influence of these mainstreaming efforts by the EPRR parties and leaders on their ‘not-necessarily-conflictual’ I-1 beliefs will be discussed.

‘Mainstream,’ on the one hand, refers to center-left and center-right parties. On the other hand, it refers to established parties, “defined on the basis of their loyalty to the political system” (Akkerman et al., 2016: 7). As opposed to the mainstream parties, radical right-wing populist parties have non-centrist programs, which focus mainly on sociocultural issues rather than socioeconomic ones and an anti-establishment outlook. The party’s reputation is also important, and this should be considered as a factor that distinguishes these parties from mainstream parties (Akkerman et al., 2016: 8). Gaining a reputation as a legitimate political actor and competitor is very difficult for these parties and leaders because they are often demonized by mainstream parties (Van Heerden, 2014). This is why contesting these demonizations and portraying themselves as legitimate actors are of the utmost importance for the EPRR parties and leaders.

For Berman (2008), two arguments explain the moderating effect of inclusion in democratic institutions and procedures. The first one is the vote-seeking logic. According to Downs (1957), political parties will appeal to the median voter if they want to get the majority of the votes. This is called the “median-voter theorem,” and its logical consequence is that inclusion in electoral politics has a moderation effect on political actors. Such a vote-seeking logic will help smooth out the radical elements in

the ideology and the discourse of the actor. In other words, if the actor wants to rule in a democratic country, he/she should appeal to the median voters and hence decrease the number and the tune of radical elements. The second explanation, according to Berman, is that the requirement to form coalitions in many Western European countries makes the populist radical right parties adjust their agendas and positions so that they become potential coalition members.

Admittedly, not all parties and their leaders have the same goals. According to Pedersen (1982: 8), “the goal of any minor party is to pass the threshold of relevance, and, to become an influential, at best a ruling party.” In this respect, an EPRR party and its leader may seek office, specific policies, or just increased votes. While in the 1990s and early 2000s, EPRR parties “seemed to focus on votes” (Akkerman et al., 2016: 13), most of them are either office-seeking or policy-seeking actors today. Their pursuit of office or policy (as in the case of UKIP during the Brexit referendum), but especially the former, can be considered as the core reason for the mainstreaming of the EPRR in the 2000s. In the new millennium, these parties have had increased opportunities to run for the presidency or to join government coalitions, and therefore they have moved from the fringes to the mainstream. They have to become reliable and credible candidates for the office or reliable and credible allies for other parties “by toning down their anti-establishment rhetoric, obeying the parliamentary rules, and ‘sanitizing’ their party” (Akkerman et al., 2016: 15).

The best example of such sanitization is the case of Marine Le Pen and her story of “de-demonizing” her party. Shields (2013: 190) argues that FN leader Marine Le Pen changed her party “from that led almost its entire lifespan by her father, not just in the renewal of its personnel but in the renewal, too, of its policies and discourse.” It is for sure that the elements of the traditional FN program and rhetoric are still present in Marine Le Pen’s party, which can be summarized as the idea that “French society is tainted by foreign influences and lax governmental public security policies and oppressed by the dictates of European integration and economic globalization” (Stockemer, 2017: 27). However, these elements remain in Marine Le Pen’s FN in

“attenuated forms that pay regard to public opinion and to a standard of political acceptability” (Shields, 2013: 191). Similarly, Stockemer (2017: 32) also argues that, for Marine Le Pen, it is not the content that has changed but “the form and the set-up of the message.”

As discussed in the previous section, EPRR leaders, strategically or truly, adopt the fundamental norms and principles of European integration. It could be argued that these norms and principles play a crucial role in the mainstreaming of the EPRR, as the leaders set their discourses based on these norms and principles. The ‘war’ against political correctness by the EPRR leaders is a good example, and they wage this war through the weapon of ‘free speech.’ Mulhall (2019: 7) quotes a speech by a far-right activist in England, speaking in the famous Speakers’ Corner of Hyde Park, which is well known for being a symbolic place of free speech in England. The activist says, “I assume you all are lovers of free speech because you have come to Speakers’ Corner. The tradition of free speech in the United Kingdom is dead. The battle, our battle for freedom of speech has just begun” (Mulhall, 2019: 7). From an ordinary activist in Hyde Park to the leader of the Netherlands’ PVV, Geert Wilders, freedom of speech is a useful tool for self-definition. Wilders describes an audience gathered to listen to him in California with these words: “This gathering here tonight is heavily protected. Why? We are no criminals. We are peaceful, ordinary citizens exercising a fundamental right in our free society, the right of free speech. This is something the American Founding Fathers fought for and enshrined in the First Amendment of your Constitution” (Wilders, 2015h). In short, to declare legitimate agency in the political sphere and to mainstream themselves, EPRR parties and leaders use the fundamental norms and principles, through which the mainstream parties demonize them.

Foreign policy is not an exception in this regard. Just as EPRR leaders try to prove themselves as reliable, credible, and legitimate actors of democratic politics both to the public and other political parties and leaders, they also care about international public opinion and strive to create a similar reputation shift in the international arena. Except for Michaloliakos, it is observed the presence of cooperation and international trade in

the texts by EPRR leaders, even if they harshly criticize the existing international institutions. When they declare their opposition to the EU, for example, a sentence follows saying that cooperation without the EU is possible and desirable. Also, when they speak about the strict measures to be taken against the uncontrolled migrant and refugee flow into Europe, they mostly add the necessity of providing shelter to these people somewhere else and humanitarian aid. Therefore, EPRR leaders have learned to play the game by the book not only in the domestic arena but also in the international arena so that they develop an acceptable reputation in domestic and international politics. The I-1 scores of eight EPRR leaders out of nine support this conclusion.

7.2.3 Reactionary Cosmopolitanism of the EPRR Leaders

Although their stress on national sovereignty may lead to simple deductions about the EPRR leaders' anti-internationalist positions, in reality, these leaders and their parties are in transnational collaboration with other EPRR leaders and parties at the institutional level and beyond that. Especially in the 2000s, this type of cooperation has become more prevalent in international politics due to the 'opportunities' provided by the European Union and the migration crisis. However, the phenomenon is not new, and "transnational bonds between right-wing nationalist movements are as old as these movements themselves" (Motadel, 2019b: 77). Dating back to the efforts by the leading name of Italian unification, Giuseppe Mazzini, to spread these nationalist ideas across Europe, nationalists have always been in cooperation with one another, albeit at different degrees throughout history. For Mazzini and other 19th-century nationalists, national order was something to be universalized and to be fought for not only within the borders but also across borders. Following the October Revolution and the further development of socialist internationalism, the common enemy of the nationalists became the 'left-wing threat,' and they united against that common threat.

Motadel (2019a) cites one of the key thinkers of this right-wing internationalism, Nicholas Murray Butler, who was distinguishing between two types of internationalism: Colloidal and crystalline. For Butler, the former is a utopian and impractical project by the liberals and the left with an ultimate aim of "a worldwide community without

national ties or national ambitions,” whereas the latter is based on “nationalistic and patriotic sentiments and aims.” Since then, right-wing leaders and parties have continued to stay in contact and collaboration to varying degrees. In the 2000s, European integration played a catalyzing role in increasing political dissent and hence providing EPRR parties with a fruitful issue to challenge. Additionally, the very same European institutions that are challenged by the EPRR parties and leaders provide an institutional arena to make themselves more visible and accountable, to socialize with each other, and to develop collaboration (Caiani, 2018: 565).

Motadel (2019b: 77-80) calls the cosmopolitanism of the right-wing nationalists a “reactionary cosmopolitanism” as opposed to the liberal cosmopolitanism. This type of cosmopolitanism or internationalism assumes the existence of the “homogeneous, essentialised, closed national communities” and the recognition of national differences. EPRR parties today collaborate both at the institutional level through several efforts to establish groups in the EP and through cross-national contacts (Caiani, 2018: 567). At the institutional level, there have been many efforts to create parliamentary groups or at least run joint political campaigns for the EP, and the 2014 EP elections were almost a success in this regard. The European Alliance for Freedom (EAF) was a radical-right coalition under the leadership of France’s Marine Le Pen, and it aimed at bringing the Eurosceptic right-wing parties together. FN, PVV, FPÖ, SD, VB, Lega Nord, and SNS delegations were in this group. While some parties declined to join, such as AfD and UKIP, others were not allowed, like BNP and Golden Dawn, for their anti-Semitic ideologies. However, the election results were not sufficient for this group to establish a parliamentary presence. Later, in 2015, the ENF was launched as the smallest group within the EP thanks to the support of delegates from Poland, the UK, and Germany. “The preservation of the identity of the peoples and nations of Europe” and “cooperation between nations” instead of a “supra-state” were in the official declaration of this group as its aims, proving its reactionary cosmopolitan understanding (Motadel, 2019b: 80).

Beyond links at the institutional level, cross-national links are also important regarding the collaboration among EPRR leaders and parties. For example, delegations of other

EPRR parties are regular participants of the EPRR party congresses. Another example is Brexit, whereby non-British EPRR leaders have supported the cause and applauded the results as a crucial moment signaling the start of the patriotic movement. Matteo Salvini was present at one of Trump's rallies in Philadelphia in 2016. Wilders traveled for miles and miles to speak at local events in European and American cities. In 2017, Nigel Farage hosted Marine Le Pen on his radio show, even if, previously, UKIP under the presidency of Farage had refused to cooperate with FN in the European Parliament. In 2017, EPRR leaders gathered in the German city of Koblenz. The ENF also held joint rallies around Europe before the EP elections in 2019. It is possible to keep adding to these examples, and it is clear that the EPRR leaders and parties challenge the existing system not only within their national borders but also across these borders.

Therefore, it is possible to argue that EPRR leaders and parties are not inherently anti-cosmopolitanism or anti-internationalist. Instead, they reject specific types of these ideologies, which are the liberal or leftist versions allegedly pushing for a borderless Europe and world. They are aware of the importance of waging their struggle as a part of a larger and international cause, which gives them more credibility and visibility. Accordingly, EPRR leaders do not only aim at changing the political situations in their countries but also at creating an alternative European and global consensus, which respects national borders, national sovereignty, and the possibility/desirability of cooperation among sovereign states. This conclusion confirms both the I-1 scores of the majority of the EPRR leaders (which are not lower or significantly lower than the average world leader's) and the findings based on the in-depth reading of their foreign policy-related texts.

7.3 Conclusion

To conclude this chapter, the following points should be re-emphasized about the foreign policy instruments of the EPRR leaders:

Firstly, the I-1 scores of these EPRR leaders do not paint a picture of more conflictual foreign policy instruments, except for Greece's Michaloliakos. The other eight EPRR leaders either have higher I-1 scores than the average world leader or there is no statistical significance even if they have a lower I-1 score in comparison to the average world leader. The mean I-1 score of the EPRR leaders is also only slightly lower than the norming group's score, and there is no statistical significance. Therefore, it can be concluded that the EPRR leaders are not necessarily more conflictual than the average world leader.

Secondly, an in-depth reading of the texts by the EPRR leaders shows that they seek a pragmatist foreign policy based on national interests and without the degeneration of idealism. Therefore, they do not reject cooperation itself, but a type of it 'imposed' by liberal cosmopolitanism and the EU. The EPRR leaders want to replace this imposed type of collaboration with a new type at the intergovernmental level, among sovereign nation-states and in a Europe of free nations. In other words, the EPRR leaders should not be analyzed along a continuum between cooperation and conflict or isolationism and internationalism. Instead, the question is about the form and the level of cooperation.

The third conclusion of this chapter is related to the previous one, and it is the discursive and policy capacity and ability of EPRR leaders to utilize the very same concepts used by mainstream actors to criticize the populist radical right. For example, EPRR leaders have been successful in (i) presenting Brexit as a step towards better cooperation between the UK and the world, (ii) using the majoritarian card in the UK and Hungary to prove themselves as democrats, and (iii) declaring their protectorship of free speech in Europe as opposed to the authoritarianism originating from political correctness. To put it differently, EPRR leaders aim at breaking the monopoly of liberal cosmopolitanism and the EU on certain Western norms and values, which is also the case in their foreign policy beliefs.

Finally, there are three underlying reasons for EPRR leaders' 'not-necessarily-conflictual' foreign policy instruments: (i) They have been socialized into a political

culture shaped by European integration, i.e., they are Europeanized Eurosceptics. (ii) The political conjuncture provides several opportunities for EPRR leaders and parties to have bigger targets, unlike in the past, such as office-seeking. This makes them seek the median voter and hence makes them more mainstream and cautious. (iii) There is a growing transnational network among the EPRR actors in different European countries, which proves their cooperative attitude towards actors sharing the same sensitivity about national borders, sovereignty, intergovernmentality, etc.



CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION

In a TV documentary by Deutsche Welle, a middle-aged Italian man describes the current picture of the populist radical right political movement, of which he is also a part: “We used to be a Fiat 500, now we will soon be a Ferrari.” The quote refers to the fact that populist radical right parties have increased their impact, visibility, and also legitimacy in European politics in the new millennium. As discussed throughout this dissertation, EPRR parties and leaders are not isolated from international issues. Instead, global phenomena help them to rise, and they are simultaneously capable of influencing international affairs and the foreign policies of their countries through particular means and tools. However, research on the intersection of the populist radical right and foreign policy is still in its infancy and needs further focus by IR scholars.

This dissertation has made an effort to call for a better-developed bridge between the research on the populist radical right and foreign policy analysis. First, the literature on the populist radical right and operational code analysis within the literature on foreign policy analysis have been reviewed. After that, in the individual chapters, a carefully selected group of European populist radical right leaders have been analyzed to contribute to this bridge and their foreign policy beliefs in terms of shared patterns and differences across EPRR leaders and also from the average world leader have been discussed. It could be argued that this dissertation has important contributions to three literatures: foreign policy analysis, populist radical right and policy-oriented studies, which will be summarized below.

First, this study utilizes the operational code approach within the FPA literature to a timely and crucial issue for the world politics, which is the rise of populist radical right parties and leaders. Since the 1950s, research on foreign policy from a cognitivist perspective, which focuses on individual decision-makers as the agents, has contributed to our understanding of the state behavior. Although cognitivist studies have been presented with contrast to the rational choice studies and structural explanations of international relations, cognitivist studies also strengthen the findings of these approaches. Thanks to the capacity of the operational code analysis to depict a leader's subjective preference ordering both for Self and Other, a researcher's ability to predict a leader's behavior in a particular condition increases. This ability is especially more important for leaders whose next step is more difficult to predict such as the leaders of terrorist groups or the populist radical right leaders. Accordingly, this study presents the foreign policy beliefs of EPRR leaders who either currently rules his or her country, or competes with full strength to rule it in the future. In this study, this presentation is available for both the individual EPRR leaders and EPRR leaders as a group. Therefore, the results could be interpreted in various ways, such as comparisons between two EPRR leaders, between an EPRR leader and the average EPRR, between an EPRR leader and the average world leader, and between the average EPRR leader and the average world leader. In other words, this study not only provides a map of EPRR leaders -a group of leaders who have been increasing its influence on the world politics-vis-a-vis the average world leader, in terms of their foreign policy beliefs, but it also enables us to predict the potential foreign policy moves of these leaders.

Theoretically, this dissertation crystalizes the micro-foundations of macro-behavior in international affairs. While foreign policy-related research on the populist radical right is mostly descriptive, IR theory, on the other hand, is dominated by structural analysis based on high degrees of abstraction. Such abstraction is necessary for being parsimonious, but at the same time, it results in agents and their preconceived cognitive heuristics being under-specified. As this research shows, although these EPRR leaders are all from Europe and they share many political stances, they have different foreign policy beliefs. Therefore, this research takes a position between the descriptive studies

on the populist radical right and the structural analysis in IR by emphasizing the value of synthesizing these two literatures.

Secondly, this dissertation contributes to the literature on the populist radical right through testing the major premises shared about populism and populist radical right. Contrary to the claims that populism and especially the populist radical right is a negative phenomenon, it has been shown that it is difficult to make such a general argument as the thin-centered ideology of populism also translates into foreign policy. Populism itself can be combined with a variety of different ideological elements, such as the right-wing populists' lens of nativism and left-wing populists' stress on the setbacks of neoliberal policies. However, such combinations still do not yield a shared pattern for these leaders and parties, meaning that populist radical right parties and leaders are also more complicated than these over-simplified generalizations suggest. This is also apparent in their foreign policy beliefs and stances.

EPRR leaders have more conflictual—or less cooperative—foreign policy beliefs than the average world leader and the mainstream European leadership, especially in terms of how they perceive other actors in the international arena. However, this dissertation has proved that things are more complicated. Given (1) the already existing transnational collaboration among EPRR leaders and parties, (2) the socialization and participation of EPRR leaders in long-lasting cooperative European institutions and culture, and (3) the EPRR parties' desire to be elected, it has been discussed that it is reasonable to assume that if more EPRR leaders take office in their countries, they might not be inclined to introduce more conflictual policies, but will rather pursue a new type of intergovernmental cooperation among sovereign nation-states. In other words, however EPRR leaders are more conflictual in their foreign policy beliefs about the political universe, this is not necessarily translated into their instrumental beliefs, which corresponds to the tools they use or will use in achieving their foreign policy goals.

Third contribution of this study is to the policy-oriented studies. Due to the fundamental challenge brought by EPRR parties and leaders, the issue is understood as something

that should be dealt with. It is true that populist radical right leaders, in general, criticize the existing forms of international cooperation and integration. However, it is crucial to specify the differences among EPRR leaders if one wishes to study their foreign policy positions. Considering this, a one-size-fits-all solution in ‘dealing with’ these leaders will be misleading. Research through case studies and leader-specific analysis will be a better option for both scholars and policymakers to pursue. Not only in scholarly but also in political domains, there are many assertive conclusions about the effects of the populist radical right on European politics. On the contrary, it has been proven that such analyses must be more cautious, and they must be based on strong theoretical and methodological foundations rather than ungrounded assertive claims. In this respect, the results of this dissertation about the populist radical right and foreign policy represent an original contribution to an under-studied aspect of the literature.

The concerns about EPRR leaders at the domestic level are clearly not within the scope of this study. As a scholarly work, this dissertation neither aims at acquitting the EPRR leaders nor demonizing them. Instead, based on substantial theoretical and empirical grounds, it is argued that the populist radical right does not necessarily connote a more conflictual foreign policy and hence requires case studies and leader-specific analysis. Politicians may be more prone to using these assertive but ungrounded claims about EPRR leaders and parties to more easily balance the challenge brought by EPRR parties and leaders. However, in the scholarly domain, there is a need for further analysis and more caution. Ruling leaders such as Viktor Orbán and Boris Johnson are good cases with which to test the widespread expectations about EPRR leaders’ foreign policies. Similarly, it is hoped that this dissertation closes some of the gaps in the literature and provides a basis for further research.

By introducing an eclectic method of studying the link between the populist radical right and foreign policy, this study draws an overall picture of the foreign policy beliefs of the EPRR leaders and also presents a baseline for future studies. As a follow-up to this dissertation’s conclusions regarding the EPRR leaders and their foreign policy beliefs, the present efforts to bridge these two literatures may also pave the way for further

research on leaders with different perspectives. Being an under-explored subfield in FPA, there are many opportunities for future research on the populist radical right leaders' foreign policies.

Particularly from a comparative point of view, opportunities to use operational code analysis to study the EPRR leadership in foreign policy are plentiful. For instance, a research design that would compare ruling and non-ruling EPRR leaders could contribute to our understanding of the role of party positions and institutional limitations on a populist radical right leader's foreign policy beliefs. Especially in the case of Viktor Orbán, these limitations are crucial in shaping the beliefs. Also, the same approach can be applied to a single EPRR leader, comparing his/her foreign policy beliefs before and after taking office on his/her own or within a coalition.

Taking office may not be the only turning point for a leader's foreign policy beliefs to change. Other crucial events at both national and international levels might play an influential role in such changes. For the EPRR leaders, for example, 2015 can be considered as such a moment, as the European migration crisis erupted in 2015. EPRR leaders' foreign policy beliefs can be compared before and after 2015, both individually and as a group, which will show the effect of the eruption of the migration crisis on foreign policy belief changes. Brexit can also be considered as a similar moment, not only for the British EPRR leaders but for all of them.

The audience of the texts by an EPRR leader is another potential research area, as the comparison of texts addressed to a domestic and an international audience will allow the researcher to identify the role of electoral concerns in shaping the leader's discourse. In this dissertation, 116 texts by EPRR leaders have been utilized, and they include speeches made in the national parliaments and the EP, texts written for international news websites, interviews given to national and international newspapers and television channels, etc. Considering that the audience matters for any discourse, further research on the foreign policy beliefs of EPRR leaders might focus on differentiating between texts targeting different audiences.

Lastly, populism's thin-centered nature and its parasitic relations with other political ideologies provide fertile research grounds for the analytical strength of operational code analysis. Comparisons between left-wing and right-wing populisms, between nationalist and civilizational populisms (Brubaker, 2017), or between European and non-European populisms are some examples of potential comparative research. Further research on these comparisons will yield conclusions about the foreign policy perspectives of different populist leaders from different political traditions and geographies.

Certainly, the present research is not without its limitations, which originate from both the methodological constraints and practical issues. As was also discussed in Chapter 4, the operational code analysis construct only allowed the use of texts in English. This was a severe limitation for leaders other than Farage and Johnson, and it also prevented the inclusion of other important EPRR leaders such as Italy's Salvini and Poland's Kaczyński. Chapters 6 and 7 contextualized the quantitative findings for each leader and therefore compensated the language-related limitations to a certain degree. However, this should still be noted as a significant limitation.

Also, for practical reasons (such as having a large sample and having limited time to finish the study), it was not possible to include the psychobiographies or key life transitions of the individual EPRR leaders. The focus was instead on the social, national, and international context to understand their foreign policy beliefs. Therefore, future research on a smaller number of EPRR leaders may also include such perspectives in its analysis, which may contribute substantially to our understanding of the foreign policy beliefs of EPRR leaders.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: Individual Scores of Each Text Analyzed

filename	word count	verb count	punish	threaten	oppose	appeal	promise	reward	punish	threaten	oppose	appeal	promise	reward	I-1	I-2	P-1	P-2	I-3	I-4a	I-4b	Punish	Threaten	Oppose	Appeal	Support	Reward	P-3	P-4	P-5
FP-1	1431	45	0	1	5	2	0	3	4	1	5	15	1	8	-0.091	0.121	0.412	0.216	0.19	0.91	0.55	0	0.09	0.45	0.18	0	0.27	0.39	0.32	0.88
FP-2	2676	62	4	0	1	8	1	0	7	1	6	29	0	5	0.286	-0.071	0.417	0.104	0.3	0.71	0.57	0.29	0	0.07	0.57	0.07	0	0.42	0.29	0.88
FP-3	578	22	1	0	3	2	0	2	1	0	3	3	1	6	0	0.083	0.429	0.405	0.14	1	0.75	0.13	0	0.38	0.25	0	0.25	0.85	0.57	0.52
FP-4	1747	51	2	0	2	6	0	0	10	1	5	16	4	5	0.2	-0.067	0.22	0.016	0.33	0.8	0.4	0.2	0	0.2	0.6	0	0	0.19	0.24	0.95
FP-5	2267	70	1	0	3	8	1	0	9	3	10	17	2	16	0.385	0.103	0.228	0.152	0.33	0.62	0.15	0.08	0	0.23	0.62	0.08	0	0.33	0.23	0.92
FP-6	697	27	1	0	0	1	2	0	3	0	2	15	1	2	0.5	0.167	0.565	0.174	0.25	0.5	0.5	0.25	0	0	0.25	0.5	0	0.46	0.17	0.92
FP-7	1796	70	2	0	2	16	0	2	16	0	4	13	4	11	0.636	0.212	0.167	0.014	0.46	0.36	0.36	0.09	0	0.09	0.73	0	0.09	0.31	0.46	0.86
GW-1	1802	98	2	0	4	17	0	4	23	6	13	18	1	10	0.556	0.235	-0.183	-0.207	0.33	0.44	0.44	0.07	0	0.15	0.63	0	0.15	0.17	0.38	0.94
GW-2	2350	102	0	0	5	15	0	2	16	7	13	26	2	16	0.546	0.242	0.1	0.013	0.43	0.45	0.18	0	0	0.23	0.68	0	0.09	0.21	0.28	0.94
GW-3	579	33	3	0	4	4	0	1	6	2	0	9	0	4	-0.167	-0.167	0.238	-0.016	0.15	0.83	0.67	0.25	0	0.33	0.33	0	0.08	0.37	0.57	0.79
GW-4	907	29	1	0	2	2	0	2	4	0	4	9	0	5	0.143	0.143	0.273	0.121	0.12	0.86	0.86	0.14	0	0.29	0.29	0	0.29	0.37	0.32	0.88
GW-5	1047	33	0	0	0	2	0	0	11	2	8	6	0	4	1	0.333	-0.355	-0.29	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.2	0.06	0.99
GW-6	2913	123	1	0	10	18	3	5	19	7	14	33	0	13	0.405	0.234	0.07	-0.05	0.2	0.59	0.32	0.03	0	0.27	0.49	0.08	0.14	0.22	0.43	0.91
GW-7	846	46	1	0	0	0	0	5	14	0	3	17	0	6	0.667	0.667	0.15	-0.083	0.67	0.33	0	0.17	0	0	0	0	0.83	0.35	0.15	0.95
GW-8	1727	70	2	0	2	6	0	2	13	2	20	17	0	6	0.333	0.111	-0.207	-0.161	0.2	0.67	0.67	0.17	0	0.17	0.5	0	0.17	0.2	0.21	0.96
GW-9	2020	74	0	1	5	9	1	1	11	5	9	19	1	12	0.294	0.137	0.123	0.029	0.25	0.71	0.12	0	0.06	0.29	0.53	0.06	0.06	0.23	0.3	0.93
GW-10	2207	101	2	0	10	10	0	3	17	9	14	26	2	8	0.04	0.04	-0.053	-0.127	0.21	0.96	0.4	0.08	0	0.4	0.4	0	0.12	0.14	0.33	0.95
GW-11	1128	33	2	0	2	5	0	0	7	3	3	6	1	4	0.111	-0.111	-0.083	-0.139	0.29	0.89	0.44	0.22	0	0.22	0.56	0	0	0.16	0.38	0.94
GW-12	3544	144	2	2	12	15	0	7	28	7	15	44	0	12	0.158	0.123	0.057	-0.104	0.15	0.84	0.47	0.05	0.05	0.32	0.39	0	0.18	0.23	0.36	0.92
GW-13	908	34	0	0	2	5	0	0	6	0	4	9	2	6	0.429	0.143	0.259	0.111	0.51	0.57	0	0	0	0.29	0.71	0	0	0.27	0.26	0.93
GW-14	783	36	0	1	0	0	1	0	13	0	3	14	0	4	0	0	0.059	-0.157	0.4	1	0	0	0.5	0	0	0.5	0	0.32	0.06	0.98
GW-15	871	40	0	2	8	5	0	2	5	0	3	8	0	7	-0.177	-0.02	0.304	0.159	0.2	0.82	0.24	0	0.12	0.47	0.29	0	0.12	0.49	0.74	0.64
GW-16	796	31	1	0	0	0	0	2	7	1	5	4	0	11	0.333	0.333	0.071	0.107	0.47	0.67	0	0.33	0	0	0	0	0.67	0.68	0.11	0.93
GW-17	734	34	1	0	1	1	0	0	10	4	5	9	0	3	-0.333	-0.333	-0.226	-0.269	0.2	0.67	0.67	0.33	0	0.33	0.33	0	0	0.15	0.1	0.99

filename	word count	verb count	punish	threaten	oppose	appeal	promise	reward	punish	threaten	oppose	appeal	promise	reward	I-1	I-2	P-1	P-2	I-3	I-4a	I-4b	Punish	Threaten	Oppose	Appeal	Support	Reward	P-3	P-4	P-5
GW-18	730	23	1	0	0	1	0	1	6	0	2	11	0	1	0.333	0.111	0.2	-0.1	0.2	0.67	0.67	0.33	0	0	0.33	0	0.33	0.34	0.15	0.95
GW-19	1225	52	0	2	5	2	1	1	10	2	7	13	3	6	-0.273	-0.061	0.073	-0.033	0.15	0.73	0.18	0	0.18	0.45	0.18	0.09	0.09	0.16	0.27	0.96
GW-20	509	28	0	0	0	2	0	0	5	1	2	10	1	7	1	0.333	0.385	0.18	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.4	0.08	0.97
JA-1	990	28	1	1	2	6	0	3	2	0	3	8	0	2	0.385	0.205	0.333	0.111	0.16	0.62	0.62	0.08	0.08	0.15	0.46	0	0.23	0.38	0.87	0.67
JA-2	1322	34	0	0	2	8	0	2	7	0	4	6	0	5	0.667	0.333	0	-0.061	0.4	0.33	0.33	0	0	0.17	0.67	0	0.17	0.32	0.55	0.82
JA-3	657	15	0	0	2	2	0	0	5	1	2	1	1	1	0	0	-0.455	-0.394	0.4	1	0	0	0	0.5	0.5	0	0	0.2	0.36	0.93
JA-4	1272	45	0	1	4	8	1	3	6	2	6	8	0	6	0.412	0.255	0	-0.024	0.18	0.59	0.35	0	0.06	0.24	0.47	0.06	0.18	0.24	0.61	0.85
JA-5	860	35	0	0	2	6	0	1	3	0	1	13	0	9	0.556	0.259	0.692	0.385	0.41	0.44	0.22	0	0	0.22	0.67	0	0.11	0.88	0.35	0.69
JA-6	669	27	0	0	0	0	0	1	9	1	7	5	0	4	1	1	-0.308	-0.244	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.23	0.04	0.99
MLP-1	5286	183	5	2	6	4	0	5	54	8	26	41	1	31	-0.182	-0.091	-0.093	-0.141	0.06	0.82	0.91	0.23	0.09	0.27	0.18	0	0.23	0.25	0.14	0.97
MLP-2	2566	83	2	0	2	6	1	1	15	4	6	27	3	16	0.333	0.083	0.296	0.103	0.18	0.67	0.5	0.17	0	0.17	0.5	0.08	0.08	0.3	0.17	0.95
MLP-3	2020	67	1	0	5	9	0	2	11	1	8	15	1	14	0.294	0.137	0.2	0.107	0.26	0.71	0.35	0.06	0	0.29	0.53	0	0.12	0.36	0.34	0.88
MLP-4	576	19	0	0	1	0	0	1	4	1	8	2	0	2	0	0.333	-0.529	-0.274	0.4	1	1	0	0	0.5	0	0	0.5	0.27	0.12	0.97
MLP-5	2148	73	4	0	5	6	1	1	14	0	12	20	4	6	-0.059	-0.118	0.071	-0.048	0.13	0.94	0.59	0.24	0	0.29	0.35	0.06	0.06	0.18	0.3	0.95
MLP-6	1586	70	0	1	4	12	0	1	4	0	4	22	0	22	0.444	0.167	0.692	0.462	0.4	0.56	0.11	0	0.06	0.22	0.67	0	0.06	1.13	0.35	0.6
MLP-7	2433	82	5	0	2	11	0	2	17	3	12	15	3	12	0.3	0	-0.032	-0.065	0.26	0.7	0.7	0.25	0	0.1	0.55	0	0.1	0.19	0.32	0.94
MLP-8	926	25	0	0	2	3	2	1	4	1	6	4	2	0	0.5	0.333	-0.294	-0.235	0.14	0.5	0.25	0	0	0.25	0.38	0.25	0.13	0.1	0.47	0.95
MLP-9	4076	140	4	2	4	18	2	6	14	7	23	38	6	16	0.444	0.185	0.154	0.061	0.17	0.56	0.56	0.11	0.06	0.11	0.5	0.06	0.17	0.19	0.35	0.93
MLP-10	1078	48	4	0	0	3	0	0	9	3	4	17	1	7	-0.143	-0.429	0.22	0.024	0.41	0.86	0.86	0.57	0	0	0.43	0	0	0.26	0.17	0.96
NF-1	1881	54	0	0	4	0	0	3	9	5	8	16	5	4	-0.143	0.238	0.064	-0.05	0.41	0.86	0.86	0	0	0.57	0	0	0.43	0.1	0.15	0.99
NF-2	1007	27	1	0	2	2	1	0	3	1	5	7	0	5	0	-0.056	0.143	0.095	0.13	1	0.33	0.17	0	0.33	0.33	0.17	0	0.31	0.29	0.91
NF-3	945	28	0	0	1	6	0	1	2	0	7	6	0	5	0.75	0.333	0.1	0.133	0.51	0.25	0.25	0	0	0.13	0.75	0	0.13	0.41	0.4	0.84
NF-4	335	18	1	0	1	5	0	0	1	0	2	5	1	2	0.429	0.048	0.455	0.242	0.46	0.57	0.29	0.14	0	0.14	0.71	0	0	0.32	0.64	0.8
NF-5	449	19	0	0	0	2	0	0	3	1	3	7	2	1	1	0.333	0.177	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.14	0.12	0.98
NF-6	435	20	1	0	1	2	0	0	2	0	4	9	0	1	0	-0.167	0.25	0.042	0.25	1	0.5	0.25	0	0.25	0.5	0	0	0.34	0.25	0.92
NF-7	532	26	0	0	4	0	1	0	8	1	3	5	1	3	-0.6	-0.133	-0.143	-0.206	0.62	0.4	0	0	0	0.8	0	0.2	0	0.2	0.24	0.95
NF-8	664	23	1	0	0	2	0	0	3	0	2	8	1	6	0.333	-0.111	0.5	0.283	0.47	0.67	0.67	0.33	0	0	0.67	0	0	0.5	0.15	0.93
NF-9	492	18	0	0	0	1	0	0	9	2	1	2	1	2	1	0.333	-0.412	-0.431	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.31	0.06	0.98
NF-10	587	18	0	0	0	3	0	1	1	4	2	5	0	2	1	0.5	0	-0.048	0.55	0	0.5	0	0	0	0.75	0	0.25	0.22	0.29	0.94
NF-11	458	24	0	0	0	3	0	0	4	0	2	14	0	1	1	0.333	0.429	0.048	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.45	0.14	0.94

filename	word count	verb count	punish	threaten	oppose	appeal	promise	reward	punish	threaten	oppose	appeal	promise	reward	I-1	I-2	P-1	P-2	I-3	I-4a	I-4b	Punish	Threaten	Oppose	Appeal	Support	Reward	P-3	P-4	P-5
NF-12	554	26	0	1	1	2	0	0	5	1	5	8	1	2	0	-0.083	0	-0.091	0.25	1	0	0	0.25	0.25	0.5	0	0	0.16	0.18	0.97
NF-13	496	17	0	0	0	0	0	2	3	0	0	6	3	3	1	1	0.6	0.267	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.33	0.13	0.96	
NF-14	622	19	1	0	2	3	0	3	2	1	1	5	0	1	0.333	0.259	0.2	-0.033	0.14	0.67	0.89	0.11	0	0.22	0.33	0	0.33	0.27	0.9	0.76
NF-15	705	31	0	0	0	6	0	1	6	2	6	5	0	5	1	0.429	-0.167	-0.111	0.71	0	0.29	0	0	0	0.86	0	0.14	0.22	0.29	0.94
NF-16	1102	26	0	0	1	1	0	1	3	2	4	8	1	5	0.333	0.333	0.217	0.116	0.2	0.67	0.67	0	0	0.33	0.33	0	0.33	0.24	0.13	0.97
NF-17	732	39	0	0	0	6	0	0	8	0	13	10	1	1	1	0.333	-0.273	-0.222	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.19	0.18	0.97
NF-18	681	17	0	0	0	3	0	0	2	1	1	6	1	3	1	0.333	0.429	0.191	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.32	0.21	0.93
NF-19	870	22	0	0	0	1	0	3	2	0	4	6	3	3	1	0.833	0.333	0.204	0.55	0	0.5	0	0	0	0.25	0	0.75	0.19	0.22	0.96
NF-20	636	18	2	0	2	2	0	0	1	0	1	9	0	1	-0.333	-0.333	0.667	0.222	0.2	0.67	0.67	0.33	0	0.33	0.33	0	0	0.63	0.5	0.69
NF-21	630	19	1	0	0	1	0	0	4	1	2	9	0	1	0	-0.333	0.177	-0.078	0.4	1	1	0.5	0	0	0.5	0	0	0.28	0.12	0.97
NH-1	998	31	0	0	2	4	0	2	1	1	5	10	0	6	0.5	0.333	0.391	0.261	0.25	0.5	0.5	0	0	0.25	0.5	0	0.25	0.48	0.35	0.83
NH-2	1310	43	1	0	2	13	0	2	3	1	2	14	1	4	0.667	0.259	0.52	0.2	0.46	0.33	0.33	0.06	0	0.11	0.72	0	0.11	0.42	0.72	0.7
NH-3	575	21	0	0	0	2	1	0	1	0	2	6	0	9	1	0.444	0.667	0.519	0.47	0	0	0	0	0	0.67	0.33	0	1.61	0.17	0.73
NH-4	1170	30	0	0	0	10	1	4	1	0	0	9	1	4	1	0.533	0.867	0.444	0.42	0	0.53	0	0	0	0.67	0.07	0.27	0.78	1	0.22
NH-5	1489	43	0	0	1	14	0	2	1	0	2	16	2	5	0.882	0.373	0.769	0.385	0.63	0.12	0.24	0	0	0.06	0.82	0	0.12	0.59	0.65	0.62
VO-1	2273	58	2	1	8	7	0	3	5	0	7	9	1	15	-0.048	0	0.351	0.306	0.15	0.95	0.48	0.1	0.05	0.38	0.33	0	0.14	0.74	0.57	0.58
VO-2	1334	46	8	0	0	7	0	2	4	0	3	10	1	11	0.059	-0.216	0.517	0.345	0.29	0.94	0.82	0.47	0	0	0.41	0	0.12	0.71	0.59	0.58
VO-3	1092	41	0	0	0	17	1	0	0	1	2	14	1	5	1	0.352	0.739	0.391	0.87	0	0	0	0	0	0.94	0.06	0	0.64	0.78	0.5
VO-4	780	25	0	0	0	8	0	2	3	0	1	7	1	3	1	0.467	0.467	0.178	0.62	0	0.4	0	0	0	0.8	0	0.2	0.38	0.67	0.75
VO-5	708	30	0	0	1	5	1	4	2	0	0	7	3	7	0.818	0.546	0.79	0.491	0.23	0.18	0.73	0	0	0.09	0.45	0.09	0.36	0.73	0.58	0.58
VO-6	2523	86	1	0	4	9	0	10	15	3	6	21	3	14	0.583	0.444	0.226	0.065	0.21	0.42	0.92	0.04	0	0.17	0.38	0	0.42	0.28	0.39	0.89
VO-7	2935	111	4	0	6	10	0	5	16	1	11	40	1	17	0.2	0.093	0.349	0.124	0.14	0.8	0.72	0.16	0	0.24	0.4	0	0.2	0.37	0.29	0.89
VO-8	1787	74	2	1	7	3	2	5	6	1	8	25	1	13	0	0.117	0.444	0.235	0.08	1	0.7	0.1	0.05	0.35	0.15	0.1	0.25	0.44	0.37	0.84
VO-9	6210	140	9	0	5	30	0	5	6	4	16	46	1	18	0.429	0.088	0.429	0.22	0.32	0.57	0.57	0.18	0	0.1	0.61	0	0.1	0.42	0.54	0.77
VO-10	1119	33	1	0	1	3	1	0	8	1	5	8	0	5	0.333	0.056	-0.037	-0.099	0.2	0.67	0.33	0.17	0	0.17	0.5	0.17	0	0.24	0.22	0.95
VO-11	4095	107	4	0	2	14	4	7	16	0	7	27	4	22	0.613	0.312	0.395	0.202	0.15	0.39	0.71	0.13	0	0.06	0.45	0.13	0.23	0.43	0.41	0.82
VO-12	4169	130	9	0	3	20	0	6	10	2	13	42	3	22	0.368	0.07	0.457	0.243	0.24	0.63	0.79	0.24	0	0.08	0.53	0	0.16	0.42	0.41	0.83
VO-13	1372	58	2	0	6	16	2	3	3	0	3	15	1	7	0.448	0.195	0.586	0.299	0.24	0.55	0.34	0.07	0	0.21	0.55	0.07	0.1	0.53	1	0.47
VO-14	628	34	1	0	1	10	0	0	4	0	3	10	1	4	0.667	0.167	0.364	0.136	0.65	0.33	0.17	0.08	0	0.08	0.83	0	0	0.33	0.55	0.82
VO-15	1032	31	1	0	0	4	0	5	4	0	4	9	1	3	0.8	0.533	0.238	0.064	0.3	0.2	0.8	0.1	0	0	0.4	0	0.5	0.26	0.48	0.88

filename	word count	verb count	punish	threaten	oppose	appeal	promise	reward	punish	threaten	oppose	appeal	promise	reward	I-1	I-2	P-1	P-2	I-3	I-4a	I-4b	Punish	Threaten	Oppose	Appeal	Support	Reward	P-3	P-4	P-5
VO-16	3487	97	1	0	4	11	1	3	14	1	13	29	1	19	0.5	0.25	0.273	0.134	0.24	0.5	0.4	0.05	0	0.2	0.55	0.05	0.15	0.36	0.26	0.91
VO-17	804	30	0	0	0	4	1	2	4	0	3	12	1	3	1	0.571	0.391	0.116	0.31	0	0.57	0	0	0	0.57	0.14	0.29	0.34	0.3	0.9
VO-18	595	24	1	0	1	8	0	1	2	1	1	7	1	1	0.636	0.212	0.385	0.077	0.46	0.36	0.36	0.09	0	0.09	0.73	0	0.09	0.28	0.85	0.76
VO-19	2239	68	2	0	3	13	2	3	4	0	1	23	2	15	0.565	0.246	0.778	0.437	0.24	0.43	0.43	0.09	0	0.13	0.57	0.09	0.13	0.83	0.51	0.58
VO-20	1033	33	0	0	1	4	0	8	5	0	3	10	0	2	0.846	0.692	0.2	-0.033	0.38	0.15	0.77	0	0	0.08	0.31	0	0.62	0.31	0.65	0.8
VO-21	2083	71	6	2	1	10	1	1	9	0	8	22	2	9	0.143	-0.127	0.32	0.12	0.19	0.86	0.67	0.29	0.1	0.05	0.48	0.05	0.05	0.31	0.42	0.87
VO-22	5361	120	1	0	9	24	1	5	11	2	8	45	2	12	0.5	0.242	0.475	0.167	0.31	0.5	0.3	0.03	0	0.23	0.6	0.03	0.13	0.41	0.5	0.8
VO-23	1040	41	1	0	2	12	0	5	1	0	5	12	0	3	0.7	0.367	0.429	0.206	0.32	0.3	0.6	0.05	0	0.1	0.6	0	0.25	0.46	0.95	0.56
VO-24	1085	48	0	1	5	13	0	1	7	1	3	12	0	5	0.4	0.15	0.214	0.012	0.39	0.6	0.1	0	0.05	0.25	0.65	0	0.05	0.32	0.71	0.77
VO-25	1729	62	3	0	2	12	0	4	6	0	4	26	0	5	0.524	0.206	0.512	0.155	0.27	0.48	0.67	0.14	0	0.1	0.57	0	0.19	0.5	0.51	0.75
VO-26	1471	49	4	0	1	9	0	2	6	1	2	17	0	7	0.375	0.042	0.455	0.162	0.28	0.63	0.75	0.25	0	0.06	0.56	0	0.13	0.47	0.48	0.77
NM-1	909	33	0	2	0	0	0	0	5	5	2	17	1	1	-1	-0.667	0.226	-0.054	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0.26	0.06	0.98
NM-2	1071	30	0	0	0	1	0	1	6	1	7	10	2	2	1	0.667	0	-0.083	0.4	0	1	0	0	0	0.5	0	0.5	0.14	0.07	0.99
NM-3	1100	38	3	0	0	2	1	0	15	1	4	7	2	3	0	-0.278	-0.25	-0.323	0.27	1	1	0.5	0	0	0.33	0.17	0	0.23	0.19	0.96
NM-4	1028	38	0	0	0	0	0	0	14	2	12	6	1	3	NIL	NIL	-0.474	-0.36	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	0.18	0	1
NM-5	583	20	0	0	0	0	0	1	4	0	1	10	0	4	1	1	0.474	0.158	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.51	0.05	0.97
NM-6	636	25	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	4	2	11	4	2	-1	-0.333	0.417	0.167	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0.2	0.04	0.99
NM-7	667	28	0	0	0	1	0	0	7	2	8	2	3	5	1	0.333	-0.259	-0.124	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.18	0.04	0.99
NM-8	1035	30	2	0	0	1	0	0	10	2	6	2	0	7	-0.333	-0.556	-0.333	-0.21	0.47	0.67	0.67	0.67	0	0	0.33	0	0	0.38	0.11	0.96
NM-9	710	21	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	2	10	0	5	NIL	NIL	0.429	0.222	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	0.45	0	1
NM-10	978	22	2	0	0	1	1	0	9	0	2	7	0	0	0	-0.25	-0.222	-0.407	0.25	1	1	0.5	0	0	0.25	0.25	0	0.3	0.22	0.93
NM-11	672	24	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	4	1	6	2	3	NIL	NIL	-0.083	-0.194	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	0.15	0	1
NM-12	1079	19	1	2	0	1	0	0	6	2	2	2	0	3	-0.5	-0.5	-0.333	-0.289	0.25	0.5	0.5	0.25	0.5	0	0.25	0	0	0.28	0.27	0.92
NM-13	633	19	2	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	10	0	3	-1	-1	0.529	0.137	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.57	0.12	0.93
BJ-1	1187	34	2	0	0	6	0	1	9	0	4	10	0	2	0.556	0.111	-0.04	-0.2	0.41	0.44	0.67	0.22	0	0	0.67	0	0.11	0.26	0.36	0.91
BJ-2	5656	160	5	1	5	16	2	6	26	3	22	39	7	28	0.371	0.152	0.184	0.083	0.14	0.63	0.63	0.14	0.03	0.14	0.46	0.06	0.17	0.25	0.28	0.93
BJ-3	1050	24	0	0	0	0	0	1	6	0	0	9	1	7	1	1	0.478	0.203	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.58	0.04	0.98
BJ-4	842	39	1	0	1	3	0	0	14	0	1	14	1	4	0.2	-0.067	0.118	-0.147	0.33	0.8	0.4	0.2	0	0.2	0.6	0	0	0.35	0.15	0.95
BJ-5	791	23	0	0	1	4	0	1	1	1	1	8	3	3	0.667	0.333	0.647	0.333	0.4	0.33	0.33	0	0	0.17	0.67	0	0.17	0.32	0.35	0.89
BJ-6	3434	92	5	0	1	9	1	5	22	0	3	29	2	15	0.429	0.159	0.296	0.042	0.16	0.57	0.95	0.24	0	0.05	0.43	0.05	0.24	0.4	0.3	0.88

filename	word count	verb count	punish	threaten	oppose	appeal	promise	reward	punish	threaten	oppose	appeal	promise	reward	I-1	I-2	P-1	P-2	I-3	I4a	I4b	Punish	Threaten	Oppose	Appeal	Support	Reward	P-3	P-4	P-5
BJ-7	769	40	0	0	3	7	0	3	5	0	2	8	6	6	0.539	0.333	0.482	0.259	0.28	0.46	0.46	0	0	0.23	0.54	0	0.23	0.25	0.48	0.88
BJ-8	678	35	0	0	1	6	0	0	11	0	2	12	0	3	0.714	0.238	0.071	-0.167	0.71	0.29	0	0	0	0.14	0.86	0	0	0.33	0.25	0.92

APPENDIX B: The Operational Codes of the EPRR Leaders Compared to Norming Group's Scores

		Norming group n=164	Marine Le Pen n=10	Viktor Orbán n=26	Geert Wilders n=20	Nigel Farage n=21	Boris Johnson n=8	Jimmie Åkesson n=6	Frauke Petry n=7	Norbert Hofer n=5	Nikolaos Michaloliakos n=13	Average n=116
PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEFS												
P-1	Nature of political universe (conflict/cooperation)	0.301	0.068** (0.0071)	0.413* (0.027)	0.063*** (0.0002)	0.178* (0.032)	0.279 (0.4155)	0.044* (0.0175)	0.348 (0.333)	0.643** (0.0044)	0.009*** (0.0003)	0.213** (0.00725)
P-2	Realization of political values (pessimism/optimism)	0.147	-0.0010* (0.0179)	0.1830 (0.205)	-0.051*** (0.00005)	0.0270** (0.008)	0.0510 (0.1092)	-0.0380* (0.02085)	0.1540 (0.466)	0.3620* (0.0139)	-0.105*** (0.00005)	0.052*** (0.00015)
P-3	Political future (unpredictable/predictable)	0.134	0.323*** (0.0000)	0.443*** (0.0000)	0.283*** (0.0000)	0.292*** (0.0000)	0.343*** (0.0000)	0.375*** (0.0000)	0.421*** (0.0000)	0.776*** (0.0000)	0.295*** (0.0000)	0.364*** (0.0000)
P-4	Historical development (low control/high control)	0.224	0.273 (0.1179)	0.538*** (0.0000)	0.277* (0.04705)	0.266 (0.094)	0.276 (0.1305)	0.463*** (0.0000)	0.326* (0.02)	0.578*** (0.0000)	0.09*** (0.00015)	0.338*** (0.0000)
P-5	Role of chance (small role/large role)	0.968	0.91*** (0.00005)	0.755*** (0.0000)	0.923*** (0.0000)	0.919*** (0.0000)	0.918*** (0.00015)	0.825*** (0.0000)	0.847*** (0.0000)	0.62*** (0.0000)	0.971 (0.3879)	0.866*** (0.0000)
INSTRUMENTAL BELIEFS												
I-1	Strategic approach to goals (conflict/cooperation)	0.401	0.193 (0.0664)	0.518 (0.092)	0.27 (0.09715)	0.481 (0.218)	0.559 (0.1524)	0.503 (0.2833)	0.274 (0.22)	0.81* (0.018)	-0.083*** (0.00075)	0.385 (0.37635)
I-2	Intensity of tactics (conflict/cooperation)	0.178	0.06 (0.0969)	0.234 (0.166)	0.125 (0.20765)	0.211 (0.311)	0.283 (0.1523)	0.342 (0.0818)	0.078 (0.174)	0.389* (0.0477)	-0.158*** (0.0005)	0.166 (0.34665)
I-3	Risk orientation (averse/acceptant)	0.332	0.241 (0.1223)	0.311 (0.337)	0.357 (0.3342)	0.564*** (0.00005)	0.429 (0.13895)	0.425 (0.1822)	0.21 (0.095)	0.446 (0.1505)	0.664*** (0.00005)	0.410** (0.00695)
I-4	Timing of conflict											
I-4a	Conflict	0.503	0.732* (0.0119)	0.478 (0.352)	0.635* (0.03715)	0.417 (0.129)	0.44 (0.2885)	0.497 (0.48175)	0.7 (0.051)	0.19* (0.0143)	0.317* (0.0387)	0.502 (0.4909)
I-4b	Words/deed	0.464	0.583 (0.1202)	0.542 (0.112)	0.317* (0.01905)	0.353 (0.065)	0.43 (0.3818)	0.253 (0.05115)	0.469 (0.483)	0.32 (0.1531)	0.417 (0.32685)	0.422 (0.13455)
I-5	Utility of means											
I-5a	Reward	0.157	0.145 (0.4178)	0.187 (0.21)	0.166 (0.4183)	0.16 (0.473)	0.24 (0.11095)	0.282 (0.0548)	0.087 (0.154)	0.15 (0.4655)	0.15 (0.4552)	0.172 (0.2688)
I-5b	Promise	0.075	0.045 (0.3332)	0.038 (0.058)	0.037 (0.0852)	0.018* (0.015)	0.014 (0.07185)	0.01 (0.08845)	0.093 (0.349)	0.08 (0.4628)	0.042 (0.19135)	0.037* (0.00175)
I-5c	Appeal/support	0.468	0.409 (0.2134)	0.535 (0.077)	0.432 (0.25985)	0.562 (0.05)	0.529 (0.2325)	0.462 (0.47495)	0.457 (0.451)	0.676* (0.0226)	0.266** (0.0044)	0.484 (0.29605)
I-5d	Oppose/resist	0.154	0.22 (0.1321)	0.124 (0.208)	0.211 (0.0925)	0.16 (0.445)	0.116 (0.2804)	0.213 (0.21885)	0.203 (0.244)	0.084 (0.1984)	0.1 (0.1949)	0.160 (0.39955)
I-5e	Threaten	0.034	0.021 (0.263)	0.01* (0.03)	0.046 (0.2396)	0.012 (0.067)	0.004 (0.0941)	0.023 (0.33835)	0.013 (0.195)	0 (0.119)	0.15*** (0.0002)	0.030 (0.35485)
I-5f	Punish	0.112	0.163 (0.1453)	0.109 (0.46)	0.109 (0.465)	0.087 (0.231)	0.1 (0.40955)	0.013* (0.0499)	0.149 (0.254)	0.012 (0.0644)	0.292*** (0.00045)	0.118 (0.37145)

APPENDIX C: Full List of the Texts Analyzed with Their Numbers of Words, Numbers of Verbs, Dates, Sources, and Types

Text ID	Title	Word Count	Verb Count	Date	Source	Format	Text/Audio
MLP-1	Speech at the Oxford Union	5,286	183	06.02.2015	YouTube	Speech	Audio
MLP-2	Interview with RT	2,566	83	20.05.2016	YouTube	Interview	Audio
MLP-3	Interview with Spiegel	2,020	67	03.06.2016	Spiegel	Interview	Text
MLP-4	Interview with Gorani on CNN	576	19	31.08.2016	CNN	Interview	Audio
MLP-5	Interview on BBC	2,148	73	10.10.2016	BBC	Interview	Audio
MLP-6	Interview with Andrew Marr on BBC	1,586	70	13.11.2016	BBC	Interview	Audio
MLP-7	Interview on CNBC	2,433	82	21.11.2016	CNBC	Interview	Audio
MLP-8	Interview with Amanpour on CNN	926	25	30.01.2017	CNN	Interview	Audio
MLP-9	Interview with Farage on LBC Radio	4,076	140	14.03.2017	LBC	Interview	Audio
MLP-10	Interview on BBC Newsnight	1,078	48	27.03.2017	BBC	Interview	Audio
VO-1	Interview on Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung	2,273	58	04.03.2012	Occidental Observer	Interview	Text
VO-2	Press statement after his talks with Prime Minister of Bulgaria Boyko Borissov	1,334	46	29.01.2016	Website of the Hungarian Government	Press Statement	Text
VO-3	Statement at the joint press conference with Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland Beata Szydło	1,092	41	08.02.2016	Website of the Hungarian Government	Press Statement	Text
VO-4	Press statement following a meeting of the Visegrád Group	780	25	15.02.2016	Website of the Hungarian Government	Press Statement	Text
VO-5	Press statement following his talks with President of Russia Vladimir Putin	708	30	17.02.2016	Website of the Hungarian Government	Press Statement	Text
VO-6	Press statement following the summit of the European Council	2,523	86	19.02.2016	Website of the Hungarian Government	Press Statement	Text
VO-7	Preliminary address to Parliament	2,935	111	22.02.2016	Website of the Hungarian Government	Speech	Text

VO-8	Interview on BILD	1,787	74	24.02.2016	Website of the Hungarian Government	Interview	Text
VO-9	Speech at a meeting for the heads of diplomatic missions	6,210	140	29.02.2016	Website of the Hungarian Government	Speech	Text
VO-10	Speech in Budapest	1,119	33	15.03.2016	Website of the Hungarian Government	Speech	Text
VO-11	Address by Viktor Orbán at the OECD	4,095	107	07.05.2016	Website of the Hungarian Government	Speech	Text
VO-12	Article published in German in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung	4,169	130	11.07.2016	Website of the Hungarian Government	Article	Text
VO-13	Press statement after his talks with Aleksandar Vučić	1,372	58	05.09.2016	Website of the Hungarian Government	Press Statement	Text
VO-14	Press statement after a meeting of the Prime Ministers of the Visegrád Four and Ukraine	628	34	07.09.2016	Website of the Hungarian Government	Press Statement	Text
VO-15	Press conference after an extraordinary meeting of the European Council	1,032	31	16.09.2016	Website of the Hungarian Government	Press Statement	Text
VO-16	Interview with Hungarian online news portal Origo	3,487	97	22.09.2016	Website of the Hungarian Government	Interview	Text
VO-17	Post-referendum speech	804	30	02.10.2016	Website of the Hungarian Government	Speech	Text
VO-18	Speech after the V4 counter-terrorism exercise	595	24	06.10.2016	Website of the Hungarian Government	Speech	Text
VO-19	Speech at the conference “China-CEE Political Parties Dialogue”	2,239	68	06.10.2016	Website of the Hungarian Government	Speech	Text
VO-20	Press statement in Bratislava	1,033	33	07.10.2016	Website of the Hungarian Government	Press Statement	Text
VO-21	Press conference in Brussels after the EU summit	2,083	71	21.10.2016	Website of the Hungarian Government	Press Statement	Text
VO-22	Interview on The Telegraph	5,361	120	11.11.2016	Website of the Hungarian Government	Interview	Text
VO-23	Speech of Viktor Orbán at the EPP Congress Valletta	1,040	41	30.03.2017	Website of the Hungarian Government	Speech	Text
VO-24	Speech of Viktor Orbán at the EPP Congress	1,085	48	22.10.2015	Website of the Hungarian Government	Speech	Text

VO-25	Speech by Viktor Orbán at the Chatham House, London	1,729	62	09.10.2013	Chatham House	Speech	Text
VO-26	Speech at the 14th Plenary Assembly of the World Jewish Congress	1,471	49	05.05.2013	Washington Embassy Website	Speech	Text
GW-1	Speech in Copenhagen	1,802	98	02.11.2014	Wilders' personal blog	Speech	Text
GW-2	Speech at the Congress of FN	2,350	102	29.11.2014	Wilders' personal blog	Speech	Text
GW-3	Speech in the US	579	33	30.11.2014	Wilders' personal blog	Speech	Text
GW-4	Article in WSJ	907	29	21.12.2014	Wilders' personal blog	Article	Text
GW-5	Speech to the Dutch Parliament	1,047	33	14.01.2015	Wilders' personal blog	Speech	Text
GW-6	Speech to the Dutch Parliament	2,913	123	11.02.2015	Wilders' personal blog	Speech	Text
GW-7	Speech in Vienna	846	46	27.03.2015	Wilders' personal blog	Speech	Text
GW-8	Speech at PEGIDA	1,727	70	13.04.2015	Wilders' personal blog	Speech	Text
GW-9	Speech in the US	2,020	74	29.04.2015	Wilders' personal blog	Speech	Text
GW-10	Speech in Denmark	2,207	101	13.06.2015	Wilders' personal blog	Speech	Text
GW-11	Interview with Breitbart Website	1,128	33	19.06.2015	Wilders' personal blog	Interview	Text
GW-12	Speech in Silicon Valley	3,544	144	11.08.2015	Wilders' personal blog	Speech	Text
GW-13	Op-ed article in NY Times	908	34	19.11.2015	Wilders' personal blog	Article	Text
GW-14	Op-ed article on Breitbart	783	36	29.01.2016	Wilders' personal blog	Article	Text
GW-15	Press Conference	871	40	29.01.2016	Wilders' personal blog	Press Statement	Text
GW-16	Op-ed article on Breitbart	796	31	29.02.2016	Wilders' personal blog	Article	Text
GW-17	Op-ed article on Breitbart	734	34	11.05.2016	Wilders' personal blog	Article	Text
GW-18	Op-ed article on Breitbart	730	23	27.05.2016	Wilders' personal blog	Article	Text
GW-19	Op-ed article on Breitbart	1,225	52	28.09.2016	Wilders' personal blog	Article	Text
GW-20	Op-ed article on Breitbart	509	28	09.11.2016	Wilders' personal blog	Article	Text
NF-1	Speech at the UKIP Conference	1,881	54	20.09.2013	Spectator.co.uk	Speech	Text
NF-2	Speech in EP Plenary	1,007	27	02.07.2014	EP Website	Speech	Text
NF-3	Speech in EP Plenary	945	28	15.07.2014	EP Website	Speech	Text
NF-4	Speech in EP Plenary	335	18	16.09.2014	EP Website	Speech	Text
NF-5	Speech in EP Plenary	449	19	13.01.2015	EP Website	Speech	Text
NF-6	Speech in EP Plenary	435	20	11.02.2015	EP Website	Speech	Text
NF-7	Speech in EP Plenary	532	26	29.04.2015	EP Website	Speech	Text
NF-8	Speech in EP Plenary	664	23	08.07.2015	EP Website	Speech	Text
NF-9	Speech in EP Plenary	492	18	27.10.2015	EP Website	Speech	Text
NF-10	Speech in EP Plenary	587	18	16.12.2015	EP Website	Speech	Text

NF-11	Speech in EP Plenary	458	24	20.02.2016	EP Website	Speech	Text
NF-12	Speech in EP Plenary	554	26	03.02.2016	EP Website	Speech	Text
NF-13	Speech in EP Plenary	496	17	09.03.2016	EP Website	Speech	Text
NF-14	Speech in EP Plenary	622	19	13.04.2016	EP Website e	Speech	Text
NF-15	Speech in EP Plenary	705	31	08.06.2016	EP Website	Speech	Text
NF-16	Radio interview	1,102	26	20.06.2016	Spectator.co.uk	Interview	Text
NF-17	Speech in EP Plenary	732	39	28.06.2016	EP Website	Speech	Text
NF-18	Speech in EP Plenary	681	17	14.09.2016	EP Website	Speech	Text
NF-19	Speech in EP Plenary	870	22	26.10.2016	EP Website	Speech	Text
NF-20	Speech in EP Plenary	636	18	14.12.2016	EP Website	Speech	Text
NF-21	Speech in EP Plenary	630	19	01.02.2017	EP Website	Speech	Text
BJ-1	Article on the SUN	1,187	34	22.04.2016	The Sun Website	Article	Text
BJ-2	Brexit speech	5,656	160	09.05.2016	Conservativehome.com	Speech	Text
BJ-3	Article in The Telegraph	1,050	24	15.05.2016	The Telegraph Website	Article	Text
BJ-4	Statement on immigration	842	39	26.05.2016	Brexit Campaign Website	Press Statement	Text
BJ-5	Post-Brexit victory speech	791	23	24.06.2016	Newsweek Website	Speech	Text
BJ-6	Speech to Conservative Party Conference 2016	3,434	92	02.10.2016	Spectator.co.uk	Speech	Text
BJ-7	Speech at the UNSC Briefing on Somalia	769	40	23.03.2017	Website of the UK Government	Speech	Text
BJ-8	Speech at Syria Conference in Brussels	678	35	05.04.2017	Website of the UK Government	Speech	Text
JA-1	Interview with Addeurope Website	990	28	01.12.2015	Addeurope Website	Interview	Text
JA-2	Interview with Breitbart Website	1,322	34	19.12.2015	Breitbart Website	Interview	Text
JA-3	Speech on his own YouTube channel	657	15	14.05.2016	YouTube	Speech	Audio
JA-4	Speech at the parliament	1,272	45	15.06.2016	YouTube	Speech	Audio
JA-5	Speech at the Ceremony of European Freedom Awards	860	35	06.11.2016	YouTube	Speech	Audio
JA-6	Op-ed article in WSJ	669	27	22.02.2017	WSJ	Article	Text
FP-1	Interview with Int'l Trade News Website	1,431	45	n/d	internationaltradenews.com	Interview	Text
FP-2	Interview with DW	2,676	62	21.03.2016	dw.com	Interview	Text
FP-3	Interview with Channel 4	578	22	23.03.2016	Spiegel Website	Interview	Text
FP-4	Interview with Spiegel	1,747	51	30.03.2016	YouTube	Interview	Audio

FP-5	Interview with RT	2,267	70	20.06.2016	YouTube	Interview	Audio
FP-6	Interview with Euronews	697	27	20.12.2016	YouTube	Interview	Audio
FP-7	Speech on her own YouTube channel	1,796	70	31.12.2016	YouTube	Speech	Audio
NH-1	Interview with BILD	998	31	19.07.2016	BILD	Interview	Text
NH-2	Panel Discussion at the Graduate Institute of Geneva	1,310	43	21.10.2016	YouTube	Panel Discussion	Audio
NH-3	Interview on Visegrád Post	575	21	19.11.2016	Visegrád Post	Interview	Text
NH-4	Interview with RT	1,170	30	16.12.2016	YouTube	Interview	Audio
NH-5	Interview on Visegrád Post	1,489	43	8.02.2017	Visegrád Post	Interview	Text
NM-1	The return of the Ottomans - Article	909	33	15.11.2014	Website of Golden Dawn	Article	Text
NM-2	How we lost Eastern Thrace - Article	1,071	30	12.10.2016	Website of Golden Dawn	Article	Text
NM-3	Our allies, the memoranda, and the lack of national policy - Article	1,100	38	14.11.2016	Website of Golden Dawn	Article	Text
NM-4	The beginning of the end of an era - Article	1,028	38	20.11.2016	Website of Golden Dawn	Article	Text
NM-5	Article in the newspaper "Golden Dawn"	583	20	2.12.2016	Website of Golden Dawn	Article	Text
NM-6	Our Europe - Article	636	25	16.12.2016	Website of Golden Dawn	Article	Text
NM-7	When the vote of the people displeases the oligarchy - Article	667	28	27.02.2017	Website of Golden Dawn	Article	Text
NM-8	The return of the ottomans and the fake political establishment - Article	1,035	30	13.03.2017	Website of Golden Dawn	Article	Text
NM-9	Greek People say NO to the Europe of usurers - Article	710	21	17.03.2017	Website of Golden Dawn	Article	Text
NM-10	1821 and the Greeks of 2017 - Article	978	22	27.03.2017	Website of Golden Dawn	Article	Text
NM-11	Limnos and another treason of the "allies" - Article	672	24	30.03.2017	Website of Golden Dawn	Article	Text
NM-12	Speech: "NO to the new Turkish occupation"	1,079	19	4.04.2017	Website of Golden Dawn	Speech	Text
NM-13	The elections that... not arrive and the fear towards Golden Dawn! - Article	633	19	13.04.2017	Website of Golden Dawn	Article	Text

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* The data were initially collected in 2017. However, the webpages or video links are not available for the following texts as of 01.12.2019: Åkesson, 2015a, 2016a, 2016b; Petry, n/d; 2016f. For all other texts, the last access date is 01.12.2019. For inquiries about the texts (including the ones cannot be accessed online anymore), please email the author (ceydilek@gmail.com).