

NEOLIBERALISM AND CIVIL WELFARE PROVISION
IN TURKEY: THE CASE OF DENİZ FENERİ AID AND SOLIDARITY
ASSOCIATION

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Neoliberalism and Civil Welfare Provision
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Thesis Abstract

Ümit Aydoğmuş, “Neoliberalism and Civil Welfare
Provision in Turkey: The Case of the Deniz Feneri Aid and Solidarity Association”

This thesis suggests that, the civil welfare provision organizations and their conceptions of poverty and methods of poverty alleviation create new power relations, subjectivities, and new relations among these subjects, in contemporary Turkey. To analyze this civil power, that usually lays beyond the state, and its complex relations with neoliberalism, global and local financial and political processes; I conducted an organizational fieldwork in an international civil poor relief organization, the Deniz Feneri Aid and Solidarity Association, between 2005 and 2007.

In this fieldwork, I focused on the conceptions of poor and poverty, charity, and volunteerism, and their transformations, the current organizational, technological and human power of the association, and organizational decision making processes in its poverty alleviation activities. I also observed that the representations of the poor and poverty also create the charitable and the volunteer subjectivities in the association. Furthermore, by relating the poor, the charitable and the volunteer, the association dislocates the inequalities and power relations among these subjects and their classes, and it reproduces these power relations in a particular civil setting within a neoliberal polity.

Hence, this thesis suggests that civil welfare provision organizations represent particular political groups’ discourses of poverty and the poor in Turkish public, create new channels to represent themselves, and furbish these political

communities' understanding of society, family, state, assistance, poverty and citizenship with neoliberal values, beliefs and mores in contemporary Turkey.

Tez Özeti

Ümit Aydoğmuş, “Neoliberalism and Civil Welfare
Provision in Turkey: The Case of Deniz Feneri Aid and Solidarity Association”

Bu tezde, sivil yardım kuruluşlarının yoksulluk söylemlerinin ve yoksullukla mücadele yöntemlerinin Türkiye toplumunda yeni bir iktidar biçimi, öznellikler ve bunlar arasında yeni güç ilişkileri yarattığını iddia edilmektedir. Devletle ilişkili olmasına karşın, devletin görece dışında yer alan bu yeni iktidar biçiminin neoliberalizm ve diğer küresel ve yerel siyasi ve ekonomik süreçlerle ilişkilerini incelemek ve bu süreçlerin Türkiye’deki sivil yardım kurumları üzerindeki etkisini araştırmak için 2005–2007 yılları arasında, uluslararası bir sivil toplum kuruluşu olan Deniz Feneri Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Derneğinde bir saha çalışması yapılmıştır.

Saha çalışmasında küresel ve yerel süreçler bağlamında Deniz Feneri Derneğindeki yoksul ve yoksulluk söyleminin gelişimine ve buna bağlı olarak derneğin hayırseverlik ve gönüllülük algısının dönüşümüne, derneğin teknolojik, kurumsal, örgütsel ve insan gücüne dayalı güncel yoksullukla mücadele sistemine ve yardım kararı alma süreçlerine odaklanılmıştır. Saha çalışmasında, Deniz Feneri Derneği’nin Türkiye’de yoksulluğu belli bir biçimde temsil etmenin yanı sıra yeni yoksul, gönüllü ve hayırsever öznellikleri oluşturduğu, bu öznellikleri birbirleriyle aralarındaki eşitsizlikleri koruyacak şekilde ilişkilendirdiği ve Türkiye toplumunda bu özneler ve ait oldukları sosyal sınıflar arasında var olan eşitsizlik ve güç ilişkilerini yardım ilişkisi üzerinden sivil alanda yeniden ürettiği gözlemlenmiştir.

Bu çalışmada, sonuç olarak, sivil yardım kuruluşlarının belirli sınıfların ve siyasi toplulukların yoksulluk algılarını Türkiye kamusalında temsil ettiği, bu

kuruluşların söz konusu sınıflara yeni temsil ve iktidar kanalları yarattığı, böylece bu grupların toplum, devlet, yardımlaşma, yoksulluk, vatandaşlık ve eşitsizlik kavrayışlarını neoliberal söyleme eklemlendiği iddia edilmektedir.

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To my grandmother and mother,

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CHAPTER I

Introduction

This thesis is concerned with the enhanced role of civil society organizations in poverty alleviation in Turkey from the mid-1990s, which witnessed specific national and global developments. As part of these developments, new and neoliberal¹ understandings of poverty and the poor, and the preferred role of civil organizations as agents of poverty alleviation gained widespread recognition within Turkish society. In this thesis, I claim that civil poor relief organizations have been the local and national platforms of the production, dissemination and the implementation of neoliberalism-inspired policies and understandings of the poor and poverty within the Turkish welfare regime in recent period. A major consequence of these new priorities, alongside the proliferation of these “new” and “revived” understandings of

¹ In this thesis by neoliberalism I mean a discourse, which promotes “an economic growth, free markets without government ‘interference’ as the most efficient and socially optimal allocation of resources, economic globalization, privatization, which removes the inefficiencies of public sector. As Lemke claimed (Lemke, 2001a), to achieve these objective ends neoliberalism promotes the transcription of the social onto neo-classical economy and to link a reduction in (welfare) state services and security systems to the increasing call for ‘personal responsibility’ and ‘self-care’ (p.203). Thus in neoliberal discourse there is constant interplay between the personal and collective, the rational and responsible, the subjective and objective, and the economy and the political. As Lemke argued (2001b), “the key feature of the neoliberal rationality is the congruence it endeavors to achieve between a responsible and moral individual and an economic-rational actor. It aspires to construct prudent subjects whose moral quality is based on the fact that they rationally assess the costs and benefits of a certain act as opposed to other alternative acts. As the choice of options for action is, or so the neoliberal notion of rationality would have it, the expression of free will on the basis of a self-determined decision, the consequences of the action are borne by the subject alone, who is also solely responsible for them. This strategy can be deployed in all sorts of areas and leads to areas of social responsibility becoming a matter of personal provisions” (p. 12). To construct this prudent, moral, responsible and rational subject, neoliberalism promotes an alliance between the state, market and the non-state actors to conduct the social with its own governmental rationale. In CHAPTER II, how-s and why-s of this neoliberal rationality will be demonstrated, by linking its development and hegemony with historical, economic and financial processes and local developments.

the poor and poverty in Turkey are the construction of the novel power relations among the poor, non-poor, state and society in Turkey through these civil welfare and assistance provision organizations.

These novel or revived understandings of poverty and the poor not only attached certain meanings to the question of poverty and its alleviation in Turkey, but also drew in particular political, cultural and financial actors into fighting against poverty in Turkey. This new politics of poverty and the poor, thus, has opened up social, visual and organizational spaces for the representation of these classes and political groups' understandings and discourses of poverty and the poor amongst the Turkish public, where these representations of poverty and the poor gain or fight for the particular hegemony both in the Turkish welfare regime and the Turkish public. Basically, as Harris argued (1999), these dual processes in poor relief governs

all those forms of thought which consider the principles guiding the allocation of public funds and the grounds on which government intervention should rest..." Secondly, they entail the questions of 'who should govern' (priests, philanthropists, employers or bureaucrats, for example), of 'what governing is' (reforming or disciplining the individual, providing public work and/ or assistance in money or kind) and of 'what should be governed' (the poor themselves, a category called 'poverty', income distribution or labor force opportunities) (p. 34).

To investigate the consequences of the political discourses of civil welfare provision in Turkey, I conducted an ethnographical fieldwork in a prominent civil society organization by employing action research methodology² between October 2005 and

² Action research can be defined as a research methodology, "which aims to contribute both to the practical concerns of people in immediate problematic situation and to further the goals of social science simultaneously." Thus, "there is a dual commitment in action research to study a system [or an organization, classroom and community] and concurrently to collaborate with members of the system in changing it in what is together regarded as a desirable direction. Accomplishing this twin goal requires the active collaboration of researcher and client, and thus it stresses the importance of co-learning as a primary aspect of the research process" (Gilmore et. al., 1986: 161; Reason and Bradbury, 2006). In the context of my fieldwork, the particular significance of the action research is its emphasis on the participation, negotiation and in-between position of the researcher. The notions of

July 2007. I chose to base my fieldwork at the Deniz Feneri Aid and Solidarity Association. The Deniz Feneri Association was initially a TV program, broadcast nationally on Channel 7 from 1996 to 1998. The main target of the program was drawing public attention to the problem of urban poverty on TV through of a charity program. In 1998, the association was established as a civil society organization with a legally binding charter. Since 1998, but particularly since the 1999 Marmara Earthquake and the 2002 General Elections, to the present, the Deniz Feneri Association has progressively become one of the major actors on the welfare provision and poverty relief scene in Turkey. Growing rapidly, the Deniz Feneri Association currently has more than 40,000 volunteers and 400 paid workers attempting to meet the needs of 1,350,000 individual claimants of aid and assistance, who are supported by more than 350,000 individual and corporate donors, all of who constitute the statistical, organizational, financial power and human resource base of the association.

Officially, the association defines poverty as a form of inability of the claimant to meet the basic needs of his [sic] own and of his family through his economic power. This definition of poverty is the reminiscent of the concept of absolute poverty and basic needs approach in the discourse of the poverty alleviation³. Furthermore, this view cast particular importance on employment as a remedy for poverty. In the association, this construction of poverty as a certain form of personal inability and failure renders poverty as an individualized category in its entirety. In addition, as part of this individualizing logic, the causes of poverty, whether unemployment and/or other problems, are individualized in the discourse of

participation, negotiation and in-between-ness have caused drastic alteration in the scope and extent of my fieldwork for the reasons, which will be explicated in the following parts of this chapter.

³ The concept of absolute poverty and basic needs approach will be delineated in Chapter IV of this thesis.

the association as well. Thus, poverty becomes the poverty of the claimant, which whilst individualizing poverty, it makes the requesting aid as a condition of possibility and visibility of the poverty and the poor in a society. Put otherwise, in the discourse of the Deniz Feneri Association, poverty only becomes visible through the individual bodies, who fail to secure a basic living standard by their own financial resources and thus need to be assisted by the “society”. This very need, in turn, makes the poor and poverty the objects of organizational, interpersonal and discursive aid decisions, poor relief activities, safety nets and emergency plans of the association. These activities, decisions, activities and plans, in turn, aim to produce the perfectly individualized causes of the poverty, such as unemployment, psychological endowments, familial relations, lack of education and so on, civil solutions with the help of donors and volunteers.

Since the concept of poverty has been based upon the individual claimant, the conception of poverty as an unequal and hierarchical social relation between individuals and social classes is ruled out of bounds for discussion. The unequal social relations, which deprive individuals of life choices, and are based on structural factors such as economy, politics, ethnicity, gender, religion, age and structural labor market fluctuations, as well as conceptions of society are not addressed within this discourse. Inasmuch as inequality and stratification are removed by the association’s preferred discourse of poverty, this leads to distinguishing the poor from non-poor on the basis of their ability to meet their fundamental needs. During my fieldwork, I observed that other conceptions of the poor were at work in the association. Those who were usually seen as the poor were identified as “vulnerable groups” in the association. These groups were especially identified as widows, orphans, elderly,

disabled and mentally retarded people who were deprived of due care, unschooled children, women with dependent children, and unemployed men and women.

I have chosen the Deniz Feneri Association in particular since I believe that the association is a complex organizational site in terms of the intermingling of certain traditional, religious, and “common-sense” conceptions of poverty and the poor; a heterogeneous blend of Islamic discourse of compassion and morality, conservatism and Turkish nationalism, and the discourse of the civil society with “modern”, entrepreneurialism and neoliberalism-inspired poor relief activities. In addition, the politics of poor and poverty of the association extensively uses the discourses of masculine heroism, volunteerism, and charity in Turkey from late 1990s onwards, which constitute governmental rationalities⁴ of poverty and the poor of the association. Since even the most one sided embedded-ness requires the slightest of adaptations, this new politics of poverty and the poor exemplifies a neoliberal regime of civil conduct in Turkey, fused with these local understandings of poverty and the poor as well as Turkish society, state and citizenship.

By researching the governmental rationalities of poverty and the poor of this association, I maintain that the organizational procedures, structures, discourses, projects, nets, action plans and subjects of the Deniz Feneri Association and its existing conceptions of poverty, destitution and penury – in their process of adjustment to and re-formation of the neoliberal hegemony— embody the complexities and peculiarities of the local politics, formations and histories of poverty in Turkey from the late 1970s onwards within a wider global framework. Hence, conducting fieldwork at the site of the Deniz Feneri Association led me to

⁴ A rationality of government can be defined as “a way of thinking about the nature and practice of government (who can govern; what governing is; what or who is governed) capable of making some form of that activity thinkable and practicable to both its practitioners and those on whom it is practiced” (Gordon, 1991: 2).

cover a vast array of social, financial and political issues in Turkish society. In the following part, it will be delineated the background to the methodology and particularities regarding my fieldwork in the Deniz Feneri Association between 2005 and 2007.

Fieldwork and Methodology

Especially after the financial crises of the 1990s, which exacerbated existing social inequalities within Turkish society, what one sees is a wide coverage of urban and rural poverty in Turkish media, civil society and academia (Erdogan, 2002; Bugra and Keyder, 2003; Ozbek, 2006; Ustundag, 2003). As part of this scholarly wave of interest regarding poverty alleviation, there are various academic studies referring to the new roles of civil society organizations in the poor relief and poverty alleviation in Turkey in the recent period (Bugra, 2007; Bugra and Keyder, 2003; Cakir, 2003; Isik and Pinarciklioglu, 2001). Especially among these civil poor relief organizations, the Deniz Feneri Association itself aroused the attention of social scientists, who question whether or not the Deniz Feneri Association employs humanitarian, (thus essentially modern and global) or religious –(thus essentially traditional and local) conceptions of poor relief (Bugra and Keyder, 2003; Cakir, 2003). These studies assessed the involvement of civil society organizations in terms of their adequacies and inadequacies in tackling poverty, destitution and penury in Turkey under the light of the post-1980 period in Turkey, as well as categorizing their characteristics at either “modern”, “rights-based” and “pro-welfare state” or “traditional”, “localist”, “non-modern” and “contra-welfare state”.

However, these studies generally do not problematize the participation of civil society organizations in poor relief and poverty alleviation activities as the

production of a larger political matrix of governing by the new alliances or relations between the state, media, civil society organizations, corporate bodies and other contesting political groups in Turkey (Ipek, 2006; Ozkazanc, 2007; Ustundağ, 2003). Furthermore, these studies by constituting the modern and traditional, religious and secular and local and global as the dichotomous realities or at best hybrid configurations⁵, they do not problematize the meanings and political possibilities, attached to the category of the poor under neoliberal rationality. As Bauman once argued (1999),

The poor will always be with us'; so insists popular wisdom, and there is no shortage of historical evidence to confirm this verdict. *No society we know of was ever free of a category of people who were seen by the rest as incapable, for whatever reason, of eking out a living by their own efforts; incapable of living as the rest do. It is a social decision to classify people in such a way. Since it has little to do with who those people really are, or even what they do, the expectation that the 'poor will always be with us' can hardly be faulted. Each society constitutes and perpetuates itself through setting and prompting certain standards it expects every member to follow, and those standards can only be made visible if some people are seen to fail to meet them.* Such people can then be declared a 'problem' which the rest of society must and should cope with (*"The Burning of Popular Fear"*, emphases added).

In addition, these studies largely overlooked the embedded characteristics of religion, neoliberalism, local and global, and civil and public with each other in the civil society. Under the light of Bauman's illuminating comment, to cast the problematic of civil poor relief in terms of its adequacy, universality and globality fails to analyze the discursive, political and anthropological specificities, consequences and formations of the civil poor relief in Turkey and elsewhere. In this respect, it is not

⁵ As Crehan brilliantly argued, the contemporary anthropological debates concerning hybridity presuppose two different social essences and then their mixture. Among those essences, the western element represents the categories of the "global" and "universal" and the secondary element represents necessarily the "local" and "regional". Interestingly, in this context, hybridity as a denominator is always reserved for the rest rather than the west (Crehan, 2006). In line with this observation, I argue that the Deniz Feneri Association emerges as one of the organizational agents of the global neoliberalism with its own peculiar discourses of family, society, poverty and religion in Turkey and Middle East rather than being a hybrid entity under global capitalism.

wrong to argue that the civil poor relief activities and their emergent powers should also be evaluated in terms of their role and mechanisms to conduct the population and regulate the relations between the poor and rest of the society by different means, technologies, institutions, subjects and discourses in the neoliberal period.

In this thesis, it will be demonstrated that this emergent civil conduct in Turkey, which exercises a certain financial, visual, social and collective power⁶ over the poor and poverty in Turkey, deploys peculiar so-called local discourses of society, poverty, state, family and solidarity within a national and global neoliberal context. As part of this deployment, the association, by using their discursive understandings of the family, Turkish society, the state, religion, solidarity and morality, calls particular groups to act against poverty and visualizes their understandings of family, society, morality and poverty in visual, organizational, civil and social-political templates. This dual formation, I propose, transcends the dichotomies of modern/traditional, global/local, and religious and secular, and it forms a new matrix of governing or alters the existing one over the poor and poverty in Turkey. Within this changing consolidation, this civil power, by articulating local, national and heterogeneous ideologies and discourses of poverty, answers the questions of who the poor are, what the cultural significations of being poor, or being seen as being poor in a given society are, and thus what kind of mechanisms should

⁶ According to M. Foucault (1982), power is present always in practice. It generates certain actions, where “these actions may structure the field of other possible actions. What, therefore, would be proper to a relationship of power is that it be a mode of action upon actions. That is to say, power relations are rooted deep in the social nexus, not reconstituted “above” society as a supplementary structure whose radical effacement one could perhaps dream of. In any case, to live in a society is to live in such a way that action upon other actions is possible-- and in fact ongoing. A society without power relations can only be an abstraction. Which, be it said in passing, makes all the more politically necessary the analysis of power relations in a given society, their historical formation, the source of their strength or fragility, the conditions which are necessary to transform some or to abolish others. For to say that there cannot be a society without power relations is not to say either that those which are established are necessary or, in any case, that power constitutes a fatality at the heart of societies, such that it cannot be undermined. Instead, I would say that the analysis, elaboration, and bringing into question of power relations and the “agonism” between power relations and the intransitivity of freedom is a permanent political task inherent in all social existence” (p. 208).

be used to separate the poor from rest of the society. As part of this act of separation, this civil power also re-draws, reproduces and regulates very hierarchical and power-ridden boundaries between the poor, non-poor, state and society around the globe and their relations with each other in a neoliberal polity (Gupta, 2001; Hansen and Stepputat, 2001; Ong, 2005; Inda, 2005). Thus, in this thesis I claimed that the organizational, discursive, local and political characteristics of the civil welfare provision actors constitute a complex ethnographical gamut, thus they require an in-depth analysis within contemporary global context, which lie beyond the given dichotomies.

With this novel perspective, my aim is to bring this scholarly wave of interest, geared with the analysis of neoliberal governmental rationality⁷, into an organizational setting of a civil society organization. As part of this critical gloss, through this perspective, the technologies of production, through which the Deniz Feneri Association appropriates the idea of poverty and the poor in Turkey in the recent period, will be uncovered.

Secondly, the technological and communicative mechanisms of this appropriation will be delineated. These mechanisms represent the poverty in its organizational system, its TV program and in its published material. And by doing

⁷ The governmental rationality, as Burchell, Gordon and Miller stated (1991), is an “ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security” (p. 102). As T. Lemke argued (2001a), “Foucault uses the concept of government in a comprehensive sense geared strongly to the older meaning of the term and adumbrating the close link between power relations and processes of subjectification. While the word government today possesses solely a political meaning, Foucault is able to show that up until well into the eighteenth century the problem of government was placed in a more general context. Government was a term discussed not only in political tracts, but also in philosophical, religious, medical and pedagogic texts. In addition to control/management by the state or the administration, ‘government’ also signified problems of self-control, guidance for the family and for children, management of the household, directing the soul, etc. For this reason, Foucault defines government as conduct, or, more precisely, as ‘the conduct of conduct’ and thus as a term which ranges from ‘governing the self’ to ‘governing others’. All in all, in his history of governmentality Foucault endeavors to show how the modern sovereign state and the modern autonomous individual co-determine each other’s emergence (p. 191).

this, the technological and communicative apparatuses of the association answers the questions of what poverty means, who the poor are and what should the rest of the Turkish society ought to do to fight against poverty.

Thirdly, the technologies of power, through which the Deniz Feneri Association and its subjects are made by the discourses of poverty, solidarity, family, poverty, morality, religion and society in Turkey, will be analyzed. Put another way, the technologies of power problematize the kind of subject positions that are created by association through its call for fighting against poverty in Turkey. Finally, this perspective delineates the way in which the organizational discourses of poverty and the poor are implemented, through which the Deniz Feneri Association and its various subjects orient and recreate themselves and interact with each other, or expected to do so, on the basis of the organizational discourses of morality, poverty, family, collective solidarity and society in contemporary Turkey (Dean, 1999; Rose and Miller, 1992). This fourfold focus, in turn, re-poses civil poor relief not merely as a question of the retreat of the Turkish welfare state and the lessening of the public expenditures, but, rather, evaluates the civil poor relief organizations in terms of the introduction of new elements and apparatuses to reproduce and recreate the always-already hierarchical, asymmetrical, and power-ridden relations among the poor, the state and rest of the society in Turkey in recent period.

At the beginning of my research at the Deniz Feneri Association, I casted particular importance on the visual, thus communicative, aspects of the Deniz Feneri TV program and its role in legitimization of the several cultural, religious and political groups through the poor relief activities in Turkey in mid-1990s. During these years, Islamists' search for legitimization and representation through the centres of media, civil society, politics and high finance against the Turkish

establishment was a part of heightened tensions between the army-led Kemalists, civil society organizations and the secular media and the Islamists in Turkey (Yavuz, 2004; Tugal, 2006). Though there was a vast array of scholarly and popular writings on the Islamists and their search for legitimization in the Middle East contexts through the philanthropy and poor relief activities and as the Deniz Feneri TV program was broadcast in Channel 7, an Islamist TV channel in Turkey, there is a minor aspect, of this TV program. In that sense, the prior focus of my research was the role of the visual media and a poor relief program on TV in the production of the legitimacy for particular religious groups in the aftermath of the February 28 Process.

However, the focus, the questions and the methodology of my research changed after a decisive turn in my fieldwork study. This was my employment by the Deniz Feneri Association. In October 2005, the Head of the Research and Development Unit of the Association informed me of the association's search for a research and development unit coordinator. Due to various factors such as my personal academic background and my work experience as a translator and editor for well-regarded publishing houses, I was employed by the poverty research center of the association as an administrative-research assistant. I hoped that I might "network" for the center and expand the scope of the Center's existing relations with academia. At the beginning of my employment, I informed the association and my colleagues about the topic of my graduate study and research interests at the beginning of my employment.

I began to work at the Deniz Feneri Poverty Research Center in 2005. This center is in the headquarters of the Deniz Feneri Association and I established in collaboration with conservative, religious and liberal academics after the first

Symposium on Poverty, convened by the association 2003. The final report of the symposium (2003) claimed that,

Thanks to the effect of the dynamics of traditional solidarity of family and kinship of the society, poverty in Turkish society has not exceeded the danger limits during the recent economic crises. *So the Turkish family has a buffer mechanism function here. However this situation came up with the malfunctioning and dissolution of the Turkish family and the danger of not being able to carry out its same buffering function once more. Thus, poverty has become a fact that increases the risk of facing social and psychological problems for the family members and the risk of dissolution for the family itself* (p. 2, emphases added, my translation).⁸

The primary aim of the center is to work on civil society, poverty, poverty alleviation, philanthropy, social policies and charity in Turkey and abroad, and to develop strategies to tackle poverty by furthering cooperation between academia, state and the civil society. From 2005 to the present, as a research and administrative assistant, I began to coordinate research activities of this center, organize weekly meetings with the advisory board⁹ of the center and represent the center in the weekly departmental meetings of the association. In addition, I had opportunities to attend several academic and non-academic conferences, run an EU-funded project with *Zeytinburnu* municipality, called “Candle for Future” Project, and attend several

⁸ Türk toplumunda yoksulluk, özellikle son yıllarda yaşanan iktisadi krizlere rağmen davranış olarak tehlike sınırını geçmemiş ise aile ve akrabalık temelinde var olan geleneksel yardımlaşma ve dayanışma türünden dinamiklerin etkisi sayesinde olmuştur. Yani kurum olarak aile burada tampon mekanizma işlevi görmüştür. Fakat bu durum ailenin yorulması sonucunu doğurmuş, aynı fonksiyonu ikinci kez yerine getirememeye tehlikesi belirmiştir. Çünkü yoksulluk aile için parçalanma, aile üyeleri için ise sosyal ve psikolojik problemlerle karşılaşma riskini artıran bir olgu haline gelmiştir” (Altan and Bilgili, 2003: 2).

⁹ The advisory board of the research center is composed of several academicians. These academicians, usually of religious, conservative and liberal background, consult the association in its activities. As the representative of the association, the secretary general of the association attends the meetings of this board. The projects and activities of the research center are administered by the association and advisory board consults the research center about the projects and the activities. Although I was a lower rank employee, the presence of advisory board and their power over the center enabled me to act in-between the boundaries of the association and the center. I, most of the times, strategically resorted my responsibilities against advisory board, and by doing so, I was able to influence the project making process of the research center and to formulate policies and reflection papers of the research center on the basis of my own discourses of society, social policy, politics and citizenship. In the following chapters of this thesis, I will delineate my own position in the field.

conferences and civil society trainings in Turkey and abroad. The trainings were given by several supranational, civil and private bodies such as UNDP¹⁰, CONCORD¹¹, Norwegian Refugee Council¹², British Council¹³, Solidarity Fund, STGM¹⁴ and EDAM¹⁵ civil society training center. I attended these trainings as the

¹⁰ The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) is the global development network of the United Nations. The organization has country offices in 166 countries, where it works with local governments, civil society organizations and other international organizations to achieve social and economic development. Additionally, the UNDP works internationally to help countries achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These goals are “to eradicate extreme human poverty and hunger, to achieve universal primary education, to promote gender equality and empower women, to reduce child mortality, to improve maternal health, to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases, to ensure environmental sustainability and to develop a global partnership for development” (HDP, 2006).

¹¹ CONCORD is the European NGO Confederation for Relief and Development. Its 19 international networks and 22 national associations from the European Member States and the candidate countries represent more than 1600 European NGOs vis-à-vis the European Institutions. The main objective of the Confederation is to enhance the impact of European development NGOs vis-à-vis the European Institutions by combining expertise and accountability.

¹² Norwegian Refugee Council is an independent-international non-governmental organization. It works on the issue of internal displacement and fights for the rights of internally displaced people. Internally displaced people are “people or groups of persons who have been forced to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border” (UNHCR, 1998). In Turkey, the Kurds were forcibly relocated from their territories in Eastern and Southeastern Turkey especially by the state forces, due to the armed struggle between Kurdish nationalists, Turkish paramilitary forces and Turkish state. Deniz Feneri Association invited to this event in the aftermath of the Europeanisation process of Turkish state with the election of the JDP since it is one of the most important civil poor relief organizations in Turkey. The hope was to assist the forcibly deported Kurdish people in western Turkey; however the Deniz Feneri Association was reluctant to publicize the assistance it provided these people. It was observed that Turkish state addresses the forcibly displaced people as “yerinden olmuş” rather than “yerinden edilmiş” in its official documents during this event, both to meet conditionalities set by EU and secure its discourse of the state and security in Kurdish question.

¹³ British Council is a non-departmental and registered charity in UK and to build mutually beneficial cultural and educational relations between people in UK and the foreign countries. In Turkey, British Council, by 2006, partnered in important project, STEP, to increase partnership among civil society, state and financial circles that has been funded by the EU.

¹⁴ STGM is the acronym of the Civil Society Empowerment Center which is a civil society training and advocacy center active in Turkey.

¹⁵ EDAM (Eğitim Danışmanlığı Araştırma Merkezi-Education Consultancy Research Center) is a civil society training center, with certain religious and liberal credentials, for the civil society organizations, usually of Islamist and the right-wing ones in Turkey. The center publishes several journals, such as Journal of Civil Society and several educational-journals and owns a civil society web-portal. During this research, I attended three-month long training seminar sessions at EDAM. These seminar sessions were designed to increase professionalism, networking skills, funding, volunteerism, project management, human resource management, campaign management, and organizational relations within civil society organizations and train the civil society professionals. The seminars were delivered by several notable academicians, civil society experts and activists, who have left-wing, liberal and Islamist backgrounds. Especially after the year 2003, what one observes is the increase in the number of these training centers. This increase is due to the new law of associations, which was enacted in 2004. This law represents a milestone for civil society in Turkey, which will be explained in Chapter II.

representative of the Deniz Feneri Association and its center for poverty research poverty. Furthermore, I made occasional visits to the other branches of the Association, which are scattered around Turkey. I observed the power relations between the headquarters and branches and gained a wider perspective about power relations, discourses, poverty alleviation projects and subject positions during my fieldwork.

Thanks to this training and my workplace responsibilities, and my everyday encounters with other employees and the volunteers at the Deniz Feneri Association, my subject position in my ethnographical story drastically changed. My subject position in my research moved from media content-researcher to a participant-observer and action researcher. Through my educational background, workplace responsibilities and networking activities, demanded by the center, I secured an intermediary position in the association as a research and administrative assistant of the Poverty Research Center, and I began to work with the Secretary General of the association and other managers. Nevertheless, my aim to research the association put me in a “suspicious” position, as a person who is neither an insider nor outsider but stands in-between these positions.

Furthermore, my employment in the association led me to develop a much more participatory, complicity-based, and engaging understanding of the poor relief and poverty alleviation in my research. Nevertheless, this also forced me to re-think the focus of my analysis, research questions and the methodological precepts of my research. Eventually, the central focus of my ethnographical aim moved towards considering the transformations of the Deniz Feneri Association’s poverty alleviation practices in organizational, technical and discursive senses and the evolution of its discourses of poverty between 1996 and 2007.

As part of my preliminary observations in the field, I began to ask questions such as “how poverty is defined, constructed and represented in the Deniz Feneri Association from 1996 to 2006”, “what kind of projects, mechanisms and nets, as part of its definitions and identifications of poverty in the Deniz Feneri Association, have been developed to fight against poverty”, “how one can conceive obvious organizational and discursive transformation of the association during 10 years”, “what the relations between those changes and supranational and national political, social and economic processes are”, “what kind of technological, ideological, and political elements play a role in the formation of the Deniz Feneri’ Association’s discourses of poverty” and “who the major subjects of this fight against poverty are”. Thus the basic focus of my fieldwork became the interactional and organizational constructions and representations of poverty and the poor themselves in the official discourses and within the web of interpersonal relations among the employees, the poor, and the volunteers of the Deniz Feneri Association within the larger network of social welfare in Turkey in the period of neoliberal ideological hegemony. To observe these constructions and their political ends, I deployed action research methodology, which combines the observer and participant positions in the fieldwork research.

Between 2005 and 2007, to work and to do my research, I was traveling by bus one hour each way from Besiktas to Zeytinburnu, where the headquarters of the Deniz Feneri Association is. The working hours extended from 08.00 a.m. to 05.30 p.m. and most of the employees continued to work even after 05.30 p.m. During my years in the field, I had many opportunities to establish good relations with lower and higher ranks and with the Secretary General of the Association. Through this relationship and my workplace position, I was able to raise my criticisms against

particular understandings of poverty and the poor and express my conceptions of poverty and inequality in the association. However, as part of the principles of action research and fieldwork experience, I had to formulate “my research positions and ideas to meet the specific workplace conditions under which my fieldwork research and work operate” (Goebel, 1998; Gustavsen, 2003: 158; Reason and Bradbury: 2006). This meant that, during this fieldwork, I had to put my particular understandings of the poverty and the poor in a process of constant negotiation, compromise and discussion, if not conflict, with the existing conceptions of the poor and poverty within the association. This complex negotiation, discussion and compromise process did not lead me to abandon all my beliefs about the poor and poverty, nor did it lead me to accept the existing discourses in the association; but rather it forced me to engage in the association. In this respect, in the workplace, I actively participated¹⁶ in critical and power-ridden dialogues and relations, which cover relations of the cooperation, collaboration, disagreement, struggle, and negotiation, with my colleagues and other managers to alter the existing conceptions of the poverty and the poor within the hierarchical ground of the Deniz Feneri Association. As part of this critical engagement, I became complicit with the colleagues and managers in the association who want to change the existing conceptions of the poor and poverty with the inequality-sensitive, pro-welfare state, right-based, individual rather than family based, development, usually understood as

¹⁶ The term complicity gained fresh impetus after the publication of G. Marcus’ seminal essay, “*The Fate of "Culture": Geertz and Beyond*” on another famous anthropologist C. Geertz and fieldwork encounters. According to Marcus (1999) all anthropological encounters presuppose a practice of complicity in the field (pp. 86-110), which can be grounded on the moral and personal asymmetry between the individual and foreign anthropologist and the local and somehow Manichean traitor-informant in inter-subjective level. In my fieldwork in the Deniz Feneri Association, I observed that the complicity between me and my colleagues does not derive from out our morally asymmetric encounters in the field, nor our Manichean subjectivities. Rather, we became friends because of our more or less resembling political perspectives and sentiments within the hierarchical site of the Deniz Feneri Association. Thus, to become complicit with some of the colleagues was partly because of my workplace obligation to work and to do my research in the association, rather than being my moral favor and preference towards the people in my fieldwork.

workfare, oriented, and gender, class and ethnicity dynamics-minded conceptions of poverty and the poor in Turkey. By doing this, we aimed to transform, if not all but some poor relief activities and projects of the association, rooms for political manoeuvre and struggle (Clay and Schaffer, 1984) where we could not gain decisive victories (Anderson, 1976) due to our workplace positions and limited power, but short term positional gains to voice our understandings of the poor relief, poverty and social problems.

We criticized the conceptions of poverty of the association, the discourse of aid and charity, the aid-decision councils' decisions¹⁷ and their unaccountable nature, ineffective organizational bureaucracy and the treatment reserved for the poor in the association. By engaging this kind of workplace activism, we variegated existing discourses of the poor and poverty in the association, and we, as a loose group, actively articulated relatively alien concepts and realities to the discourse of the association in our weekly departmental meetings, everyday conversations and reports. As part of this political engagement, if not introduction, we began to breach the discursive boundaries of the association with the realities such as capitalism, neoliberalism, inequality, bureaucracy, Turkish state, ethnicity, gender and structural labor market fluctuations.

For my research concerns here, this active engagement and complicity, in turn, led me to move from theoretical horizons of the analysis of governmentality and situate my research on a new ground. From this revised basis, the making and

¹⁷ In the association, the aid decision councils' decisions cause great controversy among the higher and lower ranks. Usually, the aid decision councils, although they have strictly warned about their decisions and their unaccountable and discriminatory nature, gave decisions according to their own understandings of poverty, penury, urgency, veracity of the claims and understandings of family, Turkish society and the politics. Currently, the association, to limit the power of the aid decision councils, aims to computerize the decisions, which will be based on the data obtained from the social inspection forms. However, these forms, and the social inspection process as well cause great problems as well. These forms, social inspection process and aid decision councils will be delineated in CHAPTER IV of this thesis.

processing of the policies, projects, aid-processes and safety nets within the discourse of the poverty alleviation and the poor of the association emerged as my research concern. Put otherwise, I decided to concentrate more on the political processes and their transformation, exchanges, struggles and inter and intra-institutional and interpersonal dynamics and their interactions in making of poor relief and alleviation policies through the relations of negation, cooption, power struggle and reconciliation (Hirsch and Gellner, 2001) in my fieldwork. Although a perspective of governmentality treats these policies as historically produced political and discursive formations to identify, define and conduct a group of people (Dean, 1996; Lemke, 2001a; Scott, 1985; Shore and Wright, 1996), the creation, transformation and processual evolution of these policies in-themselves, not only as functional mechanisms to create governable subjects but also as complex grounds and processes of interaction, exchange, collaboration and power, are largely neglected in the literature of governmentality (Mosse, 1998; 2005). Furthermore, a perspective from governmentality does not make justice to the exchanges and relations among the institutional actors, the production dynamics and their transformation in different levels of society or the field, and the relations among the individual subjects such as donors, experts, beneficiaries, policy makers, managers, officers, the poor, the farmers, activists and petty-bureaucrats to achieve conflicting ends in hierarchical social, organizational and bureaucratic settings (Arce and Long, 1992; De Vries, 1992; Lewis, 2005; Mosse, 2003, 2004b).

In the inter-subjective level, the governmentality studies also suffer from certain shortcomings and formations of the interrelated subjects by the discourses of poverty and poor relief. Especially in the issue of poor relief and poverty alleviation, these subjects-forming, power-ridden and interactional processes, among the

abovementioned institutional and individual actors, are largely omitted by the governmentality studies. However, as Simmel brilliantly argued on the relation between the social type of the poor and rest of the society in modern times (Simmel, quoted from Coser, 1977)

The fact that someone is poor does not mean that he belongs to the specific social category of the 'poor' It is only from the moment that [the poor] are assisted . . . that they become part of a group characterized by poverty. This group does not remain united by interaction among its members, but by the collective attitude which society as a whole adopts toward it. . . . Poverty cannot be defined in itself as a quantitative state, but only in terms of the social reaction resulting from a specific situation... *Poverty is a unique sociological phenomenon: a number of individuals who, out of a purely individual fate, occupy a specific organic position within the whole; but this position is not determined by this fate and condition, but rather by the fact that others . . . attempt to correct this condition. The poor come to be viewed not by what they do--the criteria ordinarily used in social categorization--but by virtue of what is done to them. Society creates the social type of the poor and assigns them a peculiar status that is marked only by negative attributes, by what the status-holders do not have* (pp. 182-3, emphases added).

In the Deniz Feneri Association, this comment is reinforced by the observation that conceptions of the poor and the poverty in the Deniz Feneri Association not only design a poor subjects for the association and rest of the society; but they also establish the complex terrain of poverty alleviation and poor relief projects and constitute their agents, other than the poor, in the association. In interpersonal level, the given organizational terrain was occupied by the volunteers, staffs, managers, donors, and the poor, who request aid. Other than these subject positions, this terrain was filled with a fusion of the “local” and “cultural” as well as “global” and “universal” understandings, discourses of charity and poverty, political debates, religious morality, discourses of work and professionalism and so on. This fusion proposes various remedies for the problem of poverty, whilst conceptualizing, measuring and debating, and confining, poverty in a particular fashion in the

organization. As Lister argued (2004), “concepts of poverty have practical effects. They carry implicit explanations which, in turn, underpin policy prescriptions. The emphasis placed upon socio-economic structural conditions, power relationships, culture and individual behavior varies. The policies developed to tackle poverty reflect dominant conceptualizations” (p. 3).

In the association, this fusion has been largely shaped by Turkish nationalism, conservatism, conservative morality, discourses of professionalism and altruism, notions of political toleration and pluralism regarding different life-style owners, neoliberalism and religious conservatism.¹⁸ Since the discourses of poverty and penury are not only economic and political, but also operate on social, everyday and individual basis (Steensland, 2006; Appelbaum, 2001), this discursive fusion in the association echoes particular understandings of individuals, family, society and the state as well as poverty alleviation in Turkey and also promotes certain relations among these parties. Revealingly, this is why the association defines poverty as a personal and familial failure to satisfy one’s and his family’s own primary physiological needs, and thus being in need of assistance and aid. Whilst the neoliberal element in official politics aims to transform the poor from “passive” and dependent aid-recipients to the “active” entrepreneurs, job-seekers and self-reliant

¹⁸ It should be noted here, these “local” and “global” understandings of the poor and the poverty were not only functioning in the level of abstraction. And, these conceptions were introduced into the poverty alleviation and policies structure of the Deniz Feneri Association through several external and internal power relations. Among the external relations, the association’s institutional relations with the Solidarity Fund, UNDP, other civil society organizations, local solidarity organizations and academia in Turkey were effective in the production of the fusion of the local and global understandings of the poverty and the poor in the association. The very best example of this interconnectedness of the institutional actors of the poverty alleviation and the poor relief was the implementation of more or less similar projects and policies to alleviate poverty in Turkey. These projects basically designed to lessen the “dependency” of the poor to aid and assistance vis-à-vis to increase their job-skills. The Deniz Feneri Association nowadays launched specific rural development projects. With these projects, the Deniz Feneri Association aim to transform the rural areas and render the rural poor as farmers and producers in global market. The projects are Saanen goat breeding, bee-keeping and cherry-farming projects. In the larger social policy context, more big-budgeted and similar projects were launched by Solidarity Fund to embed the rural subsistence farmers into global agro-market and from 2004 onwards in Turkey.

citizens alongside the global neoliberal rationality of the poor and poverty; the conservative and religious elements equate poverty with financial failures of the family due to personal mishaps and dysfunctional family relations. In addition, these views relate poverty with cultural and social habits, individual psychological endowments, hunger, orphan-hood, destitution, widowhood, advanced age, disability, and unemployment. In this context, in the association the root causes of poverty are given as the lack of solidarity in Turkish society, Turkish state's heavy burden of public expenditures, corruption, having many children, healthcare problems, unemployment and being dependent upon aid. However, this discourse does not address the structural inequalities, such as class, gender and ethnicity and regional disparities, Turkish state's inadequate, if not lessening, public spending and labor market fluctuations and demands on Turkish society and around the globe. Since poverty is represented in a relatively individualized fashion, the individual, cultural and psychological stigmas of poverty and being poor are extensively used in the discourse of the association to separate the poor from rest of the society by means of its tools of diagnosis. This, in turn, as once Foucault argued (1972) "does not establish the facts of our identity by means of the interplay of distinctions. It establishes that we are difference, that our reason is the difference of forms of discourse; our history is the difference of times, that our selves are the difference of masks" (p. 131).

Therefore, the discourse of the association not only makes the poor different but the difference itself. This difference, as I stated before, derives from personal, family-based and habitual characteristics rather than structural unavailability of choices, power relations and inequalities in capitalism, which in turn sutures the organizational discourses of poverty and the poor into the body of neoliberalism. To

cover the very power relations between the poor and the rest of the society, which is based on a given inequality, the association presents itself as not hurting the poor whilst assisting them, as if the only way to exercise objective and subjective power on the poor in a capitalist society is to embarrass the poor whilst assisting them. Clearly, this organizational code of compassion, which confines the hierarchical, unequal and structural power relations between the poor within a moment of aid-exchange, provides us hints about what kind of understandings of poverty and poverty alleviation regime are at work in the association. As part of this understanding, the association currently organizes dinners whose guests are the volunteers, donors and the poor together around a table. The expenses of these dinners will be covered by the donors, which are also represented as the great success of the association¹⁹. In the following parts of this chapter, I will say more on the internal relations within the Deniz Feneri Association, since they are important in shaping of the discourses of the poor and poverty, and also in the relation between the poor and the rest of the Turkish society for the association.

The Deniz Feneri Aid and Solidarity Association is a centrally organized and hierarchical association. However, this does not mean it does not establish branches all over Turkey. On the contrary, to ease organizational workload such as assistance distribution, social inspection visits controlling and producing interim reports about projects, the association establishes branches and representative offices in the major cities of Turkey. The representative offices are headed by representatives and they

¹⁹ “Hep söyleriz Deniz Feneri bir köprü diye. İmkânları ölçüsünde, gönlünden kopanlarla hayır işlemek isteyen insanlarla, yardıma gerçekten ihtiyacı olan yoksulları buluşturan bir köprü. İşte dün akşam bunun örneklerinden biri daha yaşandı. İzmir Şubemiz, Denizli’de 50 yardımsever aile ile 50 yoksul aileyi bir yemekte buluşturdu. Saat 20.00’de Sümer Koruluğu’nda gerçekleşen yemekte, Deniz Feneri’nden yardım alan bir aile ile Deniz Feneri bağışçısı bir aile aynı masayı paylaştı. Paylaşılan sadece masa değildi elbette, her iki aile için de bir ömrün kısaca özeti, sıkıntılar, mutluluklar, sohbet ve yenilen güzel yemekler de paylaşıldı. Çocuklar için animasyon gösterilerinin olacağı buluşmada her hayırsever kendi masasının hesabını karşıladı. Hayırseverler hem bir ihtiyaç sahibi aileye güzel bir yemek ikram etmiş oldu hem de onlarla pek çok şey paylaştı. İzmir Şubemizin düzenlediği yemekte, İzmir Şube yöneticilerimiz de bulundu (The Deniz Feneri, 2007)

are, in general, members of powerful local elites and artisan groups. Their role is to coordinate the activities and projects, and supervise aid distribution teams and equipment, control volunteer networks in their given region, as well as establishing sound working relations between the association and army, mayor, governor and local bureaucrats and local power groups by use of their personal/social power. In general local representatives are appointed by central headquarters, this appointment sometimes creates disputes among the local volunteers in given region. Currently the association has branches in Izmir and Ankara and representative offices in Samsun, Antalya, Diyarbakır and Erzurum.

In the association, all the aid-decisions and other projects are approved by the board of executives of the association. This organizational structure also meant a hierarchical ranking of the employees in the association. In terms of internal relations, within the hierarchical structure of the association, there were power relations among the departments. In the head office, there were departments such as Institutional Communications, Financial Affairs, Human Resources and Administration, Information Technologies, Research and Development, Center for Researching Poverty, International Relations. These departments were administered by department heads and their power was dependent on their status within the organizational hierarchy. All the department heads were male, except for the former Human Resources and Administration manager.

On the top of the administrative system of the Deniz Feneri Association sit the General Manager, the Board of Executives, and the Secretary General of the Association; in general the Secretary General actively manages the organizational activities and projects. However his power was limited with respect to the Board of Executives. He is the person whom I work closely with; this in turn enabled me to

secure my position in the power-saturated workplace relations map of the association and express my personal and professional beliefs about poverty and the poor. In the Deniz Feneri Association, the department heads are managers, though the power to control the association was in the hands of the Board of Executives, the Secretary General and the General Manager. The members of this board are members of the Deniz Feneri Association and members are elected triennially from a roster whereas department heads are not.

In the association, this hierarchical relation is subtly conveyed through the distinction between *yönetim* and *personel* (administration and staff) and between the higher and lower ranks. This distinction is also effective in poor relief activities of the association, i.e. the social inspection team members are lower rank and aid decision council members occupy usually much higher or middle rank positions. I also observed that in some cases, the aid decision council members are department heads. Most of the time, social inspection staff criticizes aid decision council members for being too harsh against the poor and giving irrational, incoherent and personal decisions during our conversations. However, these criticisms remain largely unresolved due to the power discrepancy between the two groups. On the other hand, I also observed that social inspection staffs, who criticize the aid decision council members for their harsh decisions, blame the poor for their poverty during our conversations. These staffs also deploy cultural stigmas of poverty to represent the poor. Since they both use the same stigmas to denote and represent the poor, it is not wrong to claim that most of the social inspection unit members usually oppose the aid decision councils' decisions because of workplace conflicts rather than the treatment reserved for the poor. During this fieldwork, a lot of work has been done to 'improve' social inspection staff' as well as aid decision councils' discriminatory

attitude towards the poor and aid-recipients; however the association, due to its organizational logic, failed to achieve this improvement during this fieldwork.

It is clear that not all the employees are part of these so-called conflicting groups. In addition, these openly conflictual relations were taking place among department heads or coordinators. In that sense, most of the lower rank employees' contribution to my research remained in terms of gossiping. Usually, the main topics of gossip were unequal distribution of choices and availabilities in the association, employment on the basis of kinship and acquaintanceship, apparent workplace inequalities, the loss of the authentic spirit of the Deniz Feneri, which favors "good for good's sake" rather than the sake of the show-biz. In this respect, a wider belief in the association's lower ranks that the association assists the poor to hype the organization and achieve publicity for the organization as ends in themselves.

As part of these power relations, some employees and higher ranks are totally against even moderate criticisms of the existing poverty alleviation practices and methods or general discourses of poverty within the association. And some managers and higher rank employees are not opposing the changes in the discourse of the association. Although those who are for and against changing the current poverty alleviation practices of the association cannot be clearly separated from each other since most of the department heads have the same religious or discursive backgrounds or belong to similar communal and religious groups. In that sense, these so-called pre-modern communal and religious ties and belongings were expected to bring cohesion, harmony and non-conflict. However it does not mean there are no disputes; rather the existing power disputes are mostly represented in terms of the management, knowledge, personal power, hierarchical ranking, and education and having professional background and being member of professional networks.

These internal power relations are important since I observed that the poor relief activities of the Deniz Feneri Association are not separated from them, and also these activities are largely shaped by the institutional and interpersonal relations. During the poverty alleviation projects' design, there were constant negotiations among the higher and lower ranks. The results of the negotiation depended on personal (male) charisma, power, status, education, and devotion to the association. Additionally, during this process the person who had worked in the association longer is more trusted than a person who has just started working. It is because of the belief that the person who worked in the association knows the association and its priorities better than newcomers.

This process applies also to the higher ranks. In a personal communication with the Secretary General, he informed me that he was reformulating his project proposals again and again upon my question on what he was doing if he could not persuade the Board of Executives (I. Altan, personal communication, May, 20, 2007). During this fieldwork, I observed that to initiate a project to alleviate poverty, which was guided by my negotiated understandings of the poor and poverty, I had to convince the Secretary General of the association about the meaningfulness and usefulness of a poverty alleviation project and conception of poverty and the poor. As it is obvious, the meaningfulness and usefulness are evaluated in terms of the complex discourses of poverty and the poor, as well as the Turkish family, state, society in the association. Therefore, in the association during the project-planning process, as employees, we were asked to convince the higher ranks regarding questions such as which project, method and conception would serve better to correct the individual and family-based failures, losses and inadequacies of the poor.

Thus the poverty alleviation regime of the Deniz Feneri Association is created and implemented through hierarchical webs of personal and organizational relations. These webs of personal and professional relations among staff were largely shaped by heroic/Islamic virility, compassion for the poor, humility and also “modern” market-place virtues such as shrewdness, networking skills, leadership, crisis management, creativity, knowledge, dexterity, bargaining and negotiation. As it is obvious, these “idealized” characteristics represent a blend of “modern” dispositifs of workplace (Zeybek, 2006) and religious/nationalist fantasies of manhood, community, responsibility and citizenship (Alkan, 2006; Ipek-Can 2006) in the Deniz Feneri Association.

As part of internal power relations, within the association the distribution of the assistance to those who do not deserve is an important issue and source of dissent among employees. Usually, the aid decision council members’ personal and “inconsistent” decisions are given as the examples. Many times, I observed that two similar claimant cases are evaluated differently by the same aid-council member. Usually, the organizational system allowed the aid decision council members to decide under the lights of neoliberal understandings of poverty and the poor²⁰, conservative family values, traditional and religious views of poverty and being poor, and current political debates in Turkey. In the association, these emerging problems regarding aid decisions are framed in terms of personal differences of the aid

²⁰ I observed that, the staffs of the association extensively deploy real and un-real needy distinction to classify the poor during my fieldwork. This distinction is very akin to deserving and undeserving poor debate around the globe and framed in terms of individual responsibilities, family relations, employment status and psychological characteristics. Accordingly “the deserving poor were those people not expected to work because of their age, gender, family status, or physical limitations, and they were therefore deemed as meriting government support. The “undeserving” poor, on the other hand, were expected to work and consequently warranted only limited, haphazard government assistance (Steensland, 2006). This pattern of cultural classification regarding the poor has been documented in multiple settings. Interviews (Halle 1984; Hochschild 1981; Lamont 2000), public opinion researches (Cook and Barrett 1992; Kluegel and Smith 1986; McCloskey and Zaller 1984), and the analysis of organizational poor relief practices (Mohr 1994) are main examples.

decision council members and variety of the understandings among the people. Especially the higher ranks and the Secretary General, by personalizing these problems, hope to insulate these them from the organizational and official discourses of poverty and the poor of the association. In many cases, international relations department manager, quality management unit head and I criticized this aspect of the organizational system and stressed the necessity to change it, which currently enables aid decision council members to decide on the basis of their personal, psychological, class-based, cultural, religious and ideological conceptions of poverty and the poor.

In the association, the board of executives and its power to command the resources was a source of controversy among the lower ranks and volunteers. Usually, the lower ranks and volunteers believed that there has been a certain degree of corruption, which meant an act done with the intention to give some advantage inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others, in the association. The perpetrators of this act are the higher ranks and the board of executives, and the reason given among the lower ranks was the “luxurious” “life-style” of the administration and specifically the TV program host, U. Arslan. For the lower ranks, the corruption usually meant the “violation” of official moral imperative and also the law. During our gossip exchanges, my remarks, “what if this “luxurious” life-style was perfectly legal and sanctioned by the law” meant almost nothing. In this context, I observed that for the lower ranks and the volunteers, morality forbids this kind of extravagant lifestyle. And in addition, there is an overlap between moral and the legal. Interestingly, the higher ranks themselves share the same conception of legality and morality. Many times, it has been observed that they talk with each other, usually when the others are around, with moral aphorisms to remind moral imperatives regarding the charity, moral responsibility toward the poor, the association and the

Turkish public.²¹ Since these remarks have a reminding function, they also have a productive function with which the higher ranks achieve the moral high ground under the gaze of others.

Only a colleague of mine expressed the legality of, in a quite precise and brilliant fashion, reminding me of Gramsci's common sense²² in his crude realism (Gramsci, 1971; Crehan, 2006) about class, morality, hierarchies and power relations. As Mrs. S. J.²³ argued during our conversations,

I don't think they are corrupt. Why do they endanger everything they have? They already have everything, money, power, status and loyal staff to command, which they would dream of in their entire lives. Now they have everything, whatever "everything" meant to them. Now, they became important figures, if they would be corrupt, it would be exposed and they would lose everything they have (S. J., personal communication, March, 5 2007)²⁴

In the association, we usually gossip while no department head, the Secretary General or the higher rank employee is around. In the association, I observed that gossiping enabled us to form a moral community and dissociate ourselves from those we talk about. Usually the issues we talk about are poverty, possibility organizational corruption, inequality in Turkey, the JDP government, intra-departmental and interpersonal relations among higher and lower ranks and clashing views on poverty alleviation. Especially by talking about these issues we were able to posit individuals

²¹ Hepimiz bir vakfın üzerinde oturuyoruz. Bunun hesabını vereceğiz. O nedenle çok çalışmamız lazım, vakit kaybetmemiz lazım. Sorumluluk içinde hareket etmemiz lazım, hepimiz Müslüman insanlarız, bunu bir düşünelim öyle hareket edelim. Hepimiz bir cehennemde yaşıyoruz, sanmayın ki kolayca kurtulacağız buradan (I. Altan, personal communication, January 13, 2006)

²² According to Gramsci (1971), the common sense "is a conception which, even in the brain of one individual, is fragmentary, incoherent and inconsequential, in conformity with the social and cultural position of those masses whose philosophy it is. At those times when a homogeneous social group is brought into being, there comes into being also, in opposition to common sense, a homogeneous - in other words coherent and systematic - philosophy" (p. 419).

²³ Real name is withheld by the author.

²⁴ "Ben bir çürümüşlük veya yolsuzluk olduğuna inanmıyorum. Neden sahip oldukları her şeyi tehlikeye atınlarsa ki? Yüzünü ahir ömürlerinde bile göremeyecekleri para, güç, statüye ve emre amade personele, işte onlar için her şey neyse ona şimdi sahipler. Şimdi önemli insanlar oldular, o nedenle yolsuzluk yapsalar, bu kesin açığa çıkardı. Sahip oldukları her şeyi de kaybederlerdi. Tabii ki yolsuzluk yapmazlar" (S.J., personal communication, March, 5 2007)

and people into “competitive” grounds and we were able to evaluate others and re-evaluate ourselves, take positions and criticize others in a relatively dialogical fashion. As Gluckman observed, an act of gossip both meant perpetuation of group identity, where it exposes or establishes a “common morality” and values and then facilitates the control and regulation of competing cliques and aspiring individuals (Gluckman, 1963; 1968). I usually deployed the gossip exchanges as valuable resources to understand interpersonal understandings of poverty and the poor in the association, i.e. by criticizing a higher rank employee for his non-compassionate beliefs for the poor, or his conceptions of poverty, charity and inequality in these exchanges, we claim moral and social position in the organizational setting, and intentionally or unintentionally exclude others due to their failure to meet the moral traits and values (Noon and Delbridge, 1993) regarding the poor, poverty and charity in the association. In this respect, as Loudon once observed, the gossip functioned as one of “the most important channels for constant reaffirmation of shared values about behavior” (p. 347) in social settings. Put otherwise, the gossip act led us to bond with each other and endeared us in a particular setting (Gluckman, 1963; 1968; Kanter, 1977; March and Sevón, 1988; Moore, 1962).

I used gossip exchanges and channels to create new values regarding the poor and understandings of poverty in the association at interpersonal levels. In addition, these channels enabled me to develop my own discourses of poverty and the poor in contrast to the common conceptions of poverty and the poor in the association. Although, I am quite doubtful that I, as an employee, caused a radical change in the constructions and the representations of poverty and the poor in the association especially in the organizational and official level; at least, I, as an observer, had chance to scrutinize the particular conflicts and compatibilities between my

understandings of poverty and the existing interpersonal conceptions and representations of the poverty in the association during my fieldwork. And, the observation of these compatibilities and conflicts, led me to develop a sense of what to do to manage, appropriate and change existing common beliefs about poverty to promote just, free and equal society without poverty in the association. Furthermore, I already impossible to rely on gossip exchanges to alter the existing discourses of the poor and poverty of the association, since these exchanges are formed as individual, private, secret and personal exchanges, therefore not related to “official” conceptions of poverty and the poor. In the following part of this chapter, it will be presented which materials are used to produce in this fieldwork.

Organization of the Fieldwork Material

During this research I gathered information on the politics of the poor and poverty by looking at four items produced by the association. The first one was the visual and published materials of the association. I gathered information about the representations of poverty and the poor from the published and visual materials of the association. This enabled me to construct a history of the representations of poverty and the poor in the association from 1996 to 2007.

The second fieldwork material was the organizational procedures, namely the social inspection procedure and *Yardım/Yoksul Organizasyon Programı- YOP* (Poor/Aid Organization Software), specific software of the association. These procedures are parts of the technology of the association to register the poor and collect information about the poor, chiefly on the basis of the family unit. This system is designed to tag the poor, or construed the poor as recordable lives and

families in recent period. The given organizational system is guided by several understandings of poverty. Among those, poverty as unemployment, hunger, failure to meet primary physiological needs and being susceptible to psychological and physiological health risks are the common ones. Thus, the given system classifies the poor on the basis of these definitions, and aim to alleviate the poverty on the basis of this classification.

Thirdly as a part of my analysis of “the politics of the poor and poverty” of the Deniz Feneri Association, I also researched aid management activities of the association and its registration system of the donations by looking at specific registration database of the association. This system, I contend, embodies the scope, form and content of the relation between the poor and non-poor in Turkish society according to the Deniz Feneri Association.

The last but not least element of my research was the inter-personal and interactional dynamics in the association. During this fieldwork, I participated in everyday encounters, interpersonal and inter-group relations in the site of the association in order to understand the interpersonal and interactional group dynamics. This enabled me to understand the volunteers and lower and higher rank employees’ “subjective” views on poverty and poor relief. Although I have been warned by several higher rank employees that I should mind my own business, because lower ranks might misrepresent the association; the basic anthropological value of this study lies in its multiple viewpoints, which aimed to see how those four fields interact and thus become integrated within the fieldwork. This four-tiered and relational locus enabled me to observe relations between official representations of poverty and practices of poor relief and interpersonal and “unofficial” conceptions, exchanges of ideas, metaphors and understandings of poverty among the higher and

lower rank employees, donors and volunteers within the site of association. In the following part of this chapter, how this fourfold fieldwork material is organized in this thesis will be set out.

Sequential Order

In order to frame this fieldwork study and conclusions, which was briefly delineated in this chapter of this thesis, in the second chapter of this thesis, it will be described the financial, political and social transformations that led to the participation of civil society organizations in poor relief and poverty alleviation in Turkey. These transformations are effective on global, regional and national scales. Among the global transformations, the dissolution of what social scientists call the “Keynesian consensus” among the state, labor market and big business enterprises in the late 1970’s, the transformations of welfare states, globalization, neoliberal ideology and deregulation of national economies are the prominent ones. These global transformations led to the momentous emergence of new poverty structures and new inequalities in the global context. In addition, as the regional and national developments to frame the participation of the civil society organizations in the poor relief and poverty alleviation activities, the liberalization of Turkish economy from the 1980’s onwards, the emergence of Islamism as a viable political power in Turkish and Middle Eastern politics and its demise, the re-organization of Turkish welfare expenditures through different actors such as Solidarity Fund²⁵ and the

²⁵ As Bugra and Keyder argued (2004), “the Solidarity Fund was created by a law enacted in 1986 to provide emergency relief to all residents of Turkey, including legal and illegal immigrants. Especially since the mid 1990s it has distributed a non-negligible amount of resources to provide health and education support as well as to satisfy urgent needs of those in extreme poverty, mostly through in-kind transfers of fuel or food. It also provides small interest-free credit, in cash or in kind, especially to the rural poor. The establishment of the Fund was in many ways a response to a series of

municipalities, the 1999 Marmara Earthquake and the 2002 General Elections and the rise of the Justice and Development Party²⁶ to power in Turkey in 2002 will be analyzed. In this framework, I would claim the emergence of the civil society organizations as poverty alleviation actors, more specifically the emergence of the Deniz Feneri Association, will be much more comprehensible.

In the third chapter of this thesis, it will be analyzed the emergence of the Deniz Feneri Association from a TV program and its transformation into a well-known and prominent civil society organization in Turkey. In this chapter, the ten years of the program and the association within this political and financial context will be analyzed. This chapter was basically drawn from the published journals, bulletins and visual materials of the Deniz Feneri Association. By doing this, I seek to present the transformation of the constructions of the poor and poverty of the Deniz Feneri Association as they relate to the core of the politics of the poor and poverty within the association. This will lead readers to produce an understanding of the ever-changing techniques, projects, discourses and strategies to assist the poor and to discuss poverty in the association.

international and domestic developments which have modified the socioeconomic environment and led to the emergence of new forms of poverty that could no longer be managed by the existing, basically informal mechanisms of social protection. Although the Solidarity Fund was at first not taken very seriously, since the mid-1990s it has come to be surprisingly effective in the struggle against poverty. In dollar terms, the Fund provided an average of 375 million dollars worth of relief per year between the years of 1997 and 2001. Between 1999 and 2000, disaster relief provided to earthquake victims constituted the most important item in the total assistance provided by the Fund. Starting with 2001, the significance of this item in total budget started to decline and support provided for education and health constituted the most important categories of assistance, 25.5 percent and 22.2 percent, respectively. Aid to school children, listed as a separate category, was also important, constituting 14.8 percent of the total sum distributed. Close to 10% of fund resources were transferred to local branches to be spent on urgent needs of fuel, food, clothing, and medicine. The size of the local population and socio-economic development indices for provinces form the basis for the allocation of resources to local branches. The main contribution of the fund is in cash payments, in the form of generalized social assistance” (pp. 18-19).

²⁶ Justice and Development Party (JDP) was emerged from the rosters of the Welfare Party, an Islamist party in Turkey, and established in 2001. Ideologically, the party adopts mildly-Islamist, right wing and conservative stances. The social policy program of the party and its relation with the Deniz Feneri Association will be delineated in CHAPTER III and IV of this thesis.

The fourth chapter will be focused on the current poverty alleviation practices, techniques and projects of the association. Concentrating on this will enable me to understand the present dynamics of the politics of the poor of the Deniz Feneri Association. Basically, in this chapter I aim to demonstrate how the associational practices of poor relief and interpersonal relations inseparably coincide. This mixture, I claim, whilst defining the poverty in a certain way, creates alleviation mechanisms, nets, and projects on the basis of politics of the poor and poverty. These definitions of poverty, as I will show, are based on a mixture of global and local conceptions of poverty such as hunger and identifications of risk and vulnerable groups. The political significance of this mixture lies in its constructive power for the association as the legitimate civil template. With this discourse on poverty, the association addresses many political groups and communities in Turkey in neoliberal period and gain financial support from them.

In the fifth chapter, it will be focused on the conceptions of the charitable and the volunteer of the Deniz Feneri Association. As the association meets several legal, political and financial criteria, put by the state and the society in the neoliberal period - such as “accountability”, “transparency”, “controllability”, “efficiency” and “effectivity” in its poor relief and aid management activities, it gained peculiar status under the gaze of Turkish state, the Justice and Development Party government and the Turkish society. With this enhanced status I able to begin to attract large groups of donors and volunteers, who belong to different political communities. In this respect, the association uses so-called “neutral” and “non-political” organizational and technical procedures to meet the “demands” of different political communities in Turkey. Among those demands, the most important ones are the financial transparency, accountability, efficiency, effectivity and distribution of the resources

[aids and ailments] to those who “deserve”. Meeting these demands, in turn, enables the association to address these different communities and to attract their financial, political and social support. This chapter, in that sense, analyzes the constructions of the charitable and the volunteer, which are largely neglected in governmentality studies and analyses. These constructions of the donors and volunteers, as it will be shown in this chapter, are intrinsically related with the poor and poverty in the association. And these constructions of the volunteers and donors are essential parts of the politics of the poor and poverty of the association.

In the final chapter, it will be asserted that this novel politics of the poor and poverty, which was championed by the Deniz Feneri Association, is part of a larger neoliberal governmental rationality at work in Turkey. By being a civil society actor within this particular neoliberal rationality, it is claimed that the Deniz Feneri Association functions as a civil and organizational platform for the neoliberalization of several classes and political groups and their local, religious and nationalist conceptions of the poor and poverty in Turkey. This will be called the politics of the poor and poverty of the association. This politics of the poor and poverty, I would suggest, embeds particular political groups and communities, and their political imaginaries, and form new relations with the poor and poverty for the rest of the society mainly according to the neoliberal discourses of the poor and poverty. This conclusion, in turn, enables researchers to produce an understanding of the social and political dynamics of civil society and civil society organizations and their poor relief activities in Turkey. This conclusion also explains a significant deficiency, which was found in governmentality studies and analyses of governmental rationalities during this research. In the following chapter, the global, local and organizational

grounds from the late 1970s onwards will be described, in order to produce a rigorous analysis of the civil welfare phenomenon in Turkey after the 1980s period.

CHAPTER II

GLOBAL AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENTS OF CIVIL WELFARE PROVISION

This chapter seeks to analyze the global and local dynamics, which caused the participation of the civil society organization in the poverty alleviation and the poor relief in Turkey in the last two decades. In this context, I consider the Deniz Feneri Association as a civil component of a nascent neoliberal regime of governmentality, which lies outside and beyond the state, in Turkey in the late 1990s. In the first section of this chapter, I will specify the global processes, which undergirded the participation of the civil society in welfare provision in contemporary world. I suggest that this attempt is meaningful in order to demonstrate under what global economic and political circumstances the participation of the civil society organizations in the poor relief activities took place around the globe. In the second section of this chapter, it will be analyzed the financial and political particularities of the Turkish context from the 1980s onwards. These particularities, as with the global processes, are crucial for the emergence of the Deniz Feneri Association as a prominent civil society organization in Turkey and its “new politics of the poor and the poverty” in the late 1990s. In the third section of this chapter, it will be delineated the current situation in welfare provision, particularly the Solidarity Fund and its poverty alleviation network. This tripartite nexus is important inasmuch as these

global and national developments and institutional actors have particular influences on the discursive, institutional and technological aspects of the poor relief activities of the Deniz Feneri Association.

The Global Dynamics of Civil Welfare Provision

The global processes relevant to the discussion here are the ebbing of the Keynesian consensus, which aimed to administer the national economies and nation-state based financial system between the labor market, the state and the business sectors in the late 1970s (De Martino, 2000), the rise of the supranational bodies such as IMF and World-Bank to manage national and transnational economies in the early 1980s (UNDP, 1990, Skocpol, 1985), and globalization²⁷ (Giddens, 1990; Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, and Perraton, 1999; Swank, 2002a; 2002b; 2005). As a consequence of these global developments, new poverty structures and inequalities among the social classes within national units and among the nations formed during these decades around the globe (Esping-Andersen, 1993; 1996; Jessop 1995). Together with these global transformations and the coming of the new inequalities, a new political and economic discourse emerged as an off-shoot of classical liberalism, in political and social science literature, namely neoliberal ideology (Kiely, 2005; Tormey, 2006). The following parts of this section will delineate these developments.

²⁷ As Giddens suggested (1990), the globalization can be defined as “the intensification of world wide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa” (p. 64).

The Dissolution of the Keynesian Consensus

In the last four decades, the prominent actors within public policy and social security structures have undergone significant changes around the globe. Social rights, which were usually considered as education, social security and healthcare, to be provided through welfare-states to a different extent, were fragmented and commodified, if not they were offered through a multiplicity of non- or supra-state agencies (Allen and Thomas, 2000; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Hulme, 1994; Mosse, 2003). This commodification and fragmentation process was a part and parcel of what social scientists called the ‘dissolution of the Keynesian consensus’ in international level in the early 1970s. This political consensus was aimed to administer national economies and govern the population through a consensus between the state, the labor market and the business sector from the end of WWII to the early 1970s. As Bannock, Baxter and Rees argued (1992), with this political and financial consensus, it was hoped that nation-states and governments, primarily through fiscal policy, could influence aggregate demand to cut unemployment and then poverty (p. 243). The major social and political objective of this fiscal application was to settle the economies at position with high employment and to exhibit no natural tendency for unemployment, and financial instability to as happened in the years 1929-31 and throughout the whole interwar period (Hodgson and Screpanti, 1991). In this model, social policy was perceived as an asset not a cost, where the public investment in education, health care, worker training, and low-income housing were represented as the social responsibilities of the state, whilst citizens were constructed as the major beneficiaries. However, the system was criticized to be very centralized, expensive and bureaucratic to administer, to carry high tax burden (Swank, 2001), to favor

strong government orientation and to make pressure on budget because of the high costs (Esping-Andersen, 1990; 1993).

This economic in appearance, yet political in scope, consensus had peculiar political and social aspects. Basically this nationally planned economy model steadily improved the purchasing power of the individual workers and low-income citizens through the employment, wage and the pricing policies (Saka, 2001). Hence, both the fiscal and social policies and centralized social security system of the Keynesian model facilitated the incorporation of broad sectors of the labor classes into the political and financial system of a given country (Pierson, 1998; Jessop, 2001). According to the perspective from governmentality, whilst the Keynesian consensus was guaranteeing the political and economic participation of low-income citizens and labor-classes to the formal political system of the nation-states, it aimed to achieve the legitimization of the existing national-capitalist system in the gaze of the labor and lower classes. The political hope in this system was to disable them to unbalance the given consensus for their own class-interests (Jessop; 2001; Henley, 1988).

Obviously, the governmental rationality of the Keynesian consensus did not only cover the labor and lower classes and its political objective was not only to protect the economic system from a labor militancy and insurgent proletariat revolution. The consensus was also providing a certain fiscal protection for large and corporate business sectors with some market- oriented policies, such as subsidies and tariffs to support the national business-sector to invest nationally and thus increase employment (Scholte, 2000). As Davis (2004) suggested,

with capitalists and laborers strictly disciplined in this manner, the economy is less prone to distortion and waste, industrial policy decisions are more likely to be made with long-term frameworks in mind, national

industrial growth objectives are more apt to be achieved, and sustained macroeconomic development is more likely to materialize...In contrast, where middle classes are absent or politically weak, states are less likely to impose discipline and more likely to accommodate the demands of capital or labor in ways that allow rent-seeking, short-term profit maximization, higher wage rates, and/ or protectionist measures (p. 2).

However, with the increase in “stagflation” (low growth and high inflation), which swept the western economies in the late 1960s, the development of export oriented industries, for the business and financial elites, the system of nationally-based and planned economy appeared as at best of limited use and at worst as an unacceptable barrier to economic growth (Swank, 2001) As Harvey argued to evaluate the dynamics of the dissolution of Keynesian consensus (1999),

The social democratic state in Europe and the Keynesian compromise that grounded the social compact between capital and labor in the US, had worked well enough during the high growth years of the 1950s and 1960s. Redistributive politics, controls over the free mobility of capital, public expenditures and welfare state building had gone hand in hand with relatively high rates of capital accumulation and adequate profitability in most of the advanced capitalist countries. But by the end of the 1960s this began to break down, both internationally and within domestic economies. By 1973, even before the Arab-Israeli War and the OPEC oil embargo, the Bretton-Woods system that had regulated international economic relations had dissolved. Signs of a serious crisis of capital accumulation were everywhere apparent, ushering in a global phase of stagflation; fiscal crises of various states...The Keynesian compromise had evidently collapsed as a viable way to manage capital accumulation consistent with social democratic politics (*“Neoliberalism and the Restoration of Class Power”*).

In this context, the shaky consensus among the disparate elements of the society began to collapse in national and international contexts. As Byrne (1999) argued,

The system suffered a severe shock in the early 1970s with the very rapid rise in oil prices, which lead to a drain of resources outwit the

expenditure based demand in western economies, despite the very best efforts of UK, US and French merchants of death to sell weapons systems to the primarily Arab powers now retaining a far greater share of oil revenues. However, the filling up of productive and social capital deficits, coupled with massive productivity gains in manufacturing industries in general, created a situation in which intrinsic demand for labor weakened in advanced industrial economies. Indeed the key collapse in demand has been that of demand for skilled manual labor. Productivity gains have depended on the replacement of such a labor by combination of machinery and less skilled labor. At the same time the product mix of the global capitalist economy has moved away from the heavy engineering products which were the main locus of skilled manual employment towards both light electronic goods and a range of services. These changes in the nature of the real economy are part of the story of the weakness of the classical Keynesian policies since the late 1970s (p. 36).

This perceived failure of Keynesian approaches to the “oil problem” of the early 1970s further stimulated interest in alternative economic strategies, such as supply-side economics, which focuses on the “supply” rather than the “demand” side of the economy. By focusing on the supply side of the economy, the supply-side economists aimed to transcend the financial impasse, “stagflation”, heavy tax-burden and zero-growth, sweeping the international economy in 1970s. Furthermore, this alternative vision of economy functioned as the backbone of the neoliberalism and its vision of society, market and the state, which will be delineated in the following parts of this section. After the collapse and dissolution of the nationally-planned economies both in national and international plains, to fill the emerging vacuum several supra-national institutions gained prominence. These public institutions are the IMF, World Bank and the multilateral development banks.

The Changing Role of Supranational Bodies in 1980s

After the collapse of the Keynesian consensus, to manage capital accumulation became an international and supra-national rather than a national concern. To govern the international economy during this period and to remove the national barriers and to implement certain trade-liberalization, fragmentation of social and welfare rights, flexibility and deregulation of national economies, the supra-national actors gained weight in international circles to command the new economy in late 1970s²⁸ and early 1980s. The main supra-national bodies were the IMF with its stand-by agreements and World-Bank and its conditional adjustment loans. These policies aimed to shape national economies by emphasizing tight fiscal policy regime, privatization, financial growth and de-unionization of the labor classes. However, these bodies and their policies were also supported by national, civil and business organizations, technocrats and senior bureaucrats in many countries. According to this range of policies, the realm of market was deregulated, which meant the abolition of regulations that impede market entry or restrict competition, along with the establishment of the legal security for property rights both in international and national contexts. In this context, the business sector, state and supranational actors offered to lessen public spending to promote market efficiency, productivity and economic growth at cost of growing inequalities in given national units. Furthermore, these actors proposed certain tax reforms and the flattening of the tax curve in order to promote international investment at cost of the lowering of the real wages, withering social security and increasing informal sector development. By lowering the income tax rates on proportionally high tax brackets, which are typically above

²⁸ In some cases, what one would observe is early cases such as Chile and increasing liberalization of its economy after 1973, A. Pinochet led and US backed military coup against Marxist government of S. Allende (Harvey, 2005).

median income and raising the tax rates on the proportionally low tax brackets, which are typically below median income, these policies planned to achieve economic growth and investment.

As part of this market deregulation, the quantitative restrictions with low and uniform tariffs of national industries were abolished to achieve certain openness in the national economy to foreign direct investment. This process facilitated the development of flexible, piece-meal and atelier-type mode of production as opposed to factory-based and rigid “Fordist” production system of Keynesian era, (Amin, 1994; Jessop, 1995; Kiely, 1998; Macarov, 2003). This replacement, in turn, had devastating impact on the power of the trade-unions, whose power relied on formally-registered, unionized and skilled blue-collar workers, and caused them to lose their collective bargaining power against capitalists within the nation-state. Thus, the result was the creation of power imbalances among the classes within national units and nations in international contexts (Lipietz, 1994).

As part of the dissolution of nation-based economies, the finance, communications, production systems, industries and trade were re-organized along the lines of trade liberalization. In this new unrestricted economy, it is not that difficult to guess why the “international economy” was marked by increases in transportation and easier communications through computers and increasingly large trans-national corporate mergers. With the increasing time and space compression, economic activity could no longer considered solely within the bounds of even the largest of nation-states (Harvey, 1990; Hertz, 1981; Robbins, 1999). Consequently, where the economic activity could not be contained within the political entity of the nation-state, the Keynesian planning became impossible. More and more, transnational corporations informally stepped into the place of the nation-state and

came to dominate the world economy -- operating in dozens of countries, producing for a global capitalist marketplace (Hardt and Negri, 2001; Tormey, 2006). This process will later be called as globalization. This process or a set of processes, as Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, and Perraton argued (1999), brought “certain transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions- as in terms of their extensity, velocity and impact- generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction and the exercise of power” (p. 16). During this process, to rationalize and manage the social and political consequences of the given structural and global changes, a new, heterogeneous and eclectic political discourse has emerged. This is the discourse of neoliberalism.

The Rise of the Neoliberalism

Neoliberalism, as Barrados, Mayne and Wileman claimed (2000), from its rise to the current day, has been aimed to establish a cost-benefit balance in social policy expenditures and to achieve certain degree of ‘efficiency’ in accordance (p. 495) with neoliberal market rationality²⁹ in the terrain of public policy (Osborne and Geabler, 1992). This new discourse was also proposed and hosted by supranational policy actors and was implemented by nation-states to change the condition of the state-led poverty alleviation agencies and their earlier policies.³⁰ According to several social

²⁹ In my fieldwork, the best example of this is the diner organisation, with which Deniz Feneri Association bring the donors, the volunteers and the poor together. According to a manager, it is a success the expenses of the organisation will be covered by the donors (A Dept. Head, personal communication, August 24, 2007). Everything set apart, what makes this organisation successful is to make the expenses outsourced and make bridge between philanthropists and the poor. The discourse, which produce and legitimizes this outsourcing success is neoliberal market rationality with organisational concerns.

³⁰ As Thomas argued (2001), “this has provided an important legitimization for the business of private lenders and transnational corporations, whose vision and behavior in most cases are underpinned by these norms. The neoliberal ideology has thus come to be promoted around the globe as the proper approach to development. Neoliberalism supports global economic integration and presents it as the

scientists, these policy recommendations and financial objectives are the global retreat from the state and the expansion of the free-market over the social life and politics in the global contexts (Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Bourdieu, 1998a; 1998b; Harvey, 2003 and 2005; Esping Andersen, 1999). Although there are certain universal similarities in formations of the neoliberal around the globe; as Clark clearly demonstrated on the basis of his case-studies on neoliberal welfare reform packages in six capitalist countries, there is no single model of neoliberal restructuring of the social services and public policy. As he argued (2002),

There is no single model of public service reform associated with neoliberal ideological realignment. *In practice, diffusion and adoption of new reform doctrines has varied from one location to another, reflecting the different weightings attached by reformers to traditional and new public service values and the ways these are synthesized in administrative reform discourse* (p. 772, emphases added).

In this respect the local and national configurations of neoliberalism deliver different characteristics alongside its universal aspects. Although in the global level, with the rise of the neoliberalism what one sees is the revival or reinvention of the family and community based social service provision, the reorganization of public welfare according to corporate principles, civil-public and corporate partnerships, conditional welfare provision or welfare to work schemas, dissolution of centralized public welfare bodies and other innovative mechanisms, they have different weights in different contexts, and these activities headed by different actors. In the poor relief scene, to transform the poor into entrepreneurs and self-reliant citizens, much short-term, conditional, welfare to work strategies began to be implemented in the national

best, the most natural and the universal path towards economic growth and therefore toward development for all humanity. Critics, on the other hand, see its expansion across the globe as hegemonic. Global economic integration is to be promoted through the liberalization of trade, investment and finance that will ensue alongside the reform of national economies...These policy prescriptions of a growing number of global governance institutions form a blueprint which has been marketed with the powerful language of 'There is no alternative', or TINA" (p. 13).

level. These neoliberal restructurings, in turn, provided the nation-states to reduce or eliminate the budget deficit of the centralized national economy, to manage a reduced policy-spending and to introduce of market approaches³¹ to resource allocation and service provision in their welfare activities.

As David Harvey stated in his analysis of neoliberalism, Chilean coup³² in 1973 opened the door for Augusto Pinochet to implement the first national fiscal experiment of the neoliberalism. This experience was followed by Margaret Thatcher, as a result of democratic elections, in Great Britain in 1979 and Ronald Reagan in the U.S. in 1980. In the financial plain, the basic aim of these country-based neoliberal experiments was presented as to achieve economic growth, which was hindered by Keynesian planning, stagflation, taxation system and the Welfare state (Friedman, 1973; 1982; Nishiyama and Leube, 1984). However the consequences were unlikely to occur with respect to this expectation and the economic growth performance, in three of these countries, was very weak with respect to prior Keynesian era (Harvey, 2005).

In this thesis, it will be claimed that these two points, which are suggested by Harvey and Clark, enable researchers to give an account for neoliberalism as more

³¹ In this context, as Fay argued (1975) efficiency and growth became a criterion and goal, which was usually deployed in the market and economics by the neoclassical economists (p. 50) to evaluate the public poverty alleviation mechanisms and institutions.

³² In 1973, General Augusto Pinochet participated in a coup d'état that deposed the democratically-elected Marxist President Salvador Allende. In the aftermath of the coup, the military officers established a military government in Chile. The part and parcel of Chile's economic policy, during their reign, was to make Chile a country of proprietors rather than proletariats. To secure this ideal, a group of young Chilean economists, later will be called as Chicago Boys, who were heavily influenced by the ideas of Milton Friedman and his monetarist, supply-oriented and neoclassical views of economy (Friedman, 1960), introduced a series of economic reforms in Chile. As part of this early experiment in the history of neoliberalism, the Chilean market was regularized and state-owned industries were privatized. As part of this policy, the social security and pension system were commodified, and the tax on income was lowered to attract foreign investment. The social and political consequences of this experiment were devastating. Before the military coup, the rate of the unemployment was only 4.3% and in 1983, the rate of the unemployment had risen to 22%. Whilst in 1970, only the 20% of Chile's population lived in poverty, the poverty doubled to 40% in 1990s. Between 1982 and 1983, during the worldwide economic slump, the GDP dropped 19%, largely as a result of a downturn in the copper market and the real wages declined by more than 40% (Valdés, 1995).

than being a “financial policy prescription” to achieve economic growth, through flexibilisation of labor markets, flattening tax curve, to seize the social by market forces and to lessen public expenditures. By following Clark’s case-study and Harvey’s observations on Chile and the analysis of neoliberal governmentality, which was offered by a group of theorists (Barry, Osborne and Rose, 1996; Davis, 2007; Dean, 1994, 2002; Gordon et al, 1991; Lemke, 2001a, 2001b; Peterson, 1997; 1999; Inda, 2005 and Cruishank, 1996), in this thesis, I claim that the neoliberalism whilst promoting the reduction of public expenditures, applying certain free market-inspired methods on public policies and boosting the economic growth, it concurrently promotes the incorporation of several non-state and social actors in local and national contexts, as new actors of governing, to manage each and all aspect of the social life, which includes not only the market, but also the state, society, economy, family and the individual. Put otherwise, as a tangible anthropological reality and as a discourse to govern and conduct each and all aspect of the social life, the neoliberalism legitimizes itself through the rhetoric of economic growth, but its ultimate locus is not only the economy but the society, state, family and the governing activity itself, regardless of its economy-bounded expectations vis-à-vis its real outcomes.

In this context, the new unrestricted economy functioned as a model to re-structure the society and the state, and consequently the governing activity, regardless of its financial successes. In that sense, it is not wrong to argue that, this novel discourse offered new outlook for society, state and market relations and introduced a series of “solutions” for the social and political consequences of aforementioned global transformations, in line with its specific rationality of the state, society and the market. Then the basic question is how to perform the

governing activity and to establish a society in a world of growing inequalities and escalating poverty according to its rationalities of society, family, market and the state. To answer this question, it is suffice to quote from T. Lemke. As he argued on the neoliberal governing activity (2001a),

The neoliberal forms of government feature not only direct intervention by means of empowered and specialized state apparatuses, but also characteristically develop indirect techniques for leading and controlling individuals without at the same time being responsible for them. The strategy of rendering individual subjects 'responsible' (and also collectives, such as families, associations, etc.) entails shifting the responsibility for social risks such as illness, unemployment, poverty, etc., and for life in society into the domain for which the individual is responsible and transforming it into a problem of 'self-care' (p. 201).

As part of the productive alliance of the neoliberal between public and civil actors, what one observes is also the revival of the so-called 'pre-modern' protection systems and institutions³³ in the contemporary societies. Actually, this revival and appropriation, I also claim, indicates where the neoliberalism shifts its route from economics towards politics through the community, neighborhood, family and locality. And by doing so, neoliberalism creates its own allies and foes by opening certain channels for its allies as a space of self-representation in global and local contexts. Put otherwise, neoliberalism not only expanded the sphere of the market relations in a local unit, but also juxtaposed several "modern" and "traditional" and "global" and "local" actors and competing classes to govern and maintain the country and its population (Davis, 2007; Ferguson, 1994; 1995; Ong, 2000; 2003).

³³ The so-called pre-modern and traditional poverty alleviation formations were based on the links of gift-giving, community, neighborhood and parenthood (Mauss, 2002) and as Aarre noted (1998), they were hoped to disappear with urbanization, state-formation and modernization (p. 59). However, the "positive" and "innovative" aspect of the neoliberalism lays in its "appropriation", "re-introduction" and "re-invention" of these premodern, religious and traditional social institutions in poor relief and poverty alleviation regime of given local and national unit.

These developments, in turn, enabled these political actors to voice their political views, and conceptions of poverty and distinctions of poor and non-poor within the neoliberal discourse of poverty. Thus, the given social and political power not only answers the question of who are the poor but also re-draws the very hierarchical and power-ridden boundaries among the poor, non-poor, state and society around the globe and their relations with each other under neoliberalism. To put it in a nutshell, this power process regarding the poor answers what poverty and poverty alleviation is, who the deserving and undeserving poor are, and who and how should conduct the population and what should the relations between poor, the state and rest of the society is and should be under neoliberalism.

The Rise of the New Poverty and New Inequalities

The likely social consequence of the dissolution of Keynesian consensus and its commitment to full-employment, and the implementation of the growth oriented policies was escalating inequalities around the globe. According to UNCTAD data, the Gini Coefficient, which demonstrates the global income inequality, was 0.66 in 1965, 0.68 in 1980, 0.74 in 1990 (UNCTAD, 1997). In this new context, inequality and unemployment³⁴, which was once considered politically unacceptable for

Keynesian consensus, began to soar throughout the richest countries to levels last

³⁴ In this new context, the employment has not offered firm protection from the vicious circle of poverty for the employed masses in the labor market. On the contrary, with the development of post-Fordist/atelier type production units after the internationalization of labor markets, formal social security and protection mechanisms, social rights and pension systems of the Keynesian period eroded. And the Fordist system was replaced by much informal, piece-meal, short-term, market-oriented production regime, which provided no or heavily informal social security system for workers. This production regime was called as post-Fordism. There have been numerous differences between the Fordist and post-Fordist mode of production. Basically, in the Fordist mode, as a factory-based system, there was a single task performed by the worker, and payments were made on the basis of rate. Fordism demanded high degree of job specialisation and no-training was offered during the course of work. As Saka, in line with Jessop, argued (2001), “the break from Fordism to Post-fordism is a part of the larger “break with the Keynesian the Welfare state as domestic full employment is downplayed in favor of international competitiveness and redistributive the Welfare rights take second place to a productivist reordering of society” (p. 9).

seen in the Great Depression of the 1930s. Directly the opposite of neo-classical economics' expectations, a new poverty regime, combined with several political and social issues, emerged in international contexts. The characteristics of new regime were the transnational migration (Glick-Schiller et. al., 1995), gendered and racial labor regime (Ong, 2003; Trinh Vo, 2004), social exclusion (Moulaert, Swyngedouw, and Rodriguez; 2002; Byrne, 1999), flexible labor markets or post-fordism (Amin, 1994; Jessop, 1995), employed poor (Bhatt, 2006; Lipton, 2006) and the growth of the informal sector (Tabak, 2000), exclusionary social closure, marginalization and urban peripheralisation (Allen and Thomas, 2000; Keyder, 2000; Narayan, Patel, Schaff, Rademacher and Koch-Schulte, 1999; Wacquant, 2001).

As Bhalla and Lapeyre argued (2004), to map out the social terrain, which has instigated by the process of globalization and the dissolution of Keynesian consensus,

At the heart of the new social question is the return of mass social vulnerability, marked by a growing number of people trapped in precarious forms of work or permanently superfluous, irrelevant or a hindrance to the functioning of the global economy. *Social and spatial restructuring, precarious employment and unemployment are inherent to the dynamics of capitalist accumulation. In the future every nation will have to face the challenge of what to do with the millions of people whose labor is needed less or not at all and who lack social recognition in the emerging global economy.* The emerging global economy is characterized by strong tendencies towards a fragmentation of the social fabric and the occupational structure. The crucial issue then is how to ensure social cohesion in a fragmented society where a significant portion of the population is excluded in the name of economic efficiency and flexibility (p. 4, emphases added).

As the Keynesian consensus ebbed slowly, the power balance between the working classes and business sectors of the previous era were changed to the advantage of business sectors both financially and politically. The poor, who were the dangerous classes of the previous era, are then re-codified as the outcasts, vagabonds and

strangers due to their very individual failures to work (Bauman, 1999). This codification made them amenable subjects of the various neoliberal policies, which aimed to transform the poor into self-reliant entrepreneurs. As part of this neoliberal undertaking, in this new regime, the growth of poverty and particularly escalating rates of unemployment would no longer be considered as an unmet promise of the welfare state towards its legally entitled citizens. Rather, poverty becomes a form of “social pathology” and deviance from social norms, usually the norm to work. In addition, this social pathology has been also represented as it derives from psychological and individual failures to work (Appelbaum, 2001). These failures are also credited to several the welfare state applications such as unemployment insurances, protections and taxes (Marston, 2004). Quite literally, the “solution” of legalistic protection of the poor in the classical Keynesian political economy becomes a part of the “problem” in neoliberal understanding (Heald, 1983; Friedman, 1982; Pierson, 1994; Tanner, 1996; 2003). The neoliberal understandings, as these studies criticized or hailed, emphasize the removal of these the welfare-statist approaches as a means of restoring incentives for socially, culturally and morally appropriate individual behavior in a society. Accordingly, the most commonly cited individual and personal failures are the absences of a work-ethic, self-discipline, and demandable and appropriate work-skills. Hence, neoliberalism isolated poverty from the process of capital accumulation, inequality, social hierarchies and economic development and situate them in personal and family-based grounds (Lewis, 1998; Sallan-Gul, 2004). In this context, the neoliberalism places poverty as a matter of personal responsibility and introduced indirect techniques and mechanisms to create responsible and thus non-poor actors in society.

Since the poverty is framed as personal and social pathology, usually supported by the welfare state, a series of new actors and classes to “solve” the socially maladaptive and unacceptable traits of the poor were also called for an immediate action. As Weaver, Rock and Kusterer argued (1997), whilst the new agents were the civil society organizations, who gradually began to enjoy certain enhanced powers from 1970s onwards (pp. 209-10); as Clark noted (2004), the “old” ones were the traditional middle classes and business sectors, who had vested interests in promulgation of the neoliberal, dissolution of Keynesian consensus and flattening of tax-curves for financial, political and social reasons (p.31).

In this context, the civil society organizations have been one of the important actors in the production and implementation of neoliberal poor relief and poverty alleviation policies. Clearly, there are other factors, which trigger the development of the civil society and civil poor relief organizations. As Robbins argued (2004),

Communications advances, especially the Internet, have helped create new global communities and bonds between like-minded people across state boundaries. Increased resources, growing professionalism and more employment opportunities in NGOs and the media’s ability to inform more people about global problems lead to increased awareness where the public may demand that their governments take action of some kind (pp. 128- 129).

The entrance of the Turkish economy into this global flow of ebbing Keynesian consensus, dissolution of nation-state based planned economy and neoliberal alignment began in the early 1980s with the military coup d’etat and was concluded in 1989-90. Although the development of the civil society coincides much later, due to the authoritarian nature of military government in the first half of the 1980s and relatively freer public life in the second half of the 1980s in regard to the first half (Gurbilek, 1992), this entrance stipulated and paved the way of new poverty

structures in Turkey. According to Kazgan (1999), before 1980s, the signs of the decline in the pro-nationalistic Import Substituting Industrialization³⁵ (ISI) “were already visible from the price inflation rates, which rose from 25% in 1977 to 52.6% in 1978 and reaching a peak point of 63.9% in 1979” (p. 133). Thus, as Boratav pointed out (1991), until the 1970s the Turkish state’s populist policies concerning the ISI politics and protectionist-populist policies of the Turkish state were not on the top of the Turkish industrialists’ list of complaints.

Since with these policies, were intended by the Turkish state to develop of import-substitution industries, the Turkish business sector and capitalists perceived the subsidies and protectionism, of the Keynesian consensus, as the necessary price for their own interests in Turkey. Nevertheless, the further integration of the Turkish economy with the global economy in the 1980s promoted the abandonment of these economic and social measures in favor of new governing elites’ vested interests in liberalization and internationalization of the Turkish economy. As part of this massive tide, there has been the flexibilisation of the Turkish labor markets, de-unionization of the blue-collar workers and restructuring and redefinition of the Turkish state’s already weak role in the welfare provision of its citizens, along the lines imposed by global capitalism and supranational institutions, especially the IMF. In the following section of this chapter, the national and local specificities of the Turkish case and likely social consequences of these national and local specificities in Turkey will be explored.

³⁵ Import Substituting Industrialization (also called ISI) is an economic policy to achieve development. As Lee and Naya argued (1988), this model of economic development “substitutes finished products, which are imported, with locally produced ones. To achieve development, a set of measures were implemented in national unit. Basically, these measures included active industrial policy to subsidize and orchestrate production of strategic substitutes, a monetary policy that keeps the domestic currency undervalued and protective barriers to trade (e.g. tariffs)” (pp.130-55).

National and Local Developments in Turkey

In this section of this chapter, specific national and local developments as they contributed to the multiplication of civil actors in poverty alleviation in Turkey during late 1990s will be introduced. These developments are the dissolution of the already weak Keynesian consensus in Turkey and thus emergence of the new poverty structures in Turkey in 1980s (Aydin, 2005; Bugra and Keyder, 2003), the rise of the Islamism from late 1970s onwards vis-à-vis waning power of leftist populism in Turkish society (Aydin, 2005; Gulalp, 1999; 2001; 2003; Onis, 1997), the Marmara Earthquake in 1999 (Jalali, 2002; Kale, 2001; Ipek, 2006), and the 2002 General Elections and the election of Justice and Development Party (Cinar, 2005, Heper and Toktas, 2003).

These financial and political factors, alongside the global ones, I claim that, contributed to the emergence of the Deniz Feneri Association as a reliable actor in the poverty alleviation field. Furthermore, these developments also shaped the discourses of the Deniz Feneri Association about poverty and the poor as well as state and society relations in Turkey. This peculiar delineation, thus, will enable me to understand the historical and national dynamics behind the emergence of the Deniz Feneri Association as a civil actor, and its peculiar politics of the poor and the poverty from 1996 to 2006.

The 1980 Coup D'état and the Motherland Party

Before the late 1970s, Keynesian policies of the Turkish state about the agricultural crop prices and pro-nationalistic Import Substituting Industrialization (ISI) model

were considered as beneficial for the interests of both Turkish capitalists and working classes. Actually, the applications of the ISI enabled the states to discipline capitalists and laborers to generate national prosperity and balanced growth in nation-states until the early 1970s and prevented them to unbalance the national political system for their own class interests. Turkish state, especially in its 1961 constitution, idealized this cooperation among unionized factory workers, big business sector and the state itself. However, the system was suffering from a financial impasse, increasing labor militancy, high inflation rates and boosting political instability in the early 1970s. Thus, whilst the ISI system was based on national regulation of economies, it had certain political aspects such as middling of the class identities within Turkey. However, as Yalpat suggested (1984), the political result of the financial instability from the early 1970s to 1980 was the “shattering of the idealized cooperation among Turkish state, unionized labor class and business sectors and political violence” (p. 18).

On 12th, September 1980, Turkish military took over political power due to the political violence between far-right and left, high inflation and the financial impasse, which swept Turkish economy in the late 1970s (Keyder, 2004). The priority of the military takeover was to reestablish the state power, to reaffirm the central role of the Turkish army in Turkish politics and political system and to transcend financial impasses of the already dissipating ISI system (Zurcher, 1997). In the aftermath of the coup, the trade unions were disbanded and any kind of political party and association was abolished and all the political power was concentrated in the hands of National Security Council (NSC). To restore the state power, Mousseau argued that (2006),

The organizational and political activity based on ethnicity and class was also banned, and academicians, students and civil society organizations were prohibited from engaging in political activity. The state also garnered an increased control over education and school curriculums, placing more emphasis on collectivity and the nation. State Security Courts were instituted to try cases related to the security of the state, including threats posed from ethnic nationalism (the Kurdish issue), the extreme left, religious fundamentalism, and others. The role of the military in politics was further strengthened with the National Security Council giving regular opinion and advice to the government, particularly on national security issues (pp. 306-307).

The NSC continued to liberalize the financial system in line with previous stand-by agreements with IMF and the authoritarian leanings of the Turkish state also garnered with the liberal financial applications of the state, in line with IMF's stand-by agreements³⁶. As part of the restructuring policy in Turkish economy under rule of NSC, on 24th January 1980, a new package of economic and social policies was introduced by the military government. This package of policies, as Aydin points out (2005), aimed to establish

Turkish free market and to cut the expenditures of the state by privatizing State Economic Enterprises in healthcare, education, social service provision and agricultural subsidiary takings and adjust Turkish economy to the flows of global market. To achieve the transition of private and state-led industries from import-substitute and inward-oriented economy to export-oriented and open economy, state-led sectors were increasingly privatized. Within this framework, since 1980s, finance capital has become independent from investment capital...This is indicative of a new mode of capital accumulation in which the dominant power becomes the power of money-holders and lenders. The new mode of accumulation is not production centered (p. 106).

³⁶ The stand by agreements of IMF (2003) consist of fiscal policy discipline, redirection of public spending from indiscriminate and regressive subsidies especially for primary education, healthcare and rural subsidies, tax reform, trade liberalization, which commands liberalization of imports and inward foreign direct investment, with particular emphasis on elimination of quantitative restrictions; privatization of state enterprises; deregulation, abolition of regulations that impede market entry or restrict competition, except for those justified on safety, environmental and consumer protection grounds, and prudent oversight of financial institutions and, legal security for property rights (p. 267).

In the 1983 elections, which did not take place in a free and competitive setting³⁷, NSC authority was replaced by the election of liberal-conservative Motherland Party. This party continued to implement liberal trade policies, which was based on freezing of wages, an important decrease of the public sector, a deflationary policy, and several successive mini-devaluations (Kalaycioglu, 2002). Politically, the party was situated in the central-right of political spectrum in Turkish politics. In the political lexis, the party's conservative discourse was largely relying on the "unification" of several political and social discourses in Turkish society. These discourses were "conservatism", "nationalism" and "Sunnite Islam" and "financial liberalism". In general, in the Motherland Party, the discursive conflicts among market modernism, liberalism and Sunnite-Islam (Gole, 1996a) after the authoritarian coup were prevented by the charismatic leadership style of the party leader T. Ozal. Another facilitating factor of the Motherland Party's consolidation of power in Turkish politics was the presence of less-organized democratic dissent in the first half of the 1980s. Especially, the banning of the old political parties from politics by the military chiefs enabled the Motherland Party to establish itself as a sole option in Turkish politics for a short period of time. Generally, the Motherland Party represented itself as a unifying force over Turkish politics and thus a remedy for the violent struggles between far-right and left of the political spectrum before the 1980 military takeover. During the 1980s, the party used a discourse of fratricide³⁸ to

³⁷ In the 1983 elections, many political leaders of the pre-coup era had been banned from politics, and all the new parties needed to get the approval of the NSC in order to participate in the elections. Only three parties, two of which were actually created by the ruling military regime were permitted to contest. Among these parties, the Motherland Party, which was not established by the military chiefs in command, came to power in 1983.

³⁸ Fratricide has a distinctive position in the anthropology of violence and state. Since the nation has been imagined as a community or the brotherhood (Anderson, 1991) of the middle class actors (Chatterjee, 1993) and their very hegemony over the rest of the society in Third World, the fratricide refers to a deep division, usually because of the political, ethnic, religious and class-based conflicts among the members of this imagined community or brotherhood. Usually, the accompanying meanings to the political violence and terror re-construct the boundaries between insiders and

refer to and social and political conflicts of the pre-1980 period to legitimize its own financial and political agenda.

In class-terms, the power of the Motherland Party was relying on the main pillar or broadly speaking middle class³⁹ or *orta direk*, which literally means the mainmast, of the Turkish society. This class position cover vast array of professions and subject positions and also body of aspirations, interests and discourses which go beyond the narrow considerations of the economy. Additionally, a prominent business organization, TUSIAD⁴⁰, which represent the financial and political interests of the traditional bourgeoisie and upper middle classes, openly supported the financial and political applications of the Motherland Party during these years. However, it was not only the Turkish upper middle classes, which supported the Motherland Party during this period. The party also gained popular support from the urban poor and urban migrants with its clientalistic electoral politics during the municipal and general elections. Among those clientalistic politics, the prominent

outsiders, purity and danger, in and out and we and others as many anthropological studies pointed out (Feldman, 1991; Malkki, 1995). Thus, in the case of the NSC government and subsequent Motherland Party governments, this discourse of fratricide was used to legitimize the authoritarian practices of both NSC and Motherland Party governments by revoking certain image of the past. By doing so, the state was able to re-draw boundaries between “we” and “others” and “traitor” and “loyal” subjects after the 1980-coup period and regulate the Turkish society according to these lines.

³⁹ Middle classes, as Davis noted (2004), compose of “salaried employees in commerce, services, industry, and the professions, as well as those employed by the state; self-employed artisans, craftsmen, and other independent rural and urban-based producers, who in developing countries are frequently called petty commodity producers (or yeomen farmers in the rural sector); and owners and operators of small enterprises, including family firms, in service, industry, and agriculture” (pp.1-2) Politically, middle classes have elective affinities both with capital and labor (Wright, 1996). This double-affinity enables them to represent their own ethnic, political and financial interests as the “beneficial” and “inclusive” for all members of the nation. As much as this hegemony is achieved, middle classes guarantee certain national cohesion within national unit around their discourses by means of media, literature, education, economy and healthcare (Chatterjee, 1993).

In the context of the Deniz Feneri Association, the association’s elective affinity with the poor, through the solidarity, and middle classes, enables it to represent its policies as beneficial for the poor and apparatus of the philanthropists. The political consequences of this dual elective affinity will be analyzed in CHAPTER III, IV and V of this thesis.

⁴⁰ TUSIAD is a powerful civil association, which is composed of businessmen, traders and industrialists. Usually it represents the interests of the big bourgeoisies in Turkish society. In addition, apart from these interests, as Bugra claimed (1998), the association usually supported the democratization of the country, de-militarization of the regime, peaceful resolution of Kurdish question and consolidation of democracy (p. 536). In this respect, the class-interests and politics of the TUSIAD, as Bugra rightly points out, are clearly pertained with wider socio-political processes in Turkey; therefore requires much nuanced and ethnographic/historical research

tactics were successive legalization of shanty-towns in metropolitan areas, where the informal housing market functioned as a novel class mobilization network, and informal labor market networks, through hometown associations (Bugra and Keyder, 2006; Erder, 1996). During these years, as part of the party's liberal agenda, the decentralization of the distribution of the public aid and assistance from state to local governance structures⁴¹ also deepened and altered the structure and form of this clientalistic and nepotistic solidarity networks in Turkey (Sallan-Gul, 1999). In this period, the municipalities, as part of the local governance structures in Turkey, supported informal housing development to recruit potential voters; and provided the shanty-town dwellers' an access to the locally distributed aid and assistance, provided by the Turkish state and distributed by the municipalities.

The Motherland Party gained short-lived yet broad support from small and middle-size enterprises, which have been excluded from the networks of ISI model's privileged traditional entrepreneurs. Due to the inability of the Motherland Party to address these each of these parties' needs and all political interests in the early 1990s, in the following period the interests of these small and middle-sized enterprises were represented by the Islamist political parties in the political arena. However, it is not wrong to argue that the Motherland Party achieved a broad but short-lived hegemony over the conflicting interests of different segments of the Turkish society in the first and second half of the 1980s. As Onis argued (2004),

⁴¹ As Bilen argued (2006), in Turkey, "in the local level, there are three administrative levels; province, county and town. Provinces and counties have a two-tier governance system. Local governors appointed by central government as the first tier. The second tier is comprised of the chairmen of municipalities and municipal councils voted in at local elections for a five-year period. Local councils and chairmen are responsible for physical planning, infrastructure and, to some extent, economic and social development with collaboration with the agents of central departments operating under the provincial governor. As far as local public services are concerned, ministries having branches or representatives at the provincial level (and, in some cases, at the regional level) have carried out independently on the basis of their own schedule and budget" (pp. 4-5).

Ozal's project of popular capitalism through such measures as mass housing projects, sale of revenue sharing certificates and high interests for the savings of small investors managed to incorporate with considerable success middle strata of the Turkish public as key stakeholders in a Thatcher-style project of popular capitalism. It was much more than simply generating a broad-based political coalition to secure Motherland Party's electoral success. It was part of a broader project implemented with missionary zeal to transform the Turkish economy and the Turkish society at large in the mould of what he believed to be a genuinely capitalistic economy and society, overcoming its strong etatist reflexes in the process (pp. 10-11).

To achieve economic growth in a state-backed export-oriented regime, the party promoted the freezing of wages, flattening of tax-curves and the privatization of the Public Enterprises, which had already been long-debated. The typical result of this export-oriented financial regime, which aimed to reduce the production costs to attract foreign investment, was the development of the informal sector and informal production activity in Turkey. Informal sector laborers lack formal security and unionization rights. It was also observed that, their social security rights have been also delivered on the basis of informal, gendered and personal workplace relations in Turkey (White, 1994). The Motherland Party legitimized its promotion of the export-oriented production regime as it will achieve economic growth and create the new channels of upward class mobility for some in Turkish society. In the financial plain, the financial policies of the Motherland Party had devastating effects on the working and lower classes. And as a result, this set of measures put working classes into downward class mobility spiral under a semi-authoritarian regime in 1980s, which drew opposition from weakened trade unions and these political groups, mentioned above. This downward class mobility was characterized by sub-national and national political, ethnic, regional and financial inequalities and disparities in Turkey.

Due to the growing ethnic tension with Kurdish nationalists and Kurdish minority, and widespread dissent among the urban and rural poor against

liberalization programs of the successive Motherland Party governments, during the latter 1980s the popular vote of Motherland Party drastically fell. As oppose to the expectations from the applied fiscal policy, the economic discrepancy rose between different sectors of the society and poverty was widespread. And especially the left-wing trade unions⁴², Kurdish nationalists, socialists and Islamists found themselves in opposition to the liberal-conservative agenda of the Motherland Party. During the 1980s, these political groups and unions' peculiar discourses were largely shaped by their very opposition to financial liberalism of the Motherland Party, authoritarian leanings of the Turkish state in post-coup period in Turkey. As a result of the widespread unrest against the Motherland Party's financial policies and repressive measures against the Kurds, an 'unlikely' political reaction took place in Turkey (Toprak, 1986; 1993). This is the rise of the Islamism in Turkey in 1980s and 1990s.

The Rise and Transformation of Islamism in Turkey

The major political consequence of the financial applications of the Motherland Party was the rise of the Islamist Welfare Party⁴³ with its social-democratic and populist

⁴² In larger political climate of the 1980s, the Motherland Party's repressive measures against the trade-unions were not peculiar to Turkey. A similar attitude and discourse toward trade unions was also adopted by the Conservative governments, of M. Thatcher in the UK during 1980s. Alongside its liberal credentials, the authoritarian leanings of the Thatcher-led conservative governments were studied by many social scientists (Evans, 2004; Ironside and Seifart, 2000; Gamble, 1994). Actually it was Stuart Hall in the early 1980s, who pointed out this "paradox" in Thatcher's both state-centrist and authoritarian and liberal discourse. Later, his ideas were apprehended by British school of governmentality, whose theorists treat liberalism of Thatcher as a mode of governing the British society through multiple authorities and government beyond center. As Hall argued on this aspect of conservative government of M. Thatcher (Hall, quoted from Miller, Osborne and Rose, 1996), Thatcher's government was "simultaneously dismantling the Welfare State, "anti-statist" in its ideological representation, and highly State-centralist and dirigiste in many of its strategic operations" (p. 11). In my discussion of the Deniz Feneri Association, this aspect of the neoliberalism played a pivotal role to understand the governmental rationality of Justice and Development Party government and neoliberal governmentalisation of the Turkish society in the late 1990s.

⁴³ The specificity of the Welfare Party was its combination of anti-Westernism, traditionalism, Islamism and heavy-industry oriented economic program. This economic program was a reminiscent of the earlier Keynesian period to attract urban workers' votes in urban areas and industrial towns.

agenda, usually voiced through a fundamentalist- Islamist lexicon to solve the problems of capitalist and liberal restructuring in the 1980s (Bugra, 2002a; Gulalp, 1998). During the 1980s the discourse of the Welfare Party, “the Just Order”, was shaped by its dissent against financial impasses of the ISI politics, the dissolution of the Keynesian consensus, the political and authoritarian applications of the NSC government, the liberalization programs of the successive Motherland Party governments, the corrupt, clientalistic and nepotistic electoral politics, and intrinsic Islamist dissent against the Kemalist modernization project in Turkey. To make the discourse of the Just Order more acceptable to more groups, the Welfare Party articulated a social-democratic and populist agenda to larger masses of de-unionized workers, repressed Kurdish minority of the Turkish Republic, Anatolian petty-bourgeoisie, urban poor and intimidated Muslim communities under the loose hegemony of Islamism⁴⁴ (Onis, 1997). In this regard, the political history of the

Thus, with the help of this heterogeneous discourse the Islamist party attracted large masses, especially lower and working classes, urban poor, new-urban dwellers, who came to the cities in late 1970s for better social opportunities and rural middle classes, whose class-interests were not represented by central left and right parties of the electoral system. The party strategically deployed this multi-faceted support base to pursue its own traditionalist, Islamist and anti-westernist political discourse and achieved certain level of hegemony over its electorates. The economic program of the party was usually shaped by the failure of neoliberal trade-liberalization policies of the 1980s and 1990s and their social consequences. During this period, the party with the slogan of “just order” benefited from the political failure of mainstream and central right Motherland Party’s failure to address the political disappointment of the workers’, poor’, and rural notables with its neoliberal outlook. Basically, during this period Motherland Party’s neoliberal policies whilst promoting the establishment of new middle classes in Turkey (Narli, 1999), the same policies, causally, impoverished the urban poor, small scale industrialists, workers and migrants in urban and rural areas during 1980s. This process enabled the Welfare Party to establish itself as a prominent actor in formal politics of Turkey in 1980s and 1990s. The political outlook of the Welfare Party and its “characteristic” of being the voice of the unrepresented religious and oppressed masses in Turkey had undergone drastic changes (Heper and Toktas, 2003; Sakallioglu, 1996). The Islamist parties in Turkey eventually adopted more financially liberal outlook and claimed middle class ground, usually occupied by traditional elites of Republic (White, 2002; Navaro-Yashin, 2002). The political odyssey of the Islamist parties culminated in Justice and Development Party, which was established by younger dissidents within the Welfare and then Virtue parties in 2002. This new party embraced a quintessentially neoliberal agenda, as it was delineated in CHAPTER II of this thesis.

⁴⁴ Historically, under the rule of charismatic leader of National Order Party (1970-71) and then National Salvation Party (1972-1980) in 1970s and The Welfare Party between 1984 and 1998, the political power of the Islamist parties in Turkish politics has steadily increased. Although the Islamist dissent has haunted the Kemalist Republican project from 1923 to the present, the emergent power of the Islamist politics has benefited from the financial impasses of ISI politics, political and authoritarian applications of NSC government, right-wing parties’ clientalistic electoral politics and

development of the Islamist discourse in Turkey was largely shaped by its peculiar responses towards global, financial and political processes and their impoverishing consequences over the large masses in Turkey. In the larger plan, as Keyder rightly pointed out (2004), the consolidation of the Islamist actors in Turkey was actually largely depended on the electoral politics of the political parties from 1950s onwards and American Cold War period foreign policy of to encourage Islamism against the socialist-populist movement in particular countries such as Afghanistan and Turkey (p. 69).

Although to annex the development of the Islamist discourse to the external developments means to undermine its debilitating role in Turkish politics; this analysis bears a certain degree of truth. In the aftermath of the coup, i.e., the NSC government saw the strategy to recruit the power of Islamists against Turkish socialists and militant labor power as a promising strategy. Nevertheless, this strategy had also overlooked political consequences, especially when it was combined with the growing dissent against financial liberalization, increasing Kurdish militancy and liberalization policies. As Tugal argued (2007), this dynamic engagement between Islamists and the state during the 1980–83 military dictatorship

the Turkish regime likewise took some steps towards implementing Islamist demands, while defusing their insurgent potential. Yet while these changes were intended to consolidate rather than undermine secularization, they nevertheless opened the way to further conflict, as they increased the weight of religious sectors in a nation that defined itself as secular. At the same time, the structural reforms initiated under the dictatorship served to increase the income disparities and social dislocation to which radical Islamism appeared an answer (pp. 11-12).

As Dagi argued on this broad hegemony of Islamic politics in Turkey (2002),

top-to down authoritarian Kemalist modernization project in Turkey. In this case, as Gulalp rightly points out, as oppose to modernist expectations, the Islamist party in 1980s pursued a populist agenda, and thus was able to fulfill the political vacuum, created by absence of clear and appealing social-democratic agenda of elitist Social Democrat Populist Party (Gulalp, 1995).

Apart from economic and social circumstances in favor of the Welfare Party, the party leadership also tried to transform the Welfare Party from an ideological outlook into a mass political movement in 1990s in order to widen its support base. Yet the party was careful not to lose its traditionalist character and discourse. In fact it proved to be a vehicle through which traditionalist forces claimed not only a political voice but also an economic share in the growing Turkish economy in which the state traditionally performed a redistribute role. This was true especially for urban poor and traditionalist bourgeois, the groups that emerged as the support base of the Welfare Party. The party's effective use of the party slogan "Just Order" was appealing for the poor of urban periphery and the middle class who were fed up with corruption in the system. One should notice that "just order" did not only refer to a 'divine' order but also a redistribution of the wealth. As such it was a perfectly designed political language cutting cross various social and economic segments (p. 16).

During the 1980s the discourses of Islamism inclined to more populist agenda, and emerged as a powerful opposition against to the Turkish state. There were also other factors, which involve the consolidation of the Islamist politics in Turkey.

Especially, the continuing power of the "traditional" communal and religious groups and orders such as Nurculuk and Naqshibanddiye among the laypeople and the lower and middle classes of Anatolian towns and cities were the prominent one among these factors (Yavuz, 2000). These Anatolian petty-bourgeoisie and small and middle sized enterprises began to support Islamist parties in Turkey from mid-1980s onwards. These conservative/religious financial actors⁴⁵, as Acikel rightly pointed out, composed of financially alienated traders, industrialists and business sectors from the Import Substitute Industrialization model of the previous era (Acikel, 1996). However, as Bora and Erdogan, argued their rhetoric of meekness cannot be solely subscribed to the organization of capitalism and the ISI politics in Turkey. The

⁴⁵ These middle classes constituted the financial backbone of the Justice and Development Party in the following years. Especially in the Deniz Feneri Association, it was observed that there is a "positive" belief that that Justice and Development Party will expand the boundaries of this middle class position. This, in turn, in the discourse of the association would strengthen the Turkish family against financial impasses and crises.

Kemalist modernization project itself instigated the necessary cultural and symbolic lexicon to articulate this sense of subalterity (Bora and Erdogan, 2003). These estranged groups and peripheral bourgeoisie classes also supported the Justice and Development Party, an off-shoot, neoliberal-conservative and younger generation Islamists' party, in the 2002 and 2007 General Elections General Elections.

In the question of Islamism, another facilitating factor was the formation of a stratum of the organic intellectuals⁴⁶ among the Islamists (Aktay, 1993; 1997; Cakir, 1990, Meeker, 1991; Sakallioglu, 1996). Especially the translation of the works of several Islamist thinkers was effective on the creation of intellectuals and the self-representation of the Islamists. The works of these intellectuals and their organic relations with the Islamist community played a pivotal role for the recruitment and conversion of the university students and their families to the rosters of the Islamist movements in later years. Thus, as many social scientists have argued, during the 1980s there was a particular counter-hegemony⁴⁷ of the Islamist politics over the disparate segments of the Turkish society.

⁴⁶ In *Prison Notebooks*, Gramsci defines intellectuals not as individual men, rather as a collective group in relation with the dominated classes. The intellectual stratum of the dominant classes is called as traditional intellectuals, and they were culminated in the Catholicism for Gramsci. On the other hand, working classes and dominated classes have their own organically aligned intellectuals. These intellectuals are called as organic intellectuals, whose function is to direct and organize, conduct the popular consciousness, common sense and popular beliefs among working classes and form its *selbstaufhebung* towards an incumbent working class revolution (Gramsci, 1971; Crehan, 2006).

⁴⁷ This hegemony has mostly been based on face to face and everyday interaction with the potential voters. These interactions covered provision of shelter, food and employment through network-based interactions and development of particular discourses, which aim to address each groups' social and financial problems, in turn, gave the party a populist-Islamist outlook. This combination of informal and formal relations under the hegemony of the Welfare Party was also crucial to understand particular reformation and re-articulation of existing social welfare provision activities of "traditional" charities and foundations, civil society organizations and political parties and their particular political organs in the post-1980 period. Although patron-client type relations cannot be subscribed solely to Islamist politics, rather as Erder and Aktay demonstrated these relations were parts and parcels of the official politics in Turkey's urban areas (especially at the municipal and local level), especially relations among the poor, formal state and party officials (Erder, 1996; Aktay, 2001). In that sense, the Welfare Party by re-articulating existing crony based relations and contributing new discursive elements during 1990s, achieved certain hegemony over the urban poor as well as other political and economic groups.

The Welfare Party continued its gridlock role in Turkish political system during the 1990s. Nevertheless class pressures began to alter the discourse of the ‘Just Order’ of the Welfare Party. Especially the conflicting class interests of the urban poor, of whom the Welfare Party appealed to through its pro-labor and pro-poor rhetoric in 1991, and the small and medium sized enterprises, which financially supported the Welfare Party from mid-1980s, caused strong shift in the discourse of the party. In 1994, the party began to put down its pro-labor orientation and moved forward to appeal small and middle sized enterprises, and their civil business organization, MUSIAD⁴⁸, with its pro-private sector and capitalistic orientation (Tugal, 2007).

Despite these class-based tensions and shifts in the Islamist discourse, in the 1994 municipal level elections the Welfare party gained popular support in the metropolitan cities of Turkey and continued to enjoy the support from lower and peripheral middle classes of Turkey. The success of the Welfare Party to achieve this lower class support was usually credited to the Welfare Party’s members and supporters’ astute ability to solve the financial and social problems of the poor, especially the urban poor. With their broad network of aid and assistance provision and municipal level politics, the Welfare Party supporters were usually represented as the recruiters to their ideological rosters in mainstream media. Although this was popularized in mainstream media as the exploitation of the needs of the poor by the Islamist party to gain electoral and ideological support, this process was result of the

⁴⁸ MUSIAD was established in 1990 by a group of businessmen, traders and small and medium sized enterprise owners. Geographically, it had offices all around Turkey. MUSIAD takes the modal of East-Asian model of economic development, where East-Asian capitalist states actively involve in regulating the economic market with pro-business regulations. Flexibilisation of the labor markets, flattening of the tax-curve, decreasing production expenditures and de-unionization of the workers are among those regulations. The association backed the Islamist Welfare Party throughout 1990s. Although, the association represents itself as the representative of the largely undermined Anatolian capital and investors by the former ISI model, with the dissolution of ISI model and Keynesian consensus the association began to occupy more middle class position (Bugra, 1998).

larger local level organization of the social service provision in Turkey through the municipalities.

As part of this political hegemony over disparate ideological and political segments of the society, in 1996 parliamentary elections the Welfare Party won 23% of the total vote. In this process, in 1997, after its first year in power, as part of the escalating tension with the army-led, secularist and Kemalist political and social groups, The Welfare Party had to resign from the government as part of the February 28 Process⁴⁹. This political process had as one of its goals the “cleansing” off the Islamists from public space (Yavuz, 2000). During this process, Islamist civil society organizations and political organizations faced criticisms and allegations on the ground of making discrimination on the basis of religion, abusing people’s trust and donations and distributing municipal and donated funds on the basis of crony-ridden and nepotistic relations to the potential or actual supporters of the party. As part of the February 28 Process, the Welfare Party government resigned from the government and several short-lived coalition governments were established.

The February 28 Process, and its aftermath is essential to understand the motivations for the current poor relief and aid management structure of the Deniz Feneri Association. As part of its decision to forestall similar allegations, the Deniz Feneri Association developed a special registration system and had independent audit reports; however the association continued to be at the centre of controversy in the recent period. Whilst this thesis was written, the connection of the Deniz Feneri Association with Germany-based the Deniz Feneri e.V. and the Channel 7 International attracted great media controversy (Akkoc, 2007; Alman polisinden

⁴⁹ The effect of the February 28 Process on the Deniz Feneri Association will be delineated in CHAPTER III of this thesis. This process is crucial to understand the discourse of the Deniz Feneri Association and other Islamist civil and financial actors, since it forced them to establish audit cultures in their organizations to secure their public appeal.

Kanal 7 INT'e baskın; 2007; Türk derneğine büyük gözet, 2007). This Germany based civil poor relief organization, which donated aid-in cash to the Deniz Feneri Association in Turkey and the controversy, it caused and its effects on the association will be delineated in Chapter V of this thesis.

The major event, which followed February 28 Process against Islamist actors in Turkish society, was the 1999 Marmara Earthquake. Turkish state largely failed to respond the crisis situation and to deliver even basic supplies in earth-quake struck regions. However, as a tragic event the 1999 Marmara Earthquake was also used to turn potential critics of the state into allies of the Turkish state at the price of establishing hegemony of civil the welfare provision organizations (Ipek, 2006) within Turkish civil society.

In this vein, the 1999 Marmara Earthquake made the participation of the civil poor relief organization in Turkey far more respected than traditional state actors. Civil organisations were also to go on to govern the country and thus assist the state to conduct social problems. These organizations were usually supported by the public, media, middle and big businesses, and the state itself. Among those organizations, CYDD (Association for Support of the Modern Life), TEGV (Turkish Educational Volunteers) and the Deniz Feneri Association have been the prominent ones. This event also created several political channels through which Islamist civil organizations and actors to battle for their legitimacy in state, civil society, media and business circles in the aftermath of the February 28 Process.

In the aftermath of the 1999 Marmara Earthquake, Turkish economy went into a cyclical recession and Turkey began to experience a new financial crisis. Actually, during the 1990s, as part of the structural adjustment policies of the IMF and economic growth oriented policies, Turkish economy showed signs of the

recession. The perceived inability of growth oriented policies to bring stabilization, reduce high inflation rates, and manage debt servicing (Aydin, 2005) led to increasing deprivation among the lowest strata of the society in the second half of 1990s. In addition, the increasing Kurdish migration from east Anatolia to west metropolitan areas contributed this new poverty regime an ethnic dimension. Since Kurdish people has no official room to represent their own interests and concerns in the Turkish political system on the basis of their ethnic identity (Olson, 1991; Vali, 2005), the growing poverty and its causes among the migrant Kurdish population in the urban metropolitan areas of Turkey in the 1990s were not also addressed by the Turkish state and public institutions.

The Justice and Development Party

In 2001, the Islamist Felicity Party, which was a predecessor of the Welfare and Virtue Parties, also underwent a significant change. Due to the already apparent signs of tension within the membership of the Felicity Party the younger generations within the Islamist Felicity Party, which were headed by R. Tayyip Erdogan and his aides, established the Justice and Development Party (JDP). This new party concentrated on stabilization of the economy, management of the financial crises and their outcomes. By doing this party aimed to achieve certain hegemony over “disparate” social groups, such as urban poor, big business, Kurdish minority, media, Islamists, conservatives and liberals due to financial crises and authoritarian leanings of the state.

In 2002, the JDP won the general elections in Turkey. The JDP won 363 of 550 seats in the parliament with 34.2% of the votes. Of the 17 other parties

competing in the elections, only the Republican People's Party (RPP) passed the 10% threshold and gained 178 seats in the parliament with 19.4% of the votes (Cinar, 2006; Onis 2004). In this context, the JDP unlike its antecedents the Welfare and Virtue Parties rather than following identity-based politics [of Islamism] focused particularly on economy, financial liberalization and economic stabilization. With this political agenda, the JDP enjoyed certain hegemony over the broad scope of voters as a party, which is committed to the EU-agenda, and it initiated a series of reforms in Turkish national context, in order to meet conditionalities set by the EU. Among those reforms the New Law of Associations was one of the primary ones as well as the most relevant reform for our purposes here. This law, entered into force in 2004, includes several items such as:

Associations are no longer required to obtain prior authorization for foreign funding, partnerships or activities (although a provision in the Civil Code still requires foreign organizations to obtain prior authorization of their activities in Turkey and with Turkish partners). Associations are no longer required to inform local government officials of the day/time/location of general assembly meetings and no longer required to invite a government official to conduct or to supervise general assembly meetings. Officials conducting audits must provide 24-hour advance notice and just cause in the case of random audits. NGOs are permitted to open representative offices for federations and confederations internationally.... Internal audit standards (i.e. within associations) have been increased to ensure accountability of members and management. Associations will be able to form temporary platforms/initiatives to pursue common objectives. Government agencies and departments will be able to fund up to 50% of joint projects with associations. Associations will be allowed to buy and sell necessary immovable assets without prior authorization (Bikmen, 2004).

This law perpetuated the existing civil society structures of Turkey and contributed their transformation to the recognizable partners for supranational and national bodies to achieve social cohesion and development. Although the civil society organizations were seen as a necessary component following the 1999 Marmara

Earthquake, the specific neoliberal outlook of the JDP on civil society ensures that government promotes the role of the non-state agencies and business sectors in to conduct the Turkish population. As part of this neoliberal outlook, among the public bodies, corporations and the civil organizations “good”, “functional”, “well-defined”, “non-political”, “participatory”, “non-bureaucratic”, “efficient”, “non-corrupt” and “working” cooperation became dominant trope in Turkey in the current period.

Under the JDP rule, neoliberalism in Turkey consolidated its presence in welfare provision. This local and national neoliberal project, unlike the dominant analysis of the neoliberalism, is not based on the retreat from state and its role in the welfare distribution. I.e. with this process the JDP government whilst reviving so-called traditional and communal institutions in poor relief, it deepened the existing family-based conception of the social welfare in Turkey and aimed to transform the poor into self-reliant, active citizens through civil-public and corporate partnerships.

It is clear that this is the particular mainstreaming of the civil society that, after the 1999 Marmara Earthquake and the recession of the Turkish economy. These developments enabled the JDP government to pass the costs of increasing commodification of social services and education in Turkey to civil society and particular civil society organizations. To promote this pass, the JDP maintained the necessary legal, national and international environment for civil society organizations to work in. In these mutuality based relations, on the other hand, the civil poor relief organizations began to enjoy certain symbolic and material capital from already depleted social service provision, the unaccountable nature of state-led services, and the bureaucratic structure of the state by posing itself as the “easers of the burdens of the state” in Turkey. In the next section of this chapter, it will be briefly presented the official the welfare provision practices of the Turkish state,

during 1990s and 2000s in order to present the position of the Deniz Feneri Association in a coherent fashion.

Current Terrain of The welfare provision in Turkey and Development of Civil Society

During 1990s, as part of the changing formations of poverty, new official mechanisms to alleviate poverty in Turkey were introduced. Among the old institutions of social security, Social Insurance Institution (*SSK*), which covers workers, *Bag-Kur*, which covers the self-employed, and the artisans and Retirement Chest (*Emekli-Sandigi*), which covers state employees, are the primary ones. Although the old institutions cover, often unsuccessfully, “certain” segments of the population, some new formal and informal mechanisms and networks emerged to conduct the “new” poor in rural and urban areas. These new poor are the people who lack formal mechanisms of social security of the state.

Among the formal practices to conduct those new poor, Green Card and the Solidarity Fund are the prominent ones. Whilst the Green-Card covers the healthcare of currently 10 million holders, who have none of the abovementioned healthcare coverage and constitute almost 15% of the population; the Solidarity Fund was established to assist citizens in poverty and extreme deprivation. The organization of the Solidarity Fund is province-based. It is clear that, the discourses, evolution and practices of those new and old institutions and their analyses are beyond the scope of this thesis. In that sense, in the body of this thesis, their presence will be treated as part of the novel techniques of governing the population and dividing the population into various categories.

These new institutions and their practices have particular significance to understand the discourses and conceptions of poverty in the Deniz Feneri Association. The particular perceptions of those institutions in or how the Deniz Feneri Association perceives these institutions⁵⁰ led the association to orient itself and shape its discourses of transparency, efficiency and accountability according to those who lack. In this creative web of modeling, not only the questions of the transparency and accountability, but also the questions of poverty alleviation play a significant role. The very best example of this is the relation between the Deniz Feneri Association and the Solidarity Fund. Many projects of the Deniz Feneri Association are taken from the Solidarity Fund's projects. Among these projects there are Saanen goat breeding, bee-keeping, IT operator training and cherry-farming projects. These projects are usually welfare to work projects, which aims to transform the claimants into active entrepreneurs and breadwinners. However, this modeling is not top to down, rather it is a part of general neoliberal poverty alleviation regime, which governs the concerns, discourses, political goals, and projects within its boundaries. Currently, the Fund aims to achieve certain cooperation among poverty alleviation actors.

During this fieldwork, I attended a two-day cooperation workshop in December 2007, as a representative of the Deniz Feneri Association. This project

⁵⁰ The association also promotes certain cooperation with other civil society and state-led institutions. For instance, in its Emergency Plan of Action, the association promotes certain cooperation among each segment of the Turkish society, state and civil society organization under the maintaining power of the state to conduct the population, to reduce waste and separate the real poor from un-real poor (Atalay, 2003).

Increasing partnership projects, the amount of financial resources subscribed to those projects and practical necessities and governmental rationality of specific neoliberalism of Turkey led the association to promote good partnership, coordination and cooperative relations with the state in poor relief and poverty alleviation. Interestingly, the discourse of corruption in the Deniz Feneri Association does not cover each and all institution. Rather mukhtars, petty officials, Red Crescent and Social Solidarity Fund, and due to increasing visibility of the child abuse and neglect cases in Child Protection Services, and state actors can be corruptible but not the JDP government. This strategy is to secure the government, during my ethnography I have observed several "rationalizations" of crony-based relations of the JDP government by lower and higher rank employees within the association.

covers civil society organizations, solidarity fund offices, municipalities, official social security institutions and other individual actors. Basically this network aims to prevent the distribution of same or similar aid-items to the claimants by different poor relief institutions. In addition, with this workshop the fund aims to train solidarity fund officers on issues regarding poverty in Turkey. The training seminars were delivered by several academicians, who are expert on poverty, social exclusion and rural development. During the seminars, the issues such as culture of poverty, deserving and undeserving poor, dependency culture, unemployment, employment and ending poverty, discrimination, and migration.

The aim of the higher rank officers and academicians, who attend this conference, was to train the local fund officers to give “sound”, “poor-friendly”, “non-discriminatory” and “professional” decisions. During this workshop, it was observed that especially among the lower rank employees, the poor are usually considered as undeserving subjects, who are suffering from sexual laxity, laziness, greediness and moral corruption. In addition, the Kurdish migrants in Western coast of Anatolia, unemployed poor, ethnic minorities, single mothers and women are usually considered as burden of the state rather than legally entitled citizens and right owners by the lower ranks of the fund. Although, the analysis of this workshop goes beyond the scope of this thesis, it was also observed that these concerns regarding who are the deserving poor and who are not, unemployment and poverty, minorities, and women bear certain similarities with those I observed in the Deniz Feneri Association. The next chapter will delineate how a civil society organization embraced and re-produced these concerns regarding the poor in its own organizational field in Turkey throughout its historical development from 1996 to 2007.

CHAPTER III

THE HISTORY OF THE POLITICS OF THE POOR AND POVERTY OF THE DENIZ FENERI AID AND SOLIDARITY ASSOCIATION

This chapter seeks to analyze the institutionalization process of the Deniz Feneri Association from 1996 to 2006, by looking at the transformation of the discourses of poverty and the poor of the association. As a certain part of my fieldwork in the Deniz Feneri Association, this chapter largely relies on the analysis of the published and visual materials of the Deniz Feneri Association, which I gathered during my fieldwork in the association. Thus, in this chapter it is aimed to produce a genealogy of the discourses of the poor and poverty of the Deniz Feneri Association to elucidate the current politics of the poor and poverty of the association. This organizational history, I claim, is corporeal to understand how the Deniz Feneri association currently organizes its system, defines the poor and poverty and thus the way it codifies the poor as those who need and need not and ultimately the treatment it reserved for the poor in Turkey.

The Deniz Feneri Program: Early Years, TV Program and the Audiences

During Ramadan in 1996, a TV program, called “City and Ramadan”, was launched on Channel 7, a pro-Islamist, nationwide TV channel in Turkey. The channel was established by a group of businessmen, intellectuals, ex-bureaucrats, politicians and

laymen in 1994. Channel 7, from its establishment to the present, has strong financial, personal and political ties with Islamist political parties in Turkey. During the 1990s, the political parties, with which the channel had strong ties, were the Welfare Party and its then successor Virtue Party. In 1997 the Welfare Party and in 2001 the Virtue Party were banned by the Constitutional Court with the charges of violation of laicism, one of the major essentials of Republic of Turkey. These events took place in a political context, marked by heightened tension between state, army and media coalition and Islamist actors, especially Welfare and then Virtue Parties. This process was known as February 28 Process in Turkey and was initiated with the resolutions of army-led NSC against Islamist thread in February 28 of 1997. The NSC forced the Welfare party government, which came into power in 1995, to prevent the rise of Islamist movement in Turkey. A few months later, the Welfare Party had to resign from the government and then was closed by Constitutional Court as a threat against Republican and secular basis of Turkish Republic in 1997. In 1998, the cadres of the Welfare Party established the Virtue Party. This party too was closed in 2001 by the Constitutional Court for its violation of one of the major essentials of Republic of Turkey. Within these three years, a faction, led by younger generation Islamists in the Virtue Party, against older guards of the party, emerged from within the Virtue Party.

The younger-generation led faction, which will be effective on the formation of the JDP in 2002, adopted neoliberal and EU-committed outlook vis-à-vis the older credentials of Islamist parties in Turkey. Accordingly, these parties adopted an economically protectionist, nationalist and anti-westernist or strategically westernist political discourse. As opposed to the JDP, the old guards of the Virtue Party established the Felicity Party in 2001. As Cinar rightly argued (2006) on the nature

of cleavage between older-“traditionalist” faction, known as “*Aksakallilar*”, and younger-“reformist” faction, the younger faction deployed much more EU, democratization and economic stability oriented outlook vis-à-vis the former one.

For the traditionalist faction, removing the ban imposed on N. Erbakan (the leader of the party from late 1960s onwards) held priority over endorsing a broad agenda for democratization and representation of the grievances of the Islamic constituency. The younger generation, on the other hand, favored an Islam-sensitive, rather than Islamist, political stance and employed a more comprehensive and consistent language of democracy and human rights. In this way, they hoped to be able to fill the political vacuum created by the 28 February process, to make inroads into Turkey’s power structure and to better represent the interests of Islamic identity without risking their own political survival. Once the Virtue Party was closed, the reformists founded the AKP in August 2001 and took the helm only fifteen months later (pp. 473-74).

Clearly, the political parties were not the sole actors in Islamist politics in Turkey, which have had ties with Channel 7. Rather, these political parties (and their predecessors) and Channel 7 were a part of the religious social, financial and political network⁵¹ through which Islamist actors establish their presences in Turkish society, civic life, economy and politics. The small and medium size enterprises of these actors play a pivotal role, since they later became the Deniz Feneri’s corporate donors. These small and medium sized enterprises in Turkey financial historically

⁵¹ It should be noted here, the regulatory ideal of this network, namely religion, does not display a-historical or solid category as once assumed (Huntington, 1993). On the contrary, as Asad argued (1993) of “there cannot be a universal definition of religion not only because its constituent elements and relationships are culturally specific, but because that definition itself is the historical product of discursive processes” (p. 29). In this respect, this historical category enables and disables individual and collective subjects to claim particular positions, interact with each other and thus gain social, financial, moral and symbolic capital in given field (Bourdieu, 1977; Herzfeld, 1988; Wacquant and Bourdieu, 1992). In this vein, the discursive nature of the religion in the association constitutes religion as a field of multiple reflections, practices and representations of hierarchical actors (Tugal, 2003) to maintain conflicts and achieve cooperation among each other to form “the politics of the poor and poverty” of the association. In addition, since Islamism in the Deniz Feneri Association does not represent a solitary category, rather during the development of the Deniz Feneri Association, it was observed that the religious, if not specifically Islamist, discourse of poverty and the poor, if there was “any”, combined with a series of neoliberal, common sense, traditional, gendered, capitalistic and human rights-related perspectives in the poor relief and poverty alleviation.

developed during the 70's as shop keepers' enterprises⁵² in the small or medium-sized inner Anatolian towns. Their relations with the civil and political elements of this Islamist networks are highly reciprocal. Whilst the religious brotherhood networks and their followers, actors and recruiters provide the necessary human resources and professionals for these enterprises; these enterprises backed these network and its individual actors financially, politically and socially. It should be noted here, although there were reciprocal and nepotistic relations among the institutional actors of the Islamist networks, and their subjects, neither these actors nor their subjects represent uniformity, as argued before in several studies regarding Islamist NGOs (Gole, 1996; Kadioglu, 2005; Ozdalga, 1998; White, 2002).

In this multi-layered context of local political struggles, ensuing financial crises and escalating ethnic, religious and class inequalities, the "City and Ramadan" began to broadcast on Channel 7 to assist the urban poor of Turkey in the mid-90s. Initially, "The City and Ramadan" was a relatively minor case amongst other welfare and social security institutions in Turkey in this period. Among those institutions, state-led Social Solidarity Fund, Green-Card, tripartite social security system, composed of Social Insurance Institution (*SSK*), *Bağ-Kur*, which covers self-employed and artisans and Retirement Chest (*Emekli Sandığı*), and more traditional charities, foundations, civil social service delivery organizations, soup-kitchens,

⁵² As Onis rightly pointed out (1997), "These enterprises had been an important constituency of the National Salvation Party, the predecessor of the Welfare Party. Hence a certain link between Islamic business interests and political party campaigning on explicitly Islamic grounds has been evident right from the beginning in the late 1960s. It was during the 1980s, however, that we observe a profound take-off in the volume and depth of Islamic business activity, a process at clearly received a significant boost from the major inflows of Saudi capital arriving in the country to take advantage of the new opportunities provided by the liberal economic environment, notably in the financial sphere. Similarly, the savings of the migrant working community in Germany have been flowing back to Turkey, contributing to the rise of Islamic business activity as well as providing an important source of financial support for the Welfare Party. The opportunities for profit provided by the shift to a market-orientated economy also encouraged Islamic brotherhood organizations or sufi orders (*tarikat*) to engage in investment activity on a substantial scale. By the 1990s Islamic networks had grown significantly in strength, establishing themselves as major actors on the economic scene, where exists a significant link between a substantial majority of Islamic businesses, strengthened considerably in the market-orientated environment of the 1980s and the rise of the Welfare Party" (p. 1).

religious organizations and hometown and local solidarity associations as well as the larger Turkish Red Crescent Society were the most prominent ones. Most of the influential civil society organizations of this period had Kemalist outlook⁵³ and concentrated on education and educational support (Erdogan, 2001).

From the perspective of governmentality, what makes the “City and Ramadan” a distinctive case among the other charities, civil relief and educational support organizations was its visual character. On the TV show, two program hosts, U. Arslan and I. Uğurlu’s (known as Brother Ramadan in the program) arranged visits to the poor districts and neighborhoods of the major cities of Turkey during Ramadan and delivered aid-in-kind items. In later-day association’s discourse, the idea and the plot⁵⁴ of the TV program was that of “a few good men”, “responsible and compassionate people” and lay-people (*halk çocukları*) in Channel 7 (The Deniz Feneri, 1, 2003: 30). In this discursive arrangement, being a lay-people meant to be close to the people, whom they assisted, and to belong to the same cultural and religious world, of which usually neglected and disrespected by governing elites in Turkey. As the discourses of the poor and poverty and the entire politics of the poor and poverty of the program and the association changed, the class and community affiliations of the later day association has also altered. However, the notions of “closeness” and “lay-peopleness” with the poor were still kept in hand to use where necessary and useful.

Especially after the case of the well-publicized corruption case against the Deniz Feneri e.V. in 2007, the Deniz Feneri Association deployed this elective

⁵³ Among those, ÇYDD (Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği, Support for the Modern Life Association), TEGV (Türk/Türkiye Eğitim Gönüllüleri Vakfı- Turkish/Turkey Educational Volunteers Foundations), ÇEV (Çağdaş Eğitim Derneği- Modern Education Foundation) were the prominent Kemalist civil society organizations.

⁵⁴ According to Aristotle's Poetics (1927), a plot in literature is "the arrangement of incidents" that (ideally) each follow plausibly from the other. The plot is like the chalk outline that guides the painter's brush.

affinity strategy with the poor. According to the press statement⁵⁵ made by the association, those who criticize the association on this ground without any substantial proof will be considered and as who do not like the poor in Turkish public, and hence, do not like the people who assist the poor in Turkish society.

During my fieldwork, it was observed that this discursive construction of ‘belonging’ and compassion was assumed to entitle the TV program and the later day association with the right to decide what the poor need and do not need, since the association and the people in need supposedly belong to the same category of the people. As Bayat argued (2002) on the elective affinity of the religious actors with the poor in civil society organizations in Middle-East contexts,

Paternalistic NGOs perceive their beneficiaries more as recipients of assistance than as participants in development. For their “favors” and benevolence, NGOs often expect loyalty, support, and service. It is not the place of beneficiaries to question the adequacy and quality of services or the accountability of the NGOs, for this would be interpreted as interfering in NGOs’ affairs. It is not the target groups but the NGO leaders and donors who define the needs and priorities of a given NGO (p. 18)

Thus, the program and later day association, the categories of need, the needy, charity, the charitable; belonging and the community were deployed strategically. Since they have strategic value, they do not only refer to static situation rather refer to a dynamic engagement among the poor, TV program, the association and supporters. As it was stated in an interview with the program host U. Arslan (2002), about the emergence of the program and its dynamic character in Channel 7⁵⁶,

⁵⁵ The press statement of the association can be found in the Appendices section of this thesis (Appendix A).

⁵⁶ The emergence of the program was a minor part of a change in the broadcasting policy of the Channel 7, during these years, which can be interpreted as a result of the transformation of Islamist politics in Turkey. The broadcasting policy of Channel 7, which included documentaries, Third-world cinema films, discussion programs aimed to address “intellectual” audiences to gain “intellectual hegemony” in Turkey, were suddenly interrupted in the mid 1990s. And instead more mainstream and conservative broadcasting policy was adopted. As part of this new policy, Channel 7 began to host TV

The TV channel wanted us to make a TV program to broadcast in Holy Month Ramadan. They want us to organize our program in doing good-deeds and solidarity. You know, those feelings are intensified in the society during this month. We decided that this kind of program should not be a desk job and we decided to go to the public. We teamed up with another layman, Ibrahim Ugurlu and we began to stroll in the streets of Istanbul. We didn't imagine how far this job could go, so we entered into a modest grocery shop. And we said to shop-owner, "we know several poor families and if he permits us to take several items, we will broadcast this and his grocery's name on TV in our program". Thanks to our camera, the shop owners did not refuse our strange request. And the program broadcasted. Step by step, grocery owners and philanthropists began to join our program. And then *BIM* Mall Chains requested to be sponsor of our program (pp. 6-7).⁵⁷

The construction of the program as the "active" endeavor bears strong resemblances with the discursive change in the Islamist politics in Turkey during this period. In a larger plain, the transformation of Islamist politics in Turkey, as a part of the political defeat of Islamism and Welfare Party in 28 February Process by army and state, was interpreted by A. Cigdem as the "Turcication" of Islamism and other counter-hegemonic ideologies in Turkey. Accordingly, this act has been marked by vague yet decisive rhetoric of "epic of periphery" in the face of political retreat and defeat (Cigdem, 2001). In this epic, masculine heroism, agility, hot bloodedness and yet compassion, justness and protection towards the meeker have been produced as a

shows, entertainment programs, türkù-shows, Hollywood films, prime-time shows and TV series whose audiences are usually housewives, and local people from Black-Sea and East and Southeast Anatolia regions. During this process, Channel created its own public figures, usually represented as "lay-people and "celebrities" such as I. Ugurlu, U. Arslan, S. Kisaparmak, S. Uzun and I. Turut who are "non-political" yet retain their "local", "authentic", "national" and Turkish outlook.

⁵⁷ "Ramazan ayında akşamları yayınlanmak üzere Ramazan ve toplumsal yaşamımız üzerine bir program istendi. Programda Ramazan dolayısıyla insanlarımızda daha da yoğunlaşan yardımlaşma duygusuna ve hayır-hasenat konusuna ağırlık vermemiz isteniyordu. Böyle bir programın bir masabaşı programı olmaması gerektiğini düşündük ve halkın içine girmeye karar verdik. Böylece yanımıza yine son derece halktan birini, sevgili Ibrahim Ugurlu'yu alarak Istanbul sokaklarına daldık....Henüz işe başladığımızda işin nereye uzanacağını tahmin edemediğimizden olsa gerek, mütevazı bir markete girerek market sahibine bildiğimiz birkaç fakir aile olduğunu, bu ailelerin ihtiyaç duyduğu gıda maddelerini almamıza izin verdiği takdirde bunu kayda alarak programda yayınlanacağını, bu arada marketinin ismini de zikredeceğimizi söyledik. Sağolsun kameramızın hatırına o an garip gelen bu teklifimizi kırmadı. Program yayınlandı. Gün geçtikçe market sahipleri, yardımseverler peyderpey olaya gönüllü olarak katılmaya başladılar. Derken BIM Marketler Zinciri programımızın sponsorluğunu üstlenmek istediğini bildirdi ("Ugur Arslanla Röportaj", 2002).

novel “strategy” for individual and collective Islamist actors in their “war of position”⁵⁸ (Gramsci, 1971; Crehan, 2006) with the political powers of Turkish army and state (Cigdem, 2001). In this context, the superior political war, In Islamic langue the grand-jihad (Musallam, 2005) failed against the Turkish army and state by the Islamists, to re-establish public presence of Islamism in Turkey, the “moral-side”, “human-face”, “everyday aspects” of Islamism, and its “roots” had strategically revived among Islamist circles. In this respect, the program, and media-personality U. Arslan, by using this rhetoric and giving it a visual character, addressed the political sentiments of the Islamist and religious audiences, who are looking a platform to publicize their moral attitude towards the poor and thus their own political, moral and social views in times of political defeat.

In a wider sense, the discursive map of the program represents an example of the change in the Islamist discourse. During this period, the religious morality, heroic masculinity, localism, traditionalism⁵⁹ and emphases on Turkish-ness were also

⁵⁸ In Gramsci’s discourse, the war of position is a culture war in which anti-capitalist elements seek to gain a dominant voice in mass media, mass organizations, and educational institutions to heighten class consciousness, teach revolutionary analysis and theory, and inspire revolutionary organization (Gramsci, 1971).

⁵⁹ As part of this defeat, in the aftermath of February 28 Process, a highly “localist” discourse in Islamist politics, usually known as “localism” (yerlilik) and traditionalism in Islamist politics in Turkey, gained prominence. This view criticized “non-local” sources and figures such as Iranian-Shiite Ali Shariati (1933-1977), Sunnite with Salafi outlook Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), Mawdudi (1903-1979) and European-Bosnian Muslim Alija Izzet Begovic (1925-2003) of the Islamist discourse in Turkey, in order to emphasize its Turkish and non-alien character. This traditionalist-localist clique in Islamist politics in Turkey was headed by several think-tanks such as *Bilim ve Sanat Vakfı* (Arts and Sciences Foundation), publishing houses and their newspapers and journals such as *Dergah* (1990-), *Gerçek Hayat* (2001-) and *Altınoluk* (1987-). In addition, the influential columnists, writers and Islamic, especially Sufi, brotherhood networks, whose political relations with the existing regime were not at odds as much as radical Islamist groups, began to voice this localist, nationalist and traditionalist jargon in Islamist politics in Turkey among Islamist circles (Silverstein, 2005). As part of this politico-moral strategy, a keen interest “national” figures, intellectuals and milieus of Islamism in Turkey and Ottoman sources revived among the Islamist actors. Among the figures, who were attracted interest among Islamists, have been Nurettin Topcu (1909-1975), Necip Fazıl Kısakürek (1904-1983), Cemil Meriç (1916-1987), Samiha Ayverdi (1905-1993), late Ottoman period Islamists such as Said Halim Pasha (1863-1921) and others. However, as Gramsci argued (1971) on his observations on Ceaserism and restoration of political system after political crises, “for it is certain that in the movement of history there is never any turning back, and that restorations in toto do not exist” (p. 464). In this respect, the traditionalism of the Islamism is a very contemporary and strategic one as the revival of the religious morality in the face of political defeat, times of crises and conflict in Turkey to secure Islamism’s discursive boundaries from Republican and military breach.

constructed as common denominators among the Islamist actors and Turkish society by several influential columnists, journals, Islamist-radical, Islamist networks, orders and brotherhoods. This promising strategy was deployed to establish and to conserve the evading power of Islamism in Turkey for the Islamist actors themselves.

Obviously, the political expectation here was the positive reception and reproduction of this moral panacea by the Islamist actors in public space. In that sense, each political group hoped that although the Islamism was defeated in the formal and superior political arena, this strategy was deployed to keep their human “resource” in hand to represent Islam through subjects in the public arena. It should be noted here, this moral tone was not totally alien to the Islamist politics in Turkey, i.e. Islamic brotherhood networks (Pratt-Ewing, 1997), everyday conversations in tea-houses (Tugal, 2002) and radical, traditional and mainstream journal-milieus; however the new roles and political expectations were ascribed to the morality, subjects, and their public presences in Turkish context in times of political tension.

Paradoxically, the more the Islamist discourse minded the hypothetical gap between the Turkish people and Islamist discourses in Turkey, the more it became class and inequality insensitive to restore its own discursive boundaries against the powers of February 28 Period and Turkish state. The more Islamism minded the hypothetical gap between itself and Turkish public, the more it became insensitive to the apparent ethnic, class and gender based inequalities and social problems in Turkish public.

In visual media, as a certain consequence of the ensuing financial crises of Turkish economy during 1990s and the escalating political, ethnic, economic and religious struggles within the Turkish society, the number of TV serials, programs and TV shows that depict and visualize heroic male protagonists also increased

(Erjem and Caglayandereli, 2006). The reason for the increase in the religious media was explicated above; however for the secular and mainstream TV channels such as Show TV, ATV, these programs enable them to claim positions in the field of morality and heroism vis-à-vis religious or conservative channels.⁶⁰ The protagonists of these series usually have quasi-religious morality and power of personal charisma aimed to solve social, structural and financial problems with their powerful position within the social network they are responsible from, as an agha, family leader, or a respectful individual living in a community. In these serials, programs often shown at prime time, they were ascribed to resolve the conflictual situations and help others, which is a responsibility they are assigned to and hence unavoidable for their powerful position (Akinerdem, 2005). Furthermore, during these years family dramas on TV gained strong popularity among Turkish audiences. These TV series⁶¹ usually represent the family, neighborhood, local and neighborhood based community and its problems. Among the problems depicted, there were generational gaps, misunderstandings, financial crises that hit the family, newcomers, class distinctions among lovers, the separation of couples and the divorce. The most important element than those problems was the way the people and families respond these problems, by holding together and displaying solidarity.

In this context, it is not wrong to argue that the “City and Ramadan” is another template to solve another conflictual situation, the poverty and destitution, with personal charisma of the Islamist/religious or media-personality actors and networks. In turn, it was hoped to strengthen poor families against the eminent

⁶⁰ Among the TV serials in secular media, the *Deliyurek* (in *Show TV*, 1998-2002) and *Aynali Tahir* (in various TV channels, between 1996 and 2000) were the prominent ones. On the other hand, *Askin Daglarda Gezer* (in *TGRT* between 1999 and 2001) and *Mihrali* (Channel 7, between 2002 and 2004) were broadcast by TV channels with religious outlook.

⁶¹ Among the family dramas, *Bizimkiler* (Ours) (1989–1997) and its spin-off *Yazlikçılar* (Summer Tourists) (1994-1997), *Üzgünüm Leyla* (I’m Sorry Leila) (2001-2004), *Super Baba* (Super Daddy) (1993-1997), *İkinci Bahar* (Second Season) (1998-2001), *Cocuklar Duymasin* (Lest Kids Hear) (2002-2004) and *Ekmek Teknesi* (Earning a Livelihood) (2002-2004) were the prominent ones.

danger of dissolution with the power of Channel 7's networks and TV hosts' charisma. In order to assist the people, the power of the networks and charisma was also deployed by the program. In the early days of the program to reach the poor, the program hosts asked shop-owners, the elderly, notable figures, preachers, doctors and nurses in local clinics and teachers in schools questions about those who are extremely poor and in need as well as disabled, elderly, orphaned, widowed, who lack familial protection from their neighborhood. Thus, the orphan, disabled, elderly, widow are more or less "cultural", "traditional" and "religious" definers of being poor and being seen as a poor in Turkey have been extensively used in the TV program. It is clear that, at the heart of this preference it lays the belief that the people, who are extremely poor, orphan, widowed or lack protection of their families, are more appealing to the audiences of the Channel 7 to assist. Since these audiences are religious and conservative, to deploy their local understandings of poverty and the poor on screen, this strategy is preferred.

In this iconography of poverty, the personal narratives, bodily movements, gestures and silences of the poor provided a visual image of the poor in the gaze of audiences. In other words, all these registers gained iconic⁶² status to signify the "meaning" of being poor in the early days of the program. Since the program

⁶² Here I use the term icon, as semiotician, philosopher and natural scientist Charles S. Peirce used. According to Peirce's semiotics (1932), "a sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its object. It stands for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the ground of the representamen" (p.228). In this system, the patterns of meaning of signs can be divided into three categories such as iconic, symbolic and indexical. In Peirce's discourse, an iconic sign looks like what it represents: a picture of a dog for example. Peirce defines an icon as similar to its subject. An iconic signs carry some quality of the thing they stand for as a portrait stands for a person. Most often an iconic sign is a representation of a drawing or a photograph where likeness or resemblance is a determining characteristic. Icons in general are "motivated", which resemble more the object they stand for rather than being created by convention. Put otherwise, the motivating character of the icons "calls for" interpretation and cultural consummation, as well as sets certain limits to the interpretation of the represented object by the addressed audience.

answers the question of who the poor are; it also constructs the basic insignias of being poor and being seen as the poor by using their images and voices.

Alternatively, the hosts directly visit noticeably poor households, which they have seen while strolling around the neighborhood. Those houses were in general neglected, lacking almost all infrastructural facilities, poorly decorated or undecorated. These are constructed within the program as the material icons of their residents' penury, deprivation and destitution. In that sense, physical conditions of the house are still used as an iconic and material proof of the poverty of its residents by the program and, later on, the association. In these visits, the poor and program hosts talk about the families' social, economic, medical and personal problems; whereas the poor ask for advice on their social, economic and medical conditions or request aid from program hosts and Turkish public. During the TV program, the program hosts and audiences, appealed to as responsible and kind-hearted people and fellow brothers and sisters, listen to their narratives, which are broadcast on TV, view the poor' saddening stories of social "decline", learn the causes of their familial and personal decline and attest their mental, emotional, physical, social and bodily desperations. The reasons for the poor' decay are the loss of a job, death of a beloved and caring father or mother or grandparents, incurable physical illness, senile decay, abandonment, mental breakdown or simply misfortune, all of which are represented in a particularly "individualized" yet interactional form on the complex ground in which the poor, audiences, hosts and the program are positioned.

The by proxy consequence of this iconography of poverty, is its signification to be well-off or be seen as well-off in given community. In this respect, those who are well-off not only commands and enjoys several material objects in their social environment but also holds a moral/religious duty of taking care of their needs

compassionately in given program. The program in that respect gives the audiences, as appealed to responsible and caring brothers and sisters, a visual site to perform duties of responsibility, compassion, solidarity and care, shaped by various causes such as religiosity, philanthropy, compassion, citizenship, brotherhood and goodness. These values in turn all transform each addressed audience into an eminent community of charitable people and supporters of a good cause. In this respect, it is not wrong to argue that the program represents a visual template of new technologies, stories and relations of constituting and performing a moral community of people-hood (Migdal, 2004). Through this activity, a “moral community” and of course an “amoral community”, though unstated, are come to be defined in the discourse of the program. Thus, the program answers the questions of what should be the response of the audiences to the visualized poverty. This is why the hosts ask these officers and notables, is that those people have had contact with those people, such as orphan, widow, elderly and extremely poor people who lack basic means of subsistence, in the everyday life, since they have been constructed as the people who should know each other and each other’s problems. And most importantly, according to this view these people, as part of their everyday contacts with the poor, can separate the real poor from not-so-real poor. Thus, what makes them eligible to separate, and conduct, the poor from un-real or not-so real poor is their relational class positions and their statuses in given community.

As part of the representation of the poor on TV, some noticeable details of their life-stories were highlighted. The most frequent ones are “they are hungry for seven months...”, “she cooked rocks to her hungry baby...”, “the landlord put them on the street...”, “she is taking care of her ill mother...”, “he is carrying his disabled

brother everyday...”⁶³ These noticeable details are displayed on TV with usage of ellipsis while the conversation between the host and the poor takes place about the poor’ poverty. As a meta-text operation (Bakhtin, 1981, 1986, 1988) or suppression or consolidation of the process of interpretation (Peirce [1949], 1993); this highlighting also leads to the creation of an authorial voice in the receptions of their poverty narratives. This authorial voice signifies “essential” and “elemental” points in these visual poverty narratives to the audiences and edits the already-visualized narratives by excluding some other details by prioritizing some. This process makes the televisual narratives of the poor apt to decoding priorities of the community of audiences⁶⁴. And this constructs the meaning of the poverty as a certain lack, failure and loss, and visualizes what poverty and being poor is for the community of audiences in Turkey in recent times.

In this reception process, usage of ellipsis constructs an open space or a lack in the structure of narrative-representation couplet. This lack also calls for cultural consummation of the narrative to a culturally proper end by the audience. This consummation, by being able and eligible to decode these cultural representations and responding them “properly”, re-constitutes the boundaries of the community of the addressed audiences and enables these audience community to publicize its mores (such as compassion, heroism, mercy, agility to respond crisis situations) in public life of Turkey. Hence, as part of the will of good-deeds of the program, the hosts not only listen to the poor people and request information about the details of

⁶³ “yedi aydır açlar...”, “aç çocuğuna taş pişirmiş...”, “ev sahibi kapıya koymuş...”, “hasta annesine bakıyor...” and “engelli kardeşini sırtında taşıyor...”.

⁶⁴ According to Bakhtin, the emergence and comprehension procedure of any visual, artistic and filmic entity comes through the inner speech that the sender speaks with another or receiver -here the implied community of audiences- as well as himself [sic]. Although the highlighting of these details as inducers and subjects of inner speech is a discursively framed act, the emotive-contemplative content of “yedi aydır açlar...”, “cocugunu tedavi ettiremiyor...” kind of sentences can be understood as an operation of discourse, they re-cast to create cultural web of associations in collective cultural memory of audiences of being poor, capped in poverty and social suffering.

their decline, loss and lack and make the audiences to listen to the life-stories of the poor, centered around their poverty, decay and desperation; but also distribute to the poor the program's sponsors' packages and bags, full of aid-in kind items. The donated items demonstrate great variation, but basically they are for the satisfaction of the basic needs of these poor families and individuals. Among the items, designed to satisfy basic needs of the poor, the commonest ones are new pairs of shoes for family members, fuel, clothes, bread, butter, rice, tea, dry bean packages, candies, sugar, dry soup, meat, fruits and vegetables. In that sense, the program is not only "informational", but it also promises them to watch their enjoyment of being remembered and taken care of physically and psychologically. Thus, in aid-exchange between these three parties what we will see is the construction of poverty as a loss or failure, the aid as a recuperation and community as an emotionally bounded social web. In order to analyze this tripartite relation, in the following part of this chapter, I will focus on the productive possibilities of the aid relation for the audiences, promised by the TV program.

The Political Possibilities of Assistance Provision in the Deniz Feneri Program

The Deniz Feneri phenomenon emerged by engaging the passive TV audience. We reminded these people that they have can have something else to do rather than just saying "what a pity, poor you". You can not guess their situation unless you see them ("U. Arslanla Röportaj", 2002).⁶⁵

The Deniz Feneri Program is based on the distinction between attested poor and rest of the society. However, it also makes an internal distinction within the category of

⁶⁵ "Deniz Feneri olgusu ekran başındaki pasif izleyicileri ortaya harekete geçirerek ortaya çıktı. Ekranı başında "vah vah, yazık yazık" demekten başka yapabilecekleri bir şeyler olduğunu hatırlattık insanlara. Görmezseniz anlayamazsınız insanların hallerini bildiğiniz gibi" ("U. Arslan'la Röportaj", 2002).

rest of the society. This is the distinction between the active and passive audiences, as it was drawn by the program host. This distinction clearly connotes a particular reformulation of the active/passive citizen rhetoric of neoliberalism. However, here the passive citizens are not the poor who are unemployed, vulnerable to social risks, dependent on the welfare, aid and assistance, lacking self-esteem or proper work-ethics, which are dominant tropes on the poor in the neoliberal understandings (Appelbaum; 2001; Cruikshank, 1996). Here, the passive citizenship is defined in terms of failure to do anything except to watch the poor' stories on screen. In this division, the active citizen is one who assists the poor, cares about the poor and works to recuperate the poor' very individual loss and failure, as depicted on screen.⁶⁶

According to the same discourse of the program, the value of this active citizen/audience is their diligence in separating the real and deserving poor from the undeserving and unreal poor. This power to conduct the poor bears various political, social and cultural potentials within the given community, such as status, moral and symbolic capital and charisma for the actors involved. In the early days of the program, the poor correspond to the non-entities. In this situation, all they can do is to wait passively for the transformation of the passive viewers into active citizens, with the mediation of the program, and the newly mobilized citizens' compassionate attention directed towards them through television.

The popularity of the program among the audiences of Channel 7 and the poor following the Ramadan of 1996 has rapidly grown. The program began to

⁶⁶ This emphasis over activeness echoes a well-known hadith of the Prophet Muhammed about the faith and its relation with social practices. According to this hadith, "whoever sees a wrong, and is able to put it right with his hand, let him do so; if he can't, then with his tongue; if he can't, then in his heart, and that is the bare minimum of faith" (quoted from Cook, 2003: 4). In this regard, it is not wrong to assume that why the program favors the active engagement of the audiences, which calls them to decode this engagement as a religious duty or deed, derives from the Islamic faith in a context marked by the cleansing off the Islamism and Islam in Turkish public arena by the army-led coalition.

attract a large audience in this and subsequent periods, as well as potential claimants, who request aid and assistance. After the month of Ramadan, to enlarge the scope of the program and remind rest of the society of the need to assist the poor in months other than just Ramadan or religious holidays, the title “The Deniz Feneri” was adopted in place of “City and Ramadan”. As it was stated (2003) in an interview with M. Kutlu, who proposes the initial idea of the City and Ramadan program,

The program, “City and Ramadan”, had a different character than Ramadan. Moreover, it has been said it has received a lot of attention. “We shall extend the program for the whole year round and develop the concept much more. We shall even pick a name for it. A new name was needed because the previous name of the program was specific to the holy month of Ramadan. There were too many names offered. I endorsed “The Deniz Feneri”. The lighthouse essentially has a symbolic meaning of help to the troubled as well as a guide and light to the voyagers and everyone else. Besides, considering my interest in cinema, I think the lighthouse is very nice visual image. It is also visually very strong that the projector is moving round and round in the dark. On the other hand, the lighthouse is a universal symbol. This symbol has the same meaning all around the world. The lighthouse guides and offers light to all ships of all kind, of all nations, at any time at night. Thus, the TV program Deniz Feneri, originating from another program City and Ramadan has been turned into a more functional aid and solidarity association and has spread throughout the country.⁶⁷ (Kocak, 2003, emphases added, my translation).

⁶⁷ “O Ramazan, “Şehir ve Ramazan” Programı bambaşka bir hüviyete büründü. O zaman, “Bu çok ilgi gördü. Bunu sene içine yayalım, daha da geliştirelim. Hatta buna bir isim koyalım” denildi. Çünkü “Şehir ve Ramazan” Ramazana özgü bir programdı. Çok sayıda isim gündeme geldi. Deniz Feneri’ni ben münasip gördüm. Çünkü Deniz Feneri mana itibarıyla, yolda kalmışlara, yolculara ve herkese yol gösteren, ışık tutan, gidilecek noktayı tayin eden bir nevi darda kalmışların yardımına koşma gibi sembolik manası olan, ayrıca –ben sinema ile de uğraşırım- görsel olarak da Deniz Feneri bana göre çok hoş bir şey. Karanlıkta o projektörün dolaşması görsellik olarak da çok hoş bir şey. Öte yandan Deniz Feneri evrensel bir simge. Dünyanın her yerinde bu simge aynı çağrışımları yapar. Deniz Feneri, gecenin bir vakti, hangi uyruktan olursa olsun, büyük ya da küçük deniz taşıtlarına ışık tutar, yol gösterir. Böylece Deniz Feneri programı Şehir ve Ramazan’ın içinden içinden çıkarak daha fonksiyonel daha yaygın daha yurt çapında bir yardımlaşma dayanışma programına dönüştü” (Kocak, 2003: 30-31, emphases added).

With the unexpected success of the program⁶⁸, as reflected in program ratings, and the growing amount of donations and requests of aid, the major objective of the TV program has been more or less settled and has hardly changed during these 11 years. Regarding the poor, this objective had been to learn the life-stories of the poor, show and publicize the problem of extreme urban and rural poverty. In the issue of poor relief, the poverty alleviation activities of the program began to answer who are the poor for the community of audiences and the program. According to the Secretary General, during this period the program primarily aims to assist “the poorest of the poor”, who are socially invisible from rest of the Turkish society (Ozbek, 2006). Regarding the charitable, the program’s visual template enables the charitable and addressed audience firstly to attest the reality of the poor broadcast on TV and secondly to watch the moments of enjoyment of the publicly attested poor, when their suffering is appeased and relieved through assistance and aid. This act of assistance, in turn, makes the Deniz Feneri Association as a righteous visual platform, which seeks and rescues the real poor and enables its addressed audiences to perform their kind-heartedness, mercy and compassion for the real needy.

Since the program began to define who can be considered as the poor in media; it also, intentionally or unintentionally, began to separate who deserve assistance and compassion and who do not deserve in its entirety. In this respect, the program conducted the poorest of the poor as a compassionate maxim, since they cannot provide their fundamental and physiological needs with their own economic

⁶⁸ The unexpected success of the program, which began in Ramadan and continued in prime-time, also triggered a series of other, similar TV programs on other TV channels and radio shows on private radio stations. These programs and shows ultimately aim to assist the poor, within the wider socio-economic context, created by the late 90’s recession. Among those programs, the national ones were “Yarınlar Umut Olsun” on ATV, “Yetiş Bacım” and “Babacan” on TGRT and “Kimse Yok mu?” on Samanyolu TV (still running) and several others on regional TV and radio channels with different discourses to cover poverty and strategies to deal with this rapidly increasing visibility of new poverty regime of Turkey. Currently, the Deniz Feneri Association also sells its program to be broadcasted on local TV channels and this is another means of expanding the local audience base of the program.

power; they certainly and definitely need assistance. This means, “the poorest of the poor” are, due to their failure to satisfy their primary needs, in need of in kind and in cash assistance of rest of the society. This relation of the assistance is constructive in the program in the sense that, it defines the fundamental characteristic of being poor and being seen as poor, thus the social attitude towards the poor. In this respect, the satisfaction of basic needs of the poorest of the poor, the lowest strata among the poor in the discourse of association, from the perspective of governmentality also sets a particular definition of the poor for the program and its audiences.

Accordingly, the poor are those who cannot provide their primary physiological needs such as food, shelter, healthcare and water. This process of categorization renders them viewable and therefore assessable and assist-able by rest of the society. Put otherwise, this dual act sets poverty for the audiences as failure to sustain primarily the well-being of family due to lacking subsistence means. This is where the caring intervention and assistance of the program is a social necessity.

It is clear that the content of the assistance, provided by the program, and its identification of “haves” and “have-nots” of the poor on TV, also intentionally or unintentionally, sets the limits for the say-able and non-say-able and practicable and non-practicable against poverty within the discursive boundaries of the program. The one thing should be said on this boundary-marking act of the program, from the perspective of governmentality, is its being characteristic form of visibility of “the poor” in the program. Briefly, the poor are visualized and visualize-able if and only if they fail to achieve certain subsistence level. Or they should be orphans, widows, women with dependent children, elderly and disabled who have financial problems to earn their basic livelihood. And when they fail to achieve certain subsistence, they come to be defined as the real poor or truly needy by the program. This very failure

is the condition they should meet to be taken care of compassionately by rest of the society for the program. During the development of the program, to reach “the poorest of the poor”, really needy and truly poor and bring these people available to rest of the society by means of a TV program eventually became a regulatory and legitimizing ideal both in the program and later day association. This act is clearly a legitimizing one, as every discursive and ideological operation is, by situating the social question into an onto-ethical/political basis of life and death and out-of the boundaries of the ideology and culture, therefore forestalls possible critiques, directed by other social policy actors and their conceptions of poverty alleviation.

Briefly, as it was explicated above there are three constructions at work in the early days of the program. Accordingly, the poor are those who fail to sustain their lives; the rest are the people who assist the poor to sustain their lives. The program is also nothing but a life-saving platform. As it will be shown in the following chapters of this thesis, none of these imaginations in the discursive practice map of the program and later day association have remained stable. Throughout the years, within the program some discursive elements remained relatively intact some were not. Among the changing constructions, the most historically constant one is the role of being bridge between the poor and charitable. The role of being bridge between the poor and charitable and recasting the problem of poverty into onto/moral basis of life and death of the poorest of the poor are basically fending off mechanisms to forestall criticisms, where the program just acts as a “modest” bridge between two parties. And to enact these conceptions of the poor and poverty as well as the charity and the charitable in 1998, the Deniz Feneri Association was established. Next part of this chapter will analyze the institutional history of the association from 1998 to 2002.

The Deniz Feneri Association: Years 1998-2002

In 1998, the Deniz Feneri Association⁶⁹ was established with a legally binding charter. According to the statute of the association, the association aims to supply all kinds of physical and psychological assistance through aid in kind and cash, in respect of such items as food, clothing, health, training, fuel for heating, rent, shelter, marriage, establishing new families, business, housing and other relevant items to people in time of natural disasters, warfare and general poverty. This organizational transformation has endowed the association with various rights and entitlements since 1998.⁷⁰

There are several external political factors that pushed the program to institutionalize its status. Alongside the increasing number of requests for assistance and donations, which is referred to in the discourse of the association as “grace and courtesy”, among those external factors, the political context within which the institutionalization process of the association took place, the February 28 process, has a particular significance. As it was previously argued, this process aimed to re-establish the military-Kemalist and secular basis of the Republican ideology against Islamic groups, politics and civil society organizations in Turkey. During the February 28 Process, Islamist groups and networks were claimed to abuse the funds and people’s trust and faith, with their crimes due in no small measure to their

⁶⁹ In order to achieve certain degree of transparency and accountability in its activities, the program transformed itself into an association. On the other hand, the term "foundation" originates in civil law jurisdictions, where it is used to describe a distinct legal entity. A foundation has legal personality, and is entered in a public registry like a company. Unlike a company, it has no shareholders. It holds assets in its own name for the purposes set out in its constitutive documents, and its administration and operation is carried out in accordance with contractual rather than fiduciary principles. The foundation has a distinct patrimony independent of its founder. Foundations are often set up for charitable purposes. The foundation finds its source in institutions of medieval times when a patron would establish a foundation to endow a monastery or other religious institution in perpetuity (OED).

⁷⁰ Especially under the EU enlargement process that created The New Law of Associations, entered into force in 2004. In addition, Cabinet of Ministry Resolutions drastically changed the legal status of the association, endowing it with the right to collect donations without legal permission.

lacking transparency and accountability in their national and international assistance activities. In addition, these organizations and groups were accused of discriminating on the basis of religion and religious doctrines in their national and international activities.

This political context has a particular significance, as the association, being broadcast on an Islamist or pro-Welfare Party TV channel, has chosen to develop strong financial reporting and audit procedures to prevent any similar potential allegations in the future. Put another way, the political and governmental effects of the “February 28 Process” on the association indirectly forced the religious civil society organizations in Turkey to develop an “audit” culture⁷¹ to forestall similar possible allegations. However, as the recent scandal of the Deniz Feneri e.V showed, it is not wrong to assume that civil society organizations are apt to create new channels to violate the laws and appropriate the discourse of audit culture.

During this period the association began to develop certain niches within its structure. Among these niches, the most significant are those which aim to ascertain the claimants’ real poverty. As a way of acquiring certain cultural and symbolic capital within the public life of Turkey in its poor relief activities, the association transferred its “viewing” culture of poor into an organizational yet changing practice of social inspection and revision visits. In poor relief and poverty relief activities the association continued to assist primarily “the poorest of the poor” of the Turkish society, which also allowed the association to claim that it uses the resources where “they were the most extremely needed”. “The poorest of the poor” in the associational discourse are the people who are helped in non-crisis, non-natural or

⁷¹ The audit culture, as Shore and Wright pointed out (1999), covers “certain neoliberal techniques of increasing workplace productivity, reducing transactions into crude/quantifiable inspect-able templates as oppose to bureaucratic operations, increasing surveillance and recording techniques and viewability of the subjects in given fields and disciplining them with new coercive yet innovative techniques” (p. 857).

man-made disaster situations. They are primarily the elderly, widows, orphans, and abandoned women with dependent children, women-headed households due to separation and disabled people. When one considers the audience base of the Channel 7 of the association, it is a strategic decision to represent divorced women as abandoned or as if the divorce took place after the abandonment of the women by her husband to prevent public disfavor. Here gendered and age-based “traditional” poverty conceptions in Turkish society merge with certain rhetoric of forestalling certain social risk and vulnerability in the association. Since the social risks and hazards are not met by the state and official welfare mechanisms anymore, those risks do not only influence those vulnerable groups but all of society. In the issue of poverty and the poor, the most haunting risk groups or in other words most vulnerable groups such as widows and abandoned women with dependent child can cause risk of dissolution of moral society and families, orphans can become criminals and women-headed households can cause public nuisance among the local population without the compassionate intervention of the association.⁷² Thus, the

⁷² In the association, it is not possible for donors to choose whom to help (i.e. Muslim/non-Muslim, “headscarf-using/not-using, Kurdish/Turkish, according to the hegemonic lines of cleavage in Turkish society in recent period); however, the donors can request from the association to assist widows and abandoned women with dependent children, the elderly, and people with medical issues and children. On the other hand, the international poor relief project locations of the association are predominantly Muslim countries, or the countries which had “ties” with Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, although there is no anthropological study about how and why the assist-ability of the widows and abandoned women as social categories emerged in Turkey, most of the studies deal with the issues, quite understandably, of citizenship, political participation, motherhood, mother, child and nation relations and sisterhood (Kandiyoti, 1997).

In this context, it is not wrong to argue that there are cultural fantasies at work regarding the widow and abandoned woman, who by definition lack the controlling gaze of their husbands/or their elderly over themselves. In this universe of male fantasies, the widow and abandoned woman should be reminded that they are part of a social fabric through the assistance of the other members of the social fabric. As part of these fantasies, due to their lack of proper/intimate male gazes [of father, brother, uncle and husband...] over themselves, they can easily jeopardize the very unity of this fabric and became thread against its very unit, the family.

In this relation, the assistance becomes a reminder as well corrective gift, an item to tame, for those who are by definition prone to transgress the very boundary of this social fabric. Interestingly, in the history of Islam, the alms, sometimes, used to convert non-Muslims to Islam, and make them part of Islamic polity (Musallam, 2005). For a brilliant discussion on the woman, social fabric and social sexuation, see (Žižek, 1994). For an anthropological and historical analysis on the priority of widows and orphans in social welfare provision in the United States, see (Kleinberg, 2006).

Deniz Feneri Association enables the so-called subaltern religious and conservative people, daunted by the February 28 Process, to join to work against this danger of moral, social and cultural decay.

In this respect, what one sees in the association, as Cakir rightly points out (Cakir, 2003) is a subsistence based conception of poverty alleviation, merged with gendered, cultural, hegemonic and religious conceptions of the poor, which divide the poor into categories of “real”, and “unreal” and “deserving and “undeserving”. And in addition, alongside the constructions of the primary physiological needs, the association extensively used particular positions in Turkish society such as orphaned, ill, elderly, abandoned, widowed and unschooled child to denote the poor.

During this fieldwork, it was observed that this activity and selection of “the poorest of the poor” as a target group in the poor relief activities of the association is also a consequence of particular organizational fear and of the need to forestall the possible criticisms and allegations from the public about giving assistance to those who are not “really” deserving. Clearly, the concept of really deserving is totally up to the compassionate public. Thus, not to evoke public disfavor, the association assists people without public healthcare provisions such as SSK, Bağ-Kur, Emekli Sandığı and Green-Card. Although the association assists those who are temporarily unemployed; it does not aim to assist those, usually considered as men, who can work according to the association, as program does in a visual fashion.

During this fieldwork, a small controversy has emerged when singing competition winner, Ms X.⁷³, expressed her and her chronically ill mother’s gratitude to the Deniz Feneri Association on TV in 2007. The donors called to call center and threatened the association to quit supporting the association. The reasons given are

⁷³ Name is upheld due to the already disrespected privacy of the singing competition winner.

the daughter had won a prize for her singing and her mother had artificially colored blonde hair, she dressed nicely and talking on the television, not about their poverty but her daughter's success. The association immediately announced that Ms X. and her mother would no longer receive aid, because they were not fit into the category of the poor due to her prize. In the following dates, the issues whether or not the poor can color their hair, to talk about an issue other than their poverty and desperation, to talk other than to cry, and to join singing contest were debated among higher and lower rank employees.

The regulatory ideal of assisting those who are really poor is also used to vilify the poor rather than a dysfunctional bureaucracy and dysfunctional public-civil society relations by the association. As U. Arslan argued in an interview,

Question: And the assistance reaches people who are truly in need (This should be a question, but it is not, so it is quoted directly).

Answer: We maintain maximum diligence on this issue. Abuses hinder the real needy people from receiving the assistance. There are people who are not even trying to collect assistance from somewhere. The families from the TV program or the families who receive assistance are families that they have no income, nobody working and no chance to support themselves. No other fact is taken into consideration but being in a quite needy situation while determining which families to send aid to ("Ugur Arslan'la Röportaj", 2002).⁷⁴

⁷⁴ Q-Yardımlar gerçek ihtiyaç sahiplerini buluyor (This should be a question but it is not, so it is quoted directly).

A- Bu konuda elden gelen titizlik gösteriliyor. Suistimaller gerçek ihtiyaç sahiplerinin yardıma ulaşmasını bile engelleyebiliyor. Buradan, beş buradan topladığı yardımlarla geçinmeye çalışmaya bile gerek duymadan yaşamak isteyenler bile var. Bizim gerek ekrana çıkardığımız gerek dernek olarak yardım ettiğimiz kişiler hiçbir yerden geliri olmayan, kendilerine bakacak veya evlerinde çalışabilecek kimsesi olmayan ailelerdir. Bu tespitler yapılırken kişilerin gerçek ihtiyaç sahibi olmaları dışında başka bir faktör dikkate alınmıyor ("U. Arslanla Röportaj", 2002).

From 1998 to 1999, until the Marmara Earthquake⁷⁵, the share of the association in the civil welfare and social service provision activity of Turkey remained relatively small. Although the program was still enjoying high-ratings, the association was relatively unknown in the public sphere. In the transformation of the association, this natural and political event provided the ground for the activities of the association to become publicized and heard. This event is also a peak point for the perceived failure of the state and state-led initiatives to carry out their duty to protect the lives and rights of its citizens. The view that the army, state-led Civil Search and Rescue Teams, (although it is not a state-led initiative) the Red Crescent Society and the wider state could not protect the Turkish citizens gained strong prominence in Turkish society for a short period of time (Kaleli, 2001; Ipek, 2006).

In that sense, this tragic “event” which left 30,000 people dead according to the official estimates and innumerable homeless, largely legitimized the urgent need for civil initiative in the Turkish public and brought new terms for the wider social context amongst civil-public-media-business-think tank and trade unions lead network of governmentality in a global sense, outlined in CHAPTER I. In this new context, created by civil society organizations, decreasing public expenditures of Turkish state, the February 28 Process, and media and media-based opinion formers

⁷⁵ During this period, the tragic Marmara Earthquake significantly altered the existing civil society structures and their position in public and social imagery. As Jalali argued (2002), “though in the aftermath of the earthquake, Islamist and political organizations were targeted by army and other state bodies as they help people on the basis of religiosity, take advantage of the situation to criticize the state; the earthquake clearly, as a natural and political breach, enabled the Islamist and political associations to join larger framework of civil society in order to legitimize themselves. Though civil society and human capital development like organization of Islamic organizations in post-earthquake period, which concentrate mostly on social service delivery rather than Islamic transformation or revolution has not researched, in broad sense the earthquake represents a benchmark political event of this transformation. As Jalali argued, since disasters are also political events, which incubate newer political contexts with pre-disaster political and institutional arrangements” (p. 121); the tragic Marmara earthquake in this respect provides certain crystallization of the rites and rituals of Turkish state bureaucracy in social assistance provision in the gaze of Turkish public. To see how much degree, this crystallization is subversive and critical to state, civil society and army (Kaleli, 2001) and (Ipek, 2006).

and power brokers, the earthquake represents a political breach and marks a transformation of the governmental regime in Turkey.

Although the earthquake took place within the political context set by the February 28 Process, the association in this period remained attentive to the state and army led potential criticisms, by using the strategies mentioned above. During this period, the discourse of the association was shaped by a “modest” and “fending off” attempt to forestall the criticisms raised by different actors such as the state, army, media and civil society, while staying away from corruption. Furthermore, the association during this period developed a discourse of the unification of various social “segments” of Turkish society, as the quotations from M. Kutlu demonstrate below, on the basis of the fight against poverty for a good cause. This fighting for a good cause and working for the economically disadvantaged ones unite the “disparate” yet “morally uncorrupted” groups of Turkish society. As M. Kutlu argued in an interview,

For a long period of time, I said that we should continue our broadcasting in accordance with our belief and thoughts; supporting the needy, aggrieved people without any discrimination and that we should insist on this concept in each program and that we should be “the voice of silent masses”. These slogans were used for a while in that time. The Deniz Feneri received a great deal of attention, far above and beyond what I had estimated. The Association has spread out of Turkey. Later on, once it had the legal status of an association; it reached the highest point that could be expected by really transforming the soul of people working for the association and the people who are contributing to the association as into a united body. For instance, they say, health institutions are working as sponsors and advertising their companies. There are some criticisms like that. Personally I, congratulate any advertisement of these companies who go so very far as to find people and help them. Some give their name while some choose not to. They are being kind in doing this. I congratulate both the ones named and the ones who are anonymous. There is no need to demonstrate the situation of Turkey right now. The suffering of millions of hungry people is very clear. The protest demonstrations were being held in front of the prime minister’s office until yesterday. I think they ,as a civil society organization, did a mighty, pious and extraordinary job with their members, board of directors, aid

downers, TV staff, drivers and carriers because they completed this program by embracing all people without any discrimination in terms of any party, society, congregation, association, religious sect or understanding (Kocak, 2003).⁷⁶

This quotation demonstrates how plurality is conceived in the discourse of the association. Accordingly, plurality is constructed in terms of quasi-religious and communal relations such as sect, organization, party, group and belonging. And then unification is achieved over the distinctions of community, sect, belief, party, network and order. These distinctions in the discourse of the association have been represented in terms of dress codes, ideas, understandings, cultural, sectarian, nationalities and communal differences, income level and locality. Thus, the two elements of the association maintain the public reliability of its modest attempt of unification around the subject of poor relief, neoliberal accountability, transparency and audit culture. Whilst the accountability and audit culture defined and identified in terms of financial transactions and processes, coming together and working for a compassionate cause, in turn, enables the association to fantasize about and represent itself as a hegemonic uniting force the “deeply” divided Turkish society along several lines.

⁷⁶ “.....Bundan 3 sene, 4 sene, 5 sene evvel asıl yolumuzun belki netice itibariyle kendi düşünce ve inançlarımız doğrultusunda bütün Türkiye için hiçbir ayırım yapmaksızın, mazlumdan, yoksuldan, zarurete düşmüşten yana olan bir yayın sürdürmemiz gerektiğini, bu anlayışı her programda takip etmemiz gerektiğini, “Sessiz Kalabalıkların Sesi” olmamız gerektiğini söylemişimdir. O günlerde bu sloganlar kullanıldı bir süre. Deniz Feneri tahminlerimin ötesine geçen bir ilgi gördü. Bütün Türkiye dışına taşı. Daha sonra dernek hüviyeti de alarak, burada işe koyulan arkadaşlarımızın çok büyük feragat ve çalışmalarıyla buna katkıda bulunan bütün insanların bu hareketi yani ruhu bir vücuda dönüştürerek çok büyük bir noktaya, yani dernekten umulabilen en büyük noktaya çıktı. Mesela diyorlar ki sağlık kuruluşları sponsor olarak çalışıyor, kendi reklamını yapıyor. Böyle bir takım tenkitler var. Ben vallahi o dağ başlarına gidip, insanlara yardımlara giden her kuruluşun reklamına helal olsun diyorum. İnsanlar çıkıyor oraya kimisi isim veriyor, kimisi isim vermiyor. Bir takım iyilikler yapıyorlar. Verenlere de helal olsun vermeyenlere de helal olsun. Şu an Türkiye’nin durumunu anlatmaya gerek yok zaten. Açlık sınırına gelmiş milyonlarca insanın yaşadığı ıstırap ortada zaten. Daha düne kadar Başbakanlığın önünde gösteriler yapılıyordu. Bunların bir sivil toplum kuruluşu olarak, herhangi bir parti, toplum, cemaat, cemiyet, mezhep, tarikat ve herhangi bir anlayış ayrılığı göstermeksizin, bütünü kucaklayan bir anlayışla bu programı kotarmış olmaları, bunun dernek üyeleriyle, yönetim kuruluyla yardım yapanlarla, televizyonun kendi kadrosuyla, şoföründen taşıyıcına kadar bence çok mübarek, çok muazzam ve çok olağanüstü bir iş yapılmasıdır” (Kocak, 2003).

Since the analysis of the distinctions of Islamist politics in Turkey goes well beyond the scope of this thesis; what will be delineated here is the “refraction” of poverty alleviation activities and welfare provision, once conducted by the Turkish state, as a nest of political and discursive possibilities for a community of audiences and supporters of the program and association. Whilst this nest of political and discursive possibilities unites seemingly disparate groups in Turkish society; it also transcends the cultural, political and sectarian distinctions within the category of the rest. Hence, the act of charity by uniting seemingly disparate groups in society and pre-empt the not-so-important fiscal, material, cultural differences among them through moral war against poverty; it has some “unintended” but “tolerable” consequences. Among these, to do charity for public recognition and political gain is the primary one. However in the association, the higher rank employees give a practical-pragmatic “answer” to this unintended consequence. Accordingly, as long as these people are helping the poor through the association, and as long as their intentions are ultimately known by God, it is not right to criticize them on this basis.

During this fieldwork, it has been observed several times that this religious and pragmatic rationalization of the given possibility is cunningly used to forestall those criticisms regarding the donors. Since their intentions cannot be known by the people, it is meaningless to criticize those people on this basis for the higher rank employees. The association attracted great deal of attention from media personalities, singers, radio-program hosts, and actors and actresses. However, each and every donor is not well publicized by the association. On the contrary, not to publicize the relations between several enterprises and the association, the Islamic-moral principle of “to hide the assistance and aid” is strategically used against my questions on relations between several enterprises and the association. Clearly, the poor are not

tolerated. One might almost say that by being poor they are excluded from religious considerations which might forestall their being criticized. The poor are subjected to variety of practices, measures, social inspection processes and discourses by the association to achieve the accountability that they are distributing the donations to the real “needy”; these practices will be delineated in the following chapter of this thesis. In this context, the only compassionate treatment reserved for the poor is the presence of the donors who treat them emphatically and not hurting their feelings in the moment of giving.

As U. Arslan argued,

“We are doing this as an act of benevolence. We see ourselves like one of them and empathize with them. Sometimes they cry and sometimes we. We do not generally understand how this happened. Then they understand that we give them benevolently. We do not see the Deniz Feneri solely as a TV program. The program eventually became a program to talk with the poor whose numbers unfortunately reach ten thousands orphans and the elderly about their grievances. We did not judge them and despise them. We felt them and shared our feelings with thousands of donors and philanthropists (“U. Arslanla Röportaj”, 2002).⁷⁷

The moral ability of empathizing with the poor clearly defines the aid-giver other than the aid-recipient. As Simmel argued (1971) to this consequence of the aid relation with the poor, “in the extreme case, the poor disappear completely as legitimate subjects and central foci interests involved. The motive for alms then resides exclusively in the significance of giving for the giver” (pp. 153-4).

In addition to this uniting function of the poor relief, in the organizational level the strategic organizational policies of accountability, non-discrimination and

⁷⁷ Biz bunu gönülden yapıyoruz. Kendimizi onlardan biri gibi görüyoruz. Onların duygularını yüreğimizde hissediyoruz. Kimi zaman onların gözyaşlarına bizim gözyaşlarımız da karışabiliyor. Bunun nasıl olduğunu anlamıyoruz çoğu zaman. O zaman içten verdiğimiz anlıyorlar. Deniz Feneri programını salt bir program olarak görmüyoruz. Yurdumuzda maalesef onbinlere ulaşan fakir, yoksul ve kimsesizlerle dertleşme, onlarla paylaşma programı oldu bir nevi. Onları yargılamadık, aşağılamadık. Onları hissettik ve bu duyguları binlerce yardımseverle paylaştık (“Ugur Arslanla Röportaj”, 2002).

bifurcation of the poor into real and unreal poor enable the association to frame the given criticisms as being on political grounds rather than real concerns over accountability or bias. The association usually does not mention the institutional or official sources of allegations, in order not to provoke the Turkish state and army. Within this context, the Deniz Feneri as an association and program only criticizes those who do not act with solidarity and continue their “insensitive”, “alienated”, “sterile”, “immodest” and “extravagant” lifestyles, in a context marked by successive financial crises in Turkey. In this context, solidarity emerges as the only option to soothe the financial effects of the ensuing financial crisis over the poor. This selective-blindness towards structural problems is a characteristic of Turkish conservatism, as it was shown in various studies (Bora and Erdogan, 2003). This redressing criticism while lacking certain corporate addressees such as the Turkish state, the structural inequalities in Turkish society, and capitalism; it individualizes the question of poverty and collective action against poverty by framing the issue of poverty in terms of the life-styles, moral values, and the lack or waning power of social solidarity. As M. Kaya argued in the first bulletin of the Deniz Feneri Association (2001),

This magazine, the Deniz Feneri “The Magazine of Others”, of which you hold the first one in your hands, is the magazine form of a message that all of you know very well; that dear Ugur has been trying to deliver for 3 years, sometimes with tears in his eyes and sometimes with happiness on his face. The initial and predominant subject of this magazine which started with the preliminary name of the Deniz Feneri “The Magazine of Others” are the “other people”. Their lives, the difficulties they face, the places where they live or take shelter, their desolation and abandonment-, their stories are going to be told. *Our magazine is addressed to you, not them, as being a mirror of the life of the “other people”. Surely it will reach out to all the literate, but it will address our dear readers who will understand the situation of these people, share their sorrow and do something to help them.*

Here is an alternative magazine, beside the lifestyle magazines that encourage luxury, extravagance and ostentation, thereby deepening the social gulf and sensation of mutual isolation and inspirational magazines which cannot go further than being a waste of paper and material, here is a beautiful magazine which has the same aesthetic and visual appeal, maybe a little modest in the materials used, but can easily be put on tables, in offices or waiting rooms to spread a more worthwhile social message.

This magazine is a guide of charity and goodness to you.

An exceptional magazine that you can have, tells your friends about, and offer suggestions to people who don't have any idea where to send their charity. This magazine is being published with no expenditure but only through your advertisements. But with ads which will bring you prestige. So we hope you will allow our selectivity. The magazine that you have in your hands is the first in Turkey and maybe in the world (pp.1-3, my translation).⁷⁸

As this quotation demonstrated, the earlier phases of the association were based on several external political and natural events and internal needs. Among those needs to meet the emotional courtesy and grace of the Turkish public as a compassionate, empathizing, modest yet active visual and organizational template of social solidarity is the major one. What one also sees, however, is the consolidation of the role of bridging between the poor and rest of the society in the association. The association, while it establishes itself as a bridging the structural gap between the poor and philanthropists concurrently makes the urban and rural poverty visible, decodable

⁷⁸ Deniz Feneri, "Öteki İnsanların Magazini" adı altında ilk sayısını elinize aldığınız iş bu derginiz, üç yıldır sevgili Uğur'un Kanal 7 televizyonda kah gözyaşlarını ekranına katık ederek, kah nispeten neşeyle ulaştırmaya çalıştığı o bildiğiniz mesajın dergileşmiş hali.

Deniz Feneri "Öteki İnsanların Magazini" ön taslak ismiyle yayına başlayan bu derginin öncelikli ve ağırlıklı konusu "öteki insanlardır". Onların yaşamları, sıkıntıları, karşılaştıkları zorluklar, yaşadıkları ya da sığındıkları yerler, kimsesizlikleri, terk edilmişlikleri...onların hikayeleri anlatılacak.

Dergimiz "öteki insanlar"ın hayatının bir aynası olurken, onlara değil size hitap edecek. Hoş, okuma yazması olan herkese hitap edecek ama, size darken: bu insanların halleri ile hallenebilen, dertlerini ve sıkıntılarını paylaşabilen, elinden birşey gelebilen siz sevgili okurlarımızı kastediyorum.

İşte size alternatif bir magazin. Zenginlerin kendi çalıp kendi oynadıkları, lüksü, israfı, gösterişi kışkırtan, toplumsal uçurumları derinleştiren life style dergileri ve kağıt ve malzeme israfından öteye gidemeyen sansasyon ve asparagas dergilerinin yanında, estetik ve titizlik bakımından ondan aşağı kalmayan, belki kullanılan malzeme bakımından nispeten mütevazı, ama büronuza, masanıza, işyerinizin bekleme salonlarına rahatlıkla koyabileceğiniz güzellikte bir dergi.

Size bir hayır ve iyilik rehberi

Elinizin altında bulunduracağınız, dostlarınıza tavsiye edebileceğiniz, bilmeyenlere ve tanımayanlara yardımlarını nereye yapabileceklerini tavsiye edebileceğiniz müstesna bir dergi.

Bu dergi hiçbir masraf yapmadan sizin ilanlarınızla çıkmaktadır. Ama size prestij katacak ilanlarınızla. O yüzden seçiciliğimizi hoş göreceğinizi umarız. Elinizdeki dergi Türkiye'de ve belki de dünyada bir ilktir (pp. 1-3,).

and therefore “understandable” and assist-able for the donor and supporter community of the association. This role is central to the organizational discourse of the association. As is clear this bridging activity has political consequences from the perspective of governmentality for those who are objectified and for those who support this objectification with their emotional courtesy and good grace.

From now on, I would consider the question of “how are the bridging and mediating functions understood, practiced and represented in the association? And “what are the political consequences of these functions for the supporters and the poor in a political context marked in aftermath of the 2002 general elections?

The Transformation: Years 2002-2006

In 2002, the newly-established Justice and Development Party (JDP) won the general election. Though the JDP was established by the younger generation of the Welfare and Virtue Party members, from the JDP’s first beginnings to the present it has articulated a particular neoliberal and neoconservative outlook in its political and economic program, rather than a narrowly Islamist and identity-politics based agenda unlike the Virtue Party. This particular overlapping of Islamism, EU-committed political agenda and conservative and neoliberal outlook enabled the JDP to address a “broad” scope of voters and gather various political and class identities, varying from the Kurdish notables to Islamists to conservatives as a hegemonic force under its auspices. The JDP was able to gain popular support from various socio-economic classes and groups such as the urban poor, Kurdish dissenters, Islamists, conservatives-democrats, and right-wing pundits.

In this political context, during and after 2002 elections, Channel 7, which hosts the TV program and has strong links with the association, decisively turned to support the conservative-democratic JDP rather than the Felicity Party (successor of the Virtue Party, which was banned by Constitutional Court in 2001). As part of Channel 7's affiliation and establishment of close-relations with the JDP and new government after the elections, the Deniz Feneri Association emerged as a powerful civil society organization and civil social service provision actor within a complex network of civil, media-based, private, public, national and international actors, whose role gained strong prominence in the provision of social services. Although a particular change in organization of social welfare was on the way, from the 1980s onwards; especially after the 1999 Marmara earthquake in civil society, with the discourse of sharing the burden with the Turkish state, network-like organization of welfare provision gained strong support from so-called ideologically different actors (Ipek, 2006; Bugra, 2007).

From the perspective of social policy, the election of JDP in 2002 with its commitment to a peculiar neoliberal and neoconservative agenda brought a new impetus and direction to social welfare provision in Turkey. The larger political program of the JDP certainly is not a retreat from the state's wider social role. At the level of population, this retreat, as a new governmental strategy, simultaneously opens up a legal, political, cultural and social environment to ally the state with several actors. As part of the program of the JDP, there has also been a reorientation of the already-weak Turkish poverty alleviation policies away from social rights towards selective, conditional, welfare to work schemas-based and targeted poor relief activities in Turkey.

Within this political context, from 2002 to 2006, the Deniz Feneri Association eventually became one of the major social welfare provision actors in Turkey. For this expansion and organizational growth, it has several reasons, which can be grouped as external and internal factors. Among the internal ones, the increasing number of aid requests and donations was the primary one. This dual increase directly forced the association to change its regime of governing the poor and the charitable as well as its organizational and bureaucratic structure to preserve the social capital it enjoyed within civil society. The prominent external causes are the election of the JDP in 2002 elections, the New Law of Associations, which came into force in 2004, the establishment of close formal and personal relations between the JDP government and the association, the entitlement of the association by the Cabinet of Ministry decree in 2004 with the status of working on behalf of public welfare.

Between the years 2002 and 2006, the discourses of association, poverty and charity were not confined anymore to representing the poor and their stories, guiding the good and kind hearted people in doing good; rather in this new context, the discursive possibilities of the association cover a vast array in poor relief, organizational structure and procedures and charity. In poverty, the increasing use of the terms the culture of poverty, the consolidation of the distinctions between deserving and undeserving poor with different technological and organizational means and systems and the construction of the education as a means to alleviate poverty were observed in the bulletins, web-sites, projects and activities of the association (Atalay, 2003; Altan and Bilgili, 2003)

At the organizational level, the term social-corporate responsibility, reviving the sense of solidarity in Turkish society and the dream of the Grand Turkey (Altan

and Bilgili, 2003: 3), stress on the enabling and moderator role of the state (Ibid) which has strong similarities with Thatcher's reorganization of the welfare provision in UK, and the role of reviving Ottoman charities in former Ottoman territories began to be observed.

As part of its evolving views of poverty and eventual neoliberalization and right-wing alignment, the two sources of organizational power, namely the knowledge, number and profiles of the aid-recipients of the association and the financial and political power of the donations, enabled the association to "diversify the existing language of civil welfare activities in Turkey, which in turn, set new goals for the association. These goals are "Aid Management" and "Eradicating/Consuming Poverty" and interestingly producing one's own modernity (Altan and Bilgili, 2003: 7). In this respect, within the association, especially among the higher ranks, the political potential of working in poor relief is well-recognized as the above mentioned article, whose writers are the Secretary General and a member of the advisory academic board of Poverty Research Center, showed. Though neither Altan nor Bilgili used the term neoliberalism, their analysis is partially true in their diagnosis of the Deniz Feneri Aid and Solidarity Association as a platform to produce one's own local and moral platform to fight against poverty, to conduct the population and to secure the Turkish family against social risks for itself and rest of the society. As it was stated in the "Symposium of Poverty" in 2003,

Poverty in Turkish society has not exceeded the danger limit terms of behavior especially during resulted in the recent economic crises. Thanks to the effect of the dynamics of traditional solidarity of family and kinship of the society. So the family has a buffer mechanism function here. However this situation came up with the malfunctioning of family and the danger of not being able to carry out its same buffering function a second time emerged. Because the poverty has become a fact that increases the risk of facing social and psychological problems for the

family members and the risk of dissolution for the family itself (Ibid: 2).⁷⁹

To see this vast array of transformations, it is sufficient to look at a several articles from the Deniz Feneri Bulletin, in which the General Manager of the association, Y. Atalay, addresses the charitable and donors (2003).

We seek to kill an animal as a sacrifice by proxy - either of your or your friends - like we have done in the past to give them to poor people, initially to widows and orphans. People of this country must not obtain their food from garbage heaps or waste. This is so sad. So all of us must share in this social responsibility and must give support by donating to the Deniz Feneri Association. We request your sacrifices for those helpless and hungry children and for the poor mothers who try to feed their children. *The public spirit of this country has not abandoned the poor of the country and will not hereafter. This pious activity will not stop until we reach out to the last poor person.* I, hereby, congratulate your feast of the sacrifice and I hope all of you can have many merry feasts (p. 5, emphases added, my translation).⁸⁰

Alongside these moral responsibilities of the donors and the nation towards *their* poor, the second quotation, below, in this respect, proposes the individual level determination of the poor by cooperation among various institutions, civil society organizations, army and citizens. The guiding principles and practices of this individual determination are highly technical yet functional cooperation and good conduct practice and new social policy orientations in a network, composed of civil

⁷⁹ “Türk toplumunda yoksulluk, özellikle son yıllarda yaşanan iktisadi krizlere rağmen davranım olarak tehlike sınırını geçmemiş ise aile ve akrabalık temelinde var olan geleneksel yardımlaşma ve dayanışma türünden dinamiklerin etkisi sayesinde olmuştur. Yani kurum olarak aile burada tampon mekanizma işlevi görmüştür. Fakat bu durum ailenin yorulması sonucunu doğurmuş, aynı fonksiyonu ikinci kez yerine getirememesi tehlikesi belirmiştir. Çünkü yoksulluk aile için parçalanma, aile üyeleri için ise sosyal ve psikolojik problemlerle karşılaşma riskini artıran bir olgu haline gelmiştir”(Ibid: 2).

⁸⁰ “Her kurban dönemi olduğu gibi hem sizin hem çevrenizdekilerin kurbanlarını vekaleten kesmeye ve başta dul ve yetim olmak üzere ihtiyaç sahiplerine ulaştırmaya talibiz. Bu ülkenin insanı çöpten veya Pazar artıklarından yiyeceğini temin etmek zorunda bırakılmamalı. Bunun için de hepimiz bu sosyal sorumluluktan pay almalı, Deniz Feneri’ne bağışlanması için çalışmalıyız. Bizler kurbanlarınızı o çaresiz aç çocuklar için, çocuklarını doyurmak için çırpınan fakir analar için talibiz. Bu milletin hamiyeti, bu ülkenin yoksulunu sahipsiz bırakmadı, bundan sonra da bırakmayacak. En son yoksula ulaşınca ya kadarda iyilik hareketi devam edecek. Bu vesile ile hepinizin Kurban Bayramı’nı tebrik eder, nice bayramlara mutlulukla kavuşmanızı dilerim” (p. 5, emphases added).

society organizations, army, local officers, state, citizens and volunteers as well as media.

It is widely known that there are some studies concerning the destitution and poverty in our country. Some data is being put forward specifically about the dimensions of poverty and hunger thresholds. Besides, relevant public institutions are investigating the subject statistically and publishing the results and then suggesting solutions concerning the matter. Generally, these cases about the dimensions of poverty are considered as necessary but insufficient efforts. Because it is more important to know who are poor rather than the ratios those put forth by the researches. Unless this is known, any word that is spoken would not work towards solution, be political and be well adapted for a purpose. The most important thing that has to be done urgently is coordinated work of the relevant ministries of state and a concept of mobilization around the country, Department of Religious Affairs, Ministry of Education and other public sources must be activated, teams must be organized and social investigations with defined forms must be evaluated with computers. Those are determined as through evaluations as poor and needy families must be entrusted to those teams and the information of those families must be updated semi-annually. Assuming that there are four million poor families in the country, each teacher should be taking care of eight families. When the staffs of other public institutions are considered in this context, this number will decrease. The software and the recording systems that the Deniz Feneri is using, enable this case study.

Rapid Reaction

Following the evaluation studies, a division of tasks is needed; shareholders who are going to take part in troubleshooting must be determined and a rapid reaction program must be commenced. A neat means of coordination between the public and Civil Society Organizations needs to be established in the rapid reaction program. Any conflict between public and NGOs must be prevented and their rapid reaction areas must be stated very clearly. Subjects like food, health, clothing, fuel for heating, sheltering, education etc., must be prioritized.

Reaction Program for Medium and Long Term

The efforts must be oriented to a permanent solution to the challenge of poverty and bereavement while the rapid reaction program is carried on as the first leg of this solution. Some of the challenges must be met by the government, especially in creating shelter, health and education and creating job opportunities. Civil society organizations, on the other hand, must prioritize studies like qualifying, rehabilitation for social harmony while they are providing aid. People who are distressed with poverty must be returned to normal social life by social rehabilitation studies (Y. Atalay, the Deniz Feneri, 2, 2003: 5–6).⁸¹

⁸¹ “Ülkemizde fakirlik ve yoksulluk sorunu ile ilgili bir takım çalışmaların varlığı herkes tarafından bilinmektedir. Özellikle fakirliğin boyutları ve açlık sınırı gibi konularda çeşitli veriler ortaya konmaktadır. Ayrıca devletin ilgili kurumları da konu ile ilgili istatistiksel araştırmalar yaparlar

The individual based determination, family-based registration and visual and social attestation of the poor and the moral, financial and social modeling/responsibilisation of the donors and nation against its poor, as a coupling strategy enable the association to imagine and perform new social relations for the disparate parties in times of escalating poverty and inequality in Turkey.

In the same discourse, the state should be an enabling state, which creates necessary legal, social, and cultural environment to the civil organizations to work. However, in the context of social policy discipline, the emergence of civil poor relief, as it was stated earlied, usually analyzed in terms of waning power of the public-mechanisms and their replacement with civil initiatives, if not lessening public expenditures. Although these analyses bear certain truth value, the obvious inadequacies of the civil poor relief, need for a regulating, controlling and enabling state was also stated by the civil actors themselves in different media (Atalay, 2003).

Whether or not this statement derives from “genuine” belief in right-based

sonuçlarını yayınlamakta ve sorun etrafında bir takım çözüm önerileri ortaya koymaktadırlar. Genel olarak fakirlik boyutlarını ele alan bu çalışmalar gerekli fakat eksik gayretler olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Zira bu çalışmalarda ortaya konan oranlardan daha önemli olan kimlerin yoksul olduklarının bilinmesidir. Bu bilinmeden söylenecek sözler çözüme uzak, politik ve belirli bir amaca yönelik olarak kalmaya mahkumdur. Bu konuda acilen yapılması gereken ilgili Devlet Bakanlığının koordinatörlüğünde, yurt genelinde bir seferberlik anlayışı ile Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı ve diğer kamu kaynakları harekete geçirilmeli, ekipler oluşturulmalı, tanımlanmış formlarla yapılacak olan sosyal incelemeler bilgisayar ortamında değerlendirilmelidir. Değerlendirmeler sonucunda tespit edilecek fakir ve yoksul aileler oluşturulmuş olan ekiplere emanet edilmeli ve bu ailelerin bilgileri altı ayda bir güncellenmelidir. Ülkemizde dört milyon fakir aile var olduğu varsayımından hareket ettiğimizde, bir öğretmenin sekiz aile ile ilgilenmesi gerekmektedir. Buna başka kurumların personeli katıldığında bu sayı daha da düşmektedir. Deniz Fenerinin kullanmakta olduğu bilgisayar programı ve kayıt sistemi bu çalışmayı mümkün kılacak özelliكتedir.

Acil Müdahale

Yapılan tespit ve değerlendirme çalışmalarından sonra işbölümüne gidilmeli, ortaya çıkan sorunların giderilmesinde rol alacak paydaşlar belirlenerek acil müdahale programı başlatılmalıdır. Acil müdahale programında kamu ile STK'lar arasında uyumlu bir çalışma düzeni kurulmalı, kamu-STK çatışmasına müsaade edilmemeli, kamu ve STK'lar acil müdahale alanlarını net olarak tespit etmelidirler. Acil müdahalede gıda, sağlık, giyim, yakacak, barınma, eğitim vb. Konulara öncelik verilmelidir.

Orta ve Uzun Vade Müdahale Programı

Acil Müdahale, ilk etap çalışması olarak devam ederken diğer yandan yoksulluk ve fakirlik sorununun nihai çözümüne yönelik çalışmalar yapılmalıdır. Özellikle barınma, sağlık ve eğitim, iş edindirme gibi sorunlar devlet tarafından karşılanmalıdır. STK'lar ise bir yandan yardım çalışmalarını sürdürürken, diğer yandan vasıf kazandırma, topluma uyum amaçlı rehabilitasyon çalışmalarına öncelik vermeli. Fakirlik sorunu içinde bunalan insanların yapılacak toplumsal kazanım çalışmalarıyla sosyal hayattaki normal rollerine kavuşmaları sağlanmalıdır” (Y. Atalay, the Deniz Feneri, 2, 2003: 5-6).

conception of poor relief or knowledge of the Deniz Feneri's or any other civil initiative's apparent inefficiencies and inadequacies to provide each and all Turkish citizen a social service is put aside; the civil poor relief clearly is a project to conduct the population under the times of escalating poverty, flexible accumulation, and capitalist restructuring, through its politics of poverty and the poor, alongside the Turkish state.

As Hansen and Stepputat argued (2001) on the ubiquitous character of the state in modern times,

as modern forms of governmentality penetrate and shape human life in unprecedented ways, the practices and sites of governance have also become more dispersed, diversified, and fraught with internal inconsistencies and contradictions. This has not necessarily weakened the state in terms of the capacity of policies and designs to create social effects. The strength of the modern state seems, on the contrary, to be its dispersion and ubiquity. The modern states, of say, Western Europe, are today more diverse, more imprecise in their boundaries vis-à-vis other forms of organization, more privatized and semi-privatized than ever before, more integrated in supranational structures and yet apparently stronger than ever before. The new role of the state, as Helmut Wilke (1992) has argued, to supervise governance by semi-private organizations, local authorities, self-governing bodies of all kinds, NGOs, and so on, rather than actually govern directly (p.16).

Under the light of this comment, since the association posits itself in a position between the philanthropists and the poor; the organizational conduct imagines new relations among the poor, the rest of the society, state and civil society. In addition, during this imagination, its practices of poor relief, organizational accountability and values represent the philanthropists' priorities, beliefs, and discourses of poverty and the poor and vague concept of the Turkish morality and Turkish family structure, who are the fiscal agents of this conducting activity. At the organizational level, the association is aware that, it is more "profitable" to represent and echo these class-based priorities, as long as this refraction brings contextually discriminated religious

and conservative groups and enterprises a moral platform, based on charity, to represent themselves in Turkish society and produce its own regime of governing. Thus, through this platform, it is expected that its corporate and individual supporters, donors and volunteers acquire legitimacy and share in the existing governmental rationality in Turkey in poor relief and poverty alleviation, which lie beyond the ideology, political struggle and political exchange since the activities of the association are simply framed in terms of life and death (of the poor). On this basis, the following chapter will analyze the specific techniques of conducting the poor within the association since they are crucial to understand the demands of the donors and rest of the society from the association.

CHAPTER IV

CURRENT POOR RELIEF SYSTEM OF THE DENİZ FENERİ ASSOCIATION

This chapter is concerned with the current organization of the poor relief system of the Deniz Feneri Association. This organizational system is basically designed to register the poor on the basis of family and it is composed of a technological registration database system called *YOP*⁸², social inspection and revision processes and several entrepreneurial projects, which are based on the equation of unemployment and poverty and being poor with the special psychological, habitual and cultural endowments.

This technological, practical and procedural system has been represented by the association as a highly formalized structure and according to the association this system does not allow personal judgments in registration and evaluation process of the claimants' cases. As Collier and Ong stated (2003), “since the technology simply designates the concrete, substantive form of instrumentally rational action, i.e. budgets, accounting practices, modes of scientific research, and practices of the self” (p.423); the technological system and evaluation process leads the association to divide the poor according to its own lenses and then it enables its subjects such as volunteers and staff, and also aid decision councils to inscribe their own personal, discursive and communal understandings of poverty and the poor onto the claimants.

⁸² YOP is the abbreviated form of *Yardım Organizasyon Programı* (Aid Organisation Programme). In the association, we usually refer the programme as *Yoksul Organizasyon Program* (Poor Organization Program).

This inscription is decisive, since on this basis the association decides who the poor are and who are not; and most importantly who deserve assistance and who do not. The following chapter will analyze the complex relations between technological, official and interpersonal constructions of poverty and the poor in the organizational system of poor relief in association to produce a perspective on civil poor relief in Turkey. Furthermore, the technology, procedures and projects of the Deniz Feneri Association are based on organizational appropriations of the “national”, “international”, “local” and “global” conceptions of poverty and the poor. By doing this, it will show how the most “neutral” and “rational” element, the technology and organizational procedures and projects are discursively constituted, and they empower the association, the charitable, volunteer and the employees, they simultaneously individualizes thus singularizes the poor and the claimants

The Poor Relief System of the Association

The previous chapter explained the transformation of the Deniz Feneri Association’s discourses of poverty and the poor as well as of charity and the charitable from 1996 to the present. This chapter concentrates on the association’s current technological, discursive and ideological practices of alleviating poverty and conducting the poor. This conduct has both “official” and “interpersonal” dimensions. Among the official practices of managing the poor in the association, social inspection questionnaire, the YOP database, social revision and inspection visits and aid decision councils are the prominent ones. However, as I will demonstrate how the interpersonal and official considerations of poverty intertwine inseparably in the Deniz Feneri Association.

As I previously stated, according to the politics of the poor and poverty of the association, poverty is defined in terms of personal and family-based failure to satisfy one's and his family's own primary physiological needs, and thus needing the social and public assistance. By following this definition, the association codes the poor as the claimants and the needy. To provide the poor basic assistance items, the association requests several official documents from the poor in order to attest their poverty. These documents are a copy of the birth certificate, residence certificate, and certificate of penury (obtainable from local mukhtar offices), form-5 household member registration form, official health reports, student certificate and other official documents if available. The association also aims to cancel the certificate of poverty, since I observed that there is a belief that *mukhtars* are not "reliable" and "trustworthy" partners. According to the association, some of the *mukhtars* do not provide the certificates to people who are truly in need, but rather give them to their relatives or friends. Because of this, the association decided to replace the certificate of poverty with a "form 5" document, and thus intended to bypass the role of *mukhtars* as "gatekeepers" to assistance. This role of the *mukhtars* is emphasized in various studies (Bugra and Keyder, 2003), with many of the local and small size associations using the official forms given by the *mukhtars*. The following quotation describes the process of aid request in the association:

First step

When a claimant calls our call center, first thing done is to inform him about the documents that we need to process his file. These documents are the first step to request assistance from the association. Our association demands that the files should be sent by mail to ease the assistance-provision process. Each document sent is registered to YOP database. This is to record every document and to be able to update the individual files. The created files are revised and inspected by our staff and volunteers. During the inspection process, the socio-economic status of the families, family members'

health, education, social security, size and shoe-sizes are recorded. For claimants, who do not reside in Istanbul, the social inspection process is performed with the help of public authorities. In provincial level, we usually work with governorships and in municipal level we usually work with the officials charged with governing a provincial district. The completed social inspection files are sent to aid-decision councils. The items requested by the family are distributed on the basis of availabilities and council-decisions. The decisions taken are performed by the branches. The period of assistance is determined by the needs of the family. There are one-time and periodical assistance provision options.

Emergency- Desk

If needed, families can renew their requests and re-apply our emergency-desk for assistance. Families who complete this process can be broadcasted on screen. By doing this, the association presents its activities to Turkish public. Philanthropists, who donated their aid in cash and in kind items, can view how these aids are used and whom we deliver these items on screen. The Deniz Feneri Association to increase social responsibility and solidarity pays scant attention to this matter (The Deniz Feneri, 2007, my translation).⁸³

After these documents are sent to the association, the cases are processed to the new claimant unit to check and control. During this process, a special form is used. This

⁸³ İlk Adım

Yardım talep eden kişi telefonla, internet yoluyla veya bizzat gelerek derneğimize ulaştığında ona yardımcı olabilmemiz için gereken belgelerin neler olduğu bildirilir. Bu belgeler yardım talep edenlerle ilgili doğru bilgilerin oluşturulması için ilk adımdır. Demeğimiz başvuruların kolaylaştırılması için evrakların posta yoluyla gönderilmesini talep etmektedir. Gönderilen başvuru evrakları ile Yardım Organizasyon Programına kayıt yapılır. Böylelikle yardım talep eden kişiler ve onlara ait bilgiler bilgisayar ortamında kayıt altına alınır ve her türlü gelişme kaydedilerek sürekli güncellenir. Oluşturulan dosya ile İstanbul'da personelimiz ve gönüllü tahkik elemanlarımız aracılığıyla ailenin sosyal incelemesi yapılır, bu inceleme ile ailenin sosyal ve ekonomik durumu rapor edilir, aile fertlerinin öğrenim, çalışma, sağlık ve sosyal güvenceleri, ayakkabı ve beden bilgileri not edilir. İstanbul dışından yapılan başvurularda sosyal inceleme mülki idareler aracılığıyla gerçekleştirilir, illerde valilikten. İlçelerde kaymakamlıktan ailenin durumunu inceleyip rapor etmesi istenir. Sosyal incelemesi tamamlanan dosyalar Yardım Değerlendirme Komisyonunda değerlendirilir. Aileye ihtiyaç duyduğu yardım imkânlarımız ölçüsünde verilir. Alınan kararlar ilgili birimlerce uygulanır. Ailelerin yardım süreçleri o ailenin kendi özel koşullarına göre belirlenir, kimi zaman tek seferlik kimi zaman da periyodik yardımlar yapılmak suretiyle ailelere yardımcı olunur.

Mavi Masa

Yardım yapılan aileler ihtiyaçlarının tekrarlaması veya yeni ihtiyaçların ortaya çıkması durumunda 'mavi masa' birimine bildirerek bunun giderilmesini talep edebilirler. Bu süreci tamamlayarak yardım yaptığımız aileler her hafta Kanal 7'de yayınlanan Deniz Feneri Programı ile ekrana taşınarak çalışmalarımız kamuoyunun takdirine sunulmaktadır. Deniz Feneri Demeği'ne bağlıta bulunarak bu toplumsal dayanışmaya katılan hayırseverler yardımların nasıl ihtiyaç sahiplerine ulaştırıldığını izleyebilmektedir. Deniz Feneri Derneği toplumsal duyarlılığı artırmak, dayanışmayı ve yardımseverliği etkin kılmak bu noktada bir sivil toplum kuruluşu olarak üzerine düşeni yapmakta azami özeni göstermektedir (The Deniz Feneri, 2007)

is called the social inspection form⁸⁴ in the association, and it lies at the heart of the social inspection procedure. The following section of this chapter will delineate this process in detail and will be shown how it enacts peculiar understandings of poverty and the poor in the association.

The Social Inspection Form and Visits

The social inspection form is a questionnaire and is designed as part of the general social inspection procedure of the association to ascertain assistance recipients' social, medical and economic conditions and it is designed to control the veracity of the claims and decide the needs of the poor. The questionnaire is completed during social inspection visits by trained social inspection teams of the association's local branches. In many cases, drivers and cleaning staff are also sent to do social inspection procedure. The social inspection teams are composed of the employees and volunteers. The employees in these teams are usually the lower rank employees. The form, used by these teams, is used to observe the needs, ascertain their poverty and requests of the families and to decide who will get what as aid and assistance from the association. The social inspection form has undergone significant changes since 1998 when the association was established. However, the social inspection teams have remained a stable element within the procedure. The current social inspection form is the fourth version of the form, and this newest version has also undergone five revisions. In order to change the structure of the form, the association

⁸⁴ The latest installment of the social inspection form can be found in Appendices section of this thesis (Appendix B).

conducted a research to reveal the opinions of the association's staff and volunteers in 2004.⁸⁵

According to the quality management unit head and aid decision council member, behind the chronological developments of the form, there is an organizational need and motive to systematize the form, both in terms of the questions and the information obtained from it. The basic reasons behind these changes are to increase the agility of the association to the external situations and problems deriving from the poor, volunteer or staff; to systematize the questionnaire, which will in turn increase the reliability of the database of the association. Hence, according to the same unit manager, the earlier versions of the form and questionnaire gave the social inspection team too much freedom to intervene in the assistance procedure. In this vein, the latter versions of the form aim to reduce the potential for subjective and individual comments, preferring to concentrate upon quantitative data as being more "objective". By quantitative data, the association means the monthly earnings, expenditures and have-s and have-nots of the families. On the other hand, the qualitative data refer to the observations of the social inspection teams, the claimants' narratives, in extreme cases illnesses (if the claimant cannot prove he or a member of his family is ill).

In order to achieve this systematization and to minimize the abuses from both sides, the aid decision councils (who decide who gets what on the basis of the social inspection) are told to evaluate the questionnaire on the basis of "quantitative" variables relating to the "have-s and have-nots" of the family, rather than on qualitative interpretations. In the discourse of the association, the social inspection procedure is represented as smooth formal, non-ideological application, done by

⁸⁵ An old version of social inspection form can be found in Appendices section of this thesis (Appendix C).

trained volunteers and employees. Nevertheless, both the categories to ascertain the poverty of the poor in the form, and the social inspection visits enact peculiar ideologies and discourses about poverty and Turkish society. Basically the form retrieves the data on the basis of family, and the family members can find a place in the form in terms of their needs, and problems rather than as individuals. In addition, the form codifies the poverty in terms of material have-s and have-nots, which are construed as the signs of being poor and not being poor. To measure poverty in terms of families' have-s and have-not discloses a particular understanding of poverty is at work in the association. According to this understanding, poverty is not an unequal relation, which deprives individuals to make choices and to command material objects; rather it is not a process but a situation marked by an individualized failure or lack to own specific material objects from alpha to omega. In this respect, the refrigerator, the cell-phone, television, PC, becomes the material registers of being poor or not being poor for the association, where the commodities are treated as independent entities from the social relations they are produced in and appropriated through.

Furthermore, the form retrieves the information about the personal habits, social security, health condition, family relations, household conditions, workability statuses of the household members. By doing this, the form pins the poor in a web of psychological habits, material haves and have-nots, personal relations, employment, and earnings and expenditures of the family. In the form, the habits of the claimants such as alcohol consumption and cigarette smoking are also recorded. The form also contains a qualitative and evaluation part. This part consists of value-judgments and evaluations of the social inspection team members. Usually, team members wrote their ideas in this part such as “they can work”, “mother is not taking care of her

children”, “they are unmarried”, “their house is bad” and “they are dirty”, “they have psychological problems”, “urgent assistance needed”, “urgent medical condition”, “they are gypsies and easterners”, “there are unschooled children”, “do not assist”, “they are lying” and so on.

In the association, these value judgments, if they are too instructive, create disputes between the social inspection team and aid decision council members, because the latter perceive these directions and judgments as interventions in their decisions. According to some aid decision council members, the intervention violates the organizational bureaucracy, within which the social inspection team is located in lower rank whereas aid decision council members are higher ranks. In the association all of the aid decision council members are managers and middle-rank staffs, whereas the social inspection team members are not. The names of the social inspection team members are written on the form. There are the cases that social inspection process should be renewed just because of the rivalries between aid decision council member and social inspection unit staff. The rivalries are usually derived from different understandings of poverty and the poor, different political party affiliations of the employees, personal rivalries, discussions regarding to whether or not providing assistance for people who have “uncommon” lifestyles⁸⁶ and different conceptions of needs and necessities. Thus, the conceptions of need, society, affiliation, urgency, family, locality, Turkish society, current politics, as well as organizational hierarchies play a decisive role in the formation of aid decisions.

Hence it is not wrong to argue that the complex interactions and organizational

⁸⁶ According to a unit head, there are cases she actively supported to provide aid to transvestites, unmarried couples, single mothers, Kurdish migrants, gypsies, alcohol and substance abusers, seasonal workers, if they really need assistance. Although she is in powerful position to give these decisions, as an aid decision council member, she credited her radical gesture to the richness and tolerance of the Deniz Feneri Association during our conversation (A Dept. head, personal communication, June, 13, 2007).

relations lead to the unsystematic aid decisions, although all the aid recipients are subjected to the same procedure and visits and even though the retrieved data about the poor is quite systematic for its own discursive standards. Thus, not only the social inspection form but also social inspection visits and aid decision councils' decisions enact particular constructions of the poor and poverty in the association.

In some cases, the branch differences are important in aid decisions as well, i.e. whilst the Izmir branch aid decision council members proposing the cut the aid to Kurdish migrants in Izmir area for reversing migration flow from east to west, the unemployed people to force them to work; the Erzurum branch aid decision council head proposed to assist the Kurdish population much in order to integrate the Kurdish minority to the compassionate and united Turkish society. I observed that these "different" understandings and their conflicts enable different subjects to gain tactical positions, rather than giving them decisive victories in the association. Actually, this organizational blur is an organizational preference. These open-ended debates among the higher ranks are tolerated, since it allows the association to establish a loose hegemony over the conflicting ideas, propositions and understandings of poverty, poor relief, charity and recent problems in Turkey in the associational site. In this context, we are called to discuss in front of the executive board members and the secretary general of the association to convince them about our conflicting ideas about these issues in the association. Clearly, since the decisions are held by the executive board members, there is no guarantee for a decisive victory for us and our own understandings of poverty and the poor.

The social inspection team members, of whom I met several times, usually criticize the poor by comparing the poor with themselves. I also observed that their salaries are more or less equal to the claimant families' monthly earnings. However,

this does not create solidarity between social inspection staff and claimants due to the unequal aid-relation between the parties. According to the social inspection staffs, I talked, even if they and the claimants earn same amount of money, they are distinguished from them by not begging for assistance. In this respect, there are many cases in the association where social inspection teams treated the poor as people who tried to deceive the moral and compassionate donors and the association and to make “unjust” profit from their poverty. In addition, I also observed that the social inspection staff may not be totally against the poor. According to the volunteer coordinator of the association, the subjective interventions of the social inspection staff are not necessarily against the benefit of the assistance recipients. According to her, during social inspection and social revision visits, the most common problems are not against the poor but “to the advantage of the poor”. It is a very common problem that inexperienced volunteers will “make unnecessary promises and provide short term and totally informal and personal aid to the families”.

Clearly, there are unsystematic and unforeseen, but actual power relations within the social inspection process, aid decisions, and executive board’s resolutions. The association usually frames these power relations as personal, therefore uncontrollable, mistakes. In other words, since these problems were framed as individual faults in the association, the organization is not blamed as an organizational subject for these “unforeseen” consequences. However, this organizational blur is a conscious choice, since this system is designed in the association to forestall several objections from the Turkish public and the donors, it cannot be considered apart from the public’s conceptions of poverty and the poor. That means this system, which systematize the poor relief, is not an external obligation; but also an internal, organizational and interpersonal dictum. Thus, the

association tolerates the staffs', executive board members, and volunteers' beliefs about the poor and the internal rivalries; as long as it prevents the distribution of the aid and assistance to those who do not deserve and need and preventing the fiscal resource from waste and corruption. In the association, this problem does not create any internal conflict, since most of the employees of higher or lower ranks have kinship ties with each other or they were close friends or members of same social, religious and communal groups.

When the struggles and conflicts occur among the members, they emerge because of the clashes of departmental authorities, personal power, autonomy, status, and other reasons, other than the unjust, humiliating and discriminatory measures taken against the poor and the claimants who request aid. In this respect, in the association the dictum of not to hurt whilst giving is only and only confined into the moment of exchange, preferably on screen. Other moments, relations, and processes are based on the very hierarchy, inequality and very power relation between the poor and rest of the society.

During my fieldwork, I criticized the social inspection procedure and aid decision councils to deepen already unequal relation with the poor. However, my criticisms remained ineffective among the higher and lower ranks, where they did not have any other "practical option" in place of the social inspection procedure. In many cases, I had to answer the question "what do you propose instead of this", raised both by the higher and lower ranks. I firstly had to explain the moral status of checking into someone's private sphere and the vile maxims used against the poor.

Since the association frames its activities within a moral ground, such as solidarity, gift-giving and compassion, by using its codes and tropes, I considered the morality could be a common ground to criticize the association. However, what I

overlooked was the historical and malleable definition of that morality. In that sense, the questions of privacy of whom and when within and above of this moral map. When the issue is poverty, class relations, inequalities and the classification of the poor as the deserving and undeserving poor, privacy in the association becomes a luxury that the poor cannot afford. Briefly, my ethical questions and quarrels “how moral is this?” did not mean anything to the employees and volunteers in the association. They could not conceive of another procedure to replace the social inspection procedure in their minds and everyday discourses, since through this procedure the association situates the categories of deserving and undeserving poor.

This in turn renders the association responsible primarily against its donors and Turkish public, rather than the poor. Alternatively, my proposal was to employ social workers during this process to change the content of the procedure. It is clear that I was supporting reformation rather than abolition of the procedure, which became my strategy during this research regardless of the question of how much I was successful to reform the association. The following part of this chapter will delineate the software and database element in its politics of the poor and poverty.

YOP Software: Digital Surveillance

The organizational belief of the Deniz Feneri Association in acting as a bridge between the poor and philanthropists has a strong influence on the creation, design and implementation of the *YOP* database and software program. In 2002, this belief of the association was digitally and technologically realized with specific software. Before this date, the registration system of the association was not digital and the governmental rationality of the association was largely based on half-handwritten

and half-computerized records. This database aims to register and record the poor after the social inspection process described above. The *YOP* database, I argue, as analyses of governmentality (Rose, 1999; Dean, 1996; Gordon, 1991; Foucault, 1991) show, stands for the technological aspect of politico-technical governmental rationality in the organizational site. It, as a technological component, its construction and processing are based on several political inclusive and exclusive principles, on techniques and discourses of poverty and the poor, held by the Turkish society. By inspecting and registering the poor to control aid-flow, to establish characteristics of the families and to collecting personal data of the poor, it aims to secure the association against various allegations and criticisms. Thus, this database is designed to sign, seal and attest the true poverty of the poor for the donors and larger supporters of the association, as well as for the Turkish public. The system thus, constructs the poor as a group which is ought to be registered, inspected and controlled by rest of society and by organizations lying outside and beyond the state.

If one uses theoretical tools of governmental analytics, this technological, discursive and strategic identification of the poor is a perfect example of a dividing practice. The perfection of this dividing practice comes from its multiple legitimizations, where the practice creates its own legitimization mechanisms.

Among the association's changing organizational legitimizations, the most stable ones are to prevent the association from wasting the resources and donations⁸⁷ and

⁸⁷ The relation between poverty alleviation, social security and waste are extensively used in the discourse of neoliberalism. I.e. in R. Reagan's first term in presidency (1981-1985), the discourse of the waste was extensively used to evaluate and to denounce welfare statist poverty alleviation mechanisms and institutions. In the same discourse, to waste the resources was shown as the primary reason behind poverty of the poor, since it creates welfare dependent poor. Therefore, according to this discourse, to prevent the poor to develop aid-dependencies should be primary aim of the new approaches to the poverty alleviation (McCullough, 2005). In the association, a narrower meaning was given to the waste reduction in poverty alleviation. This is the prevention of the distribution of similar aid-items to poor families. When similar aid-in kind items have been delivered to the poor, the problem is usually credited to the poor and their greediness rather than dysfunctional bureaucracy and lack of institutional communications.

knowing who is giving help to whom. Thus, this software enables the association to govern multiple tasks. Among these recordings of the poor, the flow of aid (in and out) and the details of the donors are the basic ones. This program has many interfaces and aspects. These interfaces are grouped into four categories. These categories are, the *yardım alan* (aid-recipient), the donors, which encompass both the *yardım edens ve gönüllüs* (donors and volunteers), the store registration (as part of logistics), the wholesale outs (of the donated items in international projects, times of disasters and so on) and the storehouse records (from which the poor can acquire several clothes, free of charge). For my purposes in this research, I will focus on the assistance recipient section, which provides the association with the means to inquire into family based recorded assistance recipients' cases.

The assistance recipient section of the *YOP* database, as the other four sections, is composed of several integrated interfaces, which enable the authorized staff to record the assistance recipients and their life stories in detail. In that sense, the “informational” richness of the program, as a governmental tool, is enormous. It enables the staff to record various details about assistance recipients. I.e. if the records are kept properly, the research database can assist you to find female claimant who is 23 years old, divorced, hypoglycemic, victim of family violence, abandoned, unemployed or temporarily employed, with dependent unschooled children, substance abuser or cigarette smoker and who takes assistance from municipality, owns a cell-phone and TV, currently lives with her family, has unpaid electric and water bills, indebted to local grocery store, according to neighbors her husband left them and but makes infrequent visits, they are not suitable to be shown on screen.

The information in the assistance recipient section is grouped into six large sub-categories. These categories are to record of several details about the assistance recipients' family and individual family members. No religious or ethnic information is recorded in the YOP, since the names and locality can provide basic clues on the religion and ethnic origin of the assistance recipient.

The first interface of the assistance recipient section is general information. This part consists of case number, case type (family, school, hospital, municipality, association or foundation, disaster), date of application, case owner (head of the family), branch (the association has four branches, cases are distributed according to their locations), date of evaluation, address/phone and suitability to be broadcasted. The second interface of the assistance recipient section is individuals. This part consists of information about ID Number, degree of intimacy (mother/father, member of family, grandfather/grandmother, relative, guest, or himself or herself), Name, Surname, and Father's Name, Mother's Name, Date of Birth, Place of Birth, Gender (M/F), Marital Status (Married, single, widow, divorced, abandoned). The second part of the Individuals part consists of personal information of the assistance recipient. In this part, the categories are education (no formal education, literate, primary, secondary or high school graduate, B.A and/or M.A holder) and there is a check-box as "still continuing his/her formal education", social security (the categories are "data is not available", "no-social security", "social security for artisans and self-employed (*BAGKUR*).", "Retired Chest (*Emekli Sandigi*).", "Social Security and Insurance (*SSK*).", "2022-law", "Green Card" (*Yesil Kart*) and "Private Insurance"), Evaluation of Health (such as too bad, disabled, cancer, and so on, filled by the social inspection staff), employment situation (categories are "data is not available", "unemployed", "officer", "worker", "retired", "freelance", "student",

“seasonal or temporarily employed”, “soldier”, “housewife”), the job (filled by social inspection staff according to assistance recipients’ statement), the address of the workplace, shoe-size and size, name of the bank (*T.C. Merkez Bankası, İller Bankası, T.C. Ziraat Bankası, Türkiye Sınai Kalkınma Bankası, Halk Bankası, T.C. Vakıflar Bankası T.A.S., Türkiye Kalkınma Bankası A.Ş., Bayındırbank A.Ş., Türk Ekonomi Bankası A.Ş., Akbank T. A.Ş., HSBC Bank A.Ş., Milli Aydın Bankası T.A.Ş., Pamukbank T.A.Ş., Şekerbank T.A.Ş. and Garanti Bankası, Yapı Kredi Bankası, Koc-Bank* and all private banks in Turkey and some international banks), branch name, account number, and e-mail of the assistance recipient.

The third part of the assistance recipient category is the sub-category of social inspection. This part is based on the digital recording and recompilation of the social inspection questionnaire. The digital recompilation of the social inspection questionnaire is composed of the income and expenditure records of the assistance recipient. In the income registration box, there are total income and sources of income (salary, rental income, agriculture, animal husbandry, and irregular income and assistance parts). The total expenditures part consists of several expenditure items (health, rent, food, bills, education and others). The total debt category on the other hand aims to detect assistance recipients’ debts and types of the debt (rent, bills, treatment, bankruptcy, others, no debt). One of the most interesting categories here is the category of to whom the family is indebted (shopkeeper, bank, landlord, relative/acquaintance and others). The second part of the social inspection category is composed of the housing conditions of the family/assistance recipients. Here the categories are landlord, tenant and not paying rent. In addition, this part also records the area of the house and the number of rooms and evaluations. The last part in the Social Inspection is the request of the family part (the categories here are cash, food,

clothes, health, fuel, education, shelter, cleaning, goods, mending, guest house soup kitchen and others).

The fourth part of the assistance recipient section is the category of decisions. In this part, the details of the decisions of the aid decision councils are recorded. Details consist of date of decision, who is helped in the assistance recipient family (family, individuals, and all individuals in the household). There is a discursive operation here who is family member and who is not in this database record. And also the list of individuals within this household, decisions (no-assistance, one time assistance, periodical assistance and emergency situation assistance), types/amount of aid and assistance, periods of assistance, end of the assistance, aid decision council member, branch of the association and projects⁸⁸ are also recorded.

The fifth part of the assistance recipient category/section is the part of Evaluations and Appointments. In this part, the details of the conversation, held with the assistance recipient family are recorded in detail. Among those details there are the date, place, subject (the request of assistance, information request on the status of assistance, document follow-up, re-request of assistance, complaint (in this ethnography it has been observed that the association feels proud that the Turkish public are careful as to who deserves and who does not deserve assistance and that they are public spirited enough to warn the association when there are misinformed decisions, though they rarely occur), will to assist, complaint, call for support and ambulance, advice and greeting, the story, who talked with the assistance recipient family (volunteer, call center staff, social inspection staff, official, army personnel), the priority (normal, low, high, emergency).

⁸⁸ The projects of the association are 81 Province, Blue Papillion, 1001 Children 1001 Wishes, Anemia Scanning, We are Visiting those who Cannot Come, Family Doctor. The projects of the association cover collective assistance activities. Usually the schools, individuals, hospitals; villages and civil society organisations can be the main focus of these projects.

The last and sixth part of the assistance recipient category/section is the query part. In this part, the queries about assistance recipients can be made in terms of the document number or individual ID details. Documents are classified in terms of family IDs and locality. The *YOP* system enables the association to divide the recorded data according to various categories such as locality, year, assistance type, family ID, presence or absence of social security, individual ID, gender, degree of intimacy, mother/father's name, degree of education, marital status, and workability and so on. The queries, within this archive can be made in terms of the document number, document owner, assistance type, branch, story and evaluation (of the social inspection staff), locality, country, postal address, province and region, aid decision council's decisions (its date, delivery date, and assistance type) and the viability of the assisted individuals to be shown on TV. During this research, I observed that the viable families to be shown on TV are assisted much, though I harshly criticized.

This digital system has pivotal significance in the association for the organization of its multiple and related activities such as aid management and recording and registration of the volunteers, the poor, and the recipients of charity. However, as I previously argued, the association keeps its records on the basis of family, which means when a claim is made within the system; a new file is opened and filed by the assistance recipients' family name. It is claimed that this act provides the association with the means to group people according to family relations and to reduce the number of the case files and associated records. In addition, this categorization also supports the original aim of the association, as set out in its statute, of supporting families and assisting the family as a whole.⁸⁹

⁸⁹ Similar emphasis on the family can be found in the political program of the mildly Islamist and conservative JDP. Accordingly, "the JDP treats family as the foundation of Turkish society. Accordingly, Turkish family is the bridge between the past and the future, and transmitter of our national values, sentiments, opinions and traditions, peculiar to our own country, to the new

Thanks to another project to integrate its database with the public *MERNIS* database, the association aims to broaden the scope of its activities. The *MERNIS* is a state-owned public digital system based on individual citizens ID numbers, and it allows banks, social security and insurance institutions and the state to reach the personal data of these citizens. The *MERNIS*, however, does not allow queries in terms of family, kinship and household relations. Though the use of the *MERNIS* would create inconsistencies with the association's *YOP* system; the association wants to use this digital citizen recording/numbering system of the Turkish state, which enables the association to use ten digit numbers to access all the necessary data for itself. Nevertheless the organizational system of the association would be inconsistent and potentially incoherent as the *MERNIS* is based around individual registration and the existing *YOP* system is based upon the family unit. This means that *MERNIS* will not allow family ties and kinship structure to be easily observed, whereas the system in the Deniz Feneri allows the association to see the world through its own lenses. This greater level of scrutiny and data retrieval has been an issue within the association, surrounded by technical questions "how to do it", political questions of why and the ethics around this. It is needless to argue that ethics here deals with practical concerns, rather than blurring the boundaries between Turkish state, civil society and corporate actors by use of same recording system.

As a technologically enhanced mode of governmentality, the *YOP* database also enables the association to track down the poor families which have received donated items from 2002 to the present, where accountability means greater surveillance of the poor. According to current data held in the database, the Deniz Feneri Association currently assists 370,396 families. According to the Institutional

generations. This makes the family the most foundational, essential and indispensable institution in Turkish society (Justice and Development Party, n.d.).

Communications department, this makes approximately over 1,200,000 individuals who have been assisted from 1998 to the present. These numbers are important, since it both gives us the variegation of the types of assistance of the association. On the other hand, in the association one assistance recipient family and each family member can take different type of assistance (education, health, medical kits) from the association and as a family they can have fuel, food, goods, shelter, cash etc., these numbers does not give us actual numbers in the association. Rather the presentation of the numbers and variegation of the aid has direct political implications as it enables the association to represent itself as a reliable, hyper-accountable and digital association. In this vein, the numbers are used to present the association as reliable and effective policy actor. As Rose argued (1999),

acts of social quantification are “politicized” not in the sense that the numbers they use are somehow corrupt –although they may be– but because “political judgments implicit in the choice of what to measure, how to measure it, how often to measure it and how to present and interpret the results...secondly, our images of political life are shaped by the realities of our society that numerical technologies appear to disclose: statistics, population counts, accountancy, economic forecasts, budgets and the like. It is not simply that political debate deploys numbers or that so many political decisions affecting our lives entail the deployment of number in their calculation and legitimation. *Numbers, like other ‘inscription devices’, actually constitute the domains they appear to represent; they render them representable in a docile form – a form amenable to the application of calculation and deliberation. Hence it is not just that the domain of numbers is politically composed, but also that the domain of politics is made up numerically. Thirdly, whilst numbers seem indispensable to politics, they also appear to depoliticize whole areas of political judgment. They redraw the boundaries between politics and objectivity by purporting to act as automatic technical mechanisms for making judgments, prioritizing problems and allocating scarce resources.*” (p. 198, emphases added).

Rather than the veracity of the numbers, the association holds and represents, what analyzed here were the form, structure and formation of the categories of this statistical data, its technological and social components, guiding principles and

through what kind of power operations this statistical information. In that sense, statistical information in the association basically means to know who the poor is. In the following parts of this chapter, the poverty alleviation projects of the association will be delineated since they bear particular significance to see how poverty and poor are conceived in the association, alongside the poor' individual level determination.

Poverty Alleviation Projects of the Association

The first poverty alleviation project in the association is a part of the larger cooperation between *BIM*⁹⁰ and the Deniz Feneri Association. With this project, the association aims to distribute several *ATM*-shopping cards to the poor families, who are eligible as they have met some of the criteria set by the association. Furthermore, the association aims to lessen the workload of registration in its logistics and storage units. The basic legitimization of the project is to make the poor to enjoy consuming and shopping like rest of the society, where the poor become the flawed consumers (Bauman, 1999). In this respect, organizational recuperation of their failure to experience the *jouissance* of shopping with this *ATM* card system makes them like one of us at least for a short period of time.

Due to their inability to satisfy their basic needs, these consumers fail to experience enjoyment of consuming several goods. So when they consume it is not an activity of purchasing but assistance. Although this *ATM* card system does not aim to enable the poor to purchase everything they want; the basic logic behind this

⁹⁰ BIM Mall Chains are one of the Green-enterprises whose financial roots were explicated in Chapter II and III. The costumers of the BIM Mall Chains are mostly urban and rural poor. The malls are mostly in poor urban districts and towns. Currently, BIM is the biggest mall chain in Turkey and it has 1452 malls all over Turkey. This is another reason why the association wants to make a joint-venture with BIM. The malls are poorly decorated, most of the times they do not have shelf system and they sell custom-made and inexpensive goods, designed for the consumption of the poor. Among those items, there are electronic goods, shoes, beans, chocolate, dairy products, non-alcoholic drinks and cleaning materials.

card system, though they will have limited credit in those cards designed only to satisfy their basic needs, is to enjoy shopping. They are allowed to make their own, though limited, consumer decisions by themselves from the limited good-range of the *BIM* mall chains. And when they do, the association will also know they are buying what due to the card system. Another establishment of the association “Clothing Stores” works with the same logic to enable the eligible poor to enjoy shopping and find clothes matching their own taste and needs, free of charge. These two projects are guided by the widespread organizational belief that the poor are different from the rest of society due to their multiple moral, educational, financial and social failures. Among those basic failures are included an inability to satisfy their basic needs, experience the joy of shopping, have certain work-ethics and work skills such as “knowing how to fish”, live in proper housing conditions. In this respect, in the association, as I have observed, the organizational belief that the failure of the poor separate them from the rest of society is the basis of the everyday interactions, exchanges and ideas about poverty and the poor among higher employees and volunteers.

The other projects of the association usually aim the poor and the social groups, which are considered to be vulnerable such as girls who stay in child protection societies, as their target groups. Projects aim to teach several work-habits, personality traits and to make them self-reliant citizens. I.e. rural projects aim to reverse the migration flows from east-to west and rural areas to urban areas. In this respect, popular political beliefs and discussions regarding those groups guide the projects. Since the rural projects make them financially stable and self-reliant citizens, in the case of EU-funded “Candle for Future” Project⁹¹, the project

⁹¹ The Candle for Future Project was funded by EU and Turkish National Agency. The project was part of an Action 5 Project Circle. Although it aimed to teach girls, who stay in Child Protection

association aims to empower the girls, who stay in Child Protection Societies, with the help of new-age gurus, public relations experts, art-teachers and Effective Personality Trainers to prevent them from being sex-workers and suffering from sexual laxity, which is a popular theme in Turkish media regarding Child Protection Societies.

Since 2005, the association has been involved in various educational activities and projects which aim to train the poor. Among those activities, bee-keeping, carpentry, occupational therapies, construction worker training course, and ecological agricultural projects for men, and sewing, embroidery and nursery training courses for women, (most of these courses were launched in 2006) are the major ones. According to the bulletin of the association, these courses are launched with the knowledge that poverty cannot be eliminated by the assistance. In this respect, training and occupational therapies will function to achieve cultural change in the poor and to bring a permanent solution to their poverty. These courses, as most of the neoliberal poor relief practices, aim at transforming the poor subjects into active job-seekers and self-reliant citizens, without questioning the role of structural inequalities, labor market fluctuations, regional disparities, gendering practices and social stratification in their poverty (Brinn-Hyatt, 2001).

During my fieldwork, I have had the chance to attend several projects with other civil society organizations. These civil society organizations criticize the Deniz Feneri Association with contributing to the culture of dependent and passive aid-recipients. Accordingly, the Deniz Feneri Association promoted begging and aid-

Societies, several personality traits and empower these girls as a target group by experts; eventually I transformed into an advocacy project by contributions from the girls, foreign attendees and Project representatives. The briefing report, which was produced after the Project, points out several biases against these kids and calls for action in Turkish society. Therefore, the project exceeded the boundaries, set by self-help and self-esteem oriented discourse of the project (Candle for Future, n.d.).

dependency. The most common advice heard from other civil society organizations' representatives, was "you should teach how to fish rather than give fish to the poor and support the future of this country by supporting education as TEGV and CYDD". This advice is meaningful in a context where the allegedly Islamist, backward and religious discourses of the Deniz Feneri Association and its poverty alleviation practices prevent it from being involved in and implementing modern educational support and training activities' unlike the "modern" and Kemalist civil society organizations (Erdogan, 2001) such as CYDD and TEGV. In this respect, being involved in educational projects in the realm of civil society is a status position, available for some groups and unavailable for others. Furthermore, it can also be argued that the Deniz Feneri Association involves the educational support projects to forestall the criticisms of backwardness, Islamism and contributing dependency culture. In this respect, to implement training projects for the rural and urban poor is also an external obligation, to which the association is called to oblige to achieve a status position in Turkey. Thus the disequilibrium of availabilities for civil society organizations and conflicts over status, what is actually at work is the particular neoliberal discourse of poor relief and welfare provision. In this discourse, the poor are constructed as those who do not know how to fish, and this failure is addressed and remedied by several civil society organizations' activities, projects and strategies. In this respect, there are organizations which truly teach how to fish and there are organizations which do not teach how to fish, the degree of truth in their claims depends on their ideological differentiation in other. In the following part of this section, I will frame the Deniz Feneri Association's specific discourse of the poor and poverty in a larger theoretical framework.

Poverty and the Poor in the Association from the Perspective of Governmentality

Three broad concepts of poverty that seem to encompass most of the difficulties associated with poverty analysis: subsistence, inequality, and externality.

Subsistence is concerned with “minimum of provisions needed to maintain health and working capacity” (capabilities).

Inequality is concerned with the “relative position of income groups to each other.” Hence, the concept of poverty must be seen in the context of society as a whole. Poverty cannot be fully understood by isolating the poor and focusing on their behavior as a special group. It is equally important to understand the behavior of the rest of society especially the richer segment and the rich economies.

Externality is concerned with the “social consequences of poverty for the rest of society rather than in terms of the needs of the poor. It is not so much the misery and plight of the poor but the discomfort and cost to the non-poor part of the community which is crucial to this view of poverty (Dasgupta and Serageldin, 2000, p.2).

The Deniz Feneri Association firstly aims to assist widows, orphans, families without income, or families whose members cannot work and families whose members have medical issues - these groups being defined as the primary target group for economic and social assistance in the association. To be employed and still poor is a relatively unmentioned concept in the association, particularly if there is no dramatizing factor, such as medical and psychiatric issues as potential offsets against being “working poor”, involved in the decision to offer economic and social assistance. The association offers several training courses to the poor, to prevent a culture of dependency from developing amongst poor people. These training courses are divided by gender - for men, as the classical breadwinners and heads of the households there is bee-keeping, carpentry, technician, goat-breeding and prêt-a-porter work; for women as the home-makers there is childcare, housekeeping, sewing and embroidery and basic office-work courses. As a conservative civil society organization, the association considers the male as the household leader and natural bread-winner. This household and family based alleviation process, in a nuclear

family or family of four, poor women's work, such as nursing, sewing and house-cleaning, are categorized as contributions to their families' net income; rather than as the net income of the families themselves.⁹² However, without regarding the gender of assistance recipient if the assistance recipient is considered as able to work especially in metropolitan areas, the ability of the assistance recipient to work or presence of a workable household head along with other members within the house are primarily used to make aid decisions. In the association, the basic division between the real poor and un-real poor, or in other words, the poorest of the poor and the not so poor is their ability to work. In this dividing set of practices, men with no medical or age-related issues are considered as able-bodied (and able to work) and should assume their traditional role of head of the household to provide the needs of their family through employment. Yet the cultural roots of grouping together women with dependent children, the elderly, disabled, widows without financial means as deserving recipients dates back before the normative construction of the work; the given construction of employment and workability is meaningful and understandable in the context set by neoliberal ideals of active, job-seeking, self-assured and self-reliant yet unfortunate people, who are vulnerable to the medical, political, financial, familial and personal risks in modern society (Rose, 1996; O'Malley, 1996).

Nevertheless, in the association work is not the sole determinant by itself, rather it is considered as a part of financial relations and total income and expenditures of the family, which determine their eligibility for the assistance. Whilst the sources of the income are not discarded within the *YOP* and the social inspection questionnaire, the assistance is also put as a category. The assistance is not only an

⁹² In Turkish, the expression *aile bütçesine katkı* is used to refer women's work, where the bütçe is essential and women's portion is a supplement or contribution to the essential budget. This expression systematically undermines the women's work. In this respect, even if the breadwinner is female in a claimant family, the expression "contribution to the family's net income" is used to refer her work in everyday conversations and published bulletins.

income source; it is also a form of social relation, reserved for the poor by the Deniz Feneri Association. Being part of this social relation as the *YOP* database shows names its subjects as “assistance recipient” in the association. Their availability to this relation is first imagined (on the basis of their income level and other selection categories) and once established, it is digitalized, checked and re-checked with the social inspection process and social revision visits. In addition, this relation pins the assistance recipient into interwoven relations of aid with civil and official welfare institutions such as charities and foundations, state-led institutions and municipalities. As part of the revival of the community project the association, this organizational aid relation does not exclude social relations with distant relatives and neighbors, whose aid and assistance can contribute to the overall income of the family. The association also records the debts of the claimant families with the amount, and to whom the family is indebted, therefore to know this detail provides to map whose family relations are well functioning and whose are not. This refers the construction of debt not only as a financial transaction but a social relation between specific parties. Within the web of particular technologies, conceptions of poverty and practices of poverty alleviation, the association’s poor relief activities endow the association, on an imaginary level, with various morals, rights and entitlements such as “the right to know”, “right to inspect” and “right to categorize” the already divided poor from rest of the society. In that sense, it is not wrong to argue that the association fuses neoliberal perceptions and practices of work with so-called “traditional” conceptions of social and familial relations, in which society and community take care of their poor and maintain their socially defined social, personal, familial, economic and cultural well-being. What is the consequence of

this categorization? What is the meaning of dividing the already segregated poor within itself, from Foucauldian lexis?

It is clear that the separation of the poor from rest of the society has a functional value in determining the eligibility of the poor by the rest of society in the association. Put otherwise, after the separation from the rest of society, they are bifurcated into categories of real and non-real poor and “the poorest of the poor” and “not-the poorest of the poor” by the association. This bifurcation has a functional value in the association in terms of determining whether the family will be assisted by the association. This categorization of the “poorest of the poor”, “real poor” and “socially invisible” individual and families in the association clearly does not represent the poor as a group for themselves. Rather the stories, narratives and histories of the poor are represented and registered in particularly individualized and singularized fashion, which in turn renders them into eligible and viable assistance recipient families for the one-by-one intervention of the compassionate segments of Turkish society.

In this respect, it is understandable why the association bears the slogan of “everyone is a Lighthouse (Deniz Feneri) for [one] who needs”. Here, to think that those poor are part/product of the society and community of everyone is discursively unimaginable. On the contrary, in the discourse of the association, as U. Arslan, the program host, once stated, “we think of ourselves to be just like one of them” is a moral ability of Turkish community, which signifies their presence, against those who are not a part of this moral community.

In the following parts of this chapter, it will be delineated how workability, income, assistance, deserving and undeserving poor conceptions produce the overall map of the politics of poverty and the poor of the association. In order to frame the

particular logic of the Deniz Feneri Association in its activities, based on the principle of separating the poor from the non-poor, and on alleviating the basic needs of those poor, it is necessary to relate these practices with larger theoretical debates around poverty such as “poverty as a human rights abuse” and “culture of poverty” and the measurement of poverty in terms of absolute and relative poverty distinctions.

Measures, Concepts and Understandings of Poverty in Perspective in the Deniz Feneri Association

Absolute poverty refers to a basic lack of the means of survival; the poor are those who, even in normal circumstances, are unable to feed and cloth themselves properly and risk death as a consequence... This measurement of poverty was carried out with reference to the changes occurring in consumption patterns whereby the majority of the population began to acquire consumer durables without having access to adequate shelter with proper sanitation, to clean drinking water and to health facilities, or even without getting the necessary daily calorie intake” (Bugra and Keyder, 2005, p.3).

The absolute and relative poverty distinction was historically based on daily \$1 purchasing power parity (PPP) of the household members and daily \$2.15 PPP respectively. In this context, the purchasing power parity of a family is calculated by translating the minimum nutritional requirements into food items and then determining the cost based on the prevailing prices to find out the minimum income required for survival. In this calculation, the absolute poverty is measured by this poverty threshold, which is the level of income below which one cannot afford to purchase all the resources one requires to live. People who have an income below the poverty line have no discretionary disposable income. In that sense, absolute poverty is a measure which quantifies the number of people below a poverty threshold, and

this poverty threshold is independent of time and place” (UN, 2005). For the measure to be absolute, the line must be the same in different countries. Such an absolute measure should look only at the individuals’ power to consume and it should be independent of any changes in income distribution.

This view of humans as only “consuming organisms” in poverty literature has been criticized on the grounds of historical and cultural blindness. Furthermore, at the core of the equation of poverty as failing to satisfy necessary “needs” lies a power process in which who, when, how and why decides what necessities are. Although the primary physiological needs are indispensable to sustain one’s own life, as P. Townsend argued that in his criticism of the basic needs approach, while retaining the core-physiological needs in advance in his discourse.

The amount and cost of the food which is eaten depends on the social roles people play and dietary customs observed as well as the kinds of foods made available socially through production and availability in markets. In short, food in all kinds of society is “socialized”. The specification of the costs of meeting minimum dietary needs in any society is as problematic as the specification of the costs of fulfilling the entire roles, participative relationships and customs enjoined of a people (Townsend, 1993:31, quoted from Lister, 2004: 14).

Clearly, the definitions of poverty will reflect continuum from the most absolute to the most relative, so there is a range of definitions about poverty and state of being poor. In this range, the relative poverty is defined as households who earn less than 25% of the median income, which is measured in the same way as absolute poverty. This distinction between absolute and relative poverty is also related to the satisfaction of basic needs. In order to emphasize these basic needs, the concept of absolute poverty largely confines poverty to the issue of income level, which is seen as the most important obstacle to fulfilling these needs. This definition neglects the

issues of social and political participation, violation of human dignity, susceptibility to violence, isolation, humiliation, and lack of social-respect, self-esteem, visibility and voice, which can be found in the concept of relative poverty alongside income inequality within a society.

According to the latest household survey conducted by TIS in 2003 and the latest UNDP data, “the incidence of extreme or absolute poverty in Turkey (the percentage of the population living on less than \$1 a day) is very low.”⁹³ However, according to the latest TIS Poverty Study based on the 2003 Household Survey; the poverty threshold has been raised, and unsurprisingly rates of poverty also rise dramatically, with 24% of the population living on less than \$4.30 a day” (UNDP, 2004), which falls into the category of the relative poverty. Since it is known that relative poverty encompasses other political and social issues alongside economic inequalities, there are couples of questions I should answer in terms of my research. Why does the Deniz Feneri Association retain a particular definition of absolute poverty in its policy recommendations and everyday representations of the poor on screen, social inspection questionnaire and other social projects? In order to answer this question, I will make use of the Foucauldian possibilities of this act of confinement.

As I argued before, in the Deniz Feneri Association the identification of poverty as a problem comes through the definition of poverty as a general condition of lacking the economic resources and power to continue one’s own life. According to this definition, the assistance recipients’ “perceived”, “individually confessed”, and “publicly attested” to failing to satisfy their and their families’ primary physiological needs. This particular reception of the concept of absolute poverty

⁹³ less than 0.02 % of the population

within the Deniz Feneri Association and its current social inspection form clearly does not reside in its statistical features or income distribution based measurement, as the poverty emergency plan of the association demonstrates. In the discourse of the association, the statistical feature is a “pointless” element in the alleviation of poverty, which quantifies the people below a certain threshold line. For the association, quantification should be supported with the knowledge of who the poor are in Turkish society.

Revealingly, in the discourse of the association, there is no place for the notion of structural inequality or social stratification as a cause of poverty. In the documents published by the association, especially on the causes of poverty and penury, the inequality of income distribution is never mentioned (Cakir, 2003), unlike the series of free-floating personal risks (labeled as misfortune in the associational discourse) of abandonment, senile decay, unemployment, physiological and psychological illnesses, and drought, natural and man-made disasters which seem to be happening frequently in recent times in Turkey and around the globe. Thus, as Bugra and Keyder (2003) argued in their report on new poverty formations in Turkey, the Deniz Feneri Association aims to reach as large a target population as possible rather than to mind the structural problems causing poverty and deprivation (p. 36). Under the light of these three important points –the relatively low level of absolute poverty, ruling out the question of inequality from its discourses and reaching the largest group horizontally- what are the political consequences of the limitation and representation of the larger poverty formations in Turkey within the category of “the poorest of the poor” under the association’s slogan “until no poor remain on earth, we’ll continue our activities”.

For a perspective from governmentality, the confinement of the larger structure and formation of poverty in Turkey and around the globe draws a line between the say-able and non-sayable, possible and impossible and practicable and impracticable within the politics of the poor and poverty of the association. To a certain extent, the discursive operations of the association frame the so-called “external” reality into a particular and compassionate measurement, “the social inspection form” and *YOP* database in order to make it represent-able on TV and assist-able by the association. This mode of representation and assistance clearly aims to attract public attention; in that sense, the mode of governmentality working on the poor in the association works through the particular and cultural imaginations about the poor and poverty hegemonic in Turkish society. This enables the association to gain the Turkish public’s support and emotional favor for its dedication to find the real poor according to the hegemonic conceptions of neoliberal times which equate poverty with individualized unemployment and several medical, psychological, familial and age-related risk factors.

In the particular discourse of the association, the poor and new poverty formations in Turkey are only manageable and assist-able for the association when they are categorized under the rubric of “the poorest of the poor”, who do not have the financial resources to provide for their fundamental and physiological needs and sustain their natural wellbeing. Furthermore, this act enables the association not to keep away from so-called political and ideological projects, since “the poorest of the poor in Turkey” are, as elsewhere, in need of food and water and other primary needs. In the association, especially at the managerial level, this functions as a mechanism with which objections from other poverty alleviation actors are removed, where the lives of the “poorest of the poor” are in danger. This apparently non-

aligned position also enables the association to criticize other poverty alleviation actors with being partisan, ideological, foreign, and relatively unaware of the dynamics of assistance and solidarity in Turkish society as opposed to the “aware” one, namely the Deniz Feneri Association. In this vein, to gain financial support of Turkish society is used as the best prize of this being aware of in the association.

The Deniz Feneri Association does not relate poverty with income inequality, which prevents any comparisons between the “well-off” and “not-well off” either on the basis of an absolute and relative poverty distinction or on the more comprehensive concept of human poverty. Throughout my fieldwork, no comment was made by the employees was made on the unequal distribution of resources and the availability of choices open to a person or a family in society. Especially after the establishment of the close relations with UNDP, the discourse of the association and its brochures adopts the definition of poverty as human rights abuse⁹⁴ (The Deniz Feneri; 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006) alongside an individual or family-based failure to satisfy basic needs with economic power alone.

According to the seminal *Human Development Report* of UNDP in 1990, economic growth and Gross National Product (GNP) cannot reveal the distribution of wealth and the composition of the income or beneficiaries alone (p. 9). Development and wealth, as well as economic growth and GNP, are just means of enlarging people’s choices and freedoms to realize themselves (Uyan-Semerçi, 2005). The discourse of human rights in poverty alleviation has been influential in poverty reduction, especially in UN, since 1986, and it is usually based on principles of equity, accountability, participation and empowerment. Accordingly, if human

⁹⁴ In 1990, in the UN’s and UNDP’s Human Development Report, poverty as a human rights abuse was introduced as a response to the IMF and World Bank promoted conceptions of poverty and to their substitution of growth as a de facto solution to problem of poverty. These reports are guided by several principles. These principles equity, human rights and responsibilities, democracy, protection of minorities, peaceful conflict resolution and fair negotiation (UNDP, 2004: 90).

development is concerned with increasing human choices, freedoms and potentials (Sen, 1990; 1999),

poverty means that opportunities and choices most basic to human development are denied –to lead a long, healthy and creative life and enjoy a decent standard of living, freedom, dignity, self-respect and the respect of others (Human Development Report, 1997: 15).

Thus, the poverty alleviation mechanisms, nets and discourses should take into account the unequal distribution of choices available to the people. In addition, this discourse promotes the participation and engagement of the poor in poverty alleviation activities and decision making processes, since there are also political and financial barriers, which prevent the poor to accede decision making processes in poverty alleviation actors. However, as a researcher I can argue that poverty as a human right abuse is a cosmetic change in the discourse of the association, which has no corporeality in the politics of the poor and poverty of the association. Thus, the external relations have not necessarily breeched the simple discursive practice map and conception of poverty in the association; rather they have systematically enforced the given discourses on the poor and poverty. Before explicating the reason why and how the association appropriated this definition of poverty, I will explain the concept of human poverty briefly.

Within the context of the Deniz Feneri Association, the participation of the poor in the decisions, of the association, has remained “unimaginable”. To see how the concept of the participation is understood within the association, it is sufficient to quote from a daily talk between me and a department head.

I: Among the poor families, you assist, are there any who join civil society organizations or other NGOs?

Department Head: No they cut their ties with other civil society organizations and stop requesting aid from those organizations when they contact us for assistance.”

I: don't you think they should voice their ideas about poverty?

Department Head: What? We more or less gave them what they want, they do not want anything else, they just want to survive (A department head from Ankara Branch, personal communication July, 8 2006).

This conversation bears particular significance for my purpose here, because before it took place, this manager emphasized how the Deniz Feneri Association needs departmental and branch autonomy and development of participatory culture in the association rather than a centralized one. However, branch autonomy is, as this quotation shows, considered as the middle rank employees' access to decision making circles. In that sense, the access of the poor to the decision making processes of the association is relatively unheard of and unimaginable in the association. The following quotation is important, since it is not concerned with participation. Rather it shows how the association is imagined vis-à-vis the poor as well as the state.

Secretary General: We have to find ways to say [to the state] we have a right to and should know the personal records of the poor. By the use of ID numbers, Social Security Administration (SSK), Social Security for Artisans and Self-Employed (Bağ-Kur) and Social Solidarity Fund and Credit and Loan Banks we can acquire all the necessary information.

1st Dept. Head: The Information Right Law [*Bilgi Edinme Yasası*] enable us to know their liquid or stable assets, records and so on?

2nd Dept. Head: [Regretfully] No, it does not.

3rd Dept Head: Why? We have the right to acquire information.

I: This law does not give us the right to reach personal information and violate basic personal rights. Helping them does not give us the right to know, though we wish to think otherwise (Secretary Gen. And 3 Dept. Heads and I, personal communication, July, 09 2006).

In order to exclude certain inequalities from the discourse of the association, in the Deniz Feneri Association the concept of human poverty and poverty as human rights abuse is appropriated literally, where neither abusers nor abusing social structures are available in the discourse of the association. In addition, the other credentials of the

human poverty and human development conceptions are not available in the politics of the poor in the association. Since, the Deniz Feneri Association is not an advocacy group, which fights for the rights of the poor, conceived as human rights, citizens' rights, women's rights, children's rights or someone else's rights. On the contrary, in the words of the general secretary, "we are not an advocacy group; everyday we thrust the poor [or "thrust poverty"] under the eyes of the authorities and state, but we are not partisan or ideological in this matter and we do nothing militant" (I. Altan, personal communication, April, 20, 2006) was a warning given to me, as a research assistant for the Deniz Feneri Poverty Research Center. This makes the concept of human poverty and poverty as a human rights abuse in the association only strategies to dislocate the very question of inequality, unequal distribution of choices and availabilities, and structural factors from the centre of the poverty.

In addition, these illicit appropriations give us particular hints as to how the poor and poverty vis-à-vis the employees and organization within the association are situated and imagined at subjective and objective levels. At the objective level, the relation of poor relief, according to the organizational outlook, entitles the association with a certain right to know the citizens vis-à-vis social pensions and Turkish State Organs or private enterprises, such as Banks and Private Loans. However, at the subjective level, this particular organizational will to knowledge opens new organizational subject positions, though these organizational subjects are subjected to the same surveillance systems, they are equipped with different authorities, vocabularies, statuses, identities, ideals, values and ethics, which can be performed on the poor. In that sense, during this ethnography, I have observed that regardless of their hierarchical position in the association and its power networks, the employees and volunteers argue that if someone is poor it is the public's and in turn

the associations and their “right” to know, register, search and inspect his or her poverty, familial and personal history and “privacy”. In this picture, the laws or social rights are imagined to be on the side of the helping and assisting institutions and organizations, since the organizations exist to help and assist the poor. This is an interesting merging of the association’s needs with the perceived needs of the poor; what is good for the association must, by extension, be good for the poor too. In this respect, the poor are once and for all framed as the outsiders of the society and its organizations in the association, where the basic issue is largely confined to the content of the relation of the society with these always-already outsiders and what is good for the association, as far as it assists those poor, is also good for them. In that sense, since the poor request aid and assistance from the association, it is largely considered the legitimate right and obligation –duty and imperative— of the association to ascertain the reality of the poverty and penury of the aid-recipients by the use of any means, and in turn to decide whether they are poor and deserve the social compassion and not hurting whilst assisting.

As Bauman argued on the position reserved for the poor in modern societies, especially in poor relief and poverty alleviation,

The poor subject to ever more humiliating means tests, vilified for being a drain on ‘taxpayers money’, associated in the public mind with sponging, reprehensible negligence, sexual laxity or drug abuse - they turn ever more into the contemporary version of the wages of sin; and the wages of sin which we not only ‘cannot afford’ but for which there is no moral reason why we should try to do so (Bauman 1997: 37).

As I maintained before, in the hierarchical structure there are specific discursive equations about poverty, such as misfortune, unemployment, welfare dependency, illiteracy and lack of longer years of formal schooling, worsening health situations,

lack or loosening of kinship and familial ties, having too many children. These conceptions are open to change through external debate and relations with the academia, state administrations, civil society and the poor, preferably in much more neoliberal and conservative fashion. With increasing relations with the academia, civil society, the JDP and other political parties, the state and state officials, and with the help of number of the poor registered in the database and assisted by the association and with an increase in the financial resources available to the association, the particular view of poverty in the association has undergone significant changes. Among those changes, the most important one is the deployment of the concept of culture of poverty, also known as culture of dependency in the association, since the organization of the Poverty Symposium in 2003 and its successor, the Culture of Poverty Symposium in 2004. This notion of the “culture of dependency” is used in the association where the poor are seen as being under the becoming dependent on economic assistance and assistance providers, namely the charitable and donors. The next part of this chapter will delineate the peculiar appropriation of this notion of culture of poverty in the Deniz Feneri Association

Culture of Poverty: The Organizational Odyssey of a Notion

The concept of the culture of poverty was firstly introduced by Oscar Lewis in 1966 has some common points with the notion of culture of dependency. In general, the culture of poverty is a social theory explaining the cycle of poverty. Based on the concept that the poor have a unique value system, the culture of poverty theory suggests that the poor remain in poverty because of their adaptations to the burdens of poverty. As Lewis argued (1998 [1966]),

People with a culture of poverty have very little sense of history. They

are a marginal people who know only their own troubles, their own local conditions, their own neighborhood, and their own way of life. Usually, they have neither the knowledge or the vision nor the ideology to see the similarities between their problems and those of others like themselves elsewhere in the world. In other words, they are not class conscious, although they are very sensitive indeed to status distinctions. When the poor become class conscious or members of trade union organizations, or when they adopt an internationalist outlook on the world they are, in my view, no longer part of the culture of poverty although they may still be desperately poor (p.7).

Since the term initially was cast to refer to the “creative” and innovative subsistence strategies of the poor (Erdogan, 2002); in historical continuum it has evolved into a characteristic expression, namely “culture of dependency” (Murray, 1984; Mead, 1986). As far as I observed in my ethnography, this notion is deployed about the poor people’s “terrifying” dependency and “their addiction to wanting” aid and assistance, which in turn functions as a social stigma of their poverty as the definition of poverty in the association implies. In this stigmatizing relation, the assistance taking becomes the very mark of being poor, as the category reserved for the poor in the association - - assistance recipient—shows. In the association, this mark becomes the core and essence of their life stories and narratives. They are called to narrate nothing but their poverty in the discourse of the association, since there is no room for them; and in turn they will be stigmatized as not only different, but they are danger and negation to rest of the society. Especially, among the higher and lower rank employees of the association, this very difference of the poor and aid-recipient is expressed as “addiction to begging”, “the effect of the luxurious life promoted on TV on the poor”, “doing nothing to change their lives, even though they have the means”, and “they even do not know how to clean their houses, even though the association assists them with every necessary material”.

As it has been previously argued, the association does not include the problems and issues of income or wealth distribution in its discourse. Within these discursive limits, the association cannot “mind” or “conceive” the question of “why the poor remain poor, even though the association and other social welfare provision actors assist them” without the notion of culture of poverty in its discourse. In that sense, the culture of poverty and dependency is the key-notion to explain why the poor are poor and why the poor remain poor within the discursive limits of the association. As most of the social policy literature inspired studies showed (Bugra and Keyder, 2003; Cakir, 2003), the practices of the poor relief in the association aim to reach large segments of the poor population. According to these studies, the association cannot or does not solve the problem of poverty in a structural vein. Interestingly, during this research none of the employees in the association present their activities as permanent and structural solutions to the problem of poverty, rather they tend to present their aid and relief provision activities as “risk”-delay activities¹, “temporary assistance provision”, “supporting family against cyclical economic crisis of Turkish economy”, “integrating the poor to society”, “making them remember hope and social solidarity” and “revitalization of the social solidarity inherent in Turkish society”. On this basis, the activities of the association aim to reproduce the Turkish society and protect rest of the society from the dangers, posed by the poor. This in turn, contributes to the neoliberalization of the beliefs and mores of several social and political communities in Turkish society in the issues regarding poverty and the poor. In the next part of this chapter, in order to understand for whom the poor represent a burden, danger and treasure of moral and political possibilities will be delineated.

CHAPTER V

THE CHARITY, THE CHARITABLE AND THE VOLUNTEERS IN THE DENIZ FENERI ASSOCIATION

In the previous chapter, I discussed the organizational practices of managing poverty and the poor in the association through the perspective of governmentality. In this chapter, I will delineate the management of charity and the charitable in the association. As part of the specific organizational rationality of the association, this management activity of the association constitutes the poor subjects as they are related to the charitable subjects in Turkey in the recent period. Therefore, the analysis of the politics of the poor and poverty of the association entails me to consider the understandings of donor community, the charitable and the volunteer in the discourse of the association.

I claim that, this relational construction whilst situating the poor and poverty in a particular fashion, which was delineated in CHAPTER III and Chapter IV, enables particular individual, political and corporate actors as well as social groups, such as the Islamists and conservatives, to participate in the governmentalisation of the Turkish society by means of an association. Furthermore, I also claim that this participation alters the existing discourses of poverty and the poor of these groups. Thus, the association and its policies transform these local, particular and national discourses of the poverty and the poor to the larger neoliberal discourses of poverty

and the poor, hegemonic around the globe. In order to apprehend this transformation this chapter will focus on the certain meanings attached to the donor and volunteer subjectivities through the procedures of aid management, followed by the Deniz Feneri Association in its organizational site.

The Charity in the Deniz Feneri Association

The source of the moral authority of the association is charity. The financial basis of this authority ultimately lies in the donations of several corporate and individual donors, who are motivated by a variety of reasons. According to the association's research and development unit's recent donor profile survey, the accountability of the association, the "non-ideological" criteria to assist the poor and its distribution of the aids to the people, who deserve are the main motives.

To represent poverty in a non-ideological fashion for its supporters, the association represents poverty as an individual failure, and constitutes poverty in terms of family and individual. As part of this arrangement, the conception of poverty as an unequal social relation between individuals and social classes is ruled out of the bounds of discussion in the association. The unequal social relations, which deprive individuals of life choices, and are based on structural discrepancies due to economy, politics, class, ethnicity, age, religion and gender are not addressed within this discourse. Inasmuch as the inequality is removed by the association's preferred discourse of poverty, this leads to distinguishing the poor from non-poor on the basis of their ability to meet their fundamental and physiological needs. Likewise, this inability makes the poor to need the assistance, provided by the state, civil society and rest of the society. Therefore, the two tiers of the poverty for the

discourse of the association are inability to meet his and his family's own fundamental needs and thence to need assistance from others, which include the state, civil society and rest of the society. This chapter will specifically focus on the assistance provider, the charitable and the volunteer in the politics of the poor and poverty in the association.

The association has corporate and individual donors. According to the latest data of the association, %80 of the donors is male and %20 of the donors is female. The association codes its female donors as *hanim* (lady) whilst males are coded as male. Most of the corporate donors are small and middle-size mall chain stores and what is known as Medium and Small-Size Enterprises in Turkey. Some of these enterprises are members of MUSIAD (Independent Association of Businessmen) and other business associations. These enterprises have been publicly promoted as being “Anatolian Tigers” and nowadays “Anatolian Lions”, with the claim that they are being excluded from the center of the Turkish economy by the larger and more powerful financial actors and groups, such as the members of the TUSIAD (Association of Turkish Industrialists and Tradesmen) and corporate banks (Bugra, 1998). Although these small and middle sized enterprises bear clear references to the East Asian economies, which eagerly embraced neoliberal policies, resulting in much higher economic growth from mid-1980s onwards; the East Asian counterparts of the MUSIAD are monopolistic-state dependent cartels and big industries (Ibid). In Turkish context, the discourses of the Anatolian felines and MUSIAD are largely characterized by the rhetoric of subalterity, aspiration and exclusion, as part of the general subalterity rhetoric, sweeping the right and left of the political spectrum in Turkey during 1980s and 1990s (Acikel, 1996).

Before the establishment of the Deniz Feneri Association in 1998, *Kiler*, *Kervan*, *BIM*, and *YIMPAS* were the prominent middle-size chain store sponsors of the TV program; today, however, there are relatively unknown and unheard of small, local and regional corporate donors alongside the big corporate bodies, media groups and private medical healthcare facilities which compose the donor profile of the association. The aid budget of the association is more than \$ 40 million. However, whether or not this amount represents aid in cash or kind or both could not be determined clearly during this fieldwork.

Having said this, the economic base of the association underwent a notable shift through this period. With the increasing visibility and institutionalization of the association, it began to attract large groups of large and middle size enterprises and major private banks such as Logo Business Solutions, IBM Turkey, *AYTAC*, *Hayrunisa* Medical Group, Turkey Finance Bank, *Garanti Bankasi* and etc., both as a business-partner (to produce specific-products such as sugar, medical kits, bean-packages and to provide every purchasable service for the association, varying from technology and advertisement to banking services, health and education materials) and as a favorable civil society organization. The association also uses several sponsorship channels where *AYTAC*, *Vatan* Media Group and other enterprises sponsor various projects of the association (e.g. “1001 Children and 1001 Wishes”, and “The Feast of Sacrifice”, both in 2006). In the organizational discourse, the size of enterprise attracted to work for the association has mirrored its own success at self-promotion. Particularly after the entitlement of the association with the status of working on behalf of public welfare in 2002, its corporate donors have gained the right to exempt their donations from taxation. This also put the association into a “favorable” position for its corporate donors, since they both can fulfill their

“corporate social responsibilities” and be exempted from paying their taxes. The legal context of the increasing relations of corporate donors with the association is the New Law of Association and abolition of several barriers to make Food Banking possible in Turkey in 2004. As far as the Deniz Feneri Association is concerned this law has had a largely positive impact. Although it has increased the financial benefits of donating for some small and middle size enterprises, the law also requires the association to register its corporate donors from 2005, if they wish their donations to be deducted from their tax obligations. During this fieldwork, as I stated before, there is a reluctance of the association to share the knowledge of some of its corporate donors’ names with me. According to the Secretary General, “if they do not want to be known, we should respect their privacy and do not share their names” (I. Altan, personal communication, May, 14 2006). This act was also legitimized by Islamic morals of hiding the charity and assistance. In this respect, the association deploys a selective strategy and legitimizations for its activities among the discourses, such as religion, conservatism, Turkish nationalism and others, which are widely available. This is also done when criticisms are made to the association. Most of the times, the staff and other believe that, although in a tacit fashion, these criticisms are made because they work hard for the well-being of the poor. Or, in the association these criticisms are framed as they are made because the Deniz Feneri Association is an initiative of the religious and conservative people. Thus, in the association, this selective strategy is deployed to provide a terms of reference for its supporters and to frame possible or real criticisms in a dialogic fashion as observed by other ethnographic accounts on religion and urban areas (Tugal, 2002).

As it was stated earlier, the association represents itself acting as a bridge between the “real” and “deserving” poor and the charitable in Turkish society in

recent period. This discursive operation whilst construing the association as a modest actor between two parties, it individualizes the relation between the charitable and the poor. In this redrawing of relations, the very structural and social discrepancy and class-distinctions between the poor and the donors is refracted into the singular poor and the individual philanthropist relation. Although in Islamist and Islamist-revivalist discourse, the distribution of alms and ailments to the poor are obligatory and they should be collected by the state to distribute the poor and others from the “well-off” segments of the society (Musallam, 2005); the association represents alms giving as an individual relation, derives from religious reasons, between the poor and the charitable in Turkish society therefore a kindness and compassion of the charitable towards the poor. When I expressed this tenet in Islamist-revivalist discourse and argued that it is an obligation rather than benevolence, I was criticized for not knowing the essentials of Turkish state such as laicism by higher rank managers.

During this fieldwork, it was also observed that association represents those enterprises alongside individual donors, who are motivated by variety of reasons to donate, as the lower and upper middle “segments” of Turkish society (A Dept. Head, personal communication, February, 09 2006). This emphasis on middle-class is not only a popular belief in the association; but the association constitutes these middle classes as modals in moral, habitual, familial, ethnic and financial senses for the poor people. Most of the projects of the association, such as social rehabilitation and social revision visits enact this modeling practice. In these visits, “successful” and “compassionate” volunteers and donors visit the poor houses and train the poor. Whereas, morally corrupt higher classes are construed as they are not interested in the condition of the poor masses. In this respect, in the discourse of the association, the middle-segments occupy a moral high-ground. Accordingly, the middle-classes

assist the poor, and those who assist the poor are, by proxy, are the middle-segments of Turkish society.

As these examples showed, the discourse of the association deploys religious and other discursive elements selectively to achieve “inclusive” representation of the association in Turkish public. This, in turn, constitutes religion in field as a site of multiple reflections, appropriations, discourses and positions. Interestingly, by usurping the characteristics of discourses, the association addresses various political and socio-economic communities within the public sphere – these include such diverse groups such as Islamists, nationalists, liberals, conservatives and others.

Clearly, the individualizing relation between the poor and the charitable in the association does not mean that the association does not record corporate donors, who act charitably, as firms. Before 2005, some of the corporate donors were recorded in the *YOP* database as individual donors, whose relation with the association can cause political and financial damages for these corporations. Most of the times, the donors themselves request to be recorded as individual donors. In other words, the firms and enterprises that do not wish to publicize their donations; they might request their donations to be recorded as individual donations. This is legitimized through the privacy of the assistance to the poor and needy both by the association and corporate donors. Most of the time, the donors decline to share their “private data” with the association. Their rejection is considered as a serious matter in the association. In general, it was argued that the donors take this as an invasion of privacy and harshly reject requests to register their individual and identifiable information. During this fieldwork, it was observed that some of the employees in the association found this rejection meaningful. Accordingly, since these people are not poor --if they would be poor they might not help others-- the association does not

need to acquire all details. In this respect, for some employees it is logical attempt to acquire only necessary/short information not to cause disturbance among the donors.

Furthermore, especially during the February 28 Process, several corporate enterprises were stigmatized by secular and mainstream media due to their alleged support for the Islamist actors. Especially after the new law of Food Banking and the association's new tax-exempt status for its donors, this "privacy" issue underwent significant changes. From 2004 to the present, more than 500 firms have requested tax-exemption for their donations to the association. And they were represented as the corporate social responsible actors by the association.

In the association, it is widely observed that most of the service providers and business partners have some common histories. Furthermore, during my ethnography I could not obtain information on the purchasing policy of the association or its business partners. Many times, the reasons given by the higher ranks were the privacy of the exchange between two consenting parties. Many times, financial affairs manager and secretary general of the association told me that if the donors do not want to be known then the association should respect their decision and do not publicize or share their names. It should be noted here, this "respect the privacy" policy of the association does not cover the poor. I used different channels, and developed different ways, to obtain information regarding business partners during this fieldwork. And I suggested that to achieve accountability and reliable status in Turkish public, we should publicize our business partners. But my idea was firmly rejected by some department heads, since they understood this as to interfere in the internal affairs of the association. The same thing also went for the donors as well. Among the lower ranks of the association, there is a certain belief that several services and goods the association purchased in its national and international

activities provided an increase in the market share for the acquaintances of the executives and managers. However, this belief is largely resulted from hierarchical and non-participatory structure of the association's decision making process. In this respect, most of the lower rank employees with whom I discussed the organizational processes demanded more autonomy and access to decision making. In this context, if they are excluded, it is attributed to some known "others" who are occupying the available and desired position and accordingly illegitimately enjoying the symbolic and moral capital as well, which they feel, they are denied.

Currently, the association sends "a letter of thanks" to its donors. This "letter of thanks" includes the names of the poor, who receive the goods and services, which are donated by individual and corporate donors. This practice, although I strongly opposed during weekly meetings⁹⁵; was legitimized to achieve certain accountability by the association in poor relief and poverty alleviation. This practice was put forward by the association in a political climate, which was set by the heightened complaints about Germany based civil society organization, the Deniz Feneri e.V. As a result of the events following the closing of the Deniz Feneri e.V., the association rejected organic connection between the Deniz Feneri Aid and Solidarity Association and the Deniz Feneri e.V. But it has been observed that many donors, who reside in Germany and the EU, have believed that these two poor relief organizations are the one and the same, and this is why they supported the organization. Although Turkish authorities found no administrative connection between the Deniz Feneri and the

⁹⁵ Although I opposed this practice during weekly departmental meeting, it was decided that the letters and the names will be sent to the corporate and individual donors. I argued that it is a human rights abuse and further stigmatization of the poor in Turkish society. To publicize the names of the claimants in "letter of thanks" also showed that in the association, one of the organizational characteristics of accountability was constructed as the right to publicize the names of the poor. In this respect, also it was largely believed that since the poor request aid and assistance from the association, the association has right to publicize their names (Secretary Gen. et al., personal communication, July, 20 2006).

Deniz Feneri e.V., the events severely tarnished the status of the association in the gaze of the Turkish public.

In the aftermath of this well-publicized situation, the association published audit reports and its annual budget reports on its website, screen and newspapers. These reports were provided by independent consultants and the state-departments. By doing this, the association aims to restore its reliability and status in the gaze of its existing donor community and Turkish public. However, it seems very difficult in the gaze of its EU-based donors, whom assumed that they supported the Deniz Feneri Association through Deniz Feneri e.V. The association's migrant donors basically believed that this Germany-based association is a branch of the Deniz Feneri Association. In the following section of this chapter it will be demonstrated how the charity, charitable, volunteer and donor are construed in the association.

The Charitable in the Association

In the extreme case, the poor disappear completely as legitimate subjects and central foci interests involved. The motive for alms then resides exclusively in the significance of giving for the giver (Simmel, 1971: 153-154).

Mr. Prime Minister Called Deniz Feneri!

The Deniz Feneri Programs (with their stories about the good and the goodness) are still programs that people watch with interest. Audiences (by calling the numbers that are published on the program) express their contributions to the families that are shown on screen). The sad situation of a family from Kahramanmaras was broadcasted last January. The place where the family sheltered was extremely unhealthy. The father of the family was saying that he had to collect bread from the garbage. It was urgent and somebody had to give a hand to that family. Meanwhile our call center representatives were on duty to handle continuous calls. On one of those calls, the caller said "good evening" and "I've watched the sad situation of the family on the program. I've got in touch with the local authorities of the relevant city. The needs of the family will be met as soon as possible. I thank you for your sensitive program." he added. When our representative who took that call asked: "We appreciate that sir, but can we learn who is calling?" the caller said in a very calm manner: "Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the

prime minister.” Surprised, our representative completed the conversation:” Thank you, Mr. Prime Minister”.

The Deniz Feneri team rented a house which is livable and delivered household goods, clothing and food aid. Besides, it was decided that the family be given a sufficient amount of cash aid to help them meet their needs and pay their rental fees easily.

The public authorities and the municipality have always been on our side while we are working for this family. We thank all of them.

It is a very happy moment for all the people in the country that Mr. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan called our call center and personally took an interest the situation of one of our citizens within his head of the state as the most authorized person of the Government. If the prime minister of a state is concerned about each citizen and is getting in touch with the local authorities for their needs, then it can be said that it is the beginning of happy days for the poor.

We congratulate Mr. Prime Minister for his sensitive approach and we hope that the rest of the state authorities take this manner as a model (“Basbakan Deniz Fenerini Aradı!”, 2006, emphases added).⁹⁶

In the Deniz Feneri Association, the alms and ailments, reserved for the poor, basically define the giver and significance of the act of giving through the recipient.

The politics of poverty and the poor of the association not only constructs the poor

⁹⁶ “Başbakan Deniz Fenerini Aradı!

Deniz Feneri Programları her zaman olduğu gibi iyiler ve iyilikler hakkında anlatılacak hikâyelerle insanlarımızın ilgiyle izlediği bir program olma özelliğini sürdürüyor. İzleyiciler, programda bildirilen telefonları arayarak o anda ekranda gösterilen aile hakkında yapabilecekleri katkıları ifade ediyorlar. Geçtiğimiz Ocak ayı içinde yayınlanan programlarımızdan birinde Kahramanmaraşlı bir ailenin durumu ekrana getirildi. Ailenin barındığı yer son derece sağlıksızdı. Aile reisi zaman zaman çöpten ekmek toplamak zorunda kaldığını söylüyordu. Konu gerçekten acildi ve aileye hemen el uzatılması gerekiyordu. Bu arada Çağrı Merkezimizdeki görevlilerimiz aralıksız gelen telefonlara cevap vermekle meşguldüler. Bu telefonlardan birinde, arayan şahıs “iyi akşamlar” diyerek söze girdi ve “Ekranda görülen ailenin durumunu izledim. İlgili ilin yerel yetkilileri ile konuştum. Ailenin ihtiyaçları en kısa sürede giderilecektir. Duyarlı yayınlarınız için teşekkür ederim” dedi.

Telefona cevap veren görevlimiz, “Biz teşekkür ederiz efendim, ancak kimin aradığını öğrenebilir miyiz?” diye sorduğunda, arayan kişi gayet sade bir ifadeyle “Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Başbakan” cevabını veriyordu. Küçük bir şaşkınlık yaşayan görevlimiz “Teşekkür ederim, Sayın Başbakanım” sözleriyle görüşmeyi tamamlıyordu. Az önce hikâyesi yayınlanan ailenin devam çekimleri ekrana yansıyor, Kahraman Maraş Belediye Başkanı’nın aileye ev yapma sözlerine yer veriliyordu.

Deniz Feneri ekibi, çekimlerle birlikte aileye yaşanabilir bir ev kiralamış, ev eşyası, giyim ve gıda yardımı yapılmıştı. Ayrıca aile ile ilgili olarak, ev kiralarnı kolayca ödemelerini sağlayacak ve diğer ihtiyaçlarının karşılanmasını kolaylaştıracak miktarda periyodik nakit kararı alınmıştı. Bu aile için yapılan çalışmalar sırasında mülki makamlar ve belediyenin destekleri derneğimizin hep yanında idi. Hepsine teşekkür ediyoruz.

Devletin en tepesi ve icranın en yetkili kişisi sıfatıyla Sayın Başbakanın Dernek Çağrı Merkezimizi arayarak bir vatandaşımızın durumu ile ilgilenmesi, bu ülkede yaşayan herkes adına sevindirici bir gelişmedir.

Bir ülkenin başbakanı her vatandaşının durumunu merak ediyor ve ihtiyaçlarının giderilmesi için yetkili mercilerle konuşuyorsa o ülkede fakir fukara, garip guraba adına güzel günlerin başladığı düşünülp sevinilebilir. Sayın Başbakanımızı duyarlı tavırlarından ötürü tebrik ediyor, devletin tüm birimlerinin bu yaklaşımdan gerekli dersi çıkarmasını diliyoruz (“Basbakan Deniz Fenerini Aradı!”, 2006).

subjects in a certain fashion as I showed in this thesis; but also the givers and the charitable, which lay far beyond the scope of the analysis of governmentality. In other words, what I want to show in this section is the relational construction of the subject positions and their moral dilemmas and fantasies regarding the poor and poverty. Since it has already been argued that the discursive articulations of the association renew the relation between the poor and rest of the society, how these relations are drawn will be considered here.

According to the association, the most probable and promising relation with the poor is the charity. This constructive relation marks the characteristics and moral traits of the charitable, such as “modesty” and “compassion” and a sense of responsibility and the necessary agility to intervene in a crisis. In addition, these people also exert power and influence over other individual citizens who occupy certain social/public positions, such as officer, bureaucrat, mayor and governor. This power is also a male power and dependent on the personal charisma, and use of it for the well-being of the gendered, usually female, meeker, (Akinerdem, 2005; Arslan, 2005; Bora, 2005). In the case of the Deniz Feneri Association, this heroic trait is also refurbished with another trait, which can be defined as “walking the walk, not just talking the talk” and “making things done”, usually referred as desirable workplace characteristics (Zeybek, 2006). To become members of the distinguished community of charitable people, the citizens should follow the orders of the kind and compassionate status holders and take them as a model. In this practice of moral community, each and every member’s actions of taking one-by-one care of the poor represent a new dawn and hope for those poor who are eligible to be seen on TV and the Deniz Feneri program.

Another characteristic of this moral community regarding the poor is “to not hurt whilst giving the poor”. Ever since to request aid and help are construed as a condition to be ashamed of, not to hurt whilst assisting the poor becomes another moral quality of the charitable. On the other hand, the interchangeable use of the words such the poor and needy erases very structural relation between the well-offs and the poor. And thus, poverty becomes as a result of risks, crises and other unexpected events, which happen to the family. The other moral quality that the association and the charitable enjoy and display is being able to put themselves in their shoes, where the reverse of this relation, putting the poor in our shoes is not a possibility in the discourse of association.

As part of these discursive constructions, one crafty advertisement jingle of the association addresses the charitable by speaking to the poor. This jingle tells “Forgive, we are so preoccupied, forgive, we forgot you.....Donate, before it is too late...”⁹⁷ As this crafty slogan shows, to fail to take care of its poor represents a failure or breach in the tissue of moral community, which requires asking for forgiveness from the outcasts. However, this slogan in the end turns its addressee once more and asks the charitable to assist its poor before it is too late. According to the discourse of the association there are also other people, who may intervene in the crisis or risk situation, before it is too late. The following parts will analyze these people from the gaze of the association.

⁹⁷ “Bağışlayın, kendi işimize gücümüze daldık, bağışlayın sizi unuttuk....Bağışlayın çok geç olmadan” Here the association uses homographic verbs, to forgive and to donate, in Turkish.

The Volunteers and the Association

During this fieldwork, I have met a lot of volunteers, who work in social inspection teams and also do other tasks in the association. The volunteer profile of the association delivers certain plurality. Usually the elders and youngsters, university students and housewives with different ideological perspectives, dress-codes, jobs and personalities apply to volunteer in the association. Usually, the association, as it was stated earlier, uses this plurality as its “richness” and power. This richness is an engendered one; the association frequently uses the images of the veiled and unveiled volunteers and staff in its bulletins, website, TV program and radio-shows as veiled and unveiled female volunteers and staff represent the association’s pluralism⁹⁸. However the subject behind to represent this plurality is male, who posit the veiled and unveiled women as icons of plurality of the association, where none of the executive board members and department heads are women in the general headquarters.

Currently the association has more than 40,000 volunteers and they are registered⁹⁹ in the *YOP* database as well. However all of the volunteers are not actively working for or in the association. The number of the volunteers attracted to work with the association has mirrored its own success at self-promotion. To see this is sufficient to quote from the magazine of the association.

“Deniz Feneri is like a dervish lodge. It set forth with the old saying of Mawlana, “come, come whoever you are” and it says join the century’s act of kindness and compassion for the poor, needy and abandoned. The Deniz Feneri attracts everyone for variety of reasons. The people who came to see us do not want to leave us....Claudia is our German

⁹⁸ In the association, all the department heads and administrative board members are male.

⁹⁹ The current volunteer registration form can be found in Appendices section of this thesis (Appendix D).

volunteer, who came to Turkey to research social assistance¹⁰⁰ (“Sora Sora Bağdat Bulunur”, 2006).

Accordingly, in the association to volunteer in civil poor relief organizations brings semi-religious sense of penitence for the volunteers and compassion towards who deserve, and the discourse of the active citizenship (Lacey and Ilcan, 2006) of neoliberalism together. In this context, what one observes is the complex integration of so-called different ideologies, compassion towards the deserving poor (Berlant, 2004), semi-religious penitence of the volunteers and social responsibility, and rhetoric active citizenship (Warburton and Smith, 2003). Clearly, the compassion is reserved for who deserve it, where it is conditional and selective. On the other hand, penitence is a personal and individual state of the volunteers, through which they are called to perform their own citizenship duties against age-old, structural problems of capitalism and social stratification. Furthermore, in the association the number of volunteers and their plurality is also invoked to remind the number of the citizens, who approve and support the activities of the association, to the “others” and “outsiders”.

It is needless to argue that, in the association the participation of the volunteers to the decision making process is very limited. Most of the time, they have been expected to do what are considered as drudgeries by the staff. In order to explicate how the association imagines its volunteers, it is sufficient to analyze “Social Rehabilitation and Support Project” of the association.

This project was implemented by the Deniz Feneri Association Ankara branch in 2005. The aim in “The Social Rehabilitation and Support Project” was to

¹⁰⁰ “Deniz Feneri bir dergâh gibi. Mevlana’nın düsturuyla yola çıkıp, “ne olursan ol gel; bu iyilik hareketinde yoksul için, muhtaç için birlikte çalışalım” diyor herkese. Herkesi bir biçimde çekiyor. Deniz Fenerine bir kez adımını atan bir daha çıkmak istemiyor... Claudia da böyle bir gönüllümüz. Almanyadan sosyal yardım incelemesi yapmaya Türkiye’ye gelen bir öğrenci...” (“Sora Sora Bağdat Bulunur”, 2006)

socialize poor families, to bring them into consonance with the society and to support the individuals of the families psychologically. Usually, the trained volunteers, who can be “good role models” for the poor families, were employed in this project. The training is not professional and usually relies on popular self-help books’ accounts on self-esteem, communications and personal development.

As it was stated previously, according to the politics of the poor and poverty of the association, the poverty is not only a condition, marked by a persistent and temporary failure to sustain due to the lack of subsistence means and thus to need assistance. The poor’ request of assistance from the rest of the society embodies their very failure, which has cultural, familial, personal and habitual reasons. In this respect, as I stated before, the deployment of the notion of “the Culture of Poverty” marks the association’s project to erase the notion of inequality between the poor and well-off from its politics of the poor and poverty. In addition, the deployment of the notion of “Culture of Poverty” in the politics of the poor and poverty of the association represents the association’s aim to give persistent poverty an explanation other than inequality. Thus, the notion of “Culture of Poverty” charges the poor for their very failure and assigns the poor families and individuals several negative attributes, that the volunteers, staffs and donors of the association do not have. During this fieldwork, the most common attributes, which are assigned to the poor in the association, are laziness, aid dependency, illiteracy, pessimism, bereavement, lacking employment skills and substance abuse. It was observed that, the social inspection team members, volunteers, staffs, department heads frequently ascribe those characteristics to the poor. This situation, in turn, legitimizes the actions and projects of the association, which were taken to change these negative characteristics. One of the projects of the association, as it was mentioned above, was “Social

Rehabilitation and Support Projects”. The association introduces the project as follows.

The experiences, that we have had so far, showed us that the reasons for the heartbreaking situation of the families were not only poverty but also illiteracy and pessimism. *In this respect, “The Social Rehabilitation and Support Project” was implemented so as either to give hope to the families and to show them how to improve themselves in order to regulate their lives.* Within the context of the project, our volunteers attended the social investigation training and started to periodically visit the families chosen for the project. The families were informed in many issues like education, health and cleanliness. *They realized that they could make big changes with small steps in their life. We supported 50 families last year. Things that happened showed us that we were on the right track. The improvement of their daily life showed in their look, talk and even their dreams.* Therefore, we included 65 families and 35 volunteers for this project this year (“Rüyalar Gerçek Olur”, 2006, emphases added).

As part of this project, the story of the Mrs. Cemile and her family was published in the Deniz Feneri bulletin.

Mrs. Cemile and her family was one in the families of our Social Rehabilitation and Support Project. As far as we could see from the notes that our volunteers took during their social inspection visits, the situation of this family was the worst of all the families chosen for the project. The husband of Mrs. Cemile took alcohol and did not staying at home. Mrs. Cemile, mother of 4 daughters, was suffering from chronic asthma and kidney diseases. All of the four daughters, who were trying to survive with an alcoholic father and a sick mother in a small cottage of 20 square meters, were students. One of the girls was more sensitive than the rest and much more in need of care; Ruya had a learning disability and difficulty syndrome. The problems of the family and bereavement were a heavy burden on this ten year old kid’s shoulders. She was having trouble studying when she was in third grade however she had been successful in first grade. She was going to school in a desperate situation, her friends were making fun of her and sometimes her teacher was getting angry with her. After these detections of our volunteers, they formed a visit schedule for this family.

Every time they visit them, they informed the mother of the house about cleaning, rules of the house and children. The father was encouraged to quit alcohol. The education expenses of the children were met and the children were inspired to be much more successful. After a few visit, a lot of unexpected good news had come up. The father had returned home

and started to spend much more time at his home. Moreover, he had painted the house with his wife, cleaned the small garden and made a small path with the old tiles even though it was winter out there. There were conspicuous changes made in the house. Curtains were cleaned and their stitches were fixed. The house was much tidier compared to its previous situation. These changes were reflected in the glitters of happiness on everyone's face. We realized that what little inspirations, care, clemency and love achieve. As our volunteers left, promising to always be with them, they are prayed they would see ever better surprises on their next visit.¹⁰¹ (Ibid).

Although this narrative is the story of a family, an alcoholic father, ill mother and a girl with learning disability, it is also the narration of how volunteers can be a modal for the poor families. In these dual and relational constructions, the volunteer become a part and parcel of the Poverty Emergency Plan of the Association. In this action plan, volunteers will take care of the families as part of the community, state, civil

¹⁰¹ “Deniz Feneri Ankara Şubesi 2005 yılında yepyeni bir projeyi daha hayata geçirmişti. “Sosyal Destek Projesi”yle ailelerimizi sosyalleştirmeyi, topluma uyumlu hale getirmeyi ve aile bireylerine manevi destek vermeyi hedefledik. Çünkü şimdiye dek edindiğimiz tecrübelerimiz bize gösterdi ki, ailelerimizin bugünkü içler acısı durumlarında yoksulluk kadar cahillik ve karamsarlık da etkiliydi. Bu doğrultuda, hem ailelerimize umut aşılacak, hem de onların eksik kaldıkları yönleri kendilerine göstererek hayatlarını belli bir düzene oturtmalarını sağlamak amacıyla “Sosyal Destek Projesi” hayat buldu. Proje kapsamında, belirlenen gönüllülerimiz sosyal inceleme eğitimi aldıktan sonra, bu proje için seçilmiş ailelerimizi belli periyotlarla ziyaret etmeye başladılar. Ziyaretlerde sağlık, eğitim, temizlik gibi pek çok konuda ailelerimize bilgiler verildi. Hayatlarında, küçük adımlarla büyük değişiklikler yapabilecekleri gösterildi. Geçtiğimiz yıl 50 aileye destek olmuştuk. Yaşadıklarımız bize doğru yolda olduğumuzu gösterdi. Ailelerin gündelik hayatlarındaki düzeltilmeler, bakışlarına, konuşmalarına, hatta hayallerine bile yansımıştı. Bu nedenle bu yıl, 65 aileyi ve 35 gönüllümüzü bu projeye dahil ettik. Cemile Hanım ve ailesi de Sosyal Destek Projesi’ne dahil ettiğimiz aileler içinde yer alıyordu. Kendilerini ziyaret eden gönüllülerimizin aldığı notlardan anladığımız kadarıyla, seçtiğimiz ailelerin içinde şartları en zor olan aileydi. Cemile Hanım’ın eşi alkol alıyordu ve evde kalmıyordu. Dört kızıyla yaşam mücadelesi veren Cemile Hanım’ın ise kronik astım ve böbrek hastalıkları vardı. 20 metre karelik küçük bir kulübede, hasta bir anne ve alkolik bir babayla yaşam mücadelesi veren kızların dördü de okula gidiyordu. Kızlardan biri vardı ki diğerlerinden daha hassas ve daha ilgiye muhtaçtı; Rüya’nın öğrenme sorunu vardı. Aile içi sıkıntılar, yoksulluk 10 yaşındaki bu küçük çocukların omuzlarında ağır bir yükü. Birinci sınıfta gayet başarılı bir öğrenciyken, üçüncü sınıfa gelmesine rağmen okuyamıyordu. Okula perişan bir halde gidiyor, arkadaşları ayıplıyor, zaman zaman öğretmeni de kızılıyordu. Gönüllülerimiz bu tespitleri yaptıktan sonra, aile için bir ziyaret çizelgesi oluşturdular.

Her gidişlerinde anneye temizlik, ev düzeni ve çocuklar konusunda bilgiler verildi. Baba ise alkolü bırakması için cesaretlendirildi. Çocukların eğitim ihtiyaçları karşılandı, daha da başarılı olabilecekleri telkin edildi. Bir-iki ziyaretin ardından hiç beklenmedik güzel haberler gelmeye başlamıştı. Baba evine dönmüştü, artık evinde daha fazla vakit geçirmeye başlamıştı. Hatta eşiyle birlikte kış günü olmasına rağmen evlerini boyamış, küçük bahçelerini temizlemişler, eski fayanslardan şirin bir yol bile döşemişlerdi. Evde de yapılan değişiklikler göze çarpıyordu. Perdeler yıkanmış, söküklükler dikilmişti. Eski sine nazaran ev çok daha derli topluydu. Bu değişiklikler herkesin yüzüne mutluluk pırıltıları olarak yansıyor. Bizler de orada, yapılan küçük telkinlerin, insanlara gösterilen ilginin, şefkatin, sevginin ne kadir olduğunu gördük. Gönüllülerimiz bundan sonra da hep yanlarında olacağımızı söyleyerek yanlarından ayrılırken, bir sonraki ziyarette daha güzel sürprizlerle karşılaşabilmenin duası içindeydiler” (The Deniz Feneri, 2006, 11: 39, emphases added).

society cooperation and they are required to check the situation of the families they care for every six months, to learn whether or not there is a change in their situation (Atalay, 2003).

As it has already become clear, these relational constructions re-draw certain insider and outsider dilemmas between the poor and charitable/volunteer in the site of the association in Turkey in a particularly neoliberal fashion. Rather than being an enmity and friendship situation, this insider and outsider dilemma is constructive in the sense that: whilst the charitable and to a lesser extent volunteer (as a service delivery agent, moral model, living proof of success and so on) is an individual member of a distinguished community, the poor becomes a constructive other to achieve this perfect community. Secondly, as part of the neoliberal belief that community of successful individuals can take care of its poor, this community action aims to transform this other through various techniques such as social revision, aid provision, spiritual support, teaching basic skills and empowerment, it also constructs and realizes itself in the public space and civil society, as a successful community. Since this realization takes place in an organization, it also establishes the association as a reliable body, whose link and connection with the community is more “corporeal” and “real” vis-à-vis relative sterility of the state (Tanner, 1996).

In this context, poverty and poverty alleviation gain new meanings, subjects, technologies and aspects, which are ultimately disempowering for the poor. As part of this disempowerment, the problems of the poor are individualized and social relations that sign them as the poor and needy are reproduced in Turkish public. As part of this reproduction, these hegemonic, neoliberal, religious, common sense and traditional views of poverty promote certain solutions about the problem whilst excluding others and calls particular groups to fight against poverty. As part of this

new call, relations, the association empowers itself and rest of the society, and for itself and its “rest”, it promises new political possibilities, positions and power to its donors and volunteers under neoliberal hegemony.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The present study has endeavored to analyze the poor relief system, discourses of poverty and the projects undertaken in the name of the poor and poverty alleviation by a prominent civil society organization in Turkey. In order to explain the systems and discourses of poverty and poor in civil welfare provision, I undertook a fieldwork study in the headquarters and branches of the Deniz Feneri Association between 2005 and 2007 through deploying action research and participant observation methodologies. Even though the social policy discipline has shown a scant interest in the foundations and of the charitable roles adopted by civil welfare provision actors in the Middle East and Southern Europe after 1990s, instead it has usually analyzed the civil agencies' poor relief institutional practices in terms of their successes and capacity to eradicate poverty within the given framework of neoliberal and globalization. Although the questions concerning the global and local contexts, financial dynamics and the adequacy and consequences of these revived or invented “traditional” poverty alleviation institutions and practices in modern societies are meaningful, there is a new scholarly wave of interest, usually derives from governmentality studies, the questions regarding how and through what agency the civil poverty alleviation activities of these institutions were formed, enacted and created under neoliberal and globalization. Furthermore, this renewed scholarly

interest has social scientific and critical value to furnish the existing social policy literature on civil welfare with an added organizational, political and ethnographic depth.

By following this latter scholarly wave of interest, I claimed that the larger politics of the poor and poverty of the Deniz Feneri Association - which covers the organizational system, the aid-management activities of the association, discourses of the poor and poverty of the association, interpersonal exchanges in the organizational setting, the technological infrastructure, and the volunteer power of the association - is crucial to an understanding of and evaluation of both the adequacy, configurations and political and social significance of the civil welfare arrangements in Turkey in this period.

Initially, the focus of my research were the discourses, mechanisms, apparatuses and techniques of the association to represent poverty and the poor in neoliberal times; however participatory research through my employment in the association led me to reformulate my focus of analysis. Instead, I began to problematize the organizational, interpersonal and technical aspects of the political site of the association, which interconnects the poor, the volunteer and the donor subjects, through technical, discursive, visual and organizational infrastructures, applications, procedures and projects. This shift in my fieldwork study led me to question the theoretical horizons of the governmentality studies, which underpinned this study to interpret the Deniz Feneri Association, and problematize the dynamic, technical, organizational and political site of the association itself, rather than the formation of the poor subjects by the association.

In order to contextualize my questions and fieldwork study, I assessed particular developments, which led to the participation of the civil society

organizations in poor relief activities. I argued that there are global and local and national processes which created and structure this participation. The global processes in question are the ebbing of the Keynesian consensus, the rise of the supranational financial bodies such as the IMF and World Bank in international economy and the rise of the neoliberal. Moreover, the local and national processes, which promoted the emergence of the civil welfare provision actors are the fiscal policies of the Motherland Party, the rise of the Islamism, the February 28 Process against Islamist political actors in Turkish society, the 1999 Marmara Earthquake, the social and political consequences of the financial crises of 1990s and finally the election of the Justice and Development Party in the 2002 General Elections.

On this historical and social basis, I studied how the Deniz Feneri Association intertwines the global and hegemonic and local, religious and national conceptions of poverty and the poor in its organizational, interpersonal, visual and technical structures. Officially, the association defines poverty as a form of inability of the claimant to meet the basic needs of his [sic] own and of his family through his economic power. This definition of poverty is reminiscent of the conception of absolute poverty and the “basic needs” definition of poverty. In the association, this construction of poverty accordingly renders poverty as an entirely individualized category. In addition, poverty becomes the poverty of the (male) breadwinner and his family, which sets the requesting aid as a condition of possibility and visibility of the poor in society. In the chosen discourse of the Deniz Feneri Association, poverty only becomes visible through individuals, who fail to secure a basic living standard through their own financial resources and thus need to be assisted by the “society”. This very need, in turn, makes them objects of the organizational, interpersonal and discursive processes in the association. Since the concept of poverty has been

founded around the claimant, any discussion of poverty as a part of a wider setting of social inequality with unequal social relation between individuals and social classes is ruled out of bounds. Unequal social relations, which deprive individuals of life choices, are based on structural factors - such as economy, politics, ethnicity, gender, religion, age and conceptions of society - are not addressed within this discourse. Inasmuch as inequality is removed by the association's preferred discourse of poverty, this leads to distinguishing the poor from non-poor on the basis of their ability to meet their fundamental needs and well-functioning family life due to their material earnings. Although it was observed that the employees who closely work with the poor as social inspection staff and others are aware of the power relations and inequalities within family unit, the association continues to represent poverty on the basis of family and frame its activities to support "the Turkish family" against financial, moral, social, medical and unforeseen risks in Turkish society. In this respect, the discourse of well-functioning of the family also creates a regime of stigmatization in the association, reserved for the poor women and men and their families. These stigmas are used to disclose and mark the poverty of aid-recipients- in larger plain to denote what it means to be the poor in Turkish society. For the poor women, these insignias are being unable to feed and nurture her children properly, living in "unclean" home, being dependent on aid, and having too many children as a sign of the ignorance, Kurdish-ness and backwardness in the association. For men, these stigmas are requesting aid from the association, alcoholism and substance abuse, and unemployment. These stigmas are used to express what the poor do or fail to do, and also explain why they are poor and remain poor in the association.

During my fieldwork, it was observed that other conceptions of the poor were at work in the association. Those who were usually seen as the poor were identified

as “vulnerable groups” in the association. Especially, the widows, orphans, elderly, disabled and mentally retarded people who were deprived of due care, unschooled children, women with dependent children, and unemployed men and women belong to these vulnerable groups. Some of these categories are usually considered as the embodiments of local and religious conceptions of poverty and meekness in Turkey and Islam. While the Deniz Feneri Association neatly distanced itself from any kind of political activism and Islamism in order not to provoke a negative reaction from the Turkish public; it embeds conservative and “religious” conceptions of poverty and the poor into the larger neoliberal and global framework. In the association, the linkage between the local and the global, national and global, is provided by the very specificity of the definition of poverty in the association, which can be understood through the created discourse around unemployment, family, assistance provision and culture of poverty.

I have noticed within the association a widespread belief that unemployment is the fundamental cause of poverty. Hence, when unemployment is ended with work being found for the poor, the expectation is that the poverty of the breadwinner person and its family would also end. This formulation led the organization to define the employed poor as a secondary or tertiary target group to assist. Insofar as poverty was individualized in the discourse of the association, the question of unemployment and more importantly the causes of the unemployment itself were individualized too. In this respect, the basic cause of unemployment for the Deniz Feneri Association is not the fluctuations, structural changes and novel demands of the labor market upon the labor class in the global system; rather, unemployment refers to specific psychological and professional inadequacies of the unemployed to adapt himself to the changing work-environments and occupational demands. The “employed poor”,

however, occupies a morally superior position within the Association than the unemployed both in interpersonal and discursive levels. This higher status derives from their self-reliant character – as evinced by their employed status - to sustain their lives. The second linkage is the concept of the family. In the association, the family is the basic unit to support with aid-in-kind and in cash. In that sense, the association centers poverty alleviation on the collective unit such as families rather than individual citizens.

The third element in the discourse of the association is the representation of poverty as a cultural and habitual phenomenon, derived from negative personal and familial traits such as laziness, lack of self-esteem and self-sufficiency, lacking know-how and work-skills – all of which lead to unemployment. With the election of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey in 2002, the association emphasized much of its work around the debates around the “culture of poverty” as an explanation of the poverty. This vision of poverty casts peculiar importance of individual characteristics, interpersonal dynamics, family relations and personal attitudes of the poor towards work, life, future and society. In this discourse, the poor emerge as the negation of the established order and self-induced sideliners, who are marked by their very will to be different from rest of the mainstream society. This imagination, thus, situates an ultimate contradiction between society and the poor, and through this contradiction it offers us a snapshot and image of the society and the poor. On this basis, in the discourse of the association the poor are usually represented as culturally, morally and psychologically “other” from the rest of the society. It was observed that for the association, this difference both explains their poverty and marks their separation from the rest of the society. Furthermore, this separation act defines the poor through a constructive relation with rest of the

society. But, as I also claimed in this thesis, this relation also describes the individual, familial, religious and national characteristics of rest of the society through what it chooses to reserve for the poor.

I argued that in the association, these complex official and interpersonal constructions and representations of the poor and poverty have been subject to certain transformation since 1998. Insofar as the discursive representations and constructions of the poor and poverty have been subject to certain transformations, what are reserved for the poor, such as determination and control techniques of the poor, and consequently the strategies and practices of the Deniz Feneri Association to alleviate these poor remained at variance during these years. The very best example of this was the social inspection procedure of the association. This procedure has been designed to ascertain the reality of the claimants' poverty, and based on visiting to the claimants households. These visits were done by trained employees and volunteers. As part of this procedure, the volunteers and staff are expected to fill out a specific questionnaire, which is called Social Inspection (Form) during their visits. The questionnaire aims to retrieve necessary data to assist the poor and it is designed on the basis of the family, rather than individual. The family rather than the individual is used as a measure of the poverty in this questionnaire.

Since poverty is defined in terms of psychological and habitual endowments in the association, the association initiates moral-support projects to change these endowments. These projects aim to integrate the poor into society and make them embrace moral, practical and social norms have been in employed by the Association under the heading of social support projects. These projects situate poverty not only as a financial failure but also as a moral and familial failure as well. Thus, it was the political aim to address this failure through the help of the donors and volunteers of

the association. In these projects, the volunteers and the donors and their family lives function as a role model for the poor and their families. Thus, it was hope to achieve a certain sense of responsibility amongst the volunteers and donors to support the poor and their families, by providing “psychological” and “cultural” assistance alongside the financial assistance. In other words, since the poverty is represented as a family-based inability to sustain the well-being of the family, unemployment and culture of poverty by the association; the association developed various projects to correct the family based inabilities, unemployment and welfare dependency and negative psychological traits. From 1998 onwards, the emphasis moved from providing cash assistance and aid-in-kind to “claimants” towards promoting entrepreneurialism and self-sufficiency of “the poor”. The basic aim of these new projects is to promote self-reliance (contra “dependency”) of the poor and transform them into active job-seekers rather than assistance-takers.

I would argue that, these constructions and representations of the poor and poverty and the techniques, strategies and the practices to alleviate poverty constituted the politics of the poor and the poverty in the Deniz Feneri Association. As part of this politics of the poor and poverty, new social and political relations between the poor and the society became possible for the Association. In this respect, this politics of the poor, whilst constructing and representing the poor and the poverty, defines the “Turkish society” in a certain way, fitting in the central concerns of the neoliberal governmental rationality about the society, poverty, inequality and family. Just as the poor are identified and defined as those who are unable to meet their fundamental requirements and thus needs from rest of the society; those who are able to meet their fundamental requirements and also to assist the poor culturally, financially and socially - namely the donors and volunteers of The Deniz Feneri

Association - became the Turkish society by extension. Donors and volunteers are defined as the “other” by which the poor can be further identified. Thus, the Deniz Feneri Association represents its volunteers and donors as “Turkish society” both to the poor and other groups. In this respect, there is a transmission between the donors and volunteers of the association and the Turkish society in the discourse of the association.

This in turn gives a chance to the volunteers and donors to imagine themselves as the “real” Turkish society vis-à-vis other political groups. In the discourse of the association, the most significant characteristic of the relation between the poor and rest of the society for The Deniz Feneri Association is the latter’s discretion and compassion towards its poor whilst assisting the poor to overcome the claimant’s failure to meet necessary standards of basic living. In addition, this bond provides the Deniz Feneri Association with the rhetorical means to attempt to fix a picture of each [group] to take form in the mind of the other, and this picture evidently is in reciprocal relationship with that personal relationship.

During this fieldwork, I have observed that the association’s representations of the real Turkish society are “professional”, “moral”, “compassionate”, “financially secure”, “socially responsible corporate actors”, “revivers of Turkish/Ottoman solidarity inherent in Turkish society”. As part of organizational development and discursive diversification, the association developed an extensive array of discourses around itself, both at structural and individual levels. Among those values are professionalism, accountability, responsiveness to crisis situations (contrasted with stagnant state-institutions); conducting the poor effectively by separating poor those who are really in need from those who are not; registering the poor; and governing

the flow of aid in kind and in cash in an efficient and accountable manner are inseparably combined with each other.

This politics of the poor and poverty, as I claimed in this thesis, is a power site. This site is created by and around power relations among the lower and higher ranks, the volunteers, the employees and the claimants. In addition, this dividing set of practice of The Deniz Feneri Association also attempts to fix the content and the form of the relation between the individual poor and the Turkish society in the neoliberal period. This panoply of the identities, relations and subjects of the poor and the Turkish society is only meaningful when it enables the donor and supporters of The Deniz Feneri Association to act as the true representatives of the “Turkish society” in the public sphere.

In other words, as a clear part of this politics of the poor and the poverty, I would argue that the Deniz Feneri Association’s attempt to fix an image of the Turkish society functions as a template for its donors and supporters and the association itself as legitimate forces to participate in the act of governing of the population in Turkey alongside the state and government. By doing this, the supporters and the Deniz Feneri Association act within a social and political ground, which is by default the nationalist-secularist middle classes’ ground in Turkey. In the second half of 1990s, this ground has been subject to a struggle between traditional elites of the Turkish nation-state and opposing Islamist groups and thus create new identities in Turkish public. This middle class position, defined by a reading of Turkish national identity, served as a meaningful template for both “political groups” as well as others in Turkey to legitimize themselves and conduct the population in the public sphere. Thus, through the discourse of the poverty and poverty alleviation, I claimed, the Deniz Feneri Association promises its donors and supporters the

propriety of a middle class position in Turkey and contributes to the self-definition of an aspiring social class with an Islamist-conservative and neoliberal orientation on poverty and social policy in 2000s.

In the Deniz Feneri Association, the construction of the middle class position as a desirable template for its political communities not only functions as a point of reference for these political groups, but it is portrayed as a secured space of leading Turkish society in conservative-neoliberal directions. Thus, the middle class as a category expresses both political desires of these political communities to be legitimate and to lead society with their own programs. The basic question then, is how this struggle over the meaning of a middle class position situated between the traditional elite and opposing Islamist and conservative forces reproduce the general discourse of the neoliberalism in Turkey. In this context, the politics of the poor and poverty within The Deniz Feneri Association represents a peculiar example in Turkey in recent period. The Deniz Feneri Association's representation of poverty situates several able bodies to assist these poor culturally, morally and financially. In this respect, the veracity of this discursive claim is both dependent on the financial, moral and cultural visibility of the latter in public as well as its own moralized and aestheticized relation with the poor. Neoliberalism as a discourse, in that sense, is what makes these middle class actors' culturally and legally sanctioned relation with the poor, provision and poor relief in modern societies with several techniques, discourses and strategies possible. In this context, it is possible to claim that, the Deniz Feneri Association occupies a specific position through which the new middle class actors of Turkey maintain and conduct the population alongside the nation-state under neoliberalism and claim the public position, which have been traditionally occupied by the traditional elites of Turkey.

My perspective in this fieldwork largely relied on a perspective from governmentality. However, with my deeper participation in the association, it was observed that the studies, geared with this theoretical perspective, suffer from certain shortcomings in their analyses of institutional, intra/inter institutional, organizational, and interpersonal processes as well as practices, rituals and relational subject positions of poor relief. In subjective plain, these given studies produce large and quite understandable bodies of analyses on the machinations of power and the “perishing” yet “determinate” and decisive effects of those power practices on dominated and consent-giving subjects such as vagabonds, the poor, mentally ill, prisoners or communities and minority groups in order to understand the formations of social, financial, colonial, public and medical power in given space and time. On the other hand, these studies, somehow, overlook the overlapping of the governmental strategies and discourses, operating both on the poor and the rest of the Turkish society. In this regard, during this fieldwork I observed that the theoretical horizons of the governmentality studies largely under-researches both the power-ridden and dialogical process of policy making and implementing and their transformation in social and civil environments by focusing on the results of this social power on social subjects and groups. Put otherwise, the perspective of governmentality mostly deals with the objectifying effects of the policies upon specific groups and subjects with certain and superfluous sense of awe. As part of this sense of awe, in these analyses these groups and subjects oscillate between being over-subversive resisters or over-perished bare exiles of modern societies. As part of this moral awe, geared with certain academic insights, the poor, the homeless and mentally ill and such other groups emerge as the most perished ones within the theoretical horizons of the perspective of governmentality and its examples.

Although there is nothing essentially flawed in analyzing the subject positions reserved for the oppressed people in contemporary societies or machinations of power over the people, during this research I figured out that very complex, hierarchical and structured interactions among the multiple subjects are not analyzed adequately due to this limited perspective. Put otherwise, during this research I observed the fact that civil welfare provision bears a vast array of relations, other than being a mere machination of hierarchical power and thus requires a nuanced multi-focal view.

During this study I also observed that these studies do not produce a compelling analysis of political possibilities of the poor relief for the rest of the society. In this respect, these accounts deploy these poor relief activities as being mere mechanisms of control, governing and coercion of particular groups under neoliberalism, rather than productive processes which generate hegemonic, counter-hegemonic and conflictual power relations between several groups, classes and communities. In this respect, I argue that governmentality studies largely overlook the spaces, rules, and layers and the outcomes of power relations among multiple groups and the content and scope of the relations among them under neoliberal polity in recent times. Although the Deniz Feneri Association empowers rest whilst individualizing the poor in Turkish society, during this study I figured out that civil society organizations require more in-depth engaging and interactional analysis, other than treatment of machinations of power.

Last not least point, I want to suggest here are the limits of this thesis. Due to the limited scope of this thesis, I could not make justice to the stories and narratives of the poor during this research nor made in-depth interviews with the poor. They remained the people, who for perfectly individualized reasons, were coded as the

incapable bodies and families in this research. In this respect, this research was a research on social, organizational and interpersonal decision to classify people as the poor under neoliberalism. Put otherwise, my research, sadly, has little to do with who the poor are and what they do, rather about what they were supposed to fail to do in the discourse of the association. Interestingly, to know who the poor is or what they do was meant to identify their individual failures, habits and their family relations and to attest their poverty by use of organizational, technological and human power in the association.

Obviously poverty is an ongoing and persistent problem, which goes beyond the dynamic interplay among the failure, knowledge and stigmatization in the associational setting. Although the subject positions as Procrustean Beds, into which the poor were called to fit, are promising sites of analysis; the problem of poverty and the poor themselves, and by definition the class relations and social inequalities, which produce poverty, the social and political discourses mark particular people as the poor in a society, and the poor people's reactions to those mechanisms and hegemonic classes lied beyond the scope of this thesis. As a prospective anthropological study, the specific topics of the structures which produce poverty, the poor people's narratives themselves, and the poor people's reactions to the discourses, classes, organizations and rest of the society sign them as the poor through several apparatuses should also be analyzed.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX-A

KAMUOYUNA DUYURU

Son günlerde, özellikle bazı basın yayın organlarında, Derneğimiz ismi etrafında bir tartışma oluşturularak, halkımızın Deniz Feneri'ne olan sarsılmaz güven ve umut duyguları yıpratılmaya çalışılmaktadır.

Almanya'da faaliyet gösteren Avrupa Deniz Feneri e.V. isimli kuruluşu yönelik Alman makamlarının yürüttüğü soruşturma bahane edilerek ve söz konusu kuruluşla isim benzerliğimizden yola çıkılarak, Deniz Feneri Derneğimiz haksız ithamlarla suçlanmakta, mesnetsiz ve bir kampanyanın hedefi kılınmak istenmektedir.

Bu gelişmeler karşısında, şu hususları Türk Milleti'nin dikkatine sunmak isteriz:

Deniz Fener Derneği, 1998 yılında insani yardım yapmak ve yoksullukla mücadele etmek için kurulmuştur.

Israrla ve inatla yardım çalışmalarında sadece yoksulluk unsuruna ihtimam göstermekte, başta ülkemiz olmak üzere dünyanın neresinde olursa olsun açlık, kıtlık, doğal afetlerin yaşandığı her coğrafyaya bağışçıları ile gönüllülerinden aldığı cesaret ve teşvikle koşturmakta, dünyanın dört bir yanında, başta Ulusüstü kuruluşlar olmak üzere pek çok Sivil Toplum Örgütü ile işbirliği yapmakta, ülkesini ve bayrağını en güzel şekilde temsil etmektedir.

Yoksullukla mücadelede birlikte çalıştığı kuruluşlarla olan ilişkilerinde, sadece insani yardım temelli bağlantılar kurarak her türlü tartışma yaratacak yaklaşımlardan uzak durmaktadır.

Gözü yaşlı, gönlü kırık, yoksulluğun pençesinde inim inim inleyen milyonların derdini, insaf sahibi, cömert, sevgi dolu her kalbe ulaştırarak, toplumdaki yoksulluk yangınına bir nebze olsun söndürmek için gecesini gündüzüne katmaktadır.

Çalışmalarıyla pek çok sivil toplum kuruluşuna örnek olan Deniz Feneri Derneği yurtdışındaki sivil toplum kuruluşlarından İçişleri Bakanlığı'nın izinleri çerçevesinde bağış kabul ettiği gibi kaynaklarının yetmediği projelerde bilgilerini paylaşmış ve Almanya'da kurulu bulunan Avrupa Deniz Feneri e.V.'den de aynı prosedürler çerçevesinde destek almıştır.

Deniz Feneri Derneği; ülkemizin içinden geçmekte olduğu siyasi süreç ve ısınan politik ortamda günlük ideolojik kavgalarına ve siyasi amaçlarına alet etmek isteyenlerin kuru gürültü ve iftira kampanyaları ile yoksula uzanan eli yaralamaya çalışanların tehdit ve yıldırma çabalarına asla aldırmayacaktır.

Deniz Feneri Derneği'nden her ay yardım alan onbinlerce gözü yaşlı gönlü kırık insanımıza yardım ulaştırılmasının engellenmesi anlamına gelen bu asılsız iddiaları yayanları hem milletimiz affetmeyecek hem de bu davranışları tarihte "yoksulu sevmeyenler" olarak anılmalarına sebep olacaktır.

Yoksullukla mücadelemizde dokuz yıldır bizi destekleyen, azdan az, çoktan çok vererek merhametini emanet etmiş cömert bağışçılarımız, fedakâr gönüllülerimiz müsterih olun. Bu nehrin yoksula ulaşmayan tek damlası, heba edilen tek bir yudumu yoktur. Biz, gece gündüz demeden kör kuruşun hesabını yapıyor ve sizin başınızı öne eğdirmeyip, gönlünüze en ufak bir şüphe düşürmeyecek bilinçle çalışmalarımızı daha yüksek azim ve bilinçle sürdürüyoruz.

Yeryüzünde son yoksula ulaşıncaya kadar çalışacağız.

KAMUOYUNA SAYGI İLE DUYURULUR
DENİZ FENERİ DERNEĞİ

DENİZ FENERİ DERNEĞİ:

Bakanlar Kurulu kararıyla kamu yararına çalışan dernektir.

Türkiye'nin ilk ve tek ISO 9001 kalite belgesine sahip yardım kuruluşudur.

Birleşmiş Milletler Ekonomik ve Sosyal Konseyi'ne (ECOSOC) Özel Danışman Statüsü'nde üyedir.

BM Mülteciler Yüksek Komiserliği (UNHCR) ile çalışmalar yapmaktadır.

Uluslararası Çalışma Örgütü (İLO) ile işbirliği yapmaktadır.

Uluslararası Kızılhaç ve Kızılay Komitesi STK'lar için Afet Müdahale Prensipleri'ni (Code of Conduct) imzalamıştır.

Resmi makamların yapmakta olduğu sürekli denetimlere ilave olarak uluslararası bağımsız denetim kuruluşunca da denetlenmektedir.

Deniz Feneri Derneği INPACT INTERNATIONAL TÜRKİYE tarafından denetlenmektedir.

APPENDIX B

Formu büyük harfle doldurunuz. Seçmeli yanıtları taşımadan (X) ile doldurunuz. Dikkat formu katlamayınız.



Deniz Feneri

Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Derneği

SOSYAL İNCELEME FORMU

Başvuru Sahibi _____

Tespit Tarihi _____

Başvuru Tarihi _____

1- ADRES

☐ Evde yok ☐ Taşınmış ☐ Adres yanlış ☐ Eksik adres

Eğer adres yukarıdakinden farklıysa lütfen doğrusunu aşağıdaki alana doldurunuz

İl _____

İlçe _____

Semt _____

Mah / Köy _____

Cadde _____

Sokak _____

Bina Adı _____

Kapı No _____ Daire No _____ Posta Kodu _____

Tarif _____

☐ Ev ☐ Cep ☐ İş ☐ Diğer _____

☐ Ev ☐ Cep ☐ İş ☐ Diğer _____

6- EVDEKİ GENEL DURUM

☐ Sürekli tedavi gerektiren hasta var

☐ Sürekli tıbbi malzeme kullanan var

☐ Okuldan alınıp çalıştırılan çocuk var

☐ Okula gönderilmeyen çocuk var

☐ Alkol ☐ sigara kullanan var

☐ Cep telefonu var

☐ Kredi kartı kullanan var

☐ Ev temiz değil

7- BARINMA DURUMU

☐ Ev sahibi ☐ Kiracı ☐ Kira ödmeden oturuyor

☐ Apartman ☐ Çadır ☐ Dükkan

☐ Müstakil ev ☐ Baraka ☐ Huzurevi

☐ Prefabrik ☐ Evsiz (sokakta) ☐ Cezaevi

☐ Gecekondu ☐ Geçici ikamet ☐ Sığınmaevi

8- BARINDIĞI YERİN DURUMU

Ev _____ m² Oda sayısı _____ Kesik mi? ☐

☐ Mutfak ☐ Kaloriferli ☐ Elektrik ☐

☐ Banyo ☐ Ciddi hasarlı ☐ Su ☐

☐ Rutubet ☐ Bodrum kat ☐ Doğalgaz ☐

☐ Sobalı ☐ Çatı katı ☐ Telefon ☐

☐ Kanalizasyon

9- EVDEKİ KULLANILABİLİR EŞYALAR

☐ Buzdolabı ☐ Halı - kilim ☐ Fırın

☐ Çamaşır Mk. ☐ Çekyat ☐ Mutfak malz.

☐ Bulaşık Mk. ☐ Masa sandalye ☐ B K tüplü ocak

☐ Elektrikli Süp. ☐ Dolap ☐ Şofben

☐ Televizyon ☐ Koltuk takımı ☐ Katalitik

☐ Bilgisayar ☐ Yatak ☐ Soba

☐ Müzik Seti ☐ Uydu Anteni ☐ Elektrikli Isıtıcı

Diğer _____

2- GELİR DURUMU

Maaş _____ YTL.

Kira _____ YTL.

Düzensiz _____ YTL.

Tarım _____ YTL.

Hayvancılık _____ YTL.

Yardım _____ YTL.

Ailenin aylık toplam geliri _____ YTL.

3- GİDER DURUMU

Sağlık _____ YTL.

Kira _____ YTL.

Gıda _____ YTL.

Fatura _____ YTL.

Eğitim _____ YTL.

Diğer _____ YTL.

Ailenin aylık asgari gideri _____ YTL.

4- BORÇ DURUMU

Kira _____ YTL.

Fatura _____ YTL.

Tedavi _____ YTL.

İflas _____ YTL.

Diğer _____ YTL.

Toplam borç _____ YTL.

Borcu yok ☐

Borcun kime olduğu

☐ Akraba-tanidik ☐ Esnaf ☐ Diğer _____

☐ Ev sahibi ☐ Banka

5- ALMAKTA OLDUĞU YARDIMLAR

	Nakit	Gıda	Giyim	Sağlık	Yakacak	Eğitim	S.Yemek	Barınma
Akraba- arkadaştan	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Komşulardan	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Vakıf-derneklerden	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Belediyeden	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Kaymakamlıktan	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Yurtdışından	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

10- YARDIM TALEPLERİ

	Nakit	Gıda	Giyim	Sağlık	Yakacak	Eğitim	Barınma	Ev esyası	Temizlik	Tamir	Misafirhane	Sıcak Yemek	Diğer
Yardım Talepleri	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Yapılabilecek Yrd.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Acil	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Diğer	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

11- GENEL DEĞERLENDİRME

☐ Çok iyi ☐ İyi ☐ Orta ☐ Kötü ☐ Çok kötü

2

AİLE BİLGİLERİ

Yoni Kaver Ali, maid,
26.06

erat
g
A

Meslek Edindirme :	V-Özpoet	12.06.2004
Tespit Eden : DERNEK GÖNÜLLÜSÜ	Ambar Celal	Tespit Tarihi : 01.01.1999
Değerlendirme Tarihi : 16.01.1999	Bilgi Alınan Kişi ve Tel	11.10.2002

Değerlendirme : Evde yokken (21.05.2004 - M. Ali)

50Milyon Yapılan yardımlar : NAKİT, Azize Hanım 7 yıl önce evinden ayrılmış
şu anda kinada oturuyor yanında ~~yaşlı~~ bir oğlu bir kızı yaşı
gocukları kızıda kafeteryada çalışıyorlar ailenin tamamı kar
mini sağlamış fakat yeniden gıbaracaktırmış. Şu anda aile pa
durumunda. Daha önce D. feneri Harbinde başta yerden Yaro
almamışlar. Şu anda Azize Hanım oğlu apustosta askere
gidecektmiş. Şu anda aileye yakın akrabaları yok. aile bide
oğlu askere girdince, en azından göçük askerden gelinceye
Kadar Gıda ve Nakit Yardımı talep ediyorlar. Şu anda
ailede sağlık sorunu olan yok.

* aile daha önce D. fenerinde iki ayda bir Gıda, aylık 150 milyon
nakit yardımını bir yıl boyunca almışlar.

Belge Tarihi : 29.05.2002 15:04:07 FR.09.18 REV.00

APPENDIX D

DİKKAT : FORMU KATLAMAYINIZ!

Formu büyük harfle doldurunuz. Seçmeli yanıtları taşımadan (X) ile doldurunuz.



DENİZ FENERİ DERNEĞİ
GÖNÜLLÜ BAŞVURU FORMU

FOTOĞRAF

TC Kimlik No

Cinsiyet ☐ Kadın ☐ Erkek

Ad

Soyad

Doğum Yeri

Doğum Tarihi - -

Sigara kullanımı ☐ Evet ☐ Hayır

Sağlık Durumu ☐ Sağlıklı ☐ Engelli

Bilinen rahatsızlık **Medeni Durum** ☐ Evli ☐ Bekar ☐ Dul

Kan Grubu Rh **Gerektiğinde kan verebilirim** ☐ Evet ☐ Hayır **Çocuk Sayısı**

FOTOĞRAF

2 - İLETİŞİM BİLGİLERİ

Ev Adresi

İl

İlçe

Semt

Mh./Köy

Cadde

Sokak

Bina Adı

Kapı No **Posta Kodu**

Tel -

Cep Tel -

E-mail

İş Adresi

İl

İlçe

Semt

Mh./Köy

Cadde

Sokak

Bina Adı

Kapı No **Posta Kodu**

Tel -

Fax -

Web

Yazışma adresi olarak ☐ Ev adresimin ☐ İş adresimin kullanılmasını istiyorum.

3 - ÖĞRENİM BİLGİLERİ

☐ Okur - yazar ☐ Yüksekokul ☐ Öğrenci

☐ İlkokul ☐ Üniversite ☐ Mezun

☐ Ortaokul ☐ Yüksek Lisans ☐ Doktora

☐ Lise ☐ Doktora

En son öğrenim gördüğünüz / görmekte olduğunuz son okulun:

Adı

Bölümü

Bildiğiniz yabancı diller ve seviyesi

	Az	Orta	İyi	Çok iyi
İngilizce	☐	☐	☐	☐
Almanca	☐	☐	☐	☐
Fransızca	☐	☐	☐	☐
İtalyanca	☐	☐	☐	☐
Arapça	☐	☐	☐	☐
Diğer	☐	☐	☐	☐

4 - KİŞİSEL BİLGİ VE İLGİLER

Hangi seviyede bilgisayar kullanıyorsunuz? ☐ Hiç ☐ Az ☐ Orta ☐ İyi ☐ Çok iyi

Katıldığınız kurs ve sertifika programları

	Yılı	Süresi
1-		
2-		

İlgi alanlarınız

5 - SOSYAL ALAN BİLGİLERİ			
Çalışma şekliniz?		☐ Kendi işim ☐ Ücretli çalışıyorum ☐ Emekliyim ☐ Çalışmıyorum	
Mesleğiniz			
Çalıştığınız firma / kurum adı			
Firma / kurumdaki göreviniz			
Üye olduğunuz sivil toplum kuruluşu			
Bu kuruluştaki göreviniz			
6 - KATKI SAĞLAYABİLECEĞİNİZ ALANLAR			
☐ Çağrı merkezi	☐ Tanıtım ve Halkla ilişkiler	☐ Hasta bakım ve refakati	
☐ Sağlık	☐ Büro içi çalışma	☐ Yardım isteyen ailenin sosyal incelemesi	
☐ Bilgi işlem	☐ Şoför ☐ Sadece araç	☐ Yardım malzemelerinin hazırlanması	
☐ Eğitim	☐ Mesleki danışmanlık	☐ Yardım malzemelerinin dağıtılması	
☐ El sanatları	☐ Aile ziyareti	☐ Olağan üstü afet hallerinde	
Diğer			
Proje ekibinde yer almak ister misiniz? ☐ Evet ☐ Hayır			
Daha önce katıldığınız projeler ve katkılarınız			
7- ARAÇ BİLGİSİ			
Ehliyetiniz var mı? ☐ Evet ☐ Hayır		Sınıfı Aracınız var mı? ☐ Evet ☐ Hayır	
Aracınızın modeli	☐ Motosiklet ☐ Panelvan ☐ Kamyon ☐ Midibüs ☐ Tır		
	☐ Otomobil ☐ Kamyonet ☐ Minibüs ☐ Otobüs		
Dernek faaliyeti esnasında kullandığınız aracınızın yakıt masraflarını karşılayabilir misiniz? ☐ Evet ☐ Hayır			
8 - KATKI SAĞLAYABİLECEĞİNİZ ZAMANLAR			
☐ Her hafta	Gün	Saat	Gün
☐ Birkaç haftada bir	Pazartesi	- arası	Cuma
☐ Her ay	Salı	- arası	Cumartesi
☐ Birkaç ayda bir	Çarşamba	- arası	Pazar
☐ Gerekli olduğunda	Perşembe	- arası	
9 - REFERANSLARINIZ (Akrabalar Hariç)			
Adı - soyadı	Mesleği	Telefon	
10 - BAŞVURU İÇİN GEREKLİ EVRAKLAR			
☐ 2 adet fotoğraf ☐ Nüfus cüzdanı fotokopisi (arkalı - önlü) ☐ İkametgah ilmuhaberi			
Dernek çalışmalarında herhangi bir ücret talep etmeden gönüllü olarak görev almak istiyorum.			
Herhangi bir sabıka kaydımın olmadığını, bu nedenle doğacak her türlü sorumluluğun tarafıma ait olduğunu beyan ederim.			
Tarih: - -		İmza: (Tükenmez kalemle)	