HOW CAN BUNDLE COSMOPSYCHISM SOLVE THE SUBJECT-DERIVATION PROBLEM

A Master's Thesis

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To Selenay

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I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy.

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ABSTRACT

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Cosmopsychism is the view that the universe as a whole is conscious and metaphysically grounds all conscious subjects. While this position has the important advantage of avoiding the fundamental problems of physicalism, dualism and micropsychism, it faces a challenge called the subject-derivation problem, that is, it must explain how all the different conscious subjects derive from a singular cosmic subject. In this thesis, I will argue that the subject-derivation problem cannot be solved as long as a singular cosmic subject is assumed, and I will propose a new model for solving this problem, which I call Bundle Cosmopsychism. The main idea of my thesis is that a bundle of cosmic subjects subsuming the entire phenomenal statespace can ground all subjects in an irreducibly collective way.

Keywords: bundle, grounding, phenomenality, Priority Cosmopsychism, subject-derivation problem

ÖZET

DEMET KOZMOPSİŞİZMİ ÖZNE-TÜREME SORUNUNU NASIL ÇÖZEBİLİR?

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Kozmopsişizm, evrenin bir bütün olarak bilinçli olduğu ve metafiziksel olarak tüm bilinçli özneleri temellendirdiği görüşüdür. Bu görüş, fizikalizm, dualizm ve mikropsişizmin temel sorunlarından kaçındığı için önemli bir avantaja sahip olsa da özne-türeme sorunu olarak adlandırılan bir zorlukla karşı karşıyadır; yani, birbirinden farklı bilinçli öznelerin tamamının tekil bir kozmik özneden nasıl türediğini açıklaması gerekir. Bu tezde, tekil bir kozmik özne varsayıldığı sürece özne-türeme sorununun çözülemeyeceğini savunacağım ve bu sorunu çözmek için Demet Kozmopsişizmi ismini verdiğim yeni bir model önericeğim. Tezimin ana fikri, fenomenal durum uzayının bütününü kapsayan bir kozmik özneler demetinin tüm özneleri indirgenemez kolektivitesi ile temellendirmesinin mümkün olduğudur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: demet, fenomenalite, Öncelik Kozmopsişizmi, özne-türeme problemi, temellendirme

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Cosmopsychism is the view that the universe as a whole is conscious. Similar to panpsychism[1], it claims that phenomenal properties are in the fundamental fabric of the universe but differs from it by contending that these properties are instantiated not by elementary particles (electrons, quarks, etc.) but by *Cosmos as a whole*. Although these two views seem at first glance incredibly implausible, more and more philosophers of mind have begun to take these positions seriously. This is because these approaches do not treat consciousness as a 'surprise' that mysteriously emerges from a combination of various non-mental particles[2], or supernatural entities that cannot be understood in terms of how they can causally relate to physical bodies.[3] According to these approaches, consciousness is a feature of nature that is 'always there'. Although panpsychism avoids both problems by integrating consciousness into the universe, it faces another major challenge, known as the

[1] Micropsychism which argues that phenomenal properties are instantiated in the basic particles in the universe is the standard form of panpsychism. Cosmopsychism is also regarded as a form of panpsychism, but unless otherwise specified, what is meant by panpsychism in the literature is usually micropsychism.
[2] This is generally seen as the most challenging problem for physicalism. Some physicalist philosophers argued that since such an emergence is metaphysically impossible, physicalism entails panpsychism See, for example, Strawson (2006).
[3] This is known as the *interaction problem*, and there is almost a consensus that Cartesian Dualism cannot overcome it.

combination problem. It has difficulty explaining how different consciousnesses in elementary particles combine to form unified minds. At this point, cosmopsychism seems to be a more favorable view than panpsychism because it does not face such a problem. This is because it explains consciousness with a top-down relation rather than a bottom-up one. In other words, if there is no combination, there is no combination problem.

However, the story does not end here. Cosmopsychism faces another challenge, known as the *subject-derivation problem*.[4] This is the problem of how all the different conscious subjects can be derived from a singular cosmic subject. Yujin Nagasawa and Khai Wager propose Priority Cosmopsychism as a solution to this problem, a structurally similar approach to Priority Monism. They employ the strategies used by Priority Monists to explain the differences between objects and the qualitative heterogeneity in the universe to solve the derivation problem of cosmopsychism.

While Priority Cosmopsychism is a promising attempt, I argue that this model ultimately fails and that a successful cosmopsychist model must contain the existence of a bundle of cosmic subjects rather than a singular cosmic subject. In the *Chapter II*, firstly, I will argue that Priority Cosmopsychism cannot overcome the problem of synchronous perspectives and show why the main responses to this argument are inadequate. I will then argue that while this problem has always been

[4] Khai Wager (2020) refers to this issue as the *subject-derivation problem*, Philip Goff (2017)as the *decombination problem*, and David Chalmers (2016) as the *decomposition problem.*

discussed in the literature in terms of the derivation of individual subjects, the problem of what I call *species-derivation* deepens the challenge to Priority Cosmopsychism. And finally, I will argue that mental states that by their intrinsic character cannot be experienced simultaneously in a single mind (I will call them *mutually exclusive mental states*) pose a further problem for Priority Cosmopsychism. In the *Chapter III*, on the basis of the conclusions reached in the second chapter, I will argue that a successful cosmopsychist account should encompass a bundle that overarches all possible –not only actual- phenomenal experiences and perspectives. I will call this model *Bundle Cosmopsychism.* I will show the possibility of such a model, how it overcomes the derivation problem, and its advantages over other models.

In conclusion, I argue that while Priority Cosmopsychism is one of the most promising cosmopsychist models, it fails and that the model I call *Bundle Cosmopsychism* offers a more successful account. However, I must emphasize the following: I am *not* claiming in this thesis that Bundle Cosmopsychism is the best solution to the mind-body problem, *nor* am I responding to the objections common to all panpsychist or cosmopsychist models. The aim of this thesis is not to solve the mind-body problem or defend cosmopsychism, but to show approximately what the most successful version of cosmopsychism would look like.

CHAPTER II

WHY PRIORITY COSMOPSYCHISM FAILS

The central thesis of Priority Cosmopsychism can be summarized as follows: There is only one *fundamental* subject, identified as the cosmic subject. All other subjects within the universe are considered *derivatives* of this overarching subject. The cosmic subject is *prior* to all other subjects and *grounds* all phenomenality and perspectives. To understand how this theory works, it is first necessary to understand Priority Monism. While Priority Cosmopsychism does not presuppose Priority Monism, it employs a structurally analogous approach. Therefore, it is pertinent to examine the problems addressed by Priority Monism and the strategy it employs before investigating the details of Priority Cosmopsychism.

The most important challenge for any monist view to overcome is that it seems intuitively obvious that the world is made up of different parts. If the world is a single object, how come there seem to be many objects? For *Existence Monism*, one of the traditional types of monism, this problem is more challenging because, according to Existence Monism, there is *only one* object, and this object does not have different proper parts. Everything that is seen as a proper part is identical to the

whole - and naturally identical to each other. This is an incredibly difficult position to defend.[5] However, Priority Monism makes a different claim. 'One' is the number of *fundamental* objects, *not* the number of *all* objects. The Cosmos is a singular fundamental object, and the other objects are its proper parts, which are its different derivatives. The proper parts are *numerically distinct* from each other and from the Cosmos. Thus, Priority Monism offers a more plausible version of monism that does not contradict our basic intuitions about the universe.

What about the qualitative heterogeneity of the universe? How can so many different properties be derived from one fundamental object? Jonathan Schaffer offers three basic proposals on how a singular fundamental object can account for the heterogeneous fabric of the universe: **(1)** properties can be *distributional*. For example, an object can be heterogeneous by having the property 'being polka dotted'; **(2)** heterogeneity can be achieved through *regionalized properties*, so that the world can be heterogeneous by bearing the redness relation to one region and the greenness relation to another region; **(3)** heterogeneity can be provided through *regionalized instantiation*, so that the world instantiates red in one region and green in another region (Schaffer, 2010: 59-60).

Understanding how Priority Cosmopsychism addresses the distinction between the fundamental subject and its derivatives, as well as explaining the phenomenal heterogeneity in the world, is now quite straightforward. First, since it assumes a

[5] Nevertheless, there are some important defenders of this view in contemporary philosophy. See, for example, Horgan & Potrč (2012).

single *fundamental* subject rather than a single *real* subject, it has no difficulty in explaining why derivative subjects are *numerically distinct* from each other and from the fundamental subject. Second, parallel to these three possibilities, cosmic consciousness can be heterogeneous, instantiating in a distributive way the quality of being heterogeneous. Or cosmic consciousness can bear the relation of redness in one region and greenness in another. Finally, cosmic consciousness can be heterogeneous by instantiating red in one place and blue in another (Nagasawa & Wager, 2016: 123).

Since it seems obvious that it is possible to instantiate many different qualities synchronously in a single mind, and there seems to be no obstacle for the Schafferian strategies to be employed, I will make no objection to this. However, a version of the subject-derivation problem called *synchronous perspectives problem*[6] is quite powerful, and the intractability of this problem is also recognized by cosmopsychist philosophers. I will argue that Priority Cosmopsychism cannot overcome the problem of synchronous subjects, and I will show that Philip Goff's and Khai Wager's answers are inadequate on this point. After that, I will show why the problems that I call *species-derivation* and *mutually exclusive mental states* deepen the problem of subject-derivation. Now, before moving on to my critique of Priority

[6] In short, this problem is based on the idea that different perspectives cannot be grounded in a single perspective. Wager (2020) refers to this problem as the *synchronous perspectives problem,* and Miri Albahari (2019) as the *incoherent contents objection.*

Cosmopsychism, I need to emphasize two points for the sake of a proper understanding of my arguments:

Point #1. According to Priority Cosmopsychism, cosmic consciousness is a singular subject and has a single perspective. Both in Nagasawa and Wager's articles (Nagasawa & Wager, 2016; Wager, 2020) and in the works of other philosophers who take a position close to Priority Cosmopsychism (Goff, 2017; Shani, 2015), the term cosmic consciousness/subject/perspective is always used in the singular, and everything is tried to be derived from a singular fundamental perspective.

Point #2. Cosmic consciousness is a subject of experience. Although Nagasawa and Wager say that this does not follow directly from Priority Cosmopsychism, they include it among the minimum requirements for any cosmopsychist model, since without a subject of experience it is not possible to conceive of how phenomenal properties are instantiated (Wager, 2020: 61).

2.1. Subject-Derivation and Synchronous Perspectives

We have seen that Priority Cosmopsychism, unlike Existence Cosmopsychism, can explain in principle how derivative subjects are different from each other and from the cosmic subject. However, the problem does not end here. How mutually exclusive synchronous perspectives are grounded in the perspective of a single

cosmic subject needs to be addressed separately. For a better understanding of the problem, we first need to understand the *Subject-Constitution Principle:*

> **The Subject-Constitution Principle:** For a subject(s) to constitute a further subject(s) the constituting subject(s) must survive in the constituted subject(s) and the constituted subject(s) must be a genuine subject(s) not mere an aggregation, or arbitrary region, of the constituting subject(s). Moreover, the constituted subject(s) must not be strongly emergent from the constituting subject(s) (Wager, 2020: 169-170).

The classic example in this regard is Red and Blue.[7] Red is a subject who experiences only red and nothing else, while Blue is a subject who experiences only blue and nothing else. Blue's perspective is characterized by "the-experience-of-blueness-to-the-exclusion-of-all-else" while Red's perspective is characterized by "the-experience-of-redness-to-the-exclusion-of-all-else". Since both subjects are fully grounded[8] in cosmic consciousness, cosmic consciousness affirms and denies both perspectives. In other words, it contains the perspectives "the-experience-of-blueness-to-the-exclusion-of-all-else" and "the-experience-of-redness-to-the-exclusion-of-all-else" simultaneously, and it seems contradictory (Wager, 2020: 67).

[7] This example is actually based on Samuel Coleman's (2014) argument against constitutive panpsychism. However, since the same problem applies to cosmopsychism, this example is often cited in discussions of cosmopsychism.

[8] Itay Shani (2015) argues that derivative perspectives are partially grounded in the cosmic perspective, not fully grounded. However, this does not solve the problem. As Miri Albahari rightly points out:

> At the same time Shani wants to insist that the contents of our conscious fields, while embedded within the absolute's field of consciousness, are hidden to the absolute's perspective. But he cannot have it both ways. If our conscious perspectives and their contents are to be embedded within – and illuminated by the sentience of – the absolute's conscious field, then, given that the absolute is a subject, our contents (and perhaps perspectives) must also, by definition, be first-personally revealed to the absolute's perspective. (Albahari, 2019: 123).

In terms of the *Subject-Constitution Principle*, constituting subject does not seem to survive in the constituted subjects.

Philip Goff argues that there is no logical contradiction in such situations, only a difficulty of imagination. Just as we do not assume that four-dimensional objects are impossible because we cannot imagine them, we should not assume that these scenarios are impossible because we cannot imagine them (Goff, 2017: 240). However, there seems to be something more than a difficulty of the imagination here. This can be better explained as follows: it is possible for an object to instantiate red and blue at the same time, for example it can be half blue and half red. There is no inconsistency here. But let's imagine that an object is *homogeneously red* and *homogeneously blue* at the same time. Here there is an inconsistency. Now, when we adapt this for cosmopsychism, the problem is this: according to Priority Cosmopsychism, all perspectives are grounded in a singular cosmic consciousness, meaning that all individual experiences are also the experience of the cosmic subject. Red's experience is the *homogeneous experience of red*, while Blue's experience is the *homogeneous experience of blue*. Hence, the cosmic perspective must experience both *homogeneous* blue and *homogeneous* red at the same time. However, there is something strange here. Just as an object cannot be homogeneously blue and homogeneously red at the same time - because the synchronous existence of *both* properties contradicts *homogeneity* - a subject cannot experience homogeneous red and homogeneous blue at the same time because the experience of red and blue contradicts the experience of homogeneity. Therefore, even if Goff is right that there is no immediate logical contradiction, he is not right that there is no real incoherence here.

Khai Wager argues that the *binocular model of synchronous perspectives* can solve this problem. Binocular vision is a field of vision formed by the fusion of two separate monocular fields of vision. All animals with two eyes have this type of vision. In this vision, the identity of both monocular fields is preserved, but they fuse into a single field of vision with a single perspective. Most of the time, the contents of the different monocular fields largely overlap, but in exceptional cases of so-called *binocular rivalry*, the contents of the monocular fields become radically different. And when these fields fuse into a single perspective, a dynamic mosaic of both fields is formed. The subject *suppresses* some parts of both fields of vision, these suppressed fields are constantly changing, and thus experiences a constantly changing mosaic of both fields. Wager believes that the problem of synchronous perspectives for cosmopsychism can be solved if we invert this model. So, if we think not of a binocular field composed of different monocular fields, but two monocular fields that derive from one binocular visual field. In this case, the main visual field is a dynamic mosaic of both monocular fields, and the monocular fields continue to survive. According to Wager, this could be an analog for synchronous perspectives existing in a single consciousness (Wager, 2020: 190-199).

However, different visual fields are *not* different subjects, and I think the error of this model lies in treating the "perspectives" of monocular fields and the "perspectives" of conscious subjects as equivalent. Monocular fields can be called perspectives in the sense that they collect *visual data* about the external world from different *angles*, but ultimately, they are not perspectives in the sense of the *conscious subjects*. For,

even though the data is processed in different visual fields, they do not have their own conscious perspectives and there is only one subject experiencing them. In short, although the binocular vision model was constructed as if the relation between monocular fields and the subject is parallel to the relation between the cosmic subject and sub-subjects, in the first case there is only one subject.

When this model is analyzed with attention to the differences between visual fields and subjects, it produces some strange results. According to this model, Red's homogeneous experience of red and Blue's homogeneous experience of blue exist in the cosmic subject's experience of a dynamic mosaic of red and blue. However, while Red's and Blue's perspectives are fully grounded in the cosmic perspective, the cosmic perspective cannot access the perspective of both. For, the cosmic subject's perspective would consist of a partially suppressed heterogeneous mixture of Red's and Blue's perspectives, what the cosmic subject experiences would in fact be neither Red's nor Blue's perspective. At this point, we return to the initial problem: How can the mutually exclusive perspectives of Red and Blue exist synchronously in a singular perspective? Even if the binocular rivalry model shows how such a thing is possible *for visual fields,* it is difficult to see how it solves the problem in terms of *subjects*. The problem is that the mutually exclusive perspectives would not be able to maintain their presence in the holistic perspective because they would "mix" when they fuse into a single perspective. In such a fusion, visual fields can still retain their content, but conscious subjects cannot retain their perspectives. This is because the perspective resulting from the fusion is now another perspective in which both sub-perspectives "disappear" and become something else. Since perspectives are characterized as much by the experiences they exclude as by

the experiences they include, all models in which different perspectives are grounded in a single perspective will continue to be plagued by this problem.[9]

At this point, with some stretch of the imagination, a Zuboff-like thought experiment (Zuboff, 1981) can be adapted to this topic (with some modifications). Let's imagine that a person's brain is separated from his body and kept alive, and after a while, the two hemispheres of this brain are separated from each other. However, communication between the two hemispheres will continue to be maintained through signals that maintain the same function without disrupting it. Since the hemispheres will not understand that they are connected to each other not in a normal way but through signals (there will be no change in normal functions), even if the two hemispheres are in different places, there will be no significant change in the subject's conscious states as long as the communication between them is maintained properly. Let's imagine this applies to all neurons. If communication between neurons can be achieved through signals without any loss, change or deterioration in function, having all neurons in different places, just like in the hemispheres, will not change the result, and consciousness will not be affected by this situation. Moreover, replacing one neuron with another of the same type will not change anything as long

[9] Another similar strategy might be to appeal to cases of *Dissociative Identity Disorder*. Bernardo Kastrup uses this analogy to defend cosmic idealism, not cosmopsychism. But it can also be adapted to cosmopsychism. He states that the alter egos in DID cases originate from a single consciousness, that in some cases these alter egos are so radically different that one is blind, and one is sighted, and that the alters remain self-aware and active even when they are not in control of the body (Kastrup, 2017). First of all, as Chalmers points out, such a model pathologizes our ordinary experiences because it means that we do not have access to a very large part of the experiences we normally have, and that introspection completely fails (Chalmers, 2019: 367). More importantly for our purposes, however, such empirical analogies are not very useful unless they solve the metaphysical riddle. For example, can the basic subject have the experience of blindness of the blind alter and the experience of sight of the sighted alter at the same time? The answer seems to be no because of the contradiction. If yes, the present analogy gives no clue as to how this happens. For this reason, I do not think that these analogies make a significant contribution to the issue.

as the same firing pattern is maintained, since this will not produce any functional changes. Therefore, if the appropriate types of neurons in the real brains of different people are included in the system, consciousness will be able to continue working without problems.

The possibility of a subject/system whose parts are spread throughout the universe and can also use the neurons of different brains/persons can be considered a good analogue for single-subject cosmopsychist theories. If we accept and follow all the steps in the thought experiment, it is possible to eventually reach a kind of cosmic consciousness that can extend throughout the cosmos and include other brains but still remain a singular subject. However, in order to talk about the theoretical possibility of such a thing, it is necessary to accept a kind of physicalism, which says that brain functions are identical to consciousness or produce consciousness. However, if we take these assumptions as a basis to construct such a possible scenario, we will return to the starting point, that is, to the 'problems of physicalism' that lead us to alternative paths such as panpsychism and cosmopsychism. While thought experiments like these are eye-opening, I think a scenario produced to save any form of cosmopsychism would need to have fewer physicalist or functionalist assumptions. Moreover, even if all these problems are ignored, it can be seen that Zuboff-like thought experiments cannot provide any solution to the fundamental problems of cosmopsychism, even if they seem to show the conceivability of subject-subsuming subjects at first glance. Human brains may be functional parts of a singular cosmic brain, but this still leaves the problem of synchronous subjects unresolved. For, in such a scenario, the experiences of the cosmic consciousness and the experiences of the subjects that are parts of it will be different from each other,

and even if the cosmic consciousness includes other subjects *functionally*, it will not subsume them *experientially*. Therefore, I do not think that such scenarios can provide a sufficient answer to the subject-derivation problem.

2.2. Species-Derivation Problem

So far in the discussion, the possibility that the subjects may belong to different species has been completely ignored. However, I think that species-derivation makes the derivation problem much more difficult, even though this aspect of the issue has been neglected in the literature on cosmopsychism. First, let us recall that we have dealt with the problem of individual subject-derivation in two stages. *In the first stage*, we saw that the problem of how numerically distinct subjects can derive from a single subject was solved in principle by the Schafferian strategy. *In the second stage*, we saw that synchronous perspectives pose a more intractable problem when mutually exclusive perspectival experiences are 'added' to the subjects. Although in individual subjects the challenge appears in the second stage and not in the first, in species-derivation the problem arises in the first stage.

To better understand the problem, let us start by considering the difference between "being me" and "being you" and the difference between "being me *as a human*

being" and "being B. *as a bat*".[10] First of all, "being me" and "being you" are not properties, because they do not instantiate in any object/subject except certain singular subjects. Since both people in this comparison are human beings, our perspectives do not differ in terms of the qualities *intrinsic* to the perspective. This differentiation can be likened to one token of a gold being different from another token of a gold. But in the case of "being me as a human being" and "being B. as a bat" the situation is different. In this case, the difference between the perspectives ceases to be a merely numerical difference and also becomes a qualitative difference. In other words, it is no longer a difference of *token* but a difference of *type*. The perspective of the bat is *intrinsically* loaded with the specific phenomenal characteristic of being a bat. On the other hand, the perspective of a human being is loaded with the specific phenomenal characteristic of being a human. There is a significant distinction between the difference in species-intrinsic phenomenal content between human being and bat and the difference between Red's and Blue's perspectives. While Red's and Blue's experiences can be exchanged[11] because they are not *intrinsic* to their perspectives, the phenomenal characteristic of being-bat and the phenomenal characteristic of being-human cannot be exchanged between bat and human, since such a qualitative exchange - unlike in the case of Blue and Red - requires a change of *entire subjecthood*. And since these phenomenal characteristics belong to two radically different species, they are epistemically *opaque* to each other. This means that they are mutually exclusive; thereby, they cannot co-exist in a singular mind.

[10] This argument, as can be easily understood, is based on Nagelian intuition: "But no matter how the form may vary, the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all means, basically, that there is something it is like to be that organism" (Nagel, 1974: 436).

[11] For instance, we can imagine that Red leaves the homogeneous red room and enters the homogeneous blue room of Blue, Blue leaves the homogeneous blue room and enters the homogeneous red room of Red.

Now, I think the difference between *subject-derivation* and *species-derivation* becomes more obvious. And Wager's binocular vision analogy is completely ineffective in this version of the problem because this analogy can say anything about the derivation of different species. After all, since bats and humans (with all their phenomenal properties and perspectives) are grounded in (or derived from) cosmic consciousness as a whole, and since cosmic consciousness is a singular subject, these two *species-perspectives*, which are not only numerically but also qualitatively mutually exclusive, cannot be partial aspects of a singular subject, cannot derive from a single subject, and these phenomenal characteristics cannot be instantiated in a single subject.

Some might counter this argument by saying that non-human animals do not have consciousness/qualia. Descartes, for example, believed that non-human animals do not have consciousness, that they are a kind of non-sentient automata. Even today there are many people who think that animals do not have consciousness. If this is true, then the species-derivation problem can be easily eliminated, because it is based on the assumption that species that are radically different from humans also have phenomenality. If different species do not have different kinds of perspectives that are epistemically closed to each other, there is no need to explain how they are derived. However, this is a rather counter-intuitive approach. For many animal species, especially mammals, appear to be highly conscious and sentient. They suffer when they are hungry, they feel pleasure when they are loved, they are frightened when they are in danger, etc. When observed from the outside, these experiences

appear quite vivid and real, giving us *prima facie* grounds to think that they do indeed have consciousness/qualia and putting the burden of proof on the other side. Moreover, the nervous systems and brain structures of vertebrates are quite similar to humans, and all mammals have the same neural apparatus that mediates pain in humans. And there is no evidence that their basic biology prevents them from being sentient (Norwood & Lusk, 2011: 80-81). All the scientific evidence supports the hypothesis that a significant proportion of non-human animals (at least vertebrates) are sentient.

At this point, however, the question can be asked: If it is the structural similarity between the nervous systems of humans and other animals that suggests that other animal species have consciousness, then how can we say that different species have different types of consciousness? In other words, if we are branches of the same tree of life as these creatures, and we infer that they are conscious from the neural similarities between us, why shouldn't these *neural similarities* also lead to *experiential similarities*? If so, then the phenomenality of different species may not be so different after all, and they may derive from a singular cosmic subject. While this objection may be true for species that are phylogenetically closer to each other, it cannot account for the differences between species like humans and bats, which are radically different from each other - and perceive the world through radically different mechanisms. And the focus of the problem is the derivation of such species. Therefore, even if we infer that species like bats have consciousness because of their complex nervous systems, fundamental differences in the way they perceive and experience the universe build epistemic barriers between us.

Another objection might be as follows: If there were a *BH* subject that was partly human and partly bat, the *BH* would know what it is like to be both human and bat, would have the phenomenality of being both bat and human simultaneously, and would have simultaneous epistemic access to the intrinsic character of both perspectives. Similarly, since bat-subjects and human-subjects are proper parts of cosmic consciousness, an analogy can be drawn with this hypothetical bat/human scenario. Just as the *BH* can have simultaneous access to the phenomenal qualities of both the bat and the human, the cosmic subject can have simultaneous access to the phenomenality of bats, humans, and all other conscious beings, and the unique perspectives of all these different species can be subsumed in a singular cosmic subject. The problem with such an analogy, however, is that it assumes that the *BH* is simultaneously human and bat, whereas it is neither bat nor human. If it existed, it would be a different species, with some characteristics of a bat and some characteristics of a human being, it would not be a complete human being or a complete bat. But, if Priority Cosmopsychism is true, the cosmic subject must be precisely such a consciousness, because the bat-subjects and human-subjects it subsumes are not partly human and/or partly bat, but fully-humans and fully-bats with a deep epistemic distance between their inner worlds. And it seems impossible for a singular subject to have the species-specific perspective of both a real bat and a real human simultaneously.

Finally, some might argue that there are real examples of inter-species experiences, citing some exceptional cases, so that the cosmic subject could also have such inter-

species experiences. For example, the psychiatrist Stanislav Grof reports some cases in which people, in certain special states of consciousness, felt themselves to be identical with various animal species (Grof & Bennett, 1993: 95-100). But it would be wrong to conclude from such cases that inter-species experiences are possible. These cases do not show that humans actually access the qualia of other species, but that some humans feel themselves to be identical with other species. However, no matter how strong this feeling or belief may be, it does not by itself indicate that this experience corresponds to objective reality (i.e. that it is identical with the actual states of consciousness of the species concerned). Just as the fact that there are people who believe that they are Napoleon, Alexander the Great or God does not mean that they have the qualia of Napoleon, Alexander the Great or God, such inter-species experiences do not mean that they have access to the real conscious states of other species. Unlike in the case of Napoleon, the cases Grof reported are not pathological, they are merely exceptional and special. But this does not mean that they are genuine inter-species experiences. Given the radical inter-species differences, it would be more reasonable to accept that such experiences merely reflect the feelings of experiencers rather than that they correspond to other animals' qualia.

2.3. Mutually Exclusive Mental States

Discussions in the cosmopsychism literature mainly focus on the mutually exclusivity of perspectives and whether it is possible for the experiences of this or

that subject to come together. However, the existence of mutually exclusive mental states, *regardless of* the difference of perspectives and subjects, that is, mental states that cannot be experienced by the same subject at the same time due to the *intrinsic nature of experiences*, may also pose a serious difficulty for Priority Cosmopsychism. Unlike the previous arguments, the problem here is that what is mutually exclusive is not the perspectives but the internal character of the experiences. For example, let's consider the situations of *tranquility* and *anger*. Both states are genuine mental qualities, that is, each has its own intrinsic character. They are not merely the absence of each other (or the absence of other mental states). The absence of anger does not automatically lead to tranquility, nor does the absence of tranquility automatically lead to anger (i.e. they are not negative properties based solely on the absence of a certain experience like *painlessness*). Both have phenomenal contents that are known and discerned by those who experience it.

However, although these two mental states are real, they are mutually exclusive, that is, it is not possible for them to coexist in the same mind at the same time. They structurally disrupt each other, and the existence of anger requires the loss of tranquility. In this respect, what I call mutually exclusive mental states are different from simply *opposite* mental states. For example, pain and pleasure are opposite mental qualities, but there is nothing preventing them from being simultaneously instantiated in a single subject. There are even people who derive pleasure from pain. However, there is a different relationship between tranquility and anger than between mental states that are merely different or merely opposite. Unlike pain and pleasure can be experienced simultaneously, tranquility and anger cannot be experienced simultaneously by a single subject. However, if Priority Cosmopsychism is true,

millions of experiences of anger and tranquility experienced in the world at any moment are experienced simultaneously in the cosmic consciousness, which is a singular subject. The extreme anger of a person going crazy, and the extreme tranquility of a Buddhist monk come from the same cosmic mind, and both feelings are experienced vividly by the cosmic mind. This has bad implications for Priority Cosmopscyhism. If there are mutually exclusive qualities that cannot be instantiated in the same subject at the same time, there cannot be a singular cosmic subject in which these qualities are instantiated at the same time.

CHAPTER III

FROM PRIORITY COSMOPSYCHISM TO BUNDLE COSMOPSYCHISM

In the second chapter, I argued that a singular fundamental cosmic subject cannot ground all phenomenality. In this section, I will discuss step by step the features that a successful cosmopsychist theory should provide. In order **(#1)** Cosmic consciousness must contain more than one subject, **(#2)** Cosmic consciousnesses must contain enough different cosmic subjects/perspectives to subsume all *actual* perspectival experiences, **(#3)** Cosmic consciousnesses must contain enough different cosmic subjects/perspectives to subsume all *possible* perspectival experiences, **(#4)** Cosmic consciousnesses must be fundamental and prior not as separate entities but as a bundle, grounding all phenomenality as a whole with their irreducible collectivity.

Before discussing whether such a model for cosmopsychism is possible, it is reasonable to investigate what kinds of grounding relations - especially those involving collectivity - might exist outside of the standard monist and pluralist models in general. At this point, Shamik Dasgupta's "irreducibly pluralistic" model

and Jamie Taylor's *Universal Plural Theory* may be inspiring. According to Dasgupta, grounding can be plural in terms of both ground and grounded, and this plurality can be *irreducibly collective*. As an example, he says that facts such as Obama weighs 75 kilograms, my laptop weighs 2 kilograms, the book weighs 1/2 kilogram are grounded in mass relations between objects, and the grounding relation here is not reducible to any one part or singular object (Dasgupta, 2014). In Jamie Taylor's model, the cosmos is identical with the *collective plurality* of all tropes of the world and this *'world bundle' grounds* all tropes. The world is bundle of tropes and *this bundle is more fundamental than each of the tropes.* Unlike traditional bundle theories, in this model the whole is not dependent on its parts, *the parts are dependent on the whole* and the *bundle is ontologically prior.* Taylor argues that this model successfully avoids the statespace problem[12] of Priority Monism and the Bradleyan Regress Problem of traditional (bottom-up) bundle theories. (Taylor, 2021).

Since Bundle Cosmopsychism does not rely on Dasgupta's or Taylor's theories, I will not wade into them. However, the existence of some "top-down bundle" theories that seem to be able to explain some things that Priority Monism cannot, and more importantly the fact that "irreducibly collective" grounding relations can somehow be shown with examples in real life, is a good starting point for us. We can be inspired by these models, just as Wager and Nagasawa were inspired by Priority Monism without relying on it.

[12] I will address the statespace problem in **(#3)** and argue that a similar argument can be constructed in favor of Bundle Cosmopsychism.

Although these models bear important similarities to the model I will present, they are not identical to Bundle Cosmopsychism in every way, and there is no such need. While the target of these models is *concreta*, the target of my model is phenomenality/perspectives. Also, Taylor's theory is based on tropes, which may be more advantageous for concreta, but since I am interested in phenomenality and qualia are generally considered universal, I will not resort to tropes.[13] Now, let's start laying the road to Bundle Cosmopsychism step by step:

(#1): Cosmic subjects/perspectives must be more than one. This is what the arguments in the second chapter show. If conscious experience is intrinsically perspectival and synchronous perspectival experiences cannot be contained in a single subject, there must be more than one cosmic consciousness. At this point, discussions in mereology about the *unrestricted composition principle* or the possibility of *worldless junk* are of little relevance. Because whatever we call the sum of subjects, they remain distinct subjects with their own perspectives, and one of the assumptions of Priority Cosmopsychism is that cosmic consciousness is a singular subject.

At this point, it can be argued that the only alternative to single-subject cosmopsychism models is not models containing more than one subject, but that cosmic consciousness is not a subject and does not have a cosmic perspective of its

[13] Although qualia are generally accepted as universal, a few philosophers argue that they should be regarded as tropes See, for example, (Bensusan & Carvalho, 2011).

own. For example, Miri Albahari (2019) is a leading proponent of this type of cosmic consciousness model. According to Albahari, Priority Cosmopsychism cannot solve the subject-derivation problem - based on the reasons some of which are discussed in this thesis - and we need to put aside the concepts of cosmic subject and cosmic perspective in order to get rid of the inconsistency between the limited perspectives of derivative subjects and the encompassing perspective of the cosmic subject (2019: 122-123). It is thought that assuming an *aperspectival* cosmic consciousness instead of the cosmic subject of Priority Cosmopsychism will eliminate these problems.

However, before concluding that aperspectival cosmic consciousness solves the subject-derivation problem, it must be shown that such consciousness is possible. In this regard, Albahari frequently refers to the mystics' experiences of aperspectival transcendence. In such experiences, people are stripped of their identities and distinctions such as subject, object, seer, seen, self and others completely disappear. The person experiences complete oneness and unity. According to Albahari, the existence of such states of consciousness shows that the concept of aperspectival consciousness should be taken seriously.

However, I think that it is a hasty maneuver to jump to the conclusion that aperspectival states of consciousness are possible - or even actual - based on these experiences. Just because some people report experiencing what appears to be oneness, transcendence, selflessness, etc. does not mean that they are actually experiencing what they think/feel they are experiencing. For example, a person may

feel that they are directly experiencing God in their religious experiences, but just because what they are experiencing appears to be God does not mean that they are actually experiencing God. Perhaps they have indeed experienced God, but it would be a mistake to conclude that they have experienced God based solely on how what is experienced appears to them. Similarly, some people have feelings of unity, oneness, selflessness, etc. Just because they think they are having experiences does not mean that the mental state they are in at that moment is a real state of oneness or selflessness. It just means that whatever they experienced, they perceived and interpreted it that way.

Moreover, there are good reasons to think that experiences that are truly aperspectival are not possible. The fact that everything experienced takes place in a certain field of consciousness and that this experience is closed to other fields of consciousness necessitates that whatever is experienced (even the experience of selflessness) be perceived from a certain perspective. A mystic's experience of transcendence - even though she feels her own self dissolving in the experience - is still *that mystic's* experience, because she alone has experienced it at that moment. While she herself knows what selflessness is like through direct acquaintance, she can only explain it to other people through words. This is because even the experience of selflessness is actually open only to the mystic's own first-person perspective. The fact that people who have mystical experiences still remember what their experiences were like when they return to their normal state (that is, the state of perspectival perception) after the experience shows that these experiences are actually experienced from their own personal perspectives. If the memory of an

experience is accessible only to a single subject, it would be a more reasonable inference to think that this experience is an experience belonging to *that* subject.

But the problem does not end there. Even if aperspectival experiences are possible, they are extremely exceptional, and it needs to be explained how our perspectival experiences, which constitute the vast majority of our phenomenality, can derive from them. This looks pretty strange. Because almost all of our sensory perceptions are spatio-temporal and they are inevitably perceived from a certain perspective. If cosmic consciousness is aperspectival, this consciousness should have almost no sensory perception. It does not seem possible for a consciousness that does not contain - and cannot contain - any of our perspectival experiences to ground our perspectival experiences. Therefore, I do not think that aperspectival models of cosmic consciousness are not serious alternatives.

(#2): Cosmic consciousness must ground all *actual* phenomenality in the universe. This is based on a principle that Jonathan Schaffer calls *No Gaps* (Schaffer, 2010: 38). According to this, fundamental entities - whether singular or plural - must ground everything in the universe, leaving no gaps. Therefore, if cosmopsychism is true, i.e. all phenomenality in the universe is grounded in a cosmic consciousness or, as I propose, a bundle of cosmic consciousnesses, then this consciousness(es) must ground all phenomenality and perspectives in the universe without leaving any gaps.

While we cannot give a complete list of all phenomenal experiences in the universe, a plausible explanation must assume that all living things above a certain level of neuronal complexity (e.g. mammals, birds, etc.) have phenomenal experiences and must include them all. Likewise, if there are complex biological life forms in different parts of the universe, a reasonable explanation must assume that they are conscious and provide an explanation for them as well. It is true that there is no "definitive" way to know whether any object other than "us" actually has a mind. But just as the inaccessibility of other minds does not change the fact that a plausible theory of mind must presuppose the existence of other minds, so my assumption in this paragraph must be the basic assumption of any acceptable theory about mind. A reasonable theory should not leave the door open to possibilities such as zombie species, zombie individuals, zombie moments, etc., but should ensure that such oddities do not occur.

In conclusion, when we consider how many different species and synchronous perspectives the world contains, and why a singular mind cannot synchronously ground them all, we can conclude that a successful cosmopsychist theory must include at least an *extremely large number* of subjects.

(#3): Cosmic consciousnesses must ground all *possible* phenomenality in the universe. My argument here is based on a combination of Theodore Sider's statespace objection to Priority Monism and the synchronous perspectives argument we discussed earlier. For this reason, I would like to quote Sider's argument first and then build my own argument step by step:

> Consider a world containing just a single computer screen with a 4 x 4 pixel resolution. Each pixel can be on or off. Since there are 16 pixels, and there are two states for each pixel, 2^{16} states are possible for the entire screen. The existence of this statespace is common ground between monists and pluralists. But only the pluralist can give a satisfying account of why the statespace has 2^{16} members. The pluralist can say: the statespace has 2^{16} members because i) there are 16 pixels, each of which has two available fundamental states; ii) the fundamental states of the system include only the states of the individual pixels; and iii) the possibilities for the entire system are generated combinatorially from the entities in the system and the fundamental states those entities can inhabit. The monist can tell no such story. For the monist, the fundamental properties are the members of the statespace itself: the 2^{16} maximally specific properties of the entire screen. These properties are not generated combinatorially from more fundamental pixel-properties. Why, then, are there exactly 2^{16} of them? (Sider, 2007: 3).

So, Sider argues that a pluralist can easily explain the physical statespace based on possible combinations of individual parts. However, for the monist, any explanation of this statespace must be related to the relevant properties of the *world* as a whole. They cannot resort to parts and relations between parts. But how can a monist explanation guarantee each member of this statespace?

Similarly, I argue that there is a *phenomenal statespace* like the physical statespace of the universe. Firstly, a significant fraction of the entire physical statespace of the universe contains many possible species, with complex neurological structures.[14] If

[14] Even if we restrict the physical statespace to the laws of nature, given the probabilistic nature of the evolutionary process, it is easy to imagine how many possible species could have existed but did not.

these species existed - as much as the species that exist now have actual phenomenal inner worlds - they would have actual experiences of their own, and those experiences would be grounded in cosmic consciousness. Given that in a cosmopsychist model all phenomenality derives from the top down, and that nothing can be in the part that is not in the whole (more importantly, since all experiences of all species and subjects are *in virtue of* the cosmic subject and no experiences of the cosmic subject are *in virtue of* species/other subjects), cosmic consciousness must overarch the perspectival experience not only of actual species but also of all possible species and subjects.

Also, phenomenal statespace is not limited to possible species and subjects. There are countless *possible* perspectival positions[15] in which a single *actual* subject can be situated at a moment *t*. And a successful account must account not only for a subject's actual experience at the moment *t* but also for all possible experiences. Let us imagine that a subject *S* experiences red at *t.* This experience is grounded in cosmic consciousness. But there were many perspectival positions *S* could have taken at *t*. For example, instead of experiencing red, she could have been experiencing another color, or she could have been having a completely different experience in any other part of the world. If *S* had taken another perspectival position at *t* instead of experiencing red, she would have experienced it as real as her actual experience - she would not have turned into a zombie for that moment. And that experience would have been grounded in cosmic consciousness. When we extend

[15] By perspectival position, I mean a position that causes a perspectival experience. For example, S's physical position at time *t* to look at a red object causes her experience of red at *t*. However, if she were physically positioned to look at a blue object, she would experience blue. Such possibilities in physical statespace also have consequences in phenomenal statespace.

this to all perspectival possibilities, it becomes clear why all possible perspectives must be overarched by cosmic consciousness.

Let us now take a final step from possible perspectival experiences to possible *synchronous* perspectival experiences. For any possible experience of subject S_1 at time *t*, there is another possible experience that S_2 can also experience at the same time, and all possible experiences can be experienced synchronously by different subjects, unless there is a special logical or metaphysical constraint. Suppose that at *t*, S_1 experiences red and S_2 experiences blue. At *t*, S_1 could experience gray, black, yellow, purple, orange, etc. Likewise, S_2 could experience gray, black, purple, orange, etc. at *t*. In other words, any perspectival experience in the phenomenal statespace could be experienced by two different subjects simultaneously at *t*. Now, we can extend this to all possible perspectival positions that S_1 and S_2 could be in. For an experience experienced by S_1 at time *t*, there could be an S_2 experiencing any other perspectival experience in the phenomenal statespace. Then, all experiences in the phenomenal statespace can be experienced simultaneously. If these simultaneous possible experiences were actually experienced, which is possible, then both experiences would actually be experienced simultaneously, and they would be grounded in cosmic consciousness. However, these possible synchronous experiences could not be grounded if there was no separate cosmic subject corresponding to each possible synchronous experience. So, possible synchronous experiences exacerbate Priority Cosmopsychism's problem of synchronous subjects. Taken together with our previous arguments that synchronous experiences require different cosmic subjects, the natural conclusion of this reasoning is that the set of cosmic subjects must subsume all possible experiences in the phenomenal statespace

without gaps. There must be a cosmic subject corresponding to every possible experience. Otherwise, a cosmopsychist theory cannot give a plausible explanation for the possible synchronicities in the phenomenal statespace.

Hence, we can connect all these points as follows:

(1) A successful cosmopsychist theory employs different subjects for synchronous perspectives.

(2) A successful cosmopsychist theory must account not only for actual synchronous perspectives but also for possible synchronous perspectives.

(3) If there were not enough cosmic subjects to correspond to each possible state in the phenomenal statespace, some possible synchronous perspectives could not be grounded if they were actual.

(4) Therefore, all possible perspectives in the phenomenal statespace must be overarched by cosmic consciousnesses.

One might say that a singular cosmic subject can encompass possible experiences through *imagination*. But cosmic imagination is not very helpful in this regard. Cosmic imagination can only solve the epistemic side of the issue, not the experiential side. For example, I can know through imagination what the experience of a homogeneous redness looks like when looking at a blue object. But I cannot

experience blue and homogeneous red at the same time. Similarly, let us consider S_1 experiencing homogeneous blue and S_2 experiencing homogeneous red at *t*. Cosmic consciousness could know what their experiences would be like if S_1 experienced red and S_2 experienced blue (or something else) at *t*. But if these possible experiences were happening at the same time, it could not overarch them because it could not have both perspectives at the same time. However, even if it knew at the same time what the homogeneous red and homogeneous blue experiences would look like, it could not have them at the same time. Therefore, if these possible experiences were actual, it could not ground them because all experiences must be experienced simultaneously in the cosmic perspective since derivative perspectives are partial aspects of a singular mind.

However, one might say that this answer makes a distinction between imagination and experience, but that this distinction may not be true for cosmic consciousness. Perhaps all the experiences of the cosmic subject are *imaginative*, and the reason why this possibility seems strange or impossible is our imagination cannot perceive how far its own power can reach. In other words, perhaps the cosmic consciousness has such a great imagination capacity that it imagines other things *through* each derivative subject, and these imaginations become the derivative subjects' own isolated realities/experiences. For example, when the cosmic subject imagines a person in pain, it actually experiences pain *through* / *as* that person, and when it simultaneously imagines someone seeing red, it experiences red *through* / *as* that person. Just as a novel writer brings all the characters to life with his imagination, but each character has different features and inner life, cosmic consciousness can imagine many characters with its high imagination power and has different

experiences in each of them. Unlike the novel writer, it actually experiences the inner life of the characters. If this is possible, this strategy could also be used as an explanation for the need for cosmic consciousness to overarch the entire phenomenal statespace. For, in such a case, the boundaries of the phenomenal statespace will be the boundaries of the cosmic imagination, and all possible phenomenal states will potentially exist in the cosmic consciousness. However, I do not think that identifying cosmic imagination with cosmic experience will solve the problem. It is true that this answer seems reasonable at first glance, as imagination has greater mental flexibility than experiencing things directly. However, regardless of the nature of the experience, the problem is common to all versions of cosmopsychism with a singular subject. Let's reconsider the Red and Blue example. The cosmic consciousness imagines red *through* Red / *as* Red, while it imagines blue *through* Blue / *as* Blue. At this time, the cosmic consciousness imagines *both* red and blue. However, in Red's perspective, it *only* imagines red and *excludes* everything else, while in Blue's perspective, it *only* imagines blue and *excludes* everything else. Similar to the original thought experiment, the cosmic consciousness imagines only red in one macro subject and only blue in the other, but since it has both perspectives at the same time, it imagines *only blue and only red together.* However, this causes the same inconsistency as in the original thought experiment, and replacing the word 'experience' with 'imagination' does not help us eliminate the inconsistency.

(#4): Cosmic consciousnesses must be a *Bundle* grounding all phenomenality in its irreducible collectivity. So far, I have argued why cosmic subjects must be maximally plural. In this section, I will argue that they are not fundamental as independent entities, but fundamental *as a bundle.* Cosmic subjects ground the

bundle, all phenomenality, in their irreducible collectivity, and *the bundle as a whole is prior.*

First, one can appeal to a principle Schaffer calls *No Overlap,* which says that fundamental entities must not overlap - so, fundamental entities can have no parts in common (Schaffer, 2010: 38). Suppose a singular subject *S* experiences homogeneous redness at t_1 and homogeneous blueness at t_2. If Top-Down Pluralism is true, these two experiences, which would be mutually exclusive if experienced simultaneously (as a corollary of our argument in **(#3)**), must be grounded by different subjects in the phenomenal statespace. Suppose the experience of E_1 at t_1 is grounded by Cosmic Subject C_1 and the experience of E_2 at t_2 is grounded by Cosmic Subject C_2. In this case, the singular subject *S* would be the proper part of two different fundamental subjects, since it would derive from both C_1 and C_2. If we extend this to all experiences in the world, we have a very intricate web of overlaps. Those who accept the "no overlap" principle can reject this situation as directly impossible. However, even if we do not accept this principle, it seems more plausible at first glance to explain a situation in which the grounding relation between fundamental and derivative subjects becomes so intricate with the collectivity of a bundle rather than with individual fundamental entities.

We can deepen this intuition by appealing to the principle of simplicity. If Top-Down Pluralism[16] is true, the grounding relation between experiences and cosmic

[16] For the sake of simplicity, I refer to the view that cosmic subjects can be independently and separately fundamental as Top-Down Pluralism.

subjects would look like this (*E* represents experiences, *C* represents cosmic subjects):

E1, in virtue of *C1*

E2, in virtue of *C2*

E3, in virtue of *C3*

...

In this way, this would produce an extraordinarily complex explanation, as separate fundamental entities would be employed for each experience. In other words, for each experience a separate explanatory relationship must be established with a separate entity. However, in *Bundle Cosmopsychism*, this is how it works:

E1, in virtue of the irreducible collectivity of the bundle

E2, in virtue of the irreducible collectivity of the bundle

E3, in virtue of the irreducible collectivity of the bundle

...

In this way, everything can be explained in terms of the collective priority of a bundle, which is fundamental when they are together rather than as separate

fundamental entities. And this move makes simpler the explanatory relation compared to positing infinitely many fundamental entities.

What else can be said about simplicity? Even if it is simpler than Top-Down Pluralism, this view still seems to be extremely complex since it too involves infinitely many entities. If we appeal to the principle of simplicity, shouldn't we also eliminate Bundle Cosmopsychism?

First, in terms of the number of subjects, it is clear that Bundle Cosmopsychism is much more complex than Priority Cosmopsychism, which assumes a single cosmic subject.[17] However, since Priority Cosmopsychism does not work, simplicity is not its virtue. A working model has to be more complex than Priority Cosmopsychism since it has to involve more than one subject. On the other hand, Bundle Cosmopsychism is in the same position as constitutive micropsychism in assuming numerous subjects. In constitutive micropsychism there are extremely many micro-subjects, and their combination constitutes macro-subjects. However, the subject

[17] It should also be noted that while Bundle Cosmopsychism is much more complex than Priority Cosmopsychism in terms of quantitative simplicity, there is no difference in terms of qualitative simplicity. Quantitative simplicity is simplicity related to the number of entities assumed by the theory. For example, if T_1 postulates 5 objects and T_2 postulates 10 objects to explain a phenomenon, T_1 is quantitatively simpler than T_2. Qualitative simplicity is related to the number of *kinds* of entities, not the total number of entities. If T_1 postulates 5 different kinds of entities and T_2 postulates 10 different kinds of entities to explain a phenomenon, T_1 is qualitatively simpler than T_2. Although Bundle Cosmopsychism is not a quantitatively simple model, it is qualitatively as simple as Priority Cosmopsychism because both models postulate a single kind of entity. In this respect, Bundle Cosmopsychism can be compared to multiverse theory. While the multiverse theory is extremely complex quantitatively because it postulates trillions of other universes to explain some properties of our universe, it is qualitatively simple because it postulates a single kind of entity, even though it increases the number of entities. Since many scientists and philosophers prioritize qualitative simplicity over quantitative simplicity, they ignore the quantitative complexity of the multiverse because of the explanatory power of this theory. If Bundle Cosmopsychism provide a good explanation for the existence of phenomenal properties, its failure to meet the criterion of quantitative simplicity can be tolerated.

inflation in constitutive micropsychism does not attract much attention since this model is bottom-up. The subjects in Bundle Cosmopsychism may at first glance seem more complex since the grounding is top-down, after all they are not "micro"-subjects but "cosmic" subjects. However, while these subjects are "cosmic" in the sense that they are part of a bundle that explains consciousness top-down, they are not all-encompassing phenomenal consciousnesses as in Priority Cosmopsychism, each covering a very restricted domain in phenomenal statespace. It is not their individual beings but their irreducible collectivity that overarches all phenomenality. In this respect, although Bundle Cosmopsychism has increased the number of subjects compared to Priority Cosmopsychism, it has in fact distributed the "power" of the singular subject of Priority Cosmopsychism to a collectivity of smaller subjects. And in this way, it avoids both the combination problem of bottom-up models and the subject derivation problem of Priority Cosmopscyhism.

Second, maximality or infinity is not always a sign of complexity. On the contrary, sometimes it can be a sign of simplicity. If we were to reach the maximality of cosmic subjects through the successive addition of individual fundamental entities, this would be the most complex model possible. However, if we consider that the bundle exists collectively and functions together, it becomes clear that the bundle does not reach this maximality by successive addition, but *as a whole, all at once*. This is simpler than the claim that the bundle contains any finite number of cosmic subjects. For, it simply assumes that the totality of all phenomenal statespace is subsumed in the bundle. Even if we had not presented the argument in **(#3)** that the totality of the phenomenal statespace must be overarched in the bundle, for

simplicity, we would have to say that it subsumes the entire phenomenal statespace just by looking at (**#2)**. As Richard Swinburne rightly observes:

> It is simpler in just the same way that the hypothesis that some particle has zero mass, or infinite velocity is simpler than the hypothesis that it has a mass of 0.34127 of some unit, or a velocity of 301,000 km/sec. A finite limitation cries out for an explanation of why there is just that particular limit, in a way that limitlessness does not. .... scientists have always preferred hypotheses of infinite velocity to hypotheses of very large finite velocity, when both were equally compatible with the data. And they have always preferred hypotheses that some particle had zero mass to hypotheses that it had some very small mass, when both were equally compatible with the data. There is a neatness about zero and infinity that particular finite numbers lack. (Swinburne, 2004: 97).

If we conclude that a working cosmopsychist theory must involve at least a large number of cosmic subjects, it seems simpler to assume that cosmic consciousnesses subsume the entire phenomenal statespace rather than assuming a finite number of subjects. In this way, questions such as why this-and-that are subsumed and this-and-that are not subsumed out of the equally possible experiences are avoided and the explanation is kept simpler in this respect. Nevertheless, I agree that it is still somewhat counter-intuitive to accept that such a bundle is ontologically prior. But even if this model lacks intuitive support, it does not lead to a logical contradiction like Priority Cosmopsychism. If a rational agent is torn between a counter-intuitive option and a logically contradictory option, she will choose the counter-intuitive one.

Bringing all this together, I argue that Bundle Cosmopsychism is a model that preserves all the virtues and avoids all the problems of Priority Cosmopsychism. This model best explains both synchronous perspectives and species-derivation, and provides a simpler explanation than alternative top-down pluralist models.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This model will inevitably be subject to *incredulous stare*. This is the common fate of all panpsychist and cosmopsychist theories. But cosmopsychism is more affected than panpsychism. Bundle Cosmopsychism will also be more exposed than other forms of cosmopsychism because it is an unconventional model. However, remember that my aim in this paper is *not* to argue that cosmopsychism is the view that best solves the mind-body problem. The purpose of this paper is not to defend cosmopsychism, but to show approximately what a model of cosmopsychism that avoids the fundamental problems would look like. Thus, I first clarified why Priority Cosmopsychism, one of the most promising models of cosmopsychism, has failed. Then, I layed out the requirements for a successful cosmopsychist model and show that Bundle Cosmopsychism meets them the best. After ruling out Priority Cosmopsychism, I showed why Top-Down Pluralist models that can be offered as an alternative to bundle are not a good explanation. In conclusion, Bundle Cosmopsychism seems to be the most plausible form of cosmopsychism and this model should be seriously considered in future discussions in this field.

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