



T.C
YEDİTEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

**THE TRANSPARENCY FACTOR IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY
DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR**

by

BÜLENT OĞUZ MAVİOĞLU

**Submitted to the Graduate Institute of Social Sciences
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of
Political Science and International Relations**

ISTANBUL, 2008



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
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
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
Yrd.Doç.Dr. Deniz TANSİ
(Supervisor)



Prof.Dr. Ahmet N. YÜCEKÖK



Prof.Dr. Feroz Ahmad



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ABSTRACT

Turkey's ability to stay out of the Second World War is one of the most impressive accomplishments in diplomatic history. Pressured for help by "allies" and threatened by the adverseries, Turkey was under constant duress. However Turks escaped from the destruction of the war while receiving credits and supplies from both sides.

The consensus is that Turks used their critical geo-political location as a bargaining chip, playing one side against the other. Even though such argument is succesful in many respects, one significant factor deserves more attention. It is the argument of this thesis that transparency (the ability of states to recognize what others are doing) was that factor leaving less room for possible misperceptions and miscalculations.

Turkish polity was not faction ridden but stable. Turkish decision makers were few, homogenous, authoritarian and hierarchical bunch. İnönü's total grip of the country was unchallenged. There was no other centers of power or ideological factions that could be manipulated. Thus Turkish actions and intentions were easier to analyse by the foreigners. Turkish polity was transparent.

Turkish decision makers also made efforts to be transparent. They affectively comminicated. In addition to official contacts, Turks used strickly controlled media to expose their intentions. During their manoeuvres, they tried to reduce perception of surprize. They were carefull limiting their commitments and took precautions against upsetting any interested powers. At many turning points, Turkish manoeuvres were well expected by their counterparts thus miscalculations and overreactions were prevented.

Transparent structure also helped. The decisive victory of Germany in Western Europe or inadequacy of Turkish military capabilities did not leave room for miscalculation. Turks were also able to read the interantional structure correctly. Impossibility of Balkan solidarity and Soviet intentions were correctly calculated by Turks.

Having benign and transparent intentions does not avoid war. If thought to be essential, Turkey could have been attacked by Germany, Russia or even by England. If Turkey did not have an extremely important geopolitical position she could have easily been a bargaining chip that could be sacrificed. Had Turkey not managed to put together a large army or did not have a difficult and costly terrain to invade the outcome could have been very much different. The argument of this thesis does not deny that structural factors are the prime determinants. However reducing the likelihood of miscalculation, transparency played a major part in the outcome of Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War.

ÖZET

Türkiye'nin 2. Dünya Savaşı'nın dışında kalabilmesi Dünya diplomatik tarihinin en önemli başarılarından biridir. Karşıtları tarafından tehdit edilen, müttefikleri tarafından yardımı istenen Türkiye, savaşa girmek için güçlü bir baskı altındaydı. Ancak Türkiye yalnızca savaştan kurtulmayı başarmakla kalmayıp, iki tarafla ticaret yaparak, kredi ve mal alarak, maddi faydalar bile elde etti.

Ortak görüş, jeopolitik konumunu kullanarak, Türkiye'nin iki tarafı birbirine karşı oynadığıdır. Bu görüş büyük ölçüde doğru olsa da, önemli bir faktör daha fazla dikkat hak etmektedir. Bu tezin savı, devletlerin niyet ve hareketlerinin bilinebilmesi olan saydamlık faktörününün yanlış anlamalara ve hesaplamalara daha az olanak vererek, 2. Dünya Savaşı sırasında Türk Dış Politikası'nda önemli rol oynadığıdır.

Türk siyasetinde kamplaşma yoktu. Karar vericiler homojen, otoriter, hiyerarşik bir yapıya sahip ve az sayıda insandan oluşuyordu. İnönü'nün ülke üzerindeki kontrolü tartışılmazdı. Ülke içinde manipüle edilebilecek güç merkezleri veya ideolojik gruplar yoktu. Bu yüzden Türklerin niyetleri ve hareketleri yabancılar tarafından daha kolay anlaşılabilirdi. Türk siyaseti saydamdı.

Türk karar vericileri de saydam olmak için uğraş vermekteydiler. Diğer devletlerle etkili iletişim içindeydiler. Resmi yollar dışında, niyetlerini açığa vurmak için, çok sıkı kontrol ettikleri basını kullanıyorlardı. Siyasi manevraları sırasında, sürpriz etkisini azaltmaya çalıştılar. Gereğinden fazla yükümlülüklerden kaçınıyorlar, ilgili tarafların hiddetlerini üzerlerine çekmemek için gerekli önlemleri alıyorlardı. Türklerin manevraları karşıtları tarafından önceden bilindiğinden, yanlış anlamalar ve gereğinden fazla reaksiyonlar önleniyordu.

Sistemsiz saydamlık da Türklere yardımcı oldu. Alman ordularının Batı Avrupa'daki başarıları, Türk ordusunun içinde bulunduğu kötü durum yanlış hesaplamalara yer vermeyecek kadar saydamdı. Türkler uluslararası yapıyı da doğru okumayı bildiler. Balkanlarda ortak bir politikanın yapılamayacağını, Sovyet'lerin Türkiye üzerindeki emellerini doğru hesapladılar.

İyi ve saydam emeller savaşları engellemez. Eğer mutlak gerekli olsaydı, Türkiye Almanya, Rusya ve hatta İngiltere tarafından saldırıya uğrayabilirdi. Eğer Türkiye'nin jeopolitik konumu bu kadar değerli olmasaydı, taraflar arası pazarlıkta feda edilebilecek bir ülke olurdu. Eğer Türkler büyük bir ordu hazırlamasalardı, Anadolu toprakları kolay işgal edilebilir olsaydı, savaşın sonuçları çok daha farklı olurdu. Bu tez yapısal faktörlerin sonuçları belirlediği savını inkar etmemektedir. Ancak yanlış hesaplamaları en aza indirerek, saydamlık, İkinci Dünya Savaşı sırasında Türk Dış Politikasında önemli rol oynamıştır.

The Transparency Factor in Turkish Foreign Policy

During the Second World War

1. Introduction

Analyzing the course of the Second World War, one can not help being amazed by Turks' ability to stay out of the War. Either pressured for help by "the Allies", or threatened to be invaded by the adversaries, Turkey was under constant stress from the start. All neighboring countries were either fighting, invaded, or under the mandate of a major fighting power. Greece was taken over by Germany. Bulgaria, Romania were in the Axis Camp. Syria and Iraq were under the mandate of French and British governments. Iran was invaded by the British and the Soviets. Not only the region but almost the whole globe experienced the destruction of the War. While thousands of towns and cities were devastated and millions of lives were lost, Turkish territory and army escaped the war.¹

A cynical and extremely simplified view is that Turkey played warring sides against each other to her benefit. As the War was about to start, France and Britain sought for Turkish alliance. What the Turks asked in return was credits and armament. As the war spread to the Balkans, the Allies asked for Turkish assistance. Using their military deficiency as an excuse, the Turks refused to fight, yet continued to receive assistance from the Allies. Furthermore, Turkey even signed a friendship treaty and traded with Germany while officially being allied to Britain.

In reality, Turkey was not a maiden seeking better dowry from both sides. Turks were under constant risk of being attacked or invaded. Their political maneuvers aimed at staving off immediate threats in face of constantly changing international structure. Initially, they foresaw the fascist threat and committed to the Ally cause at a great risk.

¹ Other than Turkey, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland managed to escape war in different ways. Neutral Sweden allowed German troops passage and Turkey traded with Germany even though officially was committed to the Allies. Thus even though "staying out of the war" is not an accurate description, it serves the purpose showing the difference between fighting and not fighting states during the war. For Further information see Annette Baker Fox, *The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1959.

Germany was Turkey's largest trade partner and Italy was the second. Yet, Turks were weary of adventurist expansionism and took a stand against the revisionists. In couple of years, however, international structure changed again. In the face of Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and unexpected successes of German Armies, the Turks found themselves encircled by the adversaries thus chose policy of appeasement toward Germany.² Even after the winds turned against the Axis and the Soviet Russia became an "Ally" once again, Germany was still capable of causing considerable harm to Turkey. Inability of the Allies to equip them with adequate military equipment left the Turks vulnerable. They also did not wanted to risk their scarce resources in face of an expansionist Soviet Russia. Even though the Soviets were officially allies, Turkey was suspicious of the Soviet Russia's intentions. The Turks kept on arguing that their resources would not be adequate to stand a German retaliation and they would not want to be saved by a Soviet "liberation" army which may not to leave even after Germans were defeated.

Turkey leaned toward Britain and France well before the War. Turkey's pro-western leanings had idealistic and moral backgrounds. The Turkish elite had fought against the imperial powers, yet never quested for communism. Turkish rulers were authoritarian as can be, yet did not aspire for fascism either. They envisaged a political system similar to that of France and Britain. The authoritarian character of the state was not the goal but only a mean to institute the reforms required for a liberal society.³

Aside from the ideological and the moral factors, the structural causes were the prime determinants for Turkey's alliance with France and Britain. The Tripartite pact was a result of shifts in the balance of power in the region. Four factors are commonly mentioned. First, Turkey's quest for the alliance stemmed from the threats of Soviet

² Paul Kennedy's definition of appeasement is useful because Turkey did not join the Axis but only made concessions. " A policy of settling international quarrels by admitting and satisfying grievances through rational negotiations and compromise, thereby avoiding the resort to armed conflict which would be expensive, bloody, and possibly very dangerous." (Kennedy, p.16)

³ The most important evidence for Turks' aspiration for a liberal society is the attempts for multiparty politics. "Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası" was the first opposition party in Republican Turkey. It did not have any consistent political agenda other than opposing many of Atatürk's reforms which were perceived to be too radical. Creation of the party coincided with most serious insurgence in Turkish history. (Şeyh Said) Atatürk felt the need to consolidate his power and the party was closed in less than one year in summer 1925. Most of its leaders were exiled, imprisoned or executed. However Atatürk once again attempted for multi-parti political system in 1930. He personally directed the creation of "Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası" as opposition. Yet once again the party became a hotbed for counterrevolutionary and was closed down. For further information see Bernard Lewis', *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, NewYork : Oxford University Press, 1961.

expansionism. Secondly, the Italian advances in the Mediterranean and the Balkans were the real culprit. The third is that Turkey wanted to balance her economic and military dependency on Germany thus sought for rapprochement with Britain and France. The fourth factor is that Turkey was satisfied with the status-quo thus took a stand against the revisionists. The reality is that all these considerations were taken into account by Turkish decision makers. The important point is that, unlike the secret pact between Stalin and Hitler, the alliance between Turkey, France and Britain was a culmination of the mutual interests, and more importantly for the purposes of this study, not secret and unexpected to the international community.

As the War commenced, Balkan countries fell under Germany one after the other. The Germans stormed almost the whole Europe and ventured into North Africa. Hitler was successful even at convincing Stalin to join the revisionist bandwagon. Almost suddenly, Turkey found herself circled with adversaries. The balance of power, Turks were trying to survive under, changed suddenly. Turkey had to modify her foreign policy once again, thus chose to acquiesce to some German demands.

It can be argued that Turkish appeasement to the German demands was just a facade hiding the opportunistic intentions. Turkey was not a direct target thus was not at the risk of German invasion and did not need to change her course. Germany's archenemy was the Soviet Union. Hitler's attention was directed to taking over Russia and could not afford another front on Turkey. Even the Greek Invasion was not a priority but a necessity in view of the embarrassing Italian losses. Therefore, Germany never intended to attack, thus Turkey was not at risk.

Even though some parts of this argument may be plausible, more convincing arguments for German invasion and threat can also be made. First and most important of all, Turkey was only out of the war (non-belligerent), not neutral. Turkey had allied herself with Great Britain and France. The tripartite pact was open to the international community. It was part of a policy to stall the revisionist aggression. The signatories hoped to encourage others to stand up to the aggression and, at the same time, discourage the expansionists. The signatories were aware of the fact that the pact carried many limitations in the strictly legalistic perspective. However every effort was spent to make it loud in the international community. Aside from the Tripartite pact, Turkey was also committed to the

Balkan and the Saadabad Pacts hoping to keep the status-quo against the aggressive revisionists. At a time when so many nations, including those invaded by or joined to the Axis such as Romania, Yugoslavia, Belgium, Norway (also the United States) were constantly emphasizing their neutrality, Turkey was making explicit gestures against the Germans, the Italians and the other revisionists. Thus from the German point of view Turkey could be seen as aggressively pro status-quo en par with France and Britain. To the Germans, Turkish alliance to West posed a real threat. (Deringil, p.93)

Similar to the Axis, Turkey also wanted revisions to the settlements after the First World War. However, the unsuccessful attempts for Mosul and Kirkuk and the successful annexation of Hatay and the change of straits regime were the outcomes of the internationally subscribed peaceful methods instead of aggression. Turkey did not want to fight. The Turkish leaders were war weary and knew the costs of wars. The huge losses from the First World War were still fresh in their memory. During the Second World War, the Turks did almost everything possible (to the point of "betraying" their "Allies") to stay out. It is important to note that the Turks also tried very hard to prevent the coming of the War. Even at the risk of irritating their most important trade partners, Italy and Germany, the Turks committed themselves to France, Britain and other regional countries in order to keep the peace.

It should also be noted that Turkish alliance to Britain and France came at a time when the West was not uniformly standing against the revisionists. Britain and France were following policies with conflicting goals. They were trying to appease the Germans while at the same time trying to create blocks of resistance. There was not a firm policy toward Italy. They did not approve the Italian expansionism but they hoped to keep Italy, at least neutral, in case of a war against Germany. They were even more ambiguous about the Soviet Russia. The Soviets who were ideological enemies for the last 20 years suddenly became possible allies against Germany. It is even argued that the Western ambiguity pushed Stalin to Hitler.

Western policies regarding smaller countries entailed even more inconsistencies and were erratic. Disappearances of Abyssinia (Ethiopia), Austria, Czechoslovakia were virtually ignored. Yugoslavia and Romania were almost encouraged to give into revisionist demands. Poland and Finland did not receive any significant help. Yet, at such critical and

complex international environment Turks took a clear and determined stand. They committed themselves to the Ally cause against their largest trade partners and under the shadow of their ambiguous giant neighbor to the north.

For Germany, Turkey was, at the most, a direct adversary, at the least, a base that could be used by the Allies. The Turkish Army lacked adequate defense capabilities. Even though, poorly equipped but committed Turkish troops and rough terrain could be a hindrance for Germans, the invasion of Turkey was not all that difficult. Furthermore, Turkey was a geopolitically attractive target. Anatolia was gateway to the Middle East and the Caucasus, while at the same time a fertile ground to control the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the Aegean Sea. Anatolian peninsula had ample natural resources that would be of great use for any major fighting power. Chrome, which was essential for the war materials, was not the only one. Even though less than desired quality, the food stuffs were hugely important during the war. And probably the most important resource was the manpower of Turkey. Non-revisionist Romania and Finland came to fight with the Germans against the Soviet Russia. The same scenario could have easily worked for the Turks. Even though Germany was an adversary for the Turkish decision makers, in case of a successful German attack and installment of a pro-German government, the Turks could have very well, once again, fought on their old comrade's side, against a communist empire that sat on the Turkish peoples and homelands.⁴

Another possible scenario would be that Turks could very well have fallen a victim of paranoia and prematurely declared war against the Axis. They could also fall into trap with the bribes such as Dodecanese Islands or pieces of territory in the Balkans and the Middle East (which were ironically offered by both the Allies and the Axis). Or Turkey could have been invaded by the Allies, not only to supply Russia, just as Iran was, but also to open another front against Germany.

In view of all these destructive scenarios it would be fair to argue that the Turks were not enjoying the spoils of the War but were successfully managing a crisis which lasted for 5 years. The Turks, not only avoided invasion and become belligerent in the War, Turkey was one of the few countries in the region that received material benefits from the

⁴ Even though İnönü held a strong grip on government Turkey had the potential to fall under an ultra nationalist movement. For further information on nationalist movements in Turkey see Mithat Atabay's *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Sırasında Türkiye'de Milliyetçilik Akımları.*, Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul 2005.

situation. Turkey traded with and received military and civilian aids from both sides. Even though accused for treachery by some among the victors, Turkey was not penalized for her non-belligerency. When the Soviets asked for revisions in the Straits and Caucasus, Turkey was spared while the Eastern Europe was given to Soviet hands. Even the wrongdoings such as wealth tax (for non-Muslims) were overlooked.⁵

The conventional wisdom is that Turkey used the anarchic and multi polar international structure in order to avoid belligerency. Such a swift German expansion in Europe was not expected. By the time Allies asked for the Turkish belligerency, France had already fallen and the German troops were almost at the Turkish borders. Britain was not sure whether the Turkish belligerency would be an asset or a liability. The invasion of Turkey would have opened many opportunities for Germany, leaving Britain at even more precarious situation. Thus, even though officially still favoured the Turkish military involvement, in private, the British were satisfied with Turkey's non-belligerency. After the German defeats in Russia, and especially when it became evident that Germany was loosing, the Allies, more confidently, pressed for the Turkish involvement. The Turks dragged their feet and managed to keep themselves off the War.

Even though Germans were loosing, they still had the capabilities to cause destruction for the virtually defenseless Turkish cities and the few precious industrial centers that the Turks had created with great effort and difficulty. Naturally, the Allies appreciated any Turkish move against Germany, yet scarcity of the resources and the post war political considerations created many discrepancies.

The Soviets were already fighting and they simply wanted a second front in Europe as soon as possible and did not care about the location. While Churchill wanted a Balkan front, the United States insisted on Normandy, Anvil and Italy. Since the Americans were the main suppliers of the war effort, their decisions carried more weight. Thus, even though a 'supposedly combined' official pressure was put on Turkey, in private, Churchill's insistence on Turkey did not find much support among the Allies.

Furthermore, the Allies were not explicit on how to incorporate the Turkish Army into their plans. The Turks did not want to be a passive co-belligerent where the military

⁵ Foreign office memorandum dated 1 May 1941 stated: 'military expenditure has reached higher level than Turkey can bear without recourse to loans and credits and other often unorthodox measures'. Those measures were 'Wealth Tax'. Knowing the dire economic situation even the British tried justify the tax regime. (Deringil p.29)

decisions regarding Turkey were made without their input. The Turks were also wary of joining an alliance which included the Soviet Russia. The Turks were suspicious about an "Ally" which had difficulty hiding her expansionist intentions. As the end of the War was, at least, seen in the horizon, the Turkish fears regarding the post-war settlements found many interested ears. Many among the Americans and the British acknowledged the Turkish fears of being "saved" by the Soviets. Furthermore, Churchill's almost singular pressure on Turkey and the Balkan front can also be explained as the beginning of an Anglo-American clash of interests and the rivalry for sphere of influence in the Middle East.⁶ Turkey successfully used this intra-ally rivalry in order to escape from the War.

Even though Turkey escaped the destruction, as the War was close to end, the international structure and the balance of power, once again, shifted. Consequently, the Turkish decision makers had to make policy changes that reflected the shift. İnönü made arrangements that reflected the international structural changes. Just as Turkey changed her foreign policy upon Germany's expansion, when the Allies' victory became evident, the Turks once again changed their course. Chrome sales to Germany was stopped, relations with Germany was cut and finally Turkey, even though symbolically, declared war against the Axis.

In order to please the Victors, İnönü also made some internal adjustments, the Pan Turanists were arrested, Von Papen's Soviet assassin was released, the Foreign Minister Menemencioğlu and Chief of Staff Çakmak were dismissed for being "Pro-German". Even the first multi-party elections held in 1946 is seen, by many, as a reflection of the changing international structure.

This study accepts the basic neorealist approach that entails "a conceptualization of international politics as a system whose structure is defined by the anarchy and the distribution of capabilities across the units within it" and "the system's structure greatly affects the behavior of the states within it because of the powerful constraints it places on them." (Kegley, p.28) Thus the study does not try to refute the argument that international and internal structural factors dictated Turkish Foreign Policy, and changes in the structure

⁶ Climax of the Anglo-American rivalry in the Middle East was the Suez Crisis of 1956. Britain, France and Israel occupied the canal after the nationalization by the President Nasser of Egypt. The U.S. was against invasion and Eisenhower threatened to sell the United States reserves of the British pound and thereby precipitate a collapse of the British currency. After Saudi Arabia started an oil embargo against Britain and France, Americans refused to fill the gap, until Britain and France agreed to a rapid withdrawal. The crisis ended with the replacement of invading troops with United Nations Emergency Force.

caused the Turkish maneuvers during the Second World War.

However, when one goes through various analyses on the Turkish Foreign Policy during this particular momentous period, one realizes that only structural explanations are not satisfactory. The structure puts constraints on states, yet decision makers' reactions to those constraints and their actions depend on perceptions and consequently their calculations.

Coarsely putting it, one can not help but feel great respect for the men involved. There were far too many complex factors and turning points during the course of the war. Turkish President İsmet İnönü and Foreign Minister Numan Menemencioğlu being the most important, the Turkish decision makers and their counterparts deserve great appreciation for what this study assumes as an implementation of a successful foreign policy.

Any miscalculation on their part could push Turks right into fighting. İnönü could have underestimated Germany's military capabilities and face the furor of Hitler's war machine. The British could have overestimated the Turkish capabilities. By putting too much pressure on Turkey, they could either lose a strategically valuable ally or end up wasting scarce resources resisting a German invasion of Anatolia. Even at the later stages of the war, during which Turkey was mostly criticized, the Turkish decision makers risked being shunned by the victors, yet managed to avoid both the destruction of the war and the possibility of becoming a Soviet satellite state.

On the Axis side, the German Ambassador in Turkey, Von Papen also deserves attention. By offering both carrots and sticks, the German Foreign Policy toward Turkey has been immensely successful from the German point of view. Naturally, Germany was not pleased with Turkey's alliance to France and Britain. In order to dissuade Turks, Hitler even bullied the Turks with the example of Poland which was divided amongst the Soviet Russia and Germany. Had Hitler not been convinced that Turkey was to remain non-belligerent, the course of the War would have shifted dramatically.

During the course of the war there were just too many wrong decisions to make. The decision makers could have (and they have) miscalculated the distribution of capabilities and their counterparts' intentions. One can not help but remember that warmonger Mussolini's armies lost almost all the battles except only very few. Or the fact

that Stalin could have been so much beguiled by Hitler. The German tanks were using Soviet oil while pandering Russia. Naturally, many more examples can be found to show the significance of miscalculation by the decision makers. This study does not only wish to draw attention to the level of analysis issue but also aims to pinpoint a specific factor that minimizes miscalculation.

Naturally, psychological and ideological tendencies of decision makers are critically important in the formulation of policy. A dogmatic person is prone to misperception and thus consequently miscalculation. However this study tries to draw attention to transparency factor that reduces the likelihood of miscalculation. With a minimal definition of the transparency as "the ability of states to recognize what others are doing", this study argues that during the course of the Second World War, the transparency factor regarding the Turkish Foreign Policy was high thus the Turkish decision makers and their counterparts made accurate estimations regarding each others intentions and capabilities.(Jervis, p.73) Turks knew that their interests laid in the status-quo and the peace, therefore they took a firm stand against the revisionists. However they read correctly the unstable nature of the international system. When power was about to shift one way or another, the Turks also shifted their policy and successfully avoided being run over by Germany or the Soviets.

The British recognized that the Turks were on their side but could not fight against Germany. At least during the initial phases of the war, Turkey as a non-belligerent ally was seen more valuable to the British than an invaded ally. Therefore British did not exert too much pressure on Turkish belligerency.

On the other side, the Germans recognized that Turks were not to fight against them in such militarily weak condition but also took precautions to abate the Turkish fears of a possible German invasion. Even toward the end of the War, when pressure on Turkey was alleviated, many among the British and the Americans acknowledged the Turkish concerns regarding to the air defenses and the Soviet expansionism.

As is usually the case in social sciences, the terms are theoretically problematic, so is transparency. Transparency can be categorized as a structural factor. The fact that there was a large German community in Turkey during the Second World War made Turkey more transparent to the Germans. Yet transparency is also a policy pursued by the actors.

The international organizations, subscribed rules and norms, treaties, declarations and others are used by actors to inform the counterparts about their intentions. Whether through personal or formal contacts or even by using strictly controlled press, İnönü and his government used all the possible means of communication in order to be correctly understood by their counterparts. The actors may choose to be transparent but may also seek transparency from their adversaries unilaterally through the intelligence gathering or the spy activity. The German intelligence gathering was extremely active in Turkey and the Germans were correct in their analysis. Turkey was to say non-belligerent. Thus scarce resources was not wasted on elimination of a British ally. Toward the end of the war, even the Turks made use of the German intelligence. When the pressure was mounting on Turks to become belligerent, the Turks were devising tactics in order to stave off pressures, using information supplied to them through the German intelligence.

Another problematic aspect of the transparency factor is that it entails a continuum. One can not argue for a total lack of or the complete transparency. There is only less and more. Yet how much transparency is required for correct calculation can not be known a priori. The transparency leads to better information and calculation, however correct information does not prevent wars if actors are in a zero sum game.⁷ Furthermore even when both sides are aware of the mutual benefits, the transparency may illuminate the possibility of the relative gains which in return may hinder the cooperation. Sometimes too much information may prevent the cooperation by creating a "noise affect". Too much and inconsistent flow of information may hinder actors' ability to make the correct decisions.⁸

Keeping these limitations in mind, it is the argument of this study that the transparency was a major factor in the Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War. The transparency supported Turkish decision makers' correct analysis of their environment. The transparency also raised their counterpart's understanding of the Turkish decision-maker's actions and intentions thus leaving less room for possible misperceptions and miscalculations.

The transparency factor has been a point of attention since the Concert of Europe

⁷ For a critique of transparency see Bernard I Finel and Kristin, M. Lord's, *Power and Conflict in the Age of Transparency*, St. Martin's Palgrave, NewYork, 2000.

⁸ According to Finel and Lord, "transparency is seen as exacerbating crises by overwhelming diplomatic signals with the "noise" of domestic politics and confusing opponents about which domestic voices are authoritative expressions of state policy" (Finel and Lord, "The Surprising Logic of Transparency", *International Studies Quarterly* Volume 43 Issue 2 P. 325-339, June 1999. p. 326)

which was a mechanism to increase transparency. The League of Nations, the United Nations, the European Union are institutions among so many that has been established by the practitioners of politics, partially, in order to increase the international transparency. Thus policy relevance of transparency can not be challenged. Being aware of dangers of vague terms as "Liberal" and "Realist", it would not be unfair to claim that the transparency has also been thought to be meaningful factor by both scholastic camps. Whether with the grand quest of uncovering the common interests between actors, or a more modest aim for reducing miscalculation, the transparency has also been found important by the scholars.⁹

This study is not a complete analysis of the transparency factor and its affects on the liberal institutionalism and the structural realism. Thus will not delve into a whole discussion. A limited definition and categorization will suffice. This study borrows Dan Lindley's definition. The transparency is "the availability of information about potential adversaries' actions, capabilities." (p.17) Even though not exclusive and many times overlapping, categorization of the transparency into two types contributes to better understanding of the term. First is "the static transparency" and refers to information available about the state of affairs and structures. The second is "the dynamic transparency" and is achieved by the conscious efforts of the actors.¹⁰

The static transparency does not necessarily involve the actors' conscious quest for information. The decisive victories of Germans during the earlier phases of the War was so obvious that the Turks recalculated their commitments to the Allies. The extend of German victories contributed to the transparency in a static way. The fall of the Maginot line was so swift that Germans did not even need propaganda to show their capabilities. However, the

⁹ Even though Grieco claims that transparency actually hinder cooperation by revealing relative gains, it is important that a neorealist scholar accepts the significance of transparency. For further info see Grieco, Joseph M. "Anarchy and The Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique On The Newest Neo Liberal Institutionalism" in *Neo Realism and Neo Liberalism* ed. by Davis A. Baldwin, Columbia University Press, NewYork, 1993.

¹⁰ Lindley's categories are more detailed and comprehensive. Even though this study does not need such categorizations it may be useful for the reader. Lindley's categories are cooperative, ambient, coerced and unilateral. Cooperative transparency is achieved by formal flow of information through international regimes, organizations and etc. Ambient transparency is a structural systemic feature that is achieved through ease of travel, mass media, global trade, spread of NGO's etc. Coerced transparency is achieved by one side forcefully revealing information of another. Unilateral transparency is achieved through an actor's either voluntarily revealing information or seeking information from the counterpart without their approval through intelligence or spy activity. For further info. see: Lindley Dan, *Promoting Peace with Information*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2007.

Germans also actively sought to impress their Turkish counterparts and invited a delegation of Turkish military staff to the Eastern Front in Autumn of 1941. Such propaganda activity is good example of the dynamic transparency. Another example would be that sending or accepting foreign missions can be an act of the dynamic transparency, yet existence of foreigners in a country can be categorized as contributing to the static transparency.

Both the static and the dynamic types of transparency were significant factors in the Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War. The nature of Turkish political structure contributed to the transparency. Unlike their counterparts in many countries, the Turkish decision makers were few, homogeneous, tightly controlled, loyal men who had been running the country for very long time. The foreigners were dealing with almost the same administration for 20 years. The foreigners did not have adjust their policies according to the numerous changes of governments and the coup d'etats , as was the case in many other countries. Even though there may have been internal disagreements, İnönü's total grip of the country and his inner circle has made their counterparts' job of understanding their actions and intentions easier. İnönü's total grip of power reduced "the noise affects". There was no other center of power in Turkey. The foreigners did not have to take into consideration, the aristocracy, the bourgeoisie, the religious institutions, the public opinion, the media, the independent judiciary or even the parliament and the military. The foreigners had to deal with only İnönü and his small circle of advisers.

This small number of people were also homogeneous in their ideological leanings. Atatürk's revolution did not allow deviant ideologies that could be manipulated by the foreigners. Even though some level of variations could be observed in the domestic politics, in matters related to the foreign policy, the Turkish elite was a uniform block behind the President İnönü.

The upbringing and the background of the Turkish decision makers and their counterparts also mattered. İnönü was not only a politician, but also a soldier and a diplomat. His advisers and he had western style upbringing and decades long experiences in the international affairs. Turkey was an underdeveloped country but had inherited an imperial ruling strata that could easily speak the same language as their powerful counterparts. The Turkish decision makers were not young, inexperienced, aspirants to the

international community. They were the grand children of Ottomans who were the masters of balance of power politics.

Familiarity between the foreign diplomats and the Turkish decision-makers also reduced the cost of communication. Even though initially not favoured by Ankara, the German Ambassador Von Papen was maybe too much familiar with Turkey and thus was very fruitful in furthering the German interests. Even less familiar with the Turks than Von Papen, the British Ambassador Knatchbull-Hugessen mentions, in his memoirs, the ease of communication with his Turkish counterparts. Interestingly, he even mentions the smallness of Ankara as a factor for better communication.

The economic and military state of Turkey was also a transparency factor. Turkish economy was not only weak but also heavily dependent on the foreign assistance and especially on Germany. The existence of foreign technical and professional personnel also made the weak state of the Turkish economy transparent to the foreigners. The German dependency of Turkish economy was acknowledged by Britain. The British were also aware that they did not have the capacity to replace the Germans as Turkey's most important trade partner. Such considerations reduced the pressure for Turkish actions against Germany. The Germans used the dependent relationship to their advantage and forced the Turks to acquiescence to their demands and thus almost eliminated Turkish adversity against them.

Recognition of Turkish military weakness played an even more important role. The Germans knew and made sure that the Turks also knew that Turkey could pay a hefty price in case of a German attack. The punitive bombardment of Belgrade was transparent enough for the Turks to realize. On the other hand, especially during the initial phases of the war, awareness of the Turkish military weaknesses convinced the British that Turkey could not stand a German attack and thus might become a liability instead of an asset. After the war started, although less than desired amounts and quality, the Allies supplied somewhat modern equipment to Turkey. The British military delegations supervising these assistance programs realized that aside from the scarcity and the quality of the equipment, even the training was a problem. The Turkish Army lacked trained professionals; even pilots for the planes could not be found. Thus during the later phases of the war when the British were more insistent on Turkish involvement, they were many among the Allies who

thought that a military campaign involving Turkey was not all that desirable.

Transparency in the international level also had affects. The German victories were so decisive that the Turks did not have the chance to underestimate the threat. France had fallen, and Britain was hardly in any shape to assist Turkey in case of a German attack. Especially in 1940 and 1941, the structure was clear and transparent. Germany was winning thus it was not that difficult for the Turks to realize that the policy of commitment to the non-revisionists had to be amended.

After it became evident that Germany was to be losing, Turks were still reading the international system clearly. Without the name proper, the Cold War was about to begin. The Turks knew that their geopolitical significance would guarantee survival between competing victorious camps thus refused to join the war effort at the risk of being shunned by the victors.

Static transparency should not overshadow the importance of dynamic transparency. Turkish decision makers made efforts to be transparent. They tried to communicate with all sides about their dealings. In addition to official contacts Turks used their strictly controlled media to expose their intentions. During their maneuvers, they tried to reduce the perception of surprise. They were careful limiting their commitments and took precautions against upsetting any interested powers. For example, although highly speculated, chrome sales to Germany were insignificant and militarily harmless to the Allies, thus did not cause a critical damage to Anglo-Turkish alliance.

At many turning points, Turkish maneuvers were expected by their counterparts. The Germans and the Soviets knew in advance about the tripartite treaty between Turkey, France and Britain. Thus reactions to the treaty were calculated. The Turkish decision makers communicated with the Allies regarding the need to change policy in view of German advances. Turkish acquiescence to German demands was not a surprise. Turkey had informed the Foreign Office about the negotiations before Turco-German Friendship Treaty. When Turkey signed trade and friendship treaties with Germany, the reactions from the Allies were also calculated.

It is also important to note that the Second World War unearthed Soviets' intentions, thus added more transparency to the international structure. The pact between Hitler and Stalin showed the Turks that supposedly anti-imperialist Soviets could very well

quench on other nations. Polish example could have easily been repeated on Turkey. The Turks were able to read the Soviet intentions and implement their policies accordingly during the war. They were also able convince many among the West regarding post-war Soviet ambitions.

Having benign and transparent intentions does not avoid war. If thought to be essential, Turkey could have been attacked by Germany, the Soviet Union or even by Britain. If Turkey did not have an extremely important geopolitical position she could have easily been a bargaining chip that could be sacrificed. Had Turkey not managed to put together an army of more than a million soldiers or did not have a difficult and costly terrain to invade the outcome could have been very much different. The argument of this thesis does not deny that these structural factors are the prime determinants of the outcome.

However structure does not automatically determine the outcome. It would be unfair and incorrect to assume that actors are irrelevant. In view of structure, actors perceive, calculate and act. Inaccurate information and miscalculation may result in over or under reaction that may cause destruction and millions of lives. Transparency increases the availability of information. More information may not mean accurate information however less information is definitely is not accurate information.

It should also be noted that transparency and structure are not exclusive terms. When one refers to structure, the distribution of capabilities within the system is meant; one actor being more capable than the other actor. Transparency can also be assessed as manifestation of the distribution of capabilities. When differences among actors' capabilities are acute and clearly observable, that also means that transparency is high. When the capability disparities are low, the transparency is also low. Had Turkey been a relatively more powerful country, (thus less transparent within the structure) Turkish decision makers could have pursued more adventurist policies, or their counterparts could have acted differently. Multipolar (less transparent) structure preceding the Cold War (bipolar thus more transparent) was extremely unstable. At times such as these when bipolar structure is in the process of transforming into multipolarity, one can not help but speculate whether the bipolar structure will be longed in the future.

Any analysis of the Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War, has to include historical and structural elements in order to understand the context. Thus, the

second and the third parts of the study will be dedicated to these elements. The second part is about the internal structural elements of Turkey. The second chapter is, in itself, divided into subsections. In the first three subsections, the ruling elite of Turkey is analyzed. This study will try to demonstrate that the authoritarian, homogeneous, well educated ruling strata contributed to the quality of information between Turkey and the foreigners. As a result of these factors, the Turkish actions were more transparent to the international community. In the fourth subsection, the study will try to demonstrate that the foreign presence in Turkey made the Turkish Foreign Policy more transparent to the foreign counterparts. In the fifth subsection, economic and military state of the country will be analyzed in order to illustrate the dire state of economic and military affairs, and the foreign acknowledgement of the situation. The study argues that the dire state of economy and military contributed to the better understanding of Turkey's limitations by both the Turkish decision makers and their foreign counterparts. The Turkish capabilities were so minimal that left hardly any room for miscalculation. The third part of the study is allocated to the international relations of Turkey at the outbreak of the war. This chapter will try to draw the picture of the international structure, and the constraints that the decision makers had to face, while also pointing some comparative examples regarding the transparency factor. The fourth part of the study will go through the war , specifically pointing to the information flow and its affects. In this part the study will try to establish the significance of transparency in the decision making processes of the Turkish decision makers and their counterparts'. The fifth part will compose of conclusions from the study.

2. The Internal Structural Factors that facilitated the Transparency

It is one of the propositions of this study that certain structural aspects of the Turkish government made easier for foreign counterparts to analyze the Turkish Foreign Policy. The Turkish policy makers were a few bunch with similar backgrounds, upbringing and Western education. The political apparatus was not only authoritarian and hierarchical; the socio-political forces such as working class, bourgeoisie or intelligentsia that could curtail political decisions were either non-existent or had negligible significance. These aspects of the Turkish politics made it easier for the foreign decision makers to analyze Turkish actions and intentions. While, there were not any credible and powerful political groups that could be manipulated for any particular interests or by the foreign powers, foreigners also did not have to consider other social forces into their calculations. The cost of communication with Turkey was low.

Political power in Turkey was concentrated in a small number of people in Ankara. The foreign diplomats had to deal with few men who had upbringing similar to theirs. It is important to note that, at many instances, the Turks were even more strictly "enlightened" than their western counterparts. "The Turks refused, as a matter of policy, to enter into any international conference or alliances on the basis of common religion" (Robinson, p.172) Even though Turkey as a whole could have been categorized as non-Western country, the Turkish policy makers shared education, lifestyles and the world view of their Western counterparts thus reducing the cost of analysis and communication for the foreign policy makers and the diplomats.

The Turkish elite was also homogeneous in ideological sense. Only men who shared the ideals of Kemalism found any place among the ruling strata.¹¹ Even though there were some level of discussion and variance, the political spectrum was much more limited relative to the other countries. Thus when came to contact, the foreigners expected in advance that their Turkish counterparts carried the sole ideology of pragmatic rationalism which was not diluted by 'utopian ideals'.

Furthermore, existence of large foreign presence in crucial sectors, flowed information about Turkey to the foreign diplomats and policy makers. Turkey had inherited

¹¹ For further information on Kemalism see Suna Kili's *Kemalism*, Robert College Publication, Istanbul, 1969.

a infrastructure made and/or operated by the foreigners from Ottoman Empire. Even though the Republican Turks aimed at national bourgeoisie, therefore, tried to end capitulations and foreign ownership, nevertheless for various reasons, by the outbreak of the Second World War, the foreign existence in various sectors was so significant that Turkish strengths and weaknesses was well known by the foreign powers. The foreign knowledge of the state of the Turkish economy and the military enabled the foreigners to make correct calculations regarding Turkey.

The internal structure will be analyzed in parts regarding to the specific nature that is significant for the study. It should be noted that these different aspects are not exclusive. For example, strict entry limitations not only creates hierarchy but also makes the governing body more homogeneous and authoritarian. The partmentalization is made for the sole purpose of drawing attention to the particular structural aspect.

2.1. The Authoritarian and Unchallenged Ruling Strata

"Submission to the will of the ruler has been the fundamental principle of government not only in the ghazi society of the Ottomans but also in the Turkish society brought into being by Gazi Mustafa Kemal". (Tamkoç, p.109)

Turkey had consolidated herself as a modern nation state after a military and diplomatic struggle against the external powers and the internal factions that partitioned the Ottoman Empire after the First World War.¹² From the consolidation of power which took place during 1920's to the end of the Second World War, the Turkish state was governed by a strictly hierarchical and authoritarian state apparatus composed of Western educated, military and technocratic elites.(Deringil, p.56) The foreign policy decisions were made by the absolute ruler- the President – who consulted only a handful of people who were at the top of the hierarchy.(Tamkoç, p.29; Weisband, p.33)

During the Independence War, Atatürk had sought alliances from as many factions as possible, including the land lords, the religious groups and even the Kurds as a separate ethnic identity and few communists. However, as he started implementing the pillars of his revolution, he met resistance from many groups. Naturally, there was considerable

¹² For Further information on Turkish Nation building see Bernard Lewis' *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, Oxford University Press, NewYork, 1961

opposition to the elimination of Caliphate, the six century old Sultanate and many other radical reforms. Atatürk tolerated opposition only in the framework of the revolution. One by one, any group or person with potential to threaten the pillars of the revolution was eliminated. The resistance was perceived so threatening that all power had to be consolidated. Even though there have been attempts for competitive multiparty system, by 1930's all power was concentrated in the president. Naturally, there were disagreements and debates among the elite. Nevertheless, "internal debates, acrimonious as they sometimes could be, rarely, if ever, succeeded in changing the direction of policies set forward by the President." (Weisband p.7)

At the outbreak of the War, one could not speak of a bourgeoisie or a working class in Turkey. Apart from few examples, the private enterprise was limited to the subsistence farming, small trade. Thus there was no economic class structure. Classless society prevented polarization and did not produce critical factions in the political strata as was the case in many other countries.

The country was largely undereducated. Apart from governing circles, professionals such as lawyers, doctors, scientists were so few that one could not speak of an independent intelligentsia which could exert any political power. The lack of intelligentsia prevented the penetration of social movements such as Turanism or Communism. A few members of the elite who delved into such ideologies were easily controlled. The existence of such small factions could only be considered as convenient tools used by Atatürk and İnönü to reflect their leanings toward the outside world.

The press was strictly controlled. Publishing an article "undermining public confidence in the State, or in the officials of the State" could be punished with fines, imprisonment or closing down the whole newspaper. In effect, one could not speak of an independent press. Few Turks read the newspapers which were closely followed by the Axis and the Allies. "The British Review of the Foreign press regularly gave translations of excerpts from Turkey's leading newspapers."(Deringil p.10) The press was used as an important medium to express the government views unofficially. At many instances during the War, the structural constraints forced İnönü Government to take a neutral stand even though they were opposed to many events. According to Deringil, the Turks " were able to maintain an official stance of neutrality while intimating their true feelings through

press" (p.11) Many leading columnists were actually members in the Assembly. Thus during this period, press could be viewed only as an unofficial line of communication of the Turkish government.¹³

Only the Army had the potential to be cited as an alternative center of power. Coming from military backgrounds, both Atatürk and İnönü had the natural weight and influence on the Army. However, they believed that the military should not delve in politics and had resigned from their military positions and asked others to do the same. During the Republican Era of 1930's, no military personnel could hold any other administrative or political position. Thus, in effect, military and civilian administrations were completely separated. However, Atatürk and İnönü did not take any chances and entrusted the army in the safe hands of Fevzi Çakmak who chose to be a military man and became the Chief of Staff. "Throughout the single-party period the army was completely isolated from political life.....Marshal Fevzi Çakmak who was the chief of the general staff from 1924 to 1944 ... was a soldier of the old school who believed that officers should take no interest in politics. He did not approve of his men reading newspapers or even enjoying such an 'un-military' pastime as playing violin."(Ahmad, p.9) Thus unlike later periods of Turkish political life, during 'Republican' period one could not speak of the Turkish military as a distinct center of power.

2.2. The Hierarchy

The state apparatus was not only authoritarian but also very hierarchical. The fact that, İnönü's replacement of Atatürk did not disrupt the political structure reveals the strength of this hierarchy. Before Atatürk's death, İnönü had been cast away from the governing circles. He is said to have been critical of Atatürk's interference during Hatay negotiations and Nyon Conference. Atatürk had replaced İnönü with Celal Bayar as prime minister in 1937. Still an assembly member, İnönü had disappeared from the governing

¹³ Newspapers *Cumhuriyet* and *Tasvir-i Efkar* was seen as Pro-German while *Tan*, leaning toward left. *Ulus* reflected the official line of the government. *Yeni Sabah* and *Tanin* were equally anti-soviet and anti-fascist. Many journalists were in the pay of foreigners. However Government kept a close lid on press. When a policy shift was being implemented, even the most opinionated journalists were to write in support of the government. For further information see Cemil Koçak's '*İkinci Dünya Savaşı ve Türk Basını*'. (Turkish Press in the Second World War), Tarih ve Toplum, No:35, November 1986, p.29-33.

circles. Even threats to his life were rumored. However during his premiership from 1924 to 1937, he had great influence on the formation of the assembly and the bureaucracy. There was simply no other alternative who had comparable weight in the governing circles. Thus only one day after Atatürk died, İnönü was elected to the presidency.

Replacement of the president in an authoritarian state may accompany a power vacuum, yet, the hierarchical nature of the Turkish State enabled a smooth transition. The state apparatus was so hierarchical that once in power, İnönü's policies or appointments were not challenged to the point that after two months, İnönü replaced Atatürk's preferred prime minister Bayar. Atatürk was gone and the 'Second Man' was in control.¹⁴

Personal tendencies of Atatürk and İnönü could have contributed to the authoritarianism, yet the government was also structured in ways to facilitate an authoritarian rule. As Turkey was going through comprehensive revolution from an Empire to a Republic, existing laws and due process were not reformed but simply replaced by the Western ones. The judicial institutions were newly created. Thus one could not speak of an independent judiciary.¹⁵ "According to the Law of Fundamental Organization (Teşkilatı Esasiye Kanunu), of 20 January 1921, all executive and legislative authority was concentrated in the assembly as the supreme repository of governmental authority." (Deringil p.43) The principle of separation of powers between the legislative and the executive did not exist, (not even in writing). The assembly chose a member of its own as president and the president picked the prime minister among the assembly members. Thus, formally, power was concentrated in the assembly. However, in absence of a competitive multi party system, the assembly could easily be manipulated and controlled by the president.

There were stringent official entry requirements to the Assembly. Those under thirty, female and illiterate did not qualify as a candidate to the assembly. Thus ninety percent of the population was denied membership. (Deringil p.43) The electoral system was indirect which made it even easier to be manipulated by the leader. If a rare incident occurred and desired person was not elected he was elected through by-election.(Frey, p.

¹⁴ The term was coined by Şevket Süreyya Aydemir in his *İkinci Adam* (The Second Man), 2 Vols, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul, 1976.

¹⁵ Ankara School of Law (Ankara Hukuk Mektebi) was established in 1925. Law faculty of Istanbul University was established in 1933. The civil law of 1926 (Medeni Kanun) was a complete break away from Ottoman Law (Mecelle)

166) However the most important tool used by the president was the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi). The candidate had to be approved by the party therefore, in effect, any candidate had to be a party member. Party membership required "a good reputation", "not to have worked against the National Movement" and not to have a "negative political psychology."(Tuncay p.329) Through these idiosyncratic criteria the president controlled the party and the members of the Assembly. Sometimes, people did not know in advance and were surprised to be candidates to the parliament.¹⁶ The Republican People's Party was in effect the party of the leader.

Authoritarian state structure does not automatically increase transparency. On the contrary, authoritarian states are prone to secrecy. However as will be analyzed in following sections, the Turks not only tried to be as open as possible about their intentions regarding international matters (many times through press), attempts for secrecy were also futile.(Deringil, p.64) The foreigners could successfully gather accurate and voluminous information. The authoritarian nature of Turkish State contributed to the transparency of the Turkish Foreign Policy by reducing "the noise affect". Any other source of power and influence was absent in Turkey. The foreigners had to deal with only İnönü and his small circle of advisers.

2.3. The Homogeneity and the Western Upbringing

One other factor that made easier for the foreign diplomats to analyze the Turkish Foreign Policy was the homogeneity of Turkish decision makers. The foreigners had to deal with Turkish counterparts who had similar backgrounds and upbringing. Homogeneity factor worked in two ways. First, Turkish elite were devoted to the same ideology of Atatürk. After almost twenty years, the regime had eliminated those who had divergent ideological leanings. Only 30% of the first assembly (which at times is referred as the most democratic parliament in Turkish political history) were re-elected to the second. (Frey p. 166) Holders of any divergent ideas were eliminated from centers of power, leaving only people with complete dedication to the pillars of Turkish Revolution and Kemalism. Thus

¹⁶ "Ali Rıza Türel, who was later to become Minister of Justice, was asked by a reporter how he became a deputy. He replied, 'I was Assistant Prosecutor in İzmir. I saw my name among the list of candidates which was published in the newspaper, and so I learned'(Deringil p.44)

the foreigners knew, in advance, the mind sets of their Turkish counterparts. The foreign policy was not contaminated by democracy, fascism, national socialism, Marxism-Leninism, abstract ideas about perpetual alliance and friendship, or by such elusive concepts of the world community, the internationalism and peace.

Secondly the Turkish elite had a Western style upbringing. Putting coarsely, both sides spoke the same language. Frey notes that " in a society in which about three-fifths of the male population on average, could not read or write, at least three-fifths of the top level political leadership, on the other hand, was university educated."(Frey p.43) İnönü was War Academy Graduate and a genuine warrior. He served in Edirne, Caucasus, Syria, Sinai, Yemen, Gallipoli and etc. He was also the chief negotiator during Lausanne conferences and proved to be an excellent diplomat. Saraçoğlu had studied in Belgium and Switzerland then in the Ecole Des Sciences Politiques in Paris. Menemencioğlu was educated in Joseph Lycée in Istanbul then studied law in Lausanne. These impressive backgrounds can be expanded to many other influential personalities. The point is that foreigners dealt with the Turks who had impeccable backgrounds and the Turkish decision makers were equipped with necessary qualifications to communicate correctly with their foreign counterparts.

2.4. The Foreign Presence

There is constant flow of information between states. Either through the intelligence gathering or the diplomatic channels every state gathers information in order to calculate counterparts' actions and intentions. Not only volume but also the quality determines the accuracy of information. It is the proposition of this study is that the volume and the quality of information between Turkey and the major powers during the Second World War was at a very high point. On one hand, the foreigners were able to gather accurate information about Turkey's capabilities and intentions, on the other hand it would not be unfair to say that the Turkish decision makers intended to keep very few secrets. The Turks did not have hidden agendas because they were satisfied with the status-quo. Even if, in rare instances, the Turks tried to keep few secrets, the relative intelligence capabilities of their counterparts were so strong that attempts for secrecy were futile. In summation,

flow of information about Turkey's actions and intentions was high and the structural constraints and the intentions were correctly calculated without interference of misinformation.

There was already a large German presence in Turkey at the outbreak of the War. Upon arrival to Istanbul, the Ambassador Von Papen cites that he was met by a large German colony in the train station. (Von Papen p.446) Germany was Turkey's largest trade partner, and many professionals who had escaped from the Nazi regime had found refuge in Turkey. The abundance of German professors in Turkish universities reached such heights that "Istanbul University was called the best German University"¹⁷

Von Papen had been the Operations Officer with the Falkenhayn army group in Mesopotamia during the First World War.(Deringil p.61) He even fought alongside with Fevzi Çakmak in 1908. (Von Papen, p.520) In his own words, he felt that the familiarity with Turkey and the Turks were by no means unimportant when returned to Turkey as an Ambassador. (Von Papen, p.68)

The German listening and code breaking service, *the Forschungsamt* intercepted and decoded communications between the Turkish Embassy in Moscow and Ankara. (Deringil, p 61) The Germans even managed to get valuable information from the British Embassy in Ankara through a spy called *Cicero*. (Von Papen, p.509-515) There was so much information gathering in Turkey that the German agencies, at times, became rivals. *Abwehr*, Gestapo's *Sicherheitsdiens* and *Auslandsorganization* denounced each others' agents to the Turkish police. (Ibid., p.481) Ribbentrop even warned Von Papen to be careful when talking to Turks, because information on his dealings were delivered to Berlin without his knowledge. (Ibid., p. 482-483)

Through past experiences, the personal contacts and the intelligence gathering, the Germans had fairly good idea about Turkish actions and intentions and especially, Turkey's disdain for military involvement. Not only, the Germans were fully aware of Turks' inadequate military capabilities but also were aware of their reservations regarding the Soviets. Thus the Germans not only anticipated Turkish non-belligerency during their infiltration to the Balkans, but also correctly expected the Turkish neutrality in case of a German attack on Soviet Union.

¹⁷ Onur Öymen, <http://www.onuroymen.com/docs/konusma37.doc>

The information about Turkey flowing to the British decision makers were also at high point. The British presence in Turkey did not match that of the Germans', yet the Turks intentionally tried to balance the flow in favor of the British. Through the economic and military delegations, the personal contacts of Ambassador Hugessen and the official diplomatic channels, the British decision makers were able to recognise the capabilities and the intentions of the Turks.

It is significant to see the increase of English presence in Turkey through Hugessen's memoirs. He notes that in 1939, the Christmas dinner for the staff of the Embassy in Ankara included 19 people, however, by 1944, he had to host 380 people including officers, NCO's and other instructors. (Hugessen, p 183)

Even the small size of Ankara mattered. The British Embassy and Saracoğlu's residence was three hundred meters apart with no houses in between. Hugessen could just walk and talk to Saraçoğlu and frequently dined *tete a tete*.(Hugessen, p.148) The Embassy car with its flag was so distinguishable that attracted wide attention. Maybe a bit exaggerated, yet Hugessen claims that "everybody could see everybody". (Hugessen, p. 148) He even mentions the use of the Embassy yacht in "catching government officials during summer scattered around summer residences in the Marmara Sea and Istanbul. (Hugessen p. 183)

Obviously these personal and informal contacts with the Turkish officials facilitated better understanding of Turkish intentions. The fact that Hugessen refers, in his memoirs, to (supposedly pro-German) Menemencioğlu with his first name Numan is an indication of close personal relations between the Turkish foreign policy makers and their British counterparts, at the least, perceived by the British side. (Hugessen, p.195) As if to confirm the propositions of this study, Hugessen says that during his interactions with Numan Menemencioğlu that he admired Menemencioğlu's clear and detailed lines of arguments that "... no item was wasted and there was the seldom danger of misunderstanding". (Hugessen, p.206) Hugessen goes further saying that "it was pleasure to be in a post where one can talk straight and frankly to people and get the same back".(Hugessen, p. 146) Even though, not necessarily reflecting the reality, perception of an Ambassador is very important because those are the perceptions that decisions are made up on.

The British Ambassador gives a small but important detail about his dealings with

with his counterparts. As Saraçoğlu gave oral accounts of Turkey's dealings with other countries, Hugessen took notes. Yet these written notes were corrected by Saraçoğlu in order to prevent any misunderstandings between the two countries. (Hugessen,p.146) Close relations and contacts not only facilitated better understanding of intentions but also prevented misunderstandings.

Even at times, when Turkey seemingly disappointed the British, the British reactions were tame for they acknowledged the arguments put forward by the Turks. The British Ambassador Hugessen admits that Anglo-Turkish rapprochement was a matter of Turk's quest to become a member of the Western camp, but not an last minute alliance in the face of the Fascist aggression as it was for the British. "Atatürk had turned to Britain well before the war clouds amassed over Europe. Anglo-Turkish Alliance was, in Turkish eyes, a permanent factor in her international life and not primarily, as with us, an element in the international grouping necessitated by the immediate German menace". (Hugessen p145) Thus even at the most critical points of the War when Turkey declined to be belligerent against Germany and appeased to the German demands, the British knew that Turkey was not to be a German Ally but only tried to protect herself from destruction.

The British did not question Turkey's pro-Allied stand. "One thing was never in doubt; Turkish desire for Allied victory."(Hugessen, p.204) On the issue of Turkish non-adventurism, the British were convinced that the Turks did not pursue any expansion from their borders. Hugessen argues that "They (Turkish leaders) followed the precepts of Atatürk's consolidation and no outside adventure, and , if irresponsible individuals ever hinted tendentiously at the presence of populations of Turkish race outside Turkey, they received nothing but discouragement from the Turkish government." Hugessen further says that there was not "the slightest justification for the notion that the Turkish government had irredentist ambitions in regard to Turkish populations in South Russia." (Hugessen, p.139)

The British also accepted a certain amount of responsibility for not assisting Turkey adequately to stand against the Axis aggression. While the British Government dragged feet for credits, the British Foreign Office was sending memorandums clearly indicating that Turkey could not keep an army without credits. (Deringil p.29) The British government was aware that they lacked the capacity to reduce Turkish economic dependency on Germany.(Deringil p.20) Interestingly, Hugessen notes that Anti-Turkish

feelings during the First World War, turned the British public against smoking Turkish Tobacco. Unable to reverse such examples of negative public opinion, the British government simply could not replace Germany as the main buyer of Turkish products. (Hugessen,p.145) Such admissions from the Ambassador show the acknowledgment that Turkey dealt with the Axis aggression under dire conditions thus reduced the British pressure for Turkish belligerency.

Since homogeneous, hierarchical and pro-Western elite established and governed the country for more than 20 years, foreign policy decisions were consistent and did not show unexpected change. The main concern of the country was the internal development. Any expansionist adventures were shunned. The country needed security and status-quo. And this main tenet of the Turkish decision makers were well understood by their foreign counterparts.

This does not mean that there were no changes in the foreign policy. In fact, as will be seen in following sections, important maneuvers were made. However, these changes took place gradually and within the expectation limits of their counterparts. The close relations with the Soviets during the early the Republican years were cooled after Atatürk consolidated his power. During the War of Independence, Turkey was seen by Lenin as a potential anti-imperialist ally. However soon after the new Republican regime consolidated power, the Turks did not hide their anti-communist stand. The fact that few Turkish communists were eliminated was not unnoticed by the Soviets. Consequently the relations relatively cooled off.

Even though Britain and France fought against the Ottomans during the First World War, Turkey chose to be a member of the Western camp and sought rapprochement with the West. Naturally, relations with France and Britain (the representative countries of the "West") were strained in 1920's. The Western Powers had annihilated the Ottoman Empire, and even tried to invade Anatolia. However, as the issues were settled one by one, the Turks made clear to the Western Powers that Turkey was satisfied with status-quo. Turkey's Western leanings toward the late 1930's were not a surprise but expected.

The governing elite had always reservations about Germany because to a certain extent they accused the alliance with Germany for the Ottoman Empire's demise. Yet the economic deficiencies dictated close economic relations with Germany in 1930's. The

Turks never gave false hopes to Hitler's government. According to Ataöv, by 1937, the Turks disapproved German policies in the Balkans and were greatly agitated. The dependent relations prevented an official stand against Germany at the time, however, negative opinions were clearly expressed through the press.(Ataöv, p. 9) Despite the fact that Germany was Turkey's largest trade partner, signing of the tripartite treaty between Turkey, France and Britain was not a surprise for the Germans.

By the same token, Turkey's appeasement policy toward German demands during the War was also expected. Since early 1930's Turks had been complaining to the French and the British for being neglected and left dependent on Germany. The German expansion was first tolerated at the expense of smaller nations and then could not be stopped. By the August 1940, (before the Italian attack on Greece) Hugessen was already informing London that Turkey would not send troops to help the Greeks. (Deringil, p.109-110)

These shifts in foreign policy never challenged the non-adventurist and the pro-Western principles. The Turkish decision makers' consistency was understood by their counterparts. The maneuvers only reflected the changes in immediate structure. Thus even when the Turks took actions contrary to their interests, their reactions were tame.

2.5. The Dire State of Economy and Military

Information regarding the military and economic capabilities of counterparts is critical in decision making. Incorrect information, forecasts and miscalculation cause great damage. Poland was to withstand or, at least, slow down German war machine, but vanished in few weeks. Maginot line that was thought to stand for years collapsed in few days. While French General Staff was still considering cavalry as an important part of the warfare, the Germans were mastering the "blitzkrieg" with panzers. There have been many instances of miscalculation regarding the capabilities of counterparts during the Second World War. However in regards to Turkey, the available information was relatively more clear. Turkey simply lacked military and economic capabilities en par with the major powers, thus expectations regarding Turkey was minimal.

The dire state of Turkish economy and military at the outbreak of the Second World War is generally known and accepted. Republican Turks had inherited a devastated

economy and dismal military capability from the Ottoman Empire. After the War of Independence, Ankara Government gave utmost attention to economic development and consequent independence. However, the results were not encouraging. Lack of capital, exodus of non-Muslim merchant and artisan class, great depression of 1930's, Turk's lack of knowledge and their general dislike of modern economic affairs inhibited economic development.

At the outbreak of war, subsistence farming was the main economic activity of 70 percent of the population.(Koçak, p.234) "In 1938 only a few 'industries' in the true sense of the word existed, 90 percent of the factories being 'ramshackle' affairs unworthy of being called factories".(Cem,p.300) The gross national product had only doubled in fifteen years from 1923 to 1938. Even more significant for political reasons, Turkish primitive economy was dependent on Germany and economic activities did not produce surplus for an adequate military capability.

This study argues that the extend of inadequate military and economic capabilities of Turkey was great enough to be accepted as a factor of static transparency. There was a large foreign presence in economic and military matters, thus foreign powers could correctly analyse Turkey's minimal capabilities. Recognition of economic and military deficiency reduced the pressures exerted on Turkey. Roughly half of Turkish exports and imports were to and from Germany.(Oran, p.250) The acknowledgement of this fact forced Britain to reduce pressure on Turkey to turn firmly against Germany.

By the out break of the War, Turkey's economy was virtually dependent on Germany. Combined share of The United States, France and Britain in Turkish trade was, at most, 20 percent.(Ibid.) The British were aware that they did not have the capacity to mitigate Turkish economic losses in case of Turks' turning their backs to Germany. Germans, on the other hand, were also well aware of such economic outlook in their favor. They successfully used dependent relations and reduced the effects of tripartite alliance between Turkey, Britain and France.

State of economy goes hand in hand with state of military. Turkish underdevelopment could not produce adequate surplus for a viable military capability. Turkish dependency on Germany was not limited to economic sphere. A large portion of the few modern military equipment Turkey possessed was from Germany and thus

dependent on German parts and ammunition. During the war, Turkish military inadequacy and dependency on Germany also reduced the possibility of Turkish belligerency against the Germans.

Virtually, one could not speak of an Turkish offensive capability. Putting aside the possibility of Turkey being used by the Allies as a base, Germans did not perceive Turkish belligerency as a major threat. More importantly, Turkey also lacked defensive capabilities. Even a symbolic sign of belligerency, such as declaration of war (without any military action), could have caused Turks dearly. Turkish cities and few industrial centers were virtually defenseless against German air attacks. The Germans were aware of this fact thus the threat of Turkish belligerency was reduced.

When the Turks told that they would declare war if the Germans troops entered Bulgaria, the Germans did not change their plans. Their only reaction was to assure the Turks that the German troops would be stationed 'comfortably' away from the border. the Germans were confident that it was only a Turkish bluff.

In summation, because of Turkish military and economic inadequacy, in one hand, Britain could not and did not pressure on Turkish belligerency, on the other hand Germany did not perceive Turkey as a major threat.

2.5.1. The Economy

The Ottomans of 18th Century not only failed to venture further into the Central Europe and the Russian Steppes but also failed to understand the extend of the Western development. During the course of 19th century, the Ottomans realized that they were losing in the international rivalry and initiated many reforms, and even attempts were made for industrialization. These efforts and attempts were not successful enough to achieve economic development en par with the West and consequently, the Ottoman Empire collapsed after the First World War.

The republican Ankara government faced a great dilemma and perhaps what can be called confusion in economic matters. The lessons learned from the Ottoman Empire was that capitulations and concessions to the foreigners were responsible for the dependency and the underdevelopment. Yet at the same time, foreign capital and expertise were badly

needed for industrialization. This dilemma resulted in two phases of economic policies. The first phase was up to 1930, during which state intervention was minimal. Yet, after 1930, étatism, economic development through state intervention, became the norm.

Even though Lausanne could be assessed as a victory for political matters, it was less so in economic domain. (Deringil, p.14) There was the heavy burden of the Ottoman debt which took a large portion of the budget of the Ankara Government. Even though Turkey did not start making debt payments until 1929, during 1930's, the Ottoman debt payments accounted 13-18 percent of the budget expenditures.(Hershlag, p.21) The tariffs set in 1916 were to be effective until 1934. Turkey acquired the right of cabotage only in 1926. Many foreign concessions were to be only gradually nationalized. It was 1947 that the last railroad concession of the French was taken back. Thus until 1930's Turks could not achieve economic independence properly even if they wanted to.

The Law of Encouragement of Industry of 1927 was the most important attempt for the private enterprise, foreign or local. The law included, free land, 10 percent price support in public tenders, reduction of the communication charges and taxes for industrial enterprises. However the foreigners were vary of investing in the 'Nationalist' Turkey and the Turks were suspicious of political intentions of the foreign investors. Turkey had lost most of the few Jewish, Greek and Armenian entrepreneurs, and the Turkish talent preferred military or bureaucracy instead of economic activities. Other than the human capital, Turkey also lacked hard currency for capital investment. The Turkish exports, mainly agricultural products fetched poor returns in the depressed international markets. The export revenues almost halved from 1929 to 1934. There was hardly any capital, thus industrialization attempts produced limited success.

It is important to note that even though there was a general negative attitude against the foreign enterprises, Turkey was not economically closed to the outside world. As said above, the foreign presence inherited from the Ottoman Empire remained for some time. The Republican Turkey was nationalistic, yet did not close all the doors to foreigners. Even the first government program of 1920 included a clause stating that "friendly" states would be welcome to engage in economic activities mutually beneficial to all sides.

Yet the Republican Turks were nationalists at heart and aimed at Turkification of the economic sphere. Although still citizens of the Republic, non-Muslim entrepreneurs

were, unofficially, discouraged in favour of Muslim-Turkish merchants. Officially, the foreign companies were forced to keep their books in Turkish and employ 75 percent of their personnel from the "Muslim-Turkish" population. (Oran, p.244) These nationalistic attempts failed to succeed and the foreign presence in economy could not be avoided. Between 1920 and 1930, one third of 210 newly created joint-stock companies had sizeable foreign investments. The Foreigners' shares were even more in companies holding governmental concessions. (Ökçün, p. 153-170) According to Keyder, the situation was even worse in the few industrial enterprises of which two thirds belonged to the foreigners. (Keyder, p.79)

Thus despite the fact that a policy of Turkification of economy was being followed, the foreigners still dominated few modern sectors of the economy. The Marxist analysts puts the responsibility of the situation to the new Turkish elite who found easier to enrich their selves replacing the non-Muslim middlemen instead of engaging productive enterprises. However, it would be more fair to say that the Turks were not equipped to rival the foreigners in economic activities. The Turks had neither capital nor know-how.¹⁸

By 1930's, many Turkish decision makers came to think that with implementation of current liberal policies it would take 50 or even 100 years to catch up with the Western development levels. Impressive economic development of the Soviet Union, Fascist Germany and Italy also convinced the Turks that development in state hands was needed. It is in this background that the étatist policies began to be implemented.

For the purpose of this study the important aspect of the étatist policies was, once again, the foreign involvement and political repercussions. Economic independence and avoidance of foreign exploitation was one of the main goals of Republican Turks. However foreign expertise and capital had to be and was used. "Even with étatist orientation after 1930, the backlog of underdevelopment proved too great. Turkey's leaders realized that foreign money and assistance was unavoidable. The once despised foreign advisers were called back to supervise the five-year plans, and foreign loans were solicited." (Deringil, p. 13)

As said above during the "liberal" period between 1920 and 1930, foreign presence was not and could not be avoided. Even though the nature of foreign presence changed in

¹⁸ For further info about Marxist analysis of Turkish development look at Çağlar Keyder's *Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar* and Baskın Oran's description of "affairism" in Oran p.246.

succeeding étatist period, the foreign presence did not diminish. During the "liberal" period, the foreign companies were mainly served as the middlemen, buying raw materials and selling industrial goods. In the étatist period the foreign companies started to supervise, finance and manage industrial enterprises aiming to reduce dependency on basic foodstuffs and industrial products.

The first five year plan (1934-1939) was modelled on the Soviet example, yet also an American commission took part in its preparation.(Herslag, p.185) For its implementation, the Soviets gave interest free \$8 Million in gold, sent experts and Turkish students went to Soviet Union.¹⁹ As a direct result of the Anglo-Turkish rapprochement, the British expertise and aid was used for the second 5 year plan. Whether by the Soviets or the British, in summation modern sectors of the Turkish economy was still dominated by the foreigners during the étatist period.

However, the German involvement in the Turkish economy during the étatist period deserve special attention for dependency on Germany became an important factor in Turkish foreign Policy. "The emergence of Hitler and the economic expansion of Germany coincided with a period when Turkey was sorely in need of finance"(Deringil, p.23) Fertile background existed for an increase of German influence and presence. Turkey had been in the German sphere of influence since before the Great War and having their hands full with many colonies and dominions, Britain and France could not match the German presence in Turkey. During the tumultuous period after the Great War many Germans found employment in Turkey.

Despite the fact that many among the Turkish leaders entertained anti-German feelings resulting from the experiences from the First World War, the Turkish government used the expertise of readily available German professionals to the extend that along with technicians and engineers, even the German officers were recruited for military training. Versailles limitations to the military industries were so severe that even a whole aeroplane factory with the machinery and the workers (Junkers Flugzeugwerke A.G.) was moved to Turkey. Furthermore, Nazi repression increased the German presence of many professionals, especially the university professors, flocked to Turkey as a safe heaven. Even though at superficial prices, and consequently to Turkey's disadvantage, Germany

¹⁹ Among many, textile factory 'c-kombinat' in Kayseri was made by the Soviets and a special institution "Turksoj" was created in Moscow, to conduct economic relations. (Deringil, p.17)

offered to sell industrial products in return for the Turkish raw materials and agricultural products which were not readily marketable in the West. Even though attempts were made to reduce Turkish economy's dependency on Germany, the results were not successful. By 1939, half of the Turkish exports were still destined for Germany.

At the outbreak of the second world war, the Germans were very familiar with the weaknesses of the Turkish side. A "large German colony" existed in Istanbul. The German influence was not enough to pull Turkey to the Axis. However, the extensive German knowledge of the Turkish economy worked in more than one way that affected the progression of the war. Fearful of economic consequences, the Turks were taking careful steps toward the Allies. As a direct result of their dominance, the Germans were assured of themselves that Turks could be convinced to move toward the Axis when it was necessary, and thus did not react too vehemently against the Anglo-Turkish rapprochement. On the other hand the British acknowledged the Turkish dependency on Germany and unable to replace the German position, reduced the pressures on Turkey.

2.5.2. The Military

During the course of the Second World War several factors related to the Turkish military capability can be counted for static transparency. (1) The offensive capabilities of the Turkish military was perceived to be negligible, reducing the threat perceived by the Germans. (2) The recognition of the difficult terrain, the poor infrastructure and the Turks' determination to fight in case of an attack increased the costs of an invasion. (3) The poor defensive capabilities of the Turkish cities and the strategical points was recognized by the Allies, reducing the pressure on Turkish belligerency.

"The opinion that Turkey was not prepared to fight a modern war was unanimous."(Ataöv, p.131) The army although a large one, lacked update equipment that became essential in modern warfare. "Turkish Armed Forces were having to face the Second World War with the technology of the First."(Deringil, p.38)

After the War of Independence, the Republican Turks were keen on internal development and reconstruction of the country. Even though a large army was always kept for mainly internal security purposes, military came second to civilian development.

According to Aydemir, after decades of continuous wars, the Turks were tired of fighting. As if deliberating the mood of the country, Atatürk, at Izmir Economic Congress, declared that the Turks were not a "warrior" nation but an "economic" nation. (Aydemir, p.14) Therefore, the civilian development was given greater attention than the military development. Frey also notes that military affairs were not the priority. The Minister of Defense was not at the top of the "ministerial pyramid", but was replaced by the minister of Interior. (Frey, p.234)

As a direct result of such lassitude regarding the military affairs, the Turkish army was in a dire state. In the age of tanks, panzers and planes, one could not speak of a motorized Turkish Army. While the great powers were preparing for the War in terms thousands of planes, tanks and vessels, the Turkish chief of staff was instructing his commanders how to use live animals more efficiently in order to mobilize the troops. (Aydemir, p.132) Whatever equipment the Turks had, lacked any sense of uniformity, making it impossible to keep them in working order. Aydemir notes 28 different makes of old trucks were available. (Ibid., p.134) The weapons were from all sorts of sources and calibers, thus even adequate ammunition for the rifles and the guns could not be kept.

There was only a single line of railway, which left out many regions. The condition of roads was even worse. The heavy guns from the First World War era could not be moved on soft surface. The fuel storage capacity was not adequate even for the few motorized equipment. During the course of the War, there were many instances that there would be only a week long supply of fuel. (Deringil, p.37)

In 1937 the air force was consisted of 131 planes, only half of which could be counted as modern. (Ibid., p.33) Until and during the war, the Turks increased the number of the planes, however they lacked trained pilots and adequate airfields. The general education of the military personnel was deficient. When new equipment arrived, training turned out to be a serious problem. Army personnel had difficulty in adapting to the modern warfare. There was also insufficiency in construction materials. Even though cement could be produced in small quantities, the Karabük Iron and Steel Factory could be completed in 1939. One could not speak of a navy which included one outdated battle cruiser, 4 destroyers and 5 submarines.²⁰

²⁰ For further information look, Deringil, p. 31-40, Aydemir, p.130-166, Koçak, p.421-422.

It was clear to all foreign powers that the Turkish Army could not be successful at an offensive operation against Germany. Before the War started, fully aware of the negative consequences of the Turkish Army's vulnerability, Britain and France pledged to modernize the Turkish Army against any potential aggression or a possible military mission against Germany. But as France was invaded and Britain was already having difficulty supplying more emergent fronts, Turkey did not receive satisfactory military aid from the Allies during the War. According to Robertson whose main source is British Foreign Office documents, even before the War started and France was lost, the British knew that they could not supply adequate military equipment to Turkey. (Robertson p. 14) Robertson goes even further claiming that the military supplies sent to Turkey during the War were of limited capability and the British knew about it. (Ibid., p.19) Consequently, even after Greece was invaded, the War cabinet decided not to force Turkey into War because the Turks could not resist German invasion. (Ibid., p. 22)

While the Allies could not press harder on Turkey, clarity of the Turkish military inadequacy made the Germans less threatened by a possible Turkish involvement against them. The Turks argued that their non-belligerency was beneficial to the British interests. "If Turkey had gone to war with Germany, it was probable that Germany could be able to advance through Anatolia to establish her hegemony, with her advantageous position at the time in Syria and Iraq, on the whole Eastern Mediterranean. This might have postponed Hitler's plans for the invasion of Russia with the concentration of forces against Britain." (Ataöv, p.133) The weakness of the Turkish military capabilities was so transparent that the British also acknowledged and accepted the Turkish arguments. It was understood by the British that Turkish belligerency against Germany was more of a liability than an asset.

The Germans did not expect Turkey to fight against them. Ribbentrop wrote to Von papen that it was an English bluff that Turkey would declare war on Germany if Germany moved through Bulgaria.(Robertson, p. 32) British Foreign Office knew that the Turkish Army was in ruins with few mechanized equipment, terrible transportation links. Even as simple as rifles were badly needed. (Deringil, p.32-34) In July 1940, Major General Cornwall-Ewans estimated that the Germans could conquer Turkey and reach the Iraqi border in 16 weeks and after the Straits, Turkey could not put much of a resistance

(Robertson p.29). According to the British, Turkey's neutrality saved Britain from still a greater peril.

The other factor that was transparent to foreigners and Germans in particular was Turks' determination to fight if attacked. The President İnönü "was ready to fight if Turkey was attacked, but did not consider his armies sufficient for offensive action." (Tamkoç, p. 205) Although the Turkish Army which was ill equipped for offense, was still perceived to be a deterrent force for having the capability to hurt an invading army. "The Army was large and had reputation of valiant. " (Deringil, p.31) " The Turks were able to impose circumspection on both the Germans and the British because they were intensely patriotic and fully determined to resist aggression, and because they had a substantial army, which though not modernized, was recognized as a valiant and formidable force." (Langer and Gleason, p.801) Turkish leaders were experienced warriors. " Turks had a reputation for toughness and fortitude Turks are good soldiers." (Fox, p.11)

The German Ambassador Von Papen who had great familiarity with Turkey and the Turks made it clear to Hitler that " although German attack could reach the narrow seas (Marmara) and traverse them without undue difficulty, the next stage would be suicide. The defense of Anatolia, with invading troops restricted to one supply line through Eskisehir and the high Taurus, a line with innumerable bridges and tunnels, would be a simple matter for the brave and determined Turks." (Von Papen, p.471) Turkish mountainous landscape would have made an invading army vulnerable to a defensive army. Furthermore, poor communication and transportation infrastructure was an obstacle for a successful invasion. These facts were well understood by Germany. "Hitler realistically noted that distances, the mountainous terrain, and the Turkish military strength ruled out the possibility of attempting the operation across Turkey and into Syria and Iraq by force." (Rustow, p.88)

After the Germans started retreating from Russia, it became evident to the Allies that Germany was losing and started putting more pressure on Turkish belligerency. The Turks once again declined the Allied requests. There were many unresolved issues for the Turkish and the Allied decision makers, such as reservations regarding a possible clash of interests with the Soviet Union, the role that Turkey and her army would play in an offensive campaign and whether Normandy or the Balkans be the main center of attack.

However for Turkey, the most important reason for staying out of the War was the poor air defenses and the Germans' capability to cause great damages to the Turkish cities and the few industrial centers. Istanbul was cultural, social and economic center of Turkey and could not be saved in case of a German air attack. The evacuation attempts had born embarrassing results. The few industrial centers in the Eastern Marmara that the young Republic managed to put together after painstaking efforts and the coal basins in the Western Black Sea region (the only energy resource) were virtually defenseless. Even though the Turks were also aware that Germany was losing and did not expect a direct invasion, punitive bombardment of Belgrade by Hitler was still fresh in the Turkish memory. Without any immediate gain, the Germans could still punish the Turks, and the Turkish decision makers did not want to take any chances.

As said above, at the outbreak of the Second World War, in military-economic matters, Turkey was in a relatively disadvantageous position. However, the Turkish decision makers skilfully managed to change their military and economic inadequacy into a vantage point. This study argues that the transparent structural factors were crucial for such outcome. Through their intelligence gathering and active communication of the Turkish side, the foreign powers, whether Allied or Axis, were able to assess the Turkish capabilities correctly. On one hand, the Turks were economically and militarily too weak to be under or over estimated. On the other hand the Turks did not try to distort the picture. the Turks never exegerated the capabilities of their army. On the contrary, they stressed the dire situation the military was in.

During the War, inadequate information caused many lives. The Allies underestimated the German Blitzkrieg. The Maginot line was thought to withstand any invading army. The Germans underestimated the Russian Steppes and the Soviets' determination to fight. Mussolini could not conquer Greece. In case of Turkey, the transparency facilitated accurate information and correct decision making, as a result a whole country and many lives were saved.

3. International Structure

Even though the distribution of capabilities determine the shape of international structure, the intentions of the actors are also important. The fact that Bulgaria was a relatively small power does not reflect the complete picture. The fact that the Bulgarian politicians had expansionist intentions has to be also considered. Therefore in this chapter the historical background of the related states will be described in order to understand the international structure during the War.

3.1. Emergence of non-adventurists, status-quo Turkish Republic

Historical background of Turkey and its perception by Turkish ruling elite has to be briefed in order to understand the mindset of the Turkish decision makers. As the Turks saw it, they came to Anatolia in the 11 th Century, first built Seljuk Empires and then the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire peaked in the 17th Century and decayed during the 18th and the 19th Centuries and finally Turkish Republic was put together from the ashes of the Empire. Particularly, the 19th century can be described as the Ottomans hopelessly trying to catch up with the West in all aspects of the society. As Ortaylı beautifully puts it, the 19th Century had been the longest for Turkish elite.²¹ The Empire was under threat from the nationalities within, the expanding European Powers and Russia. The existing political, socio-economic system could not keep up with the Western progress. The Empire continuously lost its power. The Ottomans instituted the constitutional monarchy, reformed the legal system, established various modern public institutions ranging from simple fire departments to the conscription based army. They even brought complete factories not only with machinery but also workers from abroad. And most importantly they opened the Western styled schools and sent students abroad. These efforts did not add up to save the Empire, yet were enough to gather a few people with wide knowledge, experience and equipped with basic institutions for the nation building.

For the purpose of this study one can not appreciate the nature of the Turkish elite during the Second World War neglecting this particular nature of the Ottoman heritage.

²¹ For further information see İlber Ortaylı's *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı*, Alkım Yayınevi, İstanbul 2006.

Ignoring this context Turkey can incorrectly be categorized a relatively young and poor nation. Even though Turkey was socio-economically and militarily devastated, the Turkish elite belonged to the Ottoman heritage with centuries old experiences in three continents. They administered and fought in different geographies. They dealt with many societies, cultures and languages. Even though the Turkish Republic was a relatively minor economic and military power, the Turkish elite belonged to the six century old Empire.

This heritage obviously carried diplomatic talents and capabilities. For the purposes of this study however, the foremost important characteristic inherited by Turkish elite was non-adventurism. As the Ottomans had opened modern schools and sent students abroad, a generation of western educated new and young elite had emerged toward the end of 19th Century. They were educated in Western standards. They admired Europe and wanted to become a part of it. They wanted to modernize the Empire. They were organized under an umbrella organization called "The Committee of Union and Progress" (CUP). Almost all, including Atatürk and İnönü, were at some point member. They had a great vision of making the Ottoman Empire once again a global power. They were young and their completely different modern education distanced them from the appeasement and conciliatory policies of the decaying Empire. They were not the sons of cautious Viziers but of energy filled adventurist "Jeune Turks" seeking constant progress. They struggled against the Sultan and the old caste, and finally came to power in 1908. They thought an alliance with Germany during the First World War was an excellent opportunity to bring back the vigor to the Empire. However they wrongfully overestimated the power of Germany. They stretched capabilities of the Ottoman Empire and caused its detriment.

After the demise of the Empire and CUP with it, Atatürk and his friends began yet a new struggle for a modern Republic. As a result of changes in the international political structure (The Bolshevik Revolution being the most significant) and successful military confrontations with the invading Greek Army, Atatürk and his circle were able to consolidate power and establish the Republic. The Turkish revolution was a genuine break with the Empire. Almost all archaic institutions including the Sultanate and the Caliphate were abolished. The revolution dictated every aspect of the society from dressing code to alphabet. The Turkish elite wanted to forget the Imperial past, except one important lesson. The devastation that resulted from unprepared adventures was not to be forgotten.

Even though many were at some point members, the Republican Turkish elite saw the adventurist policy of the Committee of Union and Progress under Enver, Celal and Talat Pashas as the main culprit for the losses of First World War. The CUP had miscalculated the Empire's strengths and weaknesses and exaggerated the German power. The Turkish army had won many battles including Gallipoli which is thought to be an important cornerstone for the Bolshevik revolution. However, the Eastern Front was a disaster, and they underestimated the Arab Nationalism. The Turks learned a very hard lesson. Opportunism had costed the Turks greatly.

The founding fathers of Turkey had these fresh memories with them and were determined not to make the same mistakes. They were not particularly distrustful of other nations as can be argued by some. On the contrary, they believed in international cooperation and immediately started making bilateral and multilateral agreements. The Turks not only wanted to be active members in the international community but also requested to be an integral part of Europe. The Turks reacted strongly when Turkey was not included in French Prime Minister Briand's proposal for Federal Union of Europe (*D'union Fédérale Européenne*) in 1930. (Ülman and Sander, p.6) They entered into the alliances and the international organizations. The Turkish elite did not want to close the country to the outside world. They sought international cooperation, foreign trade, credit and assistance. As was the norm during the Empire, many were sent to the West to study and the foreign mission schools continued their presence. the Republican Turks did not want to cut her ties with the West but also did not want to repeat the same mistakes of the CUP.

The Turkish alliance with France and Britain during the Second World War was nothing like the CUP alliance with Germany. The Turks were not looking for opportunities, in an essentially European conflict. Foremost, the Turks sought peace and saw the Alliance as a deterrent for possible Italo-German aggression. They took utmost care not to intimidate Russia. The Tripartite pact was not targeted against the Soviets. On the contrary the Turks even hoped that the Soviet Russia would join the non-revisionist camp. The Turks also made specifically clear to the Alliance partners that Turkey will not be pushed for belligerency without adequate military preparations thus not to be sacrificed for the sake of France and Britain.

From a purely structuralist perspective it can be argued that the Turks sought

international cooperation and abode to peaceful methods only because Turkey lacked resources for an aggressive expansionist policy. Whenever had the power and opportunity, Turkey changed the Straits regime, took over Hatay, and even tried for Mosul and Kirkuk. Even though such argument is probable and carries large portion of truth, it leaves out an important factor regarding the mindsets of governing the Turkish elites and the transparency factor.

As any, the Turkish interests and ambitions spilled over her borders and the status-quo. Yet, the Turks knew the costs of miscalculation. Therefore, the Turkish decision makers took utmost care to suppress emotions, ambitions and adventures. For the Turks, transparency was both a given factor and an achievable target. Underdevelopment and deficiencies in almost all sectors of the country was transparent enough to act rationally. The dire state of economy and military did not leave room for expansionist ventures. Yet, they also took every possible precaution in order to correctly analyse the international structure but also to be correctly analysed by their foreign counterparts. Whether or not if Turkey had capabilities, the Turks would be revisionists or non-revisionists is not the point. Turkey was a poor country and was non-revisionist. Turkish decision makers undertook all necessary actions in order to radiate their non-revisionism.

3.2. The Italo-German Aggression

Toward the Second World War Europe was gradually divided into two camps. On one side, Britain and France lead the status-quo camp. They were the victors and benefactors of the First World War, they had drawn the maps, had determined the settlement of the Great War. On the other side, there were the likes of Italy and Germany with the thought that they were not dealt fairly and demanded revisions. For the purpose of this study Turkish relations with Italy and Germany illustrates several important points. The first is that even though Turkey demanded revisions to the settlements after the first world war, Turkey was essentially a status-quo state and sought a non-aggression to the point that the Turks chose to join the allied camp against the Axis despite strong economic and military ties.

At first glance Turkey could be seen as a part of the revisionist camp. The sole

purpose of the Ankara Government was to reject the Treaty of Sevres. Even after the Turks managed to reestablish control over Anatolian peninsula, they were not quite satisfied with the Lausanne Conference settlements. During 20's and 30's, the Turks tried to make amendments in their favour. They unsuccessfully tried to regain the control of Mosul and the Dodecanese Islands. Some minor deductions were made in the Ottoman debt. With the Montreux Convention, Turkey also managed to militarise the Straits and regained limited sovereignty in 1936. Finally, Hatay was annexed in 1939.

Even though these examples illustrate Turkish revisionist policies, one crucial point which is important for this study is that Turkey pursued its interests without aggression, using prescribed international procedures. For the Turks, international stability carried more weight than expansion. Therefore even though the Turkish leaders, at some point, may have sympathized with the German and the Italian demands, they were against a violent change in the status-quo that could blow out into a war. The Turks did not want war. In order to avoid fighting, they gave up many ambitions across their borders. It was the quest for peace that pushed Turkey to eventually turn against Italy and Germany even though both were her most important trade partners.

3.2.1. Italy

Italy was among the invading powers after the First World War, and in 1925, had even threatened to invade the Mediterranean shores of Asia Minor if Turkey went to war with Britain over the control of Mosul.(Hakkı, p.1) However the Turkish relations with Italy were benign afterwards. The Turks were annoyed by Mussolini's expansionist rhetoric but Italy was not considered an immediate threat until the 1930's. On the contrary, relations between the two countries were dynamic because non-Muslim immigrants from Turkey to Italy facilitated a considerable amount trade between the two countries.

However, there were issues. The memories of Italian invasion Libya in 1911 were still fresh in Turkish minds.(Deringil, p.72) The Italian meddling in the Albanian affairs were not appreciated. In 1920's, Mussolini did not consider Italy to be powerful enough to show the expansionist intentions explicitly. Mussolini even tried to forge an alliance with Greece and Turkey against the French alliance with Yugoslavia and Romania (Little

Entente), in February 1935. Turkey immediately rejected the proposal on the grounds that it was anathema to the Balkan Pact that Turkey was committed to in order to secure peace in the Balkans. Italy's aim was to take advantage of the intra-Balkan rivalries. Mussolini had his eyes on the Croatian and the Slovene parts of Yugoslavia. Yet, Turkey was against any ventures that could blow into a war. However, the Italian offers of some islands in the Aegean Sea were appreciated by the Turkish counterparts. (Oran, p.293) In 1928, Turkey and Italy signed treaty of neutrality and friendship in Rome and Italy pledged to give islands to Turkey in near future. However, Turks were still uneasy about the Italian ambitions.

The fascist successes in Spain and Germany continuously increased the boldness of Mussolini.(Oran, p.295) 'Mare Nostrum' became to be used more often. Not only Italy did not give any islands back to Turkey, the Dodecanese Islands were being heavily fortified. The Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1935 further agitated the Turks. Turkey joined the League of Nations sanctions against Italy. Upon the British support, sanctions were lifted only a year later. Germany was more of a threat and the British still thought that they could prevent an Italo-German alliance by using Austria as a point of contention between Italy and Germany. When Germany installed compulsory military service, Britain and France managed to pull Mussolini to "The Stresa Front". On 14 April 1935, three countries pledged to Austria's independence and to resist any future attempt by Germany to change the Treaty of Versailles. However in two months, on 18 June 1935, Britain signed the Anglo-German Naval Agreement without consulting Italy. Such unilateral move by Britain pushed Mussolini to seek better relations with Hitler. The rapprochement between Italy and Germany surfaced itself in their support to Franco during the Spanish Civil War, yet was culminated in the creation of the Axis. The term was first used by Benito Mussolini in November 1936, when he spoke of a Rome-Berlin axis arising out of the treaty of friendship signed between Italy and Germany on 25 October 1936.

As Turkey deliberated unease about the Italian actions and threats, Italy continuously tried to soothe the Turks with the thought of possibly pulling Turkey into Italo-German Alliance. The Montreux Convention which Italy first rejected was signed two years later. However the invasion of Albania in 1939 constituted a clear threat to Turkey and according to scholars such as Deringil was the main reason pushing Turkey to seek

French and English alliance.

3.2.2. Germany

The Treaty of Versailles (1919) after the First World War, caused Germany to lose a significant portion of its territory, prohibited annexation with other states, limited the size of German armed forces and imposed massive reparations. The overseas dominions were taken. Austria became independent state. Vast territories had been given to Poland, France, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark and Lithuania. Saar land was occupied by British and French (the fate of which to be decided in a plebiscite in 15 years). Rhineland was officially left to the German administration but demilitarized. However, the French continuously meddled. Not only they tried to support the separatists and establish an independent Rhenish Republic, but also occupied industrial centers in Ruhr when Germany could not afford reparation payments.

The trauma of the First World War had deep effects on the German morale and economy. Turkey's relations with Germany was minimal, yet benign until Hitler came to power. During the 1920's there were not any problematic issues between the two countries. Turkey wanted a stronger Germany, Germany wanted a stronger Turkey. Even though the Germans did not want to intimidate Britain and were initially reluctant toward Turkey, there were instances of cooperation in many fields.

Germany was the first country to commence building the embassy compound in Ankara. The Germans also supervised the establishment of the School of Agriculture "Yüksek Ziraat Okulu". Even, the city planning of Ankara was given to the German Professor Jansen. Kayseri-Ulukışla and Kütahya-Balıkesir railway lines were financed and constructed by Germany. Many other German personnel in wide range of sectors worked in Turkey. Even German military officers found employment in the Turkish Military Schools and many Turkish students went to Germany for study. Because of Versailles limitations, some German military productions were moved to Turkey. By the beginning of the 1930's trade between two countries were the same level as before the First World War and relations were very favourable. However, the Nazi ascendancy to power once again changed the nature of relations.

Hitler pursued much more ambitious foreign policy than his predecessors from the beginning. He thought Turkey could be convinced to be an ally in his revisionist plans. He saw parallels in the Turkish quest for Hatay and his "lebensraum". However at the same time, the Turkish efforts for a Balkan Entente was seen as a hindrance to his revisionist plans. The British support for Turkey during the Montreux Conference and possible closure of the Straits to non-Black sea countries also irritated him. Nevertheless economic relations blossomed during the Hitler reign.

Hitler used economy to further political interests. Cash strapped Turkey welcomed the German offers of credit and barter (Krieling). Germany agreed to buy Turkish foodstuff at prices that could not be matched by the British or the French, even though as argued by some, the German industrial products were also sold to Turkey in prices higher than the international norms. The Nazi propaganda machine was very active in Turkey and found many sympathetic Turks, especially the Pan-Turanists. Many valuable scientists feeling the Nazi repression found refuge in Turkey. As a result of infusion of the German personnel, equipment, capital and propaganda by late 1930's the Turkish economy, and to lesser but significant extend, the military became dependent on the German trade and credits.

The Germans were using economic means to further their political agendas. For example, well before the Tripartite Treaty and the German attack on Poland, during credit negotiations, Ribbentrop asked Menemencioğlu whether Turkey would allow the French and the British fleet cross the Straits in case of a war between Germany and Poland. (Weber, 23) The Turkish leaders were aware of the danger. They were too dependent on Germany and they did not want the German economic power to dictate the Turkish foreign policy. Turkey sought economic and military assistance from the British and the French. In many cases, the British companies were treated more favorably in order to balance the German influence.

As a result of Hitler's gradual increase of aggression tactics and covert support on the Italian invasion of Albania, the Turks started to distance themselves. Even Von Papen's appointment to Ankara became an issue and was not welcomed. Not only he was seen as the man behind annexation of Austria to Germany but he also was a personified reminder of the detrimental alliance between Turkey and Germany during the First world War. Thus right before the War, the threat of military and economic dependency on Germany and

German-Italian alliance pushed Turkey to seek alliance with France and Britain.

3.3. The Reluctance of France and Britain for Turkish Alliance

As usually is the case, the general reading of the Second World War history omits many fine details. On the subject of alliance between Britain, France and Turkey, many are lead to believe that France and Britain sought Turkish alliance against the Axis block. Turkey saw the situation as opportunity to extract material benefits. As the war progressed Turkey did not commit to the Ally cause and played both sides against each other to get military and economic gains. However, actual progression of events show that by late 1930's, threatened by Italy and then the Soviet union and irritated by the German aggression, it was, initially, Turkey which sought the British and the French alliance, and it was the British and the French that showed reluctance.

3.3.1. England

During the inter war period, the relations of Turkey with Britain carried many scars. Britain had greatly benefited from the Ottoman losses during the First World War. Long occupation of Istanbul, the support for invading Greek Army and the claims regarding minorities left fresh scars. Furthermore Turkish attempts to take Mosul back did not succeed. The British were also irritated by the warm relations between Ankara and Moscow, even though Ankara Government was also seen as a buffer against the Soviets.

However by the 1930's the Anglo-Turkish relations improved. The Arab nationalism and problems related with the Jewish settlements combined with the continuously heating rivalry in the Mediterranean with Italy and the rise of German influence pushed the British to seek closer relations with Turkey.

Initially Turkey was much more enthusiastic for closer relations. Rumors circulated in Ankara as early as 1934. Regarding to the question about Turkey's drawing closer to Britain, Atatürk is said to have told the British Ambassador Percy Loraine that he is throwing himself into the arms of Britain.(Robertson, p.13) Even though greatly dissatisfied with the Mosul settlement, witnessing the heated atmosphere, Turkey felt the

need for powerful friends like Britain.(Deringil, p.71) However, the British were not so enthusiastic. They still thought that they could wean Italy away from Germany and did not want to provoke Italians further by making security agreements with the Mediterranean and the Balkan states. Italy had threatened Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey after the implementation of the League of Nations' sanctions against the invasion of Abyssinia. Britain in return gave guarantees of assistance in case of an Italian aggression. However guarantees were in form of the exchange of diplomatic notes instead of a treaty as Turkey had wanted. Only a year after when the sanctions were lifted, Britain unilaterally revoked the guarantees.

Turkey also wanted to reduce military and economic dependence Germany. The Turks asked for more economic and military collaboration from Britain. The Turks even gave more favorable terms to the British companies. However according to Robertson, Britain was reluctant also in economic matters. Britain had her hands full with problems in the colonies and was economically and militarily stretched to the limits. Public opinion favoured policies of appeasement against the threats of aggression. Furthermore anti-Turkish feelings surfaced once again. Many English politicians believed that assistance to Turkey was at best bribe at worst extortion by the Turks. Even by 1938 Percy Lorraine was instructed to make statements "that would allay Turkish doubts about British reliability while stopping short of giving a formal guarantee" (Deringil, p.71)

3.3.2. France

In the inter war period, France was a political mess. The political system simply could not function in a faction ridden society and political elite. The Monarchists, the republicans, the pacifists, the socialists, the communists, the fascists, each had considerable power, thus stability was a foreign idea. The governments fell short after they were formed. Corruption among the elite was wide and deep. The political system hardly survived the great depression. The French foreign policy could only be described as confused. France could not even suppress "the Passive Resistance" in Ruhr and had to withdraw.²² Aware of their own limited capabilities, the French desperately sought for

²² In January 1923 French forces occupied the industrial Ruhr area as Germany could not make reparation payments demanded by the Versailles Treaty. Germans commenced "passive resistance," which meant

alliances to contain Germany's ascend. Most notable was "the Little Entente" with Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia. However faction ridden political system prohibited any firm commitment, only to the effect of smaller powers slowly moving to the Axis.

During the inter war period Franco-Turkish relations were relatively better. The fact that France was the first country to recognize the Ankara Government had created a certain sympathy. Yet the Turks were not pleased with the French support for the British during the Lausanne Conferences and the Mosul settlement. The Turks also asked for reductions in the Ottoman debt of which France was the biggest creditor. However, by the mid 30's, the border with Syria (under French mandate) had been drawn and the debt issues were settled.

Hatay was the most visible problem between the two countries. France already had great difficulties governing her colonies. Syrian Arabs were pressing the French against the annexation of Hatay with Turkey. The enclave was predominantly Turkish with a vibrant nationalistic intelligentsia and more importantly, unlike Mosul, Hatay did not have oil. Yet, France was still very persistent and held the fate of Hatay until June of 1938. Only after the French were convinced that Europe was heating up and a possible Turkish alliance was more valuable, they gave up Hatay. Britain, not wanting to shy Turkey away from the Western camp also influenced the French decision. Finally, the plebiscite was held under the rules revised according to Turkish demands. Hatay first declared independence and then annexed with Turkey and the French troops withdrew.

Contrary to common knowledge, the Turks deliberated the first attempts for an alliance with the West in general and with France and Britain in particular. However their counterparts showed the reluctance to commit for a full alliance for various reasons. In a way France and Britain kept Turkey at arms-length. Deringil finds it ironic that the situation changed after the successes of the Axis. This time Turkey, for reasons of its own, would shy away from commitments to the Ally cause.

3.4. The Soviet Union

The traditional view that the Soviet Union (Russia) is seen as the archenemy by the

that coal miners and railway workers refused to obey any instructions by the occupation forces. Production and transportation came to a standstill.

Turks thus shapes the foreign policy decisions during the inter war period has been challenged.²³ For example, Deringil argues that the Turkish alliance with France and Britain is caused by the Italian threats rather than the Soviets' as argued by scholars like Weisband. Furthermore, the Turks actually thought that their close relations with the Soviets could function as a bridge between the West and the Soviets against the rise of the Fascist aggression in the region.(Deringil, p.72-75) Regarding the period between two World Wars, Tellal also believes that cooperation rather than dependency and balance of power politics best describes the relations between Turkey and the Soviets.(Tellal, p. 314-324)

The argument that the Soviets (Russians) are the archenemy of Turkey stems from the fact that during the 18th and 19th Centuries the Ottomans were continuously fighting with and had been defeated by the Russians on numerous occasions. In order to inhibit the Russia's ventures toward the warm seas, the Ottomans had sought for the help from other powers and especially from Britain. Even the Ottomans' joining the First World War was marked by the German Vessel Goeben's attack on Sevastopol under the Ottoman flag. Thus, the argument that the Turks' archenemy had always been the Russians (Soviets) for long time is quite credible. However, the 1920's witnessed major structural change in both countries thus changed the nature of relations.

With the potential of spreading, the Bolshevik revolution and its disruption of normal state of affairs threatened the Western powers. Especially the collectivism, the anti-imperialism and the proletarian internationalism threatened the basic foundations of the Western Powers. The Soviets were isolated and became cast aways. The Ankara Government was under similar circumstances, even though ideologically the Turks were not as radical as their Soviet counterparts, both countries were, at least rhetorically, anti-imperialist. Isolation from the West also created the need for mutual recognition. More importantly both countries anticipated threat from imperial powers, not much so from each other. It helped that the both had limited and non-contradictory goals. At least for the time being, the Soviets had given up the claims over the Straits and the Eastern Anatolia and the Turks were against any Turanist ventures. More importantly, both did not want to wage

²³ For example, Oran argues that certain prejudices, regarding the issue, exist but do not reflect the reality, for a brief introduction to the matter see Baskın Oran's '*Türkiye'nin Kuzeydeki Büyük Komşu' Sorunu Nedir ? (Türk Sovyet ilişkileri 1939-1970)*'

wars and settle issues peacefully and turn their attention to interval development.

In this atmosphere, warm relations were established. Even though its importance is challenged by some, the Soviets delivered badly needed military equipment during the War of Independence. Furthermore, Kars and Ardahan was given to Turkey peacefully. There were some complicated issues between two countries in the Caucasus related to Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. The Turks and the Soviets had conflicting interests in the region. The Soviets' foremost attention was given to the Bolshevik revolutions in these countries and Ankara was not powerful enough to pursue her interests. As the socialist states were established in these countries, by the 1930's most of the issues were settled. Not only the Ottoman debt to Russian Empire was erased but the Soviets even gave credit to Turkey opening the way for other major powers. The Friendship Treaties of 1921, 1925 and 1929 were culminations of the warm relations. Even though, the essence were the same, the treaty of 1929 went a step forward and committed both sides to seek approval from each other before signing of any treaties with related third parties. This addendum has been interpreted as Turkey's dependency on the Soviets. However a counter argument for Turkish independency can be made. Ankara Government showed its independence from the Soviets by repressing of the Turkish communists. The Turks also sought partnerships with the Western counterparts which were the enemies of the Soviets. And more importantly the agreement was reciprocal in nature. Not only the Turks had to seek Soviet approval but also the Soviets had to seek Turkish approval.

By the second half of the 1930's the changes in international political structure started showing affects on the Turkish-Soviet relations. After Lenin's death, Stalin had consolidated his power in the Soviet Union. Even though still felt threatened by Germany and sought alliances with the French and the British, Stalin saw opportunity in this rivalry, and started showing revisionist tendencies. The Polish defeat of the Soviet army in 1921 was not forgotten and the Soviets became noisier about Bessarrabia.

The most important change in the Turco-Soviet relations came in 1936 during Montreux negotiations regarding the Straits regime. Turkey wanted to militarize the Straits. the Soviets had initially supported the Turkish quest for revision. The Soviets thought that a revision limiting the non-Black Sea countries' access to the straits would be in their benefit. They also thought they could take part in the militarization of straits. Even though

non-black sea countries military access to the Black Sea was limited as the Soviets wanted, the Turks rejected the multilateral defense of the straits. During the negotiations, the Soviets found the Turks on the opposing side siding with and supported by the West. The new Straits regime demanded by Turkey was accepted in June 1936. Although there was no official gesture from the Soviet side, it is noted that after Montreux conference, Turco-Soviet relations were somewhat strained. In 1937, treatment of Turkish delegation in Moscow was lukewarm, and Stalin refused to meet the Turkish Foreign Minister Aras. (Oran, p.322)

Toward 1939, even though the Turkish relations with the Soviets were not as warm as before Turkey and the Soviet Union were still seen close to the point that Romania could ask for Turkish mediation for Bessarabia and the British even proposed Soviet Airbases in Turkey. The Soviets had been informed about the treaty negotiations between Turkey, France and Britain. Officially, the Soviets approved the Tripartite Alliance. However it is argued that after long years of being cast away from the Western circles, the Soviets might have felt left alone against the Nazi encirclement.(Deringil, p.74) At this point Nazi-Soviet pact was a real shock to all sides. The replacement of Jewish Litvinov by Molotov who was known to have pro-German leanings was a small sign for the German-Soviet rapprochement, nevertheless such a pact was not expected.

At the outbreak of war, Turkey hoped to secure herself from the fascist aggression by guarantees from Britain and France. Upon initial Soviet approval, Turkey also hoped that the Soviets would also join such Alliance. However as the War began and Hitler and Stalin divided Poland amongst each other, Turkey not only found herself committed to one of the belligerent camps but also encircled by the Soviets in the north. Known as "Poland Syndrome", as the war commenced, Turkey found herself in fear of experiencing the same faith of Poland.

3.5. The Delicate Balkans and The Middle East

Any aggressive expansionist policy has to carry a certain amount of secrecy and surprise. States do not normally declare their intentions for invasion. Even if invasive intentions are known, states do their preparations (whether in technical military sense or in

the form of coalition building with other states) through secretive means. However Turkey did not pursue an aggressive policy before the war thus did not seek for secrecy. On the contrary, the relations of Turkey with the regional smaller states is a good example of the transparent relations. Turkey sought to settle issues peacefully through communication, mediation and peaceful methods.

For the purpose of this study, two factors regarding the smaller states in the region are important. First is that Turkey pursued a foreign policy aiming at solving disputes peacefully, using all possible communicative and diplomatic channels. As such policy was pursued for a long time since the 1920's, by the outbreak of war, Turkey was not perceived an immediate threat by the neighboring states. The second point is that it is important to understand the difference of Turkey than other Balkan states in terms of ease in dealing with major powers. Under Atatürk and then İnönü, "radical" political ideologies such as communism or fascism were not tolerated. There were no monarchists, political parties, upheavals. Opportunity for major powers to ally or manipulate with such internal factions were limited. The Ankara Government was stable and the foreigners did not expect any sudden change. It would be fair to say that it was easier for the foreign diplomats to negotiate with their Turkish counterparts than say faction ridden Yugoslavia's. The foreigners also did not have to consider whether the government they were dealing at the present time would be in power in the near future.

The most remarkable account of Atatürk's "Peace at home, peace abroad" principle can be witnessed in Turkey's relations with the Balkan states. Even though Turkey had disputes with the countries that was under the Ottoman rule for centuries and had sizeable ethnic Turkish populations, the Ankara Government chose non-aggression and diplomacy to settle these issues. The young Republic signed friendship treaties as early as 1923 with Albania, and 1925 with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.²⁴ It was significant that a former imperial power had settled most of the issues at the outbreak of war. The Turks preferred status-quo, yet the situation was not the same among other Balkan states. Even though there were many issues between Turkey and Greece regarding the Thracian border, the Aegean islands, the settlements of immigrants from both sides and the patriarchy, by the 1930's Turkey peacefully settled most of these issues with Greece which also followed non-

²⁴ For further information see Ahmet Şükrü Esmel and Oral Sander's, " Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası".

revisionist policy, and the relations were quite stable. However the Greek politics was not so. The issue whether Greece should be a monarchy or a republic was not resolved. The country was divided. The Greeks instituted the Republic in 1925 after a military coup. The stability achieved during Venizelos, ended after the effects of great depression started to be felt. In 1935, Monarchy was reinstated, once again as a result of a military coup.

Yugoslavia was a political mess. The country was 'artificial' for it contained the Serbs, the Croats, the Slovenes, the Macedonians (Bulgarians), the Bosnians, the Albanians who distrusted each other. In 1929, King Alexander had established an authoritarian regime in order to stabilise the country. His dictatorship not only failed (he was assassinated by a Macedonian in 1934) but further agitated non-Serbs, pushing them to seek for alliances with the Italians and the Germans. At the outbreak of the War, Prince Paul was desperately trying to hold the country together. Officially, Yugoslavia was a non-revisionist state and allied to France within "the Little Entente"

The Turkish relations with Romania were warm to the point of Romanian side's asking for the Turkish mediation with the Soviets for Bessarabia. Being on the side of the Allies, Romania had benefited from the First World War to the loss of Hungary and Russia. The country was officially a liberal constitutional monarchy. However the political elite was divided, King Karol whose accession to the throne was questionable could not prevent constant turmoil. Between 1930 and 1940, governments changed hands 25 times. Romania was initially a non-revisionist country trying to keep territories from her neighbors. The Soviets had eyes on Bessarabia (Moldova), Hungary on northern Transylvania and Bulgaria wanted Dobruca. The rise of the fascist "Iron Guard" could not be avoided. The Iron Guard leader Antonescu came to power, by 1940 Romania joined the Axis.

Bulgaria was on the losing side in the First World War, and thus had revisionist leanings. Other than Dobruca, the Bulgarians also wanted the Aegean coast line ceded to Greece in 1919, and Macedonia from Yugoslavia. Further complicating the matters, Bulgaria was Slavic and emotionally sympathetic to Russia and a powerful leftist (Agrarians) faction existed. The government changed hands among right wing factions while leftists were severely repressed. Despite internal turmoils, in international structure, Bulgaria was relatively stable, pro-Axis revisionist state.

In this complex environment, Turkey still manifested efforts to foster regional

cooperation and stability. Culmination of these efforts was the Balkan Pact of 1934. The road to the pact had been prepared gradually during annual Balkan conferences that started in 1930 with Albania, Yugoslavia, Greece, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey. The conferences aimed at regional cooperation in cultural, social, economic and political spheres, yet a security regime was the main goal. However by 1934, Albania was in de facto control of Italy and Bulgaria had already showed leanings toward revisionist powers to the point that even İnönü's visit to Sofia did not change the Bulgarian decision not to join the pact. Remaining four countries signed the Balkan Pact, committing themselves against any aggression from any other Balkan state. The pact stipulated that other Balkan states were welcome to join but at the same time had limited scope.

The Turkish efforts for regional cooperation was also directed to her neighbors to the East. With the exception of Syria, by the 1930's, Turkey had already settled border issues with Iran and newly semi-independent Iraq. Hatay issue was resolved for Turks as France approved annexation of Hatay with Turkey. Even though Syrians were not satisfied with settlement since they did not have any power on Turkey, Hatay was not a considered to be a problematic issue for Turkey.

Iraq had border problems with Iran and was asking for Turkish mediation. Iraq offered a tripartite non-aggression treaty with Iran and Turkey. For, Iraq also was under the mandate of Britain, Turkey wanted the British to be part of such a treaty. At the same time, Turkey was following a policy of informing and getting approval from Moscow for any regional dealings. As the British approved the idea of the pact but declined to be a signatory of the treaty, the Soviets also withdrew but offered Afghanistan, which had border disputes with Iran, to join the pact. In 1935 non-aggression and friendship treaty, "Saadabad Pact", between Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Turkey was signed. In international political history, this treaty is not considered to be significant for signatories were smaller states without much international significance. However, the Saadabad Pact deserves more appreciation for it was a significant example of multilateralism, regional cooperation, confidence building and transparency.

4. The War

For the purposes of this study, the Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War has been divided into 3 critical phases that is marked by important policy shifts. The first phase entails interwar period upto the Turkish alliance to France and Britain against the Italian and the German expansionism. The war clouds were amassing across the European skies. The Turks thought that they needed powerful allies in order to deter expansionists. Therefore, they quit non-alignment policy and joined the non-revisionist camp. The second phase is the Turks' appeasement to the German demands and strict neutrality from 1941 to 1943. By 1941, Turkey had found herself encircled by the Axis-Soviet duo. France had been defeated and Britain was under great strains. Turks felt that appeasement to German demands was required to stave off immediate threats. Thus Turks shifted their policy in favor of Germany. The third phase is ambiguous and complex relations with "The Allies" from 1943 to 1945. The circle of threat around Turkey had been broken as Germany attacked the Soviet Union and it became evident that the Axis was losing. Thus, Turkey, once again, initiated a policy shift, this time against Germany in favour of the Allies. However, Turkey's place and relations among the Allies was ambiguous. The Turks were still feeling threatened by a German retaliation and more importantly, they had great suspicions about post-war Soviet intentions. Contrary to the common knowledge, Turks did not refuse to join the war. However, they wanted to join the war effort in their own terms, and their demands were not met by the Allies. The role that was offered by the Allies retained many unsolved issues regarding the Turkish defenses against both a German retaliation and the Soviet expansion. Thus instead of using their scarce resources for the sake of Allies, Turkey chose to wait out of the war until the last minute.

In this section the study will try to illustrate two arguments. One is that changes in the international structure was transparent enough for the Turks to make calculated bets. The other argument is that policy shifts by Turkey was also transparent. The Turks relayed all regarding parties their intentions behind their actions. The shifts in the Turkish foreign policy did not entail surprise affects. As these maneuvers were well expected by the Turkish counterparts, their reactions were also calculated and tame. There was hardly any

misunderstanding between Turks and their counterparts preventing both over and under reactions.

4.1. Turkey Takes Side

The Turkish alliance was not a last minute opportunistic move to extract resources from Britain and France who found themselves threatened by the German aggression, but a culmination of long persistent policy to deter the aggressive expansionists.

The Tripartite Pact had roots well before the coming of the immediate war. The Turkish alliance to France and Britain was not sudden but expected by both the Axis and the Allies. During the early the 1930's Turkish leaders recognized the twin dangers of Italian and German hegemony in Europe and Mediterranean. (Ataöv, p.129) The Turks were expecting an eruption of a major war in Europe and started preparations accordingly. Initially, the Turks considered the most immediate threat to originate from Italy.

According to Kamuran Gürün, even as early as the 1920's, the Turks were irritated by Mussolini's rhetoric. Atatürk thought that Italy was capable of launching a naval attack on the Turkish coast, yet was not capable to sustain an invasion of Anatolia without a land army. Thus, the Italians had to move with their army first to Albania and then to Greece in order to finalize any of their intentions regarding Turkey. (Gürün, V.II, p.193) Therefore, the Italian meddling in the Balkan politics became the focus of attention. The Turks were not shy about their suspicions regarding Italian intentions. Such animosity surfaced in issues regarding Albania.

Albania was one of the first countries that Ankara government had established diplomatic relations. The Friendship Treaty between the the two countries was signed on 15 December 1923 and the Turkish Ambassador was sent to Tirana in 1926. Italian meddling in Albanian politics was seen as threatening to Turkey. Yet, the Albanians saw Italy as a protector against Yugoslavia and Greece and moved closer to Italy by signing first a friendship treaty and an treaty of alliance in 1926 and 1927. Finally when Ahmet Zogo, who was elected as the president declared his Kingdom under the Italian protectorate, in 1928, Turkey showed displeasure by pulling and not replacing the ambassador to Tirana until 1934.

Ankara government of 1920 was naturally revisionist in character. Turks did not accept the Treaty of Sevres, and fought until they secured the Anatolian Peninsula. Yet after the signing of Lausanne Treaty (23 June 1923), the newly created Turkish Republic became essentially, a status quo country. An interesting memorandum of, then the Prime Minister, İsmet İnönü, dated 31 December 1923, illuminates the Turkish stand in the coming years. After indicating that good relations had to be established with Greece and Bulgaria in order to secure the Thracian borders, İnönü also noted that militarization of Bulgaria should be prevented and the disputes between Bulgaria and Greece should be solved peacefully. Turkey should also establish good relations with the Serbs. The ethnic Turks should become good citizens of Yugoslavia, and should not help the separatist Macedonian (Bulgarian) paramilitaries against the central government.(Gürün,V.II, p.322) The Turks rejected expansionist ambitions despite the existence of a sizeable ethnic Turkish population in the Balkans. It is significant that more than fifteen years before the Second World War, hoping to keep the status-quo, Turkey was taking sides with non-revisionist Greece and Yugoslavia against the revisionist Bulgaria.

Naturally the most significant indication of the Turkish attitude against the revisionists before the tripartite pact was the realization of The Balkan Pact (Entente) of 1934, between Greece, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia. According to Melek Fırat, Locarno treaty of 1925 had settled the Western borders of Germany, yet fell short of securing the Eastern borders. Coupled with the Italian meddling, the Balkan countries felt that Britain and France were tolerating the revisionists' demands toward the Eastern Europe, thus they sought for a multilateral security regime that would deter any aggressors. (Fırat, p.350) The Balkan Pact produced a treaty with a very limited scope because of the reservations and issues between signatories. However, for the purposes of the study, it signifies the division between the revisionists and the non-revisionists.

The pact intended to guarantee the signatories' territorial integrity and political independence against an attack by another Balkan State. However, the exact wording of the pact and consequent protocols retained conflicting goals. The pact stipulated assistance to a Balkan state in case of a joint aggression with a Balkan state and a non-Balkan State. However, Greek addendum that Greece would not fight against a major power, in effect, left Italy out of the scenario. In case of a joint attack of Albania and Italy against

Yugoslavia, Greece did not have to assist to Yugoslavia. By the same principle, Turkey also added a clause that would prevent Turkey to fight against the Soviet Union. Furthermore, territorial integrity referred only to the Balkan borders thus leaving Bessarabia under Romanian control but claimed by the Soviet Union, out of the scope of the pact. Nevertheless, the most important "accomplishment" of the Balkan pact was to identify the revisionist intentions regarding the Balkans.

The negotiations toward the Pact had roots in the Balkan Conferences that had started in 1930 with the aforementioned 4 signatories, Albania and Bulgaria. The fact that although taking part in the conferences, Albania and Bulgaria did not join the pact clarified the division between the revisionist and the non-revisionist camps. By refusing to join, the Bulgaria explicitly showed expansionist intentions and the absence of Albania which was under de facto control of Italy showed the revisionist character of Italy. Even though the Greek addendum had softened the tone of the pact against Italy, Mussolini realized that pact's implicit message was against Italy and Mussolini was not shy about criticizing it (Gürün, V.II, p.341).

At this point, it should also be added that, to a lesser extend, Turkey's commitment non-aggression and anti-revisionist camp can also be observed in the signing of the Saadabad Pact on 8 July 1937 between Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and Turkey. The pact referred to respecting borders and consultation on disputes. (Ataöv, p.5) The pact did not go as far as to include military commitments against aggressors. Yet, it was still a significant indication of Turkey's commitment to regional cooperation and collaboration.²⁵

In mid nineteen thirties, Italy began fortifying Dodecanese Islands just off the Turkish coast. The fortifications were not for defensive purposes. Especially, construction of the airfields could not be explained by anything other than a preparation for a possible attack to Turkey. Even though, the Italians were not officially claiming to have any disputes with Turkey and, at times, gave assurances for the integrity of the Turkish territory, Mussolini's trumpeting of "Mare Nostrum"(Our Sea) was perceived to be threatening to the Turkish side. The Turkish press had already been reflecting the Turkish Government's negative opinion against "totalitarian" states. The invasion of Abyssinia

²⁵ The lack of military commitment in Saadabad Pact also has been seen as an indication regarding Turkish neglect or avoidance of the Middle East politics. For Further information look , Bilge Criss and Pinar Bilgin's,"Turkish Foreign Policy Toward The Middle East".

which started in 1935, increased even more the tension between Turkey and Italy.

According to Deringil, Italy's intentions for naval dominance in the Mediterranean pushed Turkey toward seeking a "friendship" with another naval power. Since the Turkish War of Independence, the Soviet Union had been Turkey's major "friend" in the international arena. However the Soviets were primarily a land power. Thus, the Turks sought rapprochement with Britain which was the greatest naval power at the time. (Deringil, p. 71)

In addition to the Italian threat, balancing of the increasing German power was also considered. The virtual German hegemony in the Turkish economy led the Turks to take initiatives for balance in favor of Britain. Aside from other economic measures such as giving more favorable terms to British companies, the Turks had preferred British air force materials in order to reduce military dependency on Germany.

The Turkish policy in favor of Britain did not proceed unnoticed by Germany. The Germans were irritated. On the other hand, close relations between Mussolini and Hitler, and Germany's support for Italian invasion of Abyssinia was not unnoticed by Turkey. the Turks were also greatly displeased. According to Ataöv, by 1937 strains between Turkey and Germany could be observed from negative opinions between the Turkish and the German press.(Ataöv, p.9) Gürün claims that using Atatürk's' illness as an excuse for postponement of Ribbentrop's visit to Turkey in 1938, was an indication of Turks' displeasure with the German dealings in Europe.(Gürün. V.II, p. 676) Although ill, Atatürk still hosted many foreign dignitaries. However the Germans did not give up on Turkey. On 7 October 1938 German minister of economy Funk came to Ankara. Hitler was trying to pull Turkey toward the Axis by offering generous credits. Turkey accepted the trade agreements yet declined a neutrality treaty.(Ataöv, p.9)

Toward the outbreak of the War, the Turkish-Soviet relations were also changing. As said before, there is not a clear consensus on this particular interwar period. Whether, the Soviets had always been an arch-enemy of Turks, or mutual anti-imperial instincts of the Bolshevik and Atatürk revolutions led to a close and friendly relations between the two countries is outside the scope of this study. However, it is a fact that Montreux Conference marked an important change in the relations. For a long time since the War of Independence, the Turks and the Soviets were seen as an anti-imperial bloc. In the

international dealings, the Turks and the Soviets had been asking confirmations from each other. They also had been acting in complete accordance, in the League of Nations. Even in 1935, during his visit to Moscow, the French Premier Laval, was asking for the Soviet mediation for issues between France and Turkey. (Gürün, V.II, p. 659) Montreux Conferences witnessed the first time, that Turks were openly siding with Britain against the Soviets and the Soviet intentions for the Straits were implicitly coming into open.

The Lausanne Treaty had demilitarised the Straits and instituted an international commission for administration. The Turks wanted to regain, at least a limited, sovereignty and militarise the Straits. After securing the British support, the Turkish diplomatic mission circulated intentions for a conference. The Soviets were not against a revision that would limit the non-black sea countries' fleets' access. Yet, on the first day of the conference Litvinov offered the Turkish Foreign Minister Aras "mutual" defense of the Straits. (Gürün, V.II, p. 522) Understandably, "mutual defense" meant Soviet military bases on Turkish soil. In order to stave off the Soviet "offer of help" in the defense of the straits, the Turks asked whether the Soviets would also commit to the Turkish defense in case of an aggression from the Mediterranean. The Soviets did not want to give such a wide assurance to Turkey thus both offers were rejected.(Tellal, p.321) However the Soviets did not give up the idea but softened its tone by offering, this time, a "Black Sea Pact" in which Romania and Bulgaria would also take part. Such offer would mean replacing of the International commission with another one (albeit a smaller one) and thus contradict the Turkish intentions. The Turks once again rejected the Soviets. Since overall effect of the Montreux Agreement was to limit military access to Black Sea, the Soviets participated in the negotiations and accepted the new regime. However, during the conference meetings, the Soviets found Turkey on the other side supported by Britain. By the end of the conference, the Turkish-Soviet relations were wounded and it was obvious that Turkey was drifting away from the Soviets toward Britain.

It should also be noted that even though Montreux Conference of 1936 was a revision to the First World War settlements, Turkey was not seen as moving closer to revisionist Italy or Germany. Although invited, Italy did not attend the conference but signed the convention agreements two years later in 1938. According to Gürün, the Italians were not pleased for Mediterranean was opened to the Soviet fleet and the Black Sea was

closed to theirs. The Germans were also displeased for the same reason and sent a diplomatic note to Turkey. (Gürün ,V.II, p.482-483)

When calendars were showing 1938, the division in Europe was ever more visible. One of the camps included France and Britain. The other was the Axis Camp.(Officially created by a secret treaty signed by the foreign ministers of Germany and Italy, Van Neurath and Ciano in Berlin on 21 October 1936). The Soviet Russia's place was more ambiguous. The Anti-Comintern bloc against the Soviets had been created by Germany and Japan in 1936, and a year later Italy had also joined. The Montreux Conference showed that Turkey was also drifting away from the Soviets. Even though the Soviets were expansionists in essence, they were not explicitly depicting these intentions. The Soviets were also feeling threatened by the Axis and feared to be left alone by the "West". Yet, one thing was obvious , Turkey was firmly moving toward France and Britain.

The year of 1938 can be described as the last peaceful attempts of France and Britain to contain the Axis aggression. Complex domestic political factors, and disagreements among each other were affecting the French and British policies toward the Axis.²⁶ Yet, it would be fair to say that the German invasion of Austria in March and the annexation (Anschluss) in April was simply overlooked. The Munich Agreement of 30 September 1938 could only be seen as sacrifice of Czechoslovakia in order to avoid war against Germany.

Commonly known as "the Munich Betrayal", the agreement between Germany, Italy, France and Britain allowed Germany to take over the ethnic German populated "Sudetenlands" from Czechoslovakia. France had committed to defend the borders of Czechoslovakia by the Treaty of Alliance and Friendship between between the two countries, signed on 25 January 1924, in Paris. However, the French (and the British) could not risk fighting against Germany and accepted the German demands. The Munich Agreement did not completely specify the break up of Czechoslovakia. The Sudetenlands were to be handed over to Germany immediately, but the fate of other disputed areas were to be decided by plebiscites. Yet after only couple of months, leaving Ruthenia to Hungarians, Hitler invaded rest of the country. By 16 of March 1939, Czechoslovakia did not exist anymore.

²⁶ For an insight on the rivalry between "Hawks" and "Doves" in French and British political circles see Gürün V.II

The Munich Betrayal and the break-up of Czechoslovakia was not an immediate concern for Turkey. On the contrary, Hatay dispute had parallels with the Sudetenlands. Both Turkey and Germany was trying to annex areas, populated by the ethnic brethren. However, the Sudeten crisis was significant to the Turks for other reasons. During tumultuous negotiations toward Munich, Poland sided with Germany against Czechoslovakia. (Gürün, VII, p. 566) The Poles who were themselves under German threat wanted to stave off German threats by forcing Czechs to give into the German demands. Even the Romanians, who were part of "the Little Entente" with Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia against Germany, were willing to sacrifice their ally. On 19 June 1938, during his visit to Istanbul with his personal yacht, Romanian King Karol was complaining to Atatürk about Czech President Benes' hampering the peaceful solution of the Sudeten dispute.(Gürün VII, p. 676) Thus an important factor became transparent to the Turks. Alliances and states can be sacrificed. Czechs were sacrificed by their allies, including those which were to experience the same fate of theirs.

Czechoslovakia was not enough to quench Hitler's thirst. On 22 March 1939, Lithuania was forced to secede Memel (Klaipeda) also populated by the ethnic Germans. The fact that Germany could not be stopped without a war became obvious. Germany's next target was the German populated Danzig and Poland. In order to deter Hitler moving west, on 23 March 1939, Britain and France issued a joint declaration of war in case of an attack against Holland, Belgium and Switzerland. However, defense of Poland was more complicated. Britain and France did not have common borders with Poland thus the idea of, yet another, alliance with the countries in the region, was contemplated.

On 21 March 1939, Chamberlain proposed an alliance between Britain, France, Poland and the Soviet Union. All, except Poland, at least, seemed to be supportive of an alliance against Germany. Like the Romanians and the Fins, the Poles were very sceptical about the Soviets. Poland immediately rejected the offer. Thus a wide alliance against Germany could not be formed. On 31 March 1939, Britain unilaterally offered military assistance to Poland. On 6 April 1939, Poland and Britain signed a joint defense pact. Around the same time, Mussolini was becoming impatient, and on 7 April, the Italian invasion of Albania began. By 16 April 1939, Il Duce received the crown of Albania. France and Britain were to offer unilateral guarantees to Greece and Romania. Britain also

wanted to include Turkey. Since negotiations with Turkey was to take time, France and Britain decided to declare unilateral guarantee to Greece and Romania on 13 April 1939.

Negotiations toward the Turkish alliance to West was not a well kept secret. As early as 25 April 1939, Germans had learned from a confidential but reliable source that Britain and Turkey were preparing to undertake an mutual assistance pact in case of Axis or an Italian aggression. (Ataöv, p.18; Von Papen, p.446.) the Germans were aware that Turkey was moving ever closer to France and Britain. They appointed Von Papen to Ankara with the mission to steer Turkey away from the Allies. However, in his own words "he was late". (Ataöv, p. 19) Von Papen asked the Italian Foreign Minister Ciano to make assurance gestures to Turkey. The Italians gave assurances for the Turkish territorial integrity. Turkish reply was cold, so many Italian soldiers on Albanian soil could not be explained anything other than a hostile intention in the Balkans.(Ataöv p.22-23) On 6 May 1939, Menemencioğlu told Von Papen that treaty with Britain was almost ready. Von papen asked whether the declaration can at least not be made public in order to reduce "the psychological effects" Menemencioğlu refused.(Ataöv p.24) The psychological effect was exactly what the Turks wanted. They did not have much power on their own. They were forming an alliance with more powerful states in order to deter aggressors. The pyschological effect was exactly what Turks wanted.

The Turkish rapprochement with France and Britain had been progressing for some time but the time to tie the not had finally arrived. Italian invasion of Albania was the final push, Turkey needed to join France and Britain which were desperately trying to form an alliance against the Axis. However in the Turkish minds, there were many unresolved issues. France and Britain was trying for a united eastern front against the Axis. Yet the countries that were supposed to form the front had irreparable disputes amongst each other. The Turks had also witnessed the sacrifice of Czechoslovakia by her allies thus did not want to rush into an alliance without a hard bargain. The Poles had rushed into alliance first and were to receive arms later. The Turks were to receive arms first than enter the alliance.

From the Anglo-Turkish declaration of 12 May 1939, opposing any aggression in the Mediterranean (thus in affect only against Italy), to the Anglo-Franco-Turkish treaty of alliance signed on 19 October 1939, the negotiations that took place between the

signatories reflected the minds of the regarding parties.²⁷ The British and the French wanted Turkey to commit to an Balkan alliance of Greece, Yugoslavia and Romania. They also hoped that Turkey can convince the Soviets to join.

In principle the Turks agreed. Yet, they were too well aware of impossibility of such an alliance to stand firmly against the Axis. It was Greece, only few years ago, that had softened the tone of Balkan Pact against Italy, leaving Turkey and Yugoslavia alone. Interests of Romania and the Soviet Union clashed over Bessarabia. The revisionist Bulgaria would leave a large hole in the Balkan front anyway. Dodruca under the Romanian control was claimed by the Bulgarians and they also wanted Macedonia from Yugoslavia and the Western Thrace from Greece. The internal politics was a mess in Romania and the Germans were putting so much pressure that Romania could move to the Axis any moment. On 22 March 1939 Romania had signed a trade treaty with Germany. While the Turkish and the Soviet press commented on treaty as being forced on Romania, the Romanian Foreign Minister Gafenco was commenting on the treaty as being the reflection of mutual interests. (Gürün, V.II, p. 605) The Yugoslav King was also in a dire position feeling the breath of Italy and Germany on his neck. The separatist factions were encouraged by both Italy and Germany. The King thought that the Anglo-Turkish declaration could further provoke the Axis, and thus protested against it, arguing that Turkey had violated the Balkan Pact by not informing signatories in advance. (Ataöv 33) Yet, the Turks were also not pleased with Yugoslavia's attitude during Italian invasion of Albania. There were rumors that Yugoslavia was hoping to take a piece of Albania.²⁸

With so many disputes at hand, the Turks knew that they could not depend solely on alliances. Therefore during the negotiations the Turks had two goals. First, they needed to extract as much resources as possible from France and Britain, and secondly they needed time, not only to prepare for the war but also to observe constant changes in the international structure.

²⁷ Since Hatay issue had not been solved by the time, France did not join the declaration of 12 May 1939. A declaration with the same content between Turkey and France was issued on 23 June 1939, only after Hatay issue had been solved.

²⁸ According to Gürün, Ciano's diary clearly indicates that during his visit to Belgrade Ciano mentioned partition of Albania to Prime Minister Stoyadinoviç. (Gürün, V.II,p.603) Turkish knowledge of such plan can be seen during the talks between Yugoslav Prince Paul and Saraçoğlu during which Saraçoğlu told to the Prince that Turkey was suspicious of Yugoslavia during the Albanian invasion. (Ibid., p.692)

Naturally Turkish attitude was not unnoticed by the British. "The Turks were opening their mouths very wide and did not seem to realise how much they were asking for in arms, trade and finance" wrote in his diary, Hugh Dalton who was to be minister of Economic Warfare in Churchill cabinet.²⁹ The Turks were also dragging their feet in order to save time. During staff talks the British officers complained that "they found most of the Turkish answers to their questions 'lacking in detail' and that the Turks were generally reluctant to give precise information regarding strategic matters". (Deringil, p.76)

During the period of negotiations, news of the Nazi-Soviet Pact dropped like a bombshell. On 23 August 1939, the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Soviet Union was made public. Germany attacked Poland on 1 September 1939. On 3 September, Britain and France declared war on Germany, the War had officially begun. The Turks had sided with the anti-revisionists in order to avoid a war with Italy, the Soviet threat was not considered. The animosity between the Fascists and the Soviets had left Turkey a breathing ground for the Turks to seek alliance with the West. Yet suddenly rapprochement between Germany and the Soviet Union changed the international structure once again. The Turks found themselves on the opposite side of the Soviets.

The stakes were now higher for all sides. The British were losing the Soviets to Germany and was desperate to not to lose Turkey. "The Turks were well aware of this and consequently once again demonstrated their aptitude for using European situation as a bargaining counter to secure the best possible arrangement" (Deringil, p.82) However, the Turks were also in a dire situation. "Before August 23 1939, Turkey could stay pro-Ally and pro-Soviet at the same time. Since the Soviets had started calling the Allies "warmongers" right after the pact, Turkey could not longer maintain her balancing position. It made Turkey face the unpleasant possibility in a war on the opposite side from her formidable northern neighbor on account of Ankara's commitments to Britain and France". (Ataöv, p.50)

However, Turks did not immediately lose their hope to bridge the gap between the West and the Soviet Union. The Soviet reaction to the Anglo-Turkish declaration had been warm. Turkey had also been informing the Soviets about the tripartite negotiations. There was even low level negotiations with Britain, France and the Soviets. Not knowing the

²⁹ Hugh Dalton, Baron Dalton Diary vol. 21, 19 Sep. 1939, p 64. (Robinson p 15)

extend and the secret details of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact regarding the partition of Europe, the Turks still thought that a place could be found for the Soviets in the 'peace camp' or at least some sort of Soviet neutrality in a coming war between the Axis and the Allies could be secured. However, the Soviets attacked Poland on 17 September 1939. Warsaw fell on the 29th and Poland surrendered on 5 October 1939.

It became evident that the Soviets could not be pulled away from Germany. Thus the Turks, the British and the French hurried to finalise the tripartite treaty which was ready to sign on 30 September 1939. (Deringil,p.85) Upon insistence of the Turks, treaty was not made public. The Turks were still hoping to secure, at least, the neutrality of the Soviets in case of a Turkish involvement in the war. Saraçoğlu went to Moscow on 24 September 1939. He was diplomatically humiliated. He "was shunted from opera to ballet to football match until he refused to go anywhere else unless Stalin saw him" (Deringil, p. 87) When he was finally received, the Soviets asked changes in Montreux and 'a German Clause' in the tripartite treaty. A German clause was against the "raison d'etre" of tripartite treaty. The Montreux Convention was a multilateral agreement thus could not be a subject in a bilateral negotiation. The Turks rejected the Soviet demands, and Saraçoğlu left the Soviet Union on 17 October 1939. Tripartite treaty was made public on 19 October 1939 even before Saraçoğlu returned to Ankara .

Summary of the Anglo-Franco-Turkish Tripartite Treaty was as follows. "Britain and France undertook to lend Turkey all aid and assistance in their power (a) in the event of Turkey being involved in hostilities with a European power in consequences of aggression by that power against Turkey and (b) in the event of aggression by a European Power leading to a war in the Mediterranean area in which Turkey was involved. Turkey undertook to assist Britain and France (a) in case of an act of aggression by a European Power leading to a war in the Mediterranean area in which these two powers were involved and (b) in case Britain and France was engaged in hostilities in virtue of their guarantee to Greece and Romania given by their respective declarations of April 13, 1939. In the event of Britain and France being involved in the hostilities with a European Power in consequence of aggression committed by that power against either of those states, the signatories were to consult each other. It was nevertheless, agreed that in such an eventuality Turkey would observe at least a benevolent neutrality toward Britain and

France. The duration of the treaty was fifteen years. Protocol No 2. attached to the treaty stated that the obligations undertaken by virtue of the treaty could not compel Turkey to take action having as its effect, or involving as its consequence, entry into armed conflict with the U.S.S.R. . In a Special Agreement on Financial and Economic Questions , signed together with the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, Britain and France granted Turkey a credit of £25 Million for war materials, a gold loan of £15 Million and a loan of £3 1/3 million for the transfer of commercial credits. Article 2 of the Special agreement referred to a program of urgent delivery of war material."(Ataöv, p.63)

By the treaty Turkish alliance with France and Britain was completed. The Turks committed to assist France and Britain in case of hostilities regarding the Mediterranean, Greece and Romania as long as the Turks did not have to fight against the Soviets. In return France and Britain reciprocal guarantees to Turkey and promised for arms and credits. The Turks were officially in the Ally camp and started to wait for the war to arrive to the Balkans and the Mediterranean.

After the fall of Poland until the Battle of France, what is called "The Phoney War" (Sitzkrieg) period started. There were no major military operations in the continental Europe. Except few skirmishes, the German and the French soldiers were facing each other without any orders for offense. The Soviets attacked Finland on 30 October 1939 (Winter War). The Fins fought remarkably but were defeated by their giant neighbor. Probably because Stalin did not trust the strenght of the Soviet Army, a surprisingly mellow armistice was reached on 13 March 1940. On 9 April 1940 Germany started the invasion of Denmark and Norway. By the end of April, the invasion was completed. The Phoney War ended when the German offensive began on Holland on 10 May 1940. Holland fell in four days and Belgium on 27 May 1940. On 10 June 1940 Italy declared war against France and on 14 June 1940 Paris fell.

4.2. Turkey Steers Away From The Allies

The invasion of Poland and the period of Phoney War was important to illuminate valuable information about the international structure to the Turks. The most important was "the Poland Syndrome". Traditional arch-enemies, the Soviets and the Germans divided

Poland without any significant obstacle. The fate of Poland could be repeated on Turkey. The Germans were not shy in threatening Turks. After the declaration of the tripartite treaty, shipments of military supplies purchased by Turkey had already been stopped except a few pieces that Von papen had asked to be sent in order to keep an open door. (Ataöv p.43) "The German press commented that if Turkey was so blind as to follow Poland's example, she ought to bear the consequences".(Ataöv p.64).

Secondly, the French and the British who had given guarantees to Poland was not taking any serious military action against Germany. The West preferred to wage a war against an enemy, not on their own soil, but only in distant places. Almost like Czechoslovakia, Poland vanished without a single loss of a Western soldier. While the French were investigating the possibilities of a bombardment of Baku oil fields which was a major supply center for the German Army, through the Turkish air space, thus putting Turkey at risk against both the Soviet Union and Germany, the French soldiers were watching the Germans soldiers over the Maginot Line.

Thirdly, the military assistance to Turkey and strategic planning was severely disappointing. In a memorandum to the Foreign Office, it was reported, that President İnönü was "hard and bitter" during an interview with the French Ambassador Massigli and General Huntziger, the Head of French Military Mission to Turkey. The President was complaining that German supplies were cut and the British and the French were not able to ameliorate Turkish military deficiencies. Coming from the staff meetings with his French and British counterparts, Fevzi Çakmak was also complaining that there was no solid commitments but tones of talk.

The last of all, once again the Turks found out that a Balkan solidarity was an impossibility. During (the last) Balkan Conference, in February 1940, Saraçoğlu proposed a common defense plan. (Ataöv 69) However there was no hope. Yugoslavia, Romania and Bulgaria were already moving toward the Axis.

The Turks had in front of them these considerations when the German Western Front opened. Germany took over the Western Europe in almost a month humiliating both the French and the British armies. Furthermore, Italy with wide ambitions in the Balkans and the Mediterranean had joined War.

Two more considerations were added to the list. First, the German military

capabilities surpassed any expectations. The German war machine could not be stopped by the Maginot Line or any others. Sadly the only accomplishment of (so called) formidable allies of Turkey, was the evacuation of the British and the French soldiers from Dunquerque. Secondly with Italy's involvement, the hostile encirclement was closing in on the Turks. Although the Turks were greatly displeased by German actions, Germany had not been Turkey's immediate concern. The Turks had left non-alignment policy and joined the Western alliance in order to deter Italian ambitions. The Turkish policy of Western alliance did not produce the desired outcome. Italy was in the war. Worse, the Turks had also found the Soviets in the opposing camp.

Upon new developments, the Turks had to reconsider their commitments. On 10 June 1940 France and Britain officially asked for Turkish declaration of war against Italy. Applying the Protokol No.2, Turkey rejected the request on the 13th. The protocol absolved Turkey of any action that would lead to war against the Soviet Union. There was no official "démarche" from the Soviets. However, the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow reported that Molotov had been "most menacing" regarding Turkish mobilization against Italy. (Deringil, p.103) Whether Turks were trying to find an excuse for their inaction was not that important. Upon recent developments, not only Turks, but the French and the British knew that Turkey had to change course.

In his memorandums to the Foreign Office, the British Ambassador Hugessen was saying that "Protocol 2 was just a pretext as long as the Allies were unable to furnish direct assistance, Turkey would not run the 'supposed risk'(Soviet Invasion)." (Deringil p 103) The Allies knew that there was not enough resources to resist the Germans. (Hugessen, p.162) The French and the British asked Turkey to join the war knowing the negative response they were to get. The French Ambassador Massigli confessed to Hugessen that he was embarrassed to ask Turkey to join the war while they were making evacuation plans for Paris. (Deringil, p.99)

The Turks were not shy either about their disappointment regarding military defeats. On 11 June 1940, When the French and the British ambassadors were emphasizing the good effect, in the Balkans, of a Turkish declaration of war, Saraçoğlu was replying that a French victory would have an even better effect. (Ibid., p.100) The Turks were not ambiguous about their intentions. They were to stay non-belligerent as long

as possible until they were properly supplied. When the Foreign Office asked Hugessen asked whether permission to use the Turkish Waters could be taken, the latter immediately gave a negative answer. Turkey was on the side of Britain but were not to sacrifice herself by provoking the Axis. On 18 June 1940, Hugessen was reporting to the Foreign Office that even though the Turks had a favourable attitude toward Britain," There were indications that the Turks saw these latest developments as only confirming their conviction that when it came to questions of national survival, friendship came a very poor second" (Deringil p.102)

On 26 June 1940, Ankara government made public, the decision to stay out of the war, by a declaration of non-belligerency. The British response was tame. "Viscount Halifax commented that Britain fully appreciated the circumstances which led to this decision". (Ataöv p.75) "Faced with a situation in which they found themselves powerless to insist on Turkish compliance, the British had to acquiesce none too willingly in the view that they approved of Turkey's actions". (Deringil, p 92)

France was out and Britain could not adequately supply Turkey. The Turks were losing ground. They had put all their eggs in one basket, and that basket was breaking apart. The military defeats were so decisive that unforeseen scenarios had to be thought of. The Turks " had to consider what would happen if Turkey was left alone to face the Soviet Russia after a possible compromise peace with Germany and the Allies. (Ataöv p 77) Therefore, Turkey took actions. The Turks had not renewed the Turco-German trade agreement that had expired on 31 August 1939 in order to give preference to Britain and France in economic affairs. (Ataöv p.68) However, they had to find a way to get closer to Germany thus, on 12 June 1940 German-Turkish trade agreement was "decided upon" and was signed on 27 July 1940. The trade agreement was not of much value and did not include chrome. However it was a sign of Turkey's trying to keep doors open to the Germany. Turkish steer away from the Allies, toward the Axis was expected by the French and the British. On the contrary, according to Deringil, the Axis were taken aback by Turkey's change of attitude. The Italians living in Turkey had been expecting rupture of relations and had even sent their families home." (Deringil, p.108)

On the Northern front, the Turks did not give up on the Soviets either. They tried to break the hostile encirclement through a common ground with the Soviets. On 26 June

1940, the Soviets gave an ultimatum to Romania regarding Bessarabia. It was an opportunity for the Turks. They could act as mediators and seek for rapprochement with the Soviets at the same time. However their attempts were futile. On 29 June 1940, in Von Papen's report to Berlin, "the Soviet Ambassador in Ankara remarked, that Russia could establish friendly relations with Turkey only on the condition that Turkey turn her back on Britain entirely". (Ataöv, p.74) On 30 June 1940, the Soviets invaded Bessarabia and the Northern Bucovina.

The events that took place during the rest of 1940 showed the Turks that they were right to reduce their commitments to the Allies. On 30 August 1940, Germany and Italy forced Romania to give the Northern Transylvania to Hungary. (Vienna Award) On 7 September 1940, the Southern Dobruca was restored to Bulgaria under the Treaty of Craiova. The fascist Antonescu came to power in Romania. King Karol fled. On 10 October 1940, under the pretext to secure oil fields, the German army entered Romania. On 23 November 1940, only three days after Hungary, Romania officially joined the Axis Camp.

By the time Italy attacked Greece on 28 October 1940, changes in the Turkish foreign policy was well understood by their counterparts. The Turkish policy was not neutrality. The Turks had not renounced their alliance to Britain. They were only to remain non-belligerent. Even Churchill's bribes of the Northern Syria, the Dodecanese Islands and a rectification on the Bulgarian border was not to change the Turkish minds. The Turks had rejected cutting ties with the Axis, or declaration of war. They were trying to avoid a confrontation with the Axis and/or Soviets, outcome of which was clear enough to be the destruction of Turkey. They did not want to sacrifice themselves in a war that was already being lost by the Allies. The British knew that the Turks would stay non-belligerent until they were attacked. As early as 21 August 1940, months before the Italian campaign on Greece, Hugessen reported to London that Turks would not send troops to Greece. (Deringil p. 110) When the Germans were entering Romania, Hugessen was advising London not to ask for Turkish belligerency. (Ibid. ,p.111)

At the same time, in their capacity, the Turks were taking actions to help the Allies. Reflecting the mind set of Turkish decision makers, the Turkish press was furious against Italy and supported Greece. The Thracian Army was mobilized on the Bulgarian border.

When Italy attacked Greece, Turkey immediately "informed Bulgaria that if she attacked Greece Turkey would declare war".(Deringil, p.112) In such dire conditions the British and the Greeks were only grateful. According to the Foreign Office documents the Greek Ambassador in Ankara thought that if Turkey would hold Thrace against Bulgaria, "this is all that Greece requires or could expect" (Ibid, p.112) The Turkish policy pinned the Bulgarians down and left Greeks to concentrate on the Italians. Without a doubt Turkish policy contributed substantially to the success of the Greeks against the Italians. (Langer and Gleason, p. 115) Turkish policy produced limited success. Italians were stranded in Greece, and Bulgaria's official entrance to the Axis was delayed until 1 March 1941.

Turkey also resisted the Axis pressures regarding Iraq. Pro-German Al-Rashid had come to power through a coup d'etat on 3 April 1941. Since Iraq was a major supplier of oil to Britain and a land bridge between Egypt and India, it was crucial to the British. Al-Rashid cut oil supplies and attacked the British installments. Hitler wanted to send military assistance to Al-Rashid through Turkey. Turks refused.³⁰ The British crushed the revolt on 30 May 1941 and Al-Rashid had to flee to Berlin where he was received as Iraqi leader in exile. A similar situation was to arise in Syria a month later, this time the British and the Gaulist forces against the Vichy forces. The Turks once again was to reject Axis access to Syria , and by 17 June 1941 Damascus was taken from Vichy. On 14 July 1941, Syria and Lebanon was under the British and the Gaulist French control.

These small accomplishments were not enough reverse the trend. Yugoslavia finally gave into the German and the Italian pressures. King Paul joined the Axis on 25 March 1940 in order to avoid an invasion. However, he was toppled by General Simovic who was against appeasement to the Axis demands. Germany attacked both Yugoslavia and Greece on 6 April 1940. The Serbs resisted. Although militarily not necessary, Belgrade was heavily bombarded from air to punish the Serbs and to intimidate others. On 17 April 1941, Yugoslavia vanished. The Nazi Croatia was created and the rest of Yugoslavia was divided amongst the Axis countries. By 27 April 1940, The Germans were in Athens. The Greek Government and the King fled to Crete, but had to leave for Cairo only a month later. By the end of May 1941, Greece was gone, except Russia, Europe was in Axis hands and

³⁰ Even though transit of German equipment and supplies were blocked, under pressure, Turkey had allowed passage of few materials that was sent by Vichy-France which was 'supposedly' an ally of Turkey. (Deringil, p.125)

Rommel was plundering the Allies in the North Africa.

"As Britain's non-belligerent ally, Turkey had every reason for apprehension as the Balkans fell under Nazi domination. All hopes for Balkan freedom had vanished since Yugoslavia was trampled, Romania lost, Bulgaria terrorized and Greece martyred" (Ataöv, p.91) In Hugessen's own words; Turkey was " indeed cut off from her friends and in danger of encirclement by her enemies". (Hugessen, p. 169)

Before the end of Yugoslavia Campaign,(mid March) Von Papen was recalled to Berlin and stayed for almost a month. This period was the climax of Turkish fears regarding a possible German invasion. Edirne was completely evacuated and evacuation of Istanbul was ordered. If they found places to go in Anatolia, residents were given train tickets free of charge. Thracian Army was pulled back from Bulgarian border to Çatalca. Schools which were normally to end by the end of may, was closed on 14 April. Turks were sincerely awaiting for a German invasion. (Gürün, V.III, p. 367)

Against this background Turks decided to appease to, at least some of, Germans demands and they did not hide their intentions from the British. Menemencioğlu told Hugessen that Turkey was seeking a German non-aggression treaty and was to inform the British regarding details of negotiations with Germans.(Ataöv, p.93) Without any solid information on Barbarossa (German military campaign against Soviets), Turks argued that a joint invasion of Turkey by Soviets and Nazis was a possibility, thus it was also in British interest that Turks avoid such outcome. (Gürün, V.III, p. 369) After the German-Turkish treaty was signed, Eden was to tell House of Commons that "conclusion of that agreement came as no surprise to His Majesty's Government, The Turks having fully informed the former of the progress of their negotiations". (Ataöv, p.93) The British knew in advance that Turkey was steering away from the Allies toward the Axis and they were also aware that they did not have the capabilities to pull Turkey away from the Axis, therefore their reaction to Turkey was tame and calculated.

Interesting and very significant, Turco-German negotiations seemed to take place between three parties. In addition to the Turks, Von Papen was trying to convince Ribbentrop and Hitler that Turkey would not accept all of German demands. The duo who had brought more than ten countries to their knees were more than confident. Ribbentrop was asking for unlimited transport facilities for troops and equipment. In return, he was

offering trade, arms and some border rectifications favouring Turkey. If the Turks did not accepted, Germany was to 'blow out the Turkish State in within a few weeks'. 'The Russia Card' was also on the table. Unless the Turks turned backs on Allies and cooperated with the Axis, Germany would leave Turkey alone dealing with the Soviets demands.

Von Papen with his extensive knowledge of the Turks and the Anatolian landscape was trying to tone down his superior. He believed that the Turks would resist any invasion or infiltration. According to Von Papen "The neutralization of the fifty Turkish Divisions is a military requirement which can for the present be achieved only in the diplomatic field ... " (Deringil, p.121) According to Von Papen, he was able to convince Hitler that invasion of Turkey was possible only at a great cost. He was to assure Hitler that Turkish neutrality and possible entrance to the Axis in the future could be accomplished through diplomacy. (Von Papen, p.471) In regards to offers of carrots, Von Papen told Ribbentrop that "it would be erroneous to assume that the German promise of this and that island could influence the course which the Turkish Government is determined to pursue in the interest of its clean reputation " (Deringil, p.121)

The Germans were to commence on Operation Barbarossa and had already wasted valuable time and resources during the Greek Campaign and did not want to waste more on Turkey. Therefore they did not push harder. The Treaty of Territorial Integrity and Friendship was signed on 18 June 1941. The treaty was far from German's asking. The two countries were to respect each other's territorial inviolability and integrity and to abstain from any kind of direct or indirect action against each other. Despite Ribbentrop's insistence, the Turks rejected inclusion of any article aiming against Britain and insisted on a clause that would state 'Turks' adherence to Anglo-Turkish treaty. Thus the treaty stated that Turkey and Germany concluded this treaty "subject to reservation of their existing engagements" (Ataöv, p.93) In a nutshell, the treaty had limited scope and was contradictory because the Turks were to respect German territorial gains while not renouncing their alliance to Britain.

Immediate German threat had been staved off. The Anglo-Turkish alliance received a minor damage but was saved. However as long as the Allies were losing and Germany remained a formidable neighbor, the Turks had to continue steering away from the British alliance toward neutrality. After the War had spread to the Balkans, the Turkish press had

been describing Turkey's stand as only 'outside the war'. The Turkish alliance to Britain was not questioned. After the Turco-German Treaty, short of declaring that Turkey had switched sides, neutrality began to be used more often. (Deringil, p.123)

The British acknowledged the dire situation. In fact, Churchill confessed to Roosevelt that the invasion of Greece could not be avoided. Apart from moral support to the Greeks, part of the reason for the British military mission was to convince the Turks that in case of attack Britain was to help her allies. (Gürün, V.III, p.196-197) The Greek campaign was yet another disaster for the Allies. Contrary to the desired effect the Turks were even more fearful of the German military power. Furthermore, let alone stopping Rommel in the Northern Africa, the British soldiers hardly subdued Iraq and Vichy-Syria. The Turks were disappointed with the Allied war effort. The promised supplies were not delivered, and they let the British know about it. Therefore, the Turco-German treaty was not a surprise to the British and "they decided to accept the inevitable and not push Turkey into an even more difficult position by retributions". (Deringil, p.122) Hugessen reported to London that the might of the German air force, demonstrated with the catastrophic effect in Greece, Yugoslavia and Crete had caused a deterioration in the Turkish morale. "Turks felt that their treaty with Britain, far from securing their interests has got them into difficulties." Hugessen also warned that Turkey should not be pushed nearer to the Germans "by rubbing salt into their albeit self-inflicted wound" (Deringil, p. 122-123)

Immediately after the Turco-German Treaty, Italians approached Turkey for a similar treaty. However Ciano did not have time, because Hitler had ordered the execution of Barbarossa. The German troops crossed the Soviet frontier on 22 June 1941. The international structure had once again changed. The Turks immediately announced neutrality in the Nazi-Soviet War.

Since the beginning of the war, the Turks had been under constant aggravation. They had hoped to avoid war by forming an alliance with powerful states. However those allies had crumbled and the war had reached Turkish doorsteps. Almost every single day, the Turks witnessed the deterioration of their position. For the first time, there was a relatively positive development. The hostile encirclement around Turkey was shattered as Germany attacked Soviet Union. Turkish press was not short of reflecting the mood of the Turkish decision makers. "the Soviets had brought this on themselves ". Von Papen was

reporting that "Turkey is in transports of joy". Hugessen was reporting that Saraçoğlu was more than delighted. (Deringil p.123). He even shouted "*Ce n'est pas une guerre, c'est une crusade*". (Kılıç, p.91)

Amid a global war with constant new developments, the relief was very short lived. According to Deringil, "Turks began to fear that Britain would become too close to the Soviets for their liking". In his public speech Churchill had mentioned that "Russia had been hard done by in the First World War". Turks inquired whether Churchill meant that Russians had deserved the Straits. The Foreign Office attempted to rectify Churchill's gaffe. On 25 June 1941, Hugessen reported to London that "There are signs that Turkey fears that we may engage too closely with Russia ... ". (Deringil, p. 123)

On 12 July 1941, Soviet Union and Britain declared the agreement for joint action. (Gürün,V.III, p. 259) The Turks had been informed by the British therefore they were expecting an Anglo-Soviet Alliance. However there was a deep distrust between the Soviets and the Turks. The Turks were complaining that the Soviets had not informed them while the Soviets were complaining that the Turks had allowed a German War vessel (Seefalke) through the Straits.

Since the beginning of the war, the Soviet stand had been ambiguous. While Britain, France and Turkey was negotiating with the Soviets to form an alliance against the Axis, Stalin had surprised all parties and cooperated with the Axis camp. Nevertheless, while plundering Poland, Finland, Baltics and Romania, hand in hand with Hitler, the Soviets did not cut off relations, had always kept a door open to the West. According to Gürün, Stalin knew that Soviet Union was not strong enough to execute expansionist policies independently. Therefore Stalin took advantage of the situation only when possible.

Even after Germany attacked the Soviet Union, the place of the Soviets among the Allies was in dispute. The German military capability had proven itself and was seen powerful enough to destroy the Soviet Union, therefore Britain could not leave the Soviets alone. Without his asking, Churchill opened his arms to Stalin. There was no time to settle important issues between the West and the Soviets. Britain had entered the war because of guarantees to Poland which was partially invaded by the Soviets. Britain had sided with Finland when Stalin attacked. The Soviet ambitions in the Eastern Europe, the Balkans and

in Turkey was contrary to the British interests. The Soviets did not want to give up the spoils they had acquired with the Germans. Yet, there was no time to settle these issues. The Germans were moving fast. The Soviets signed a treaty with Czechoslovakia on 17 July 1941 and with Poland on 30 July 1941. The Czech and the Polish armies would fight against Germany in Russia. The Anglo-Soviet Alliance was complete.

By the end of July the Iranian Ambassador in Ankara informed the Turks that the Soviets and the British were preparing for invasion of Iran and asked for help. Saraçoğlu immediately called for Hugessen and asked about Iran. Hugessen gave guarantees for the independence of Iran, and the Soviet guarantees followed. (Gürün, V.III, p.377) The Turks saw parallel between Iran and Turkey, both on the way between Russia and Britain. The Turks did not forget that Gallipoli Campaign aimed to connect a similar link. In order to soothe the Turkish fears, on 10 August 1941, the British and the Soviet Ambassadors in Ankara presented declarations to the Turkish Government confirming "their fidelity to the Montreux Convention and they had no aggressive intentions or claims whatever regarding the Straits". The declaration also pointed out that they were prepared scrupulously to observe the territorial integrity of the Turkish Republic, and added that while fully appreciating the desire of the Turkish Government not to be involved in war, they would "nevertheless be prepared to render Turkey every help and assistance in the event of her being attacked by a European Power".(Ataöv, p.98) The declaration was significant because the Soviets and more importantly the British accepted the argument that it was beneficial to the Allies that Turkey was out of the war. With her limited defences and the Allies already having difficulties on their own, Turkey could not withstand a German attack. A neutral Turkey was more to Allies' interests than a pro-Ally, but invaded, Turkey.

However, the Turks were not only worried about the German threat, the Soviet threat was slowly taking precedence. The British-Soviet declaration was not enough to abate the Turkish fears. The British and the Soviets knew about it. On 23 August 1941 Hugessen reported to London that " The Soviet Ambassador seemed to fear that Turkey would take hostile action if we made any move in Persia I stated that I was aware that the Turkish government did not like what we were doing". (Deringil, p.126) Under the pretext of preventing German 'fifth column' activities but actually to secure a direct supply route, the invasion of Iran started mid August and by the end of the month Iran was in the

British and the Soviet hands.³¹

On 9 September 1941 Hugessen was reporting to London of a general coldness toward Britain and attributed it to 'the effect on the public mind of officially inspired comments on our actions in Persia.' (Deringil p. 128) The Turks were deeply irritated by the Soviets and the British when the Germans pressed for a chrome deal. The German Armies were still proving their military might, and moving into the Russian heartland. By September, Smolensk and Kiev had fallen and Leningrad was about to fall. There was no immediate German threat to Turkey. However the Turks also had to consider the possibility of a final German victory in Russia, and Germany's becoming a permanent neighbor.

On the other hand realising the Turkish reservations against the Soviet-British Alliance, Britain could not put much pressure on Turkey for fear of Turks' changing sides. On 9 October 1941 Chrome agreement was concluded between Turkey and Germany. (Ataöv, p. 99) The deal was not much significant and, once again, far from German's asking. The Turks rejected to cut supplies to the British until April 1943. 90,000 tones would be delivered in 1943 and 45,000 tones in 1944. In return the Turks would receive arms. The Turks argued to the British that Turkey would not be supporting German War effort because the arms that Germans had to supply would more than compensate the raw chrome. Even though agreement caused resentment in the Pro-Allied circles, the British was realistic regarding the situation. Eden told War cabinet on 9 October 1941 that "This (the Turkish promise of 90,000 tones in 1943) was not very satisfactory but things might have turned out much worse" (Deringil, p.130)

From 15 October to 5 November 1941 , the Germans invited a military delegation to the Eastern Front in order to impress the Turks. On their return, two generals who attended, Ali Fuat Erden and Emir Erkilet attempted to convince İnönü, Saraçoğlu and Chief of Staff Çakmak that Germans had won and final victory over Russia was only a matter of time. According to Koçak, Generals had considerable success with Saraçoğlu and Çakmak, but İnönü did not appear at all convinced. İnönü thought the Generals had

³¹ "Fifth column" originally used by Nationalists to refer to their supporters inside Republican Madrid as the fifth addition to the 4 column of forces circling the city, refers to a subpopulation assumed to have loyalties to countries other than the one in which they reside, or who support some other nation in war efforts against the country they live in. Thus in this case British meant pro-Nazi infiltration in Iranian government.

Pan-Turanist leanings and could not be objective. (Koçak, p.196) Nevertheless the Germans were still too powerful for the Turks to feel safe. Furthermore, the Turks were also suspicious whether negotiations regarding post-war settlements were made in Moscow and London at their expense.

On 6 December 1941, Britain declared War on Finland (and Hungary) which had joined the Axis. It was only a year ago that Britain protested against Soviets' attack on Finland and the British public opinion was vehemently pro-Finland and anti-Soviet. Britain did not have any issues with Finland. For no other reason than pleasing the Soviets, Britain had declared war. Rightfully, the Turks questioned whether the Soviet ambitions including the Straits would be served in a similar vein as to please the Soviets. The British realised that the Turks were deeply startled by such congeniality in the Anglo-Soviet relations, thus they tried to soothe the Turkish fears. On 8 January 1942, Eden felt the need to make public assurances before the House of Commons. "Turkey had nothing to fear from an Allied victory, its territory was in no way threatened by either Great Britain or the USSR." (Deringil, p.133)

Amid such considerations 1942 began. The Turkish mind set was best depicted in words of the Italian Ambassador De-Peppo's words, "Turkish ideal is that last German soldier should fall upon the last Russian corpse". Ahmet Şukrî Esmer who was an influential deputy in the parliament also stated that it was hoped the Germans and the Russians would wear each other out "We hoped they would both lose".³² However, the Turks were not close to their official ally Britain as before either. In fact On 8 April 1942 Von Papen reported to Berlin that Menemencioğlu had told him , "We have no use for either a total English or a total German victory." (Deringil, p.134) Long gone were the days when Turks were desperately trying to form an alliance with Britain against the Axis. Using the Soviets, Germany was pulling Turkey away from Britain. The British assurances did not satisfy the Turks. Sincerely fearful of the Soviet ambitions, the Turks were also winking at the Germans. Pan-Turanist activities reached heights during this period.

There is no consensus whether the Turks were pursuing a Pan-Turanist policy or İnönü and top echelon of Turkish government used Pan-Turanists as a tool to keep options open in case of a German Victory. Many scholars such as Avcıoğlu, Ataöv, Koçak, Hostler,

³² Ciano Diaries p. 456 ; Esmer in a private interview on 29 October 1977 in Deringil, p.135.

Weisband argue that among the Turkish elite, there was a large faction who had great sympathy toward Pan-Turanism.³³ Others such as Landau and Deringil do not deny the existence of the sympathy, but argue that Pan-Turanism was always second to non-adventurism that was deeply rooted in Turkish mind therefore did not dictate the Turkish policy.(Deringil, p. 131; Landau 112)

The existence of fertile ground can not be denied. Non-too friendly Soviet Empire sat on many Turkish homelands, Crimea, Caucuses, the Central Asia. Even Bessarabia was home to Gagauz Turks. As axis members, the Hungarians and the Fins were kins. Many influential Turks were from Crimea and detested the Russians. With extensive contacts in Turkey, Von Papen was also diligent in supporting and supplying Pan-Turanist circles.

It would be fair to say that İnönü was allowing the Pan-Turanists to flourish in order to have doors open in case of a final German Vivtory. He was also using the strength of Pan-Turanists to stave off the British pressures. Yet, he was not short of assuring the British that Turkey was not to cross to the Axis Camp. When Hugessen asked about the German offers of the Northern Syria, Aleppo and Mosul, Saraçoğlu was confident enough to say that he had told Von Papen, Turkey would ask for Scotland as well to join the Axis. (Hugessen, p.178) In fact Hugessen comments in his diary, that during his service he never felt that Turkey was to cross to the Axis.

4.3. The Awkward Alliance

1942 was a relatively less unnerving period for the Turks. The United States had entered the War but its effects were not to be felt until the end of the year. The Germans and the Soviets were fighting each other and the British seemed to accept Turkish neutrality. Even though the Turks were trying very hard to keep a balance, by playing one side against the other they were making material gains from trading with both parties.

The international structure began to change toward the end of 1942 and once again the Turks had to adjust to the requirements of the new structure.

"The successful British counter offensive at El Alamein in October 1942 and the

³³ Avcıoğlu, p. 1531; Ataöv, p.97,Koçak, p.196; Hostler, p.177; Weisband, p.297. For Further information look II. *Dünya Savaşı Sırasında Türkiye'de Milliyetçilik Akımları* , Atabay Mithat İstanbul Kaynak Yayınları 2005.

successful counter-offensive at Stalingrad in November brought increased pressure to bear on Turkey. Now more than ever Turkey became a tool for shortening the war. The Turks found themselves in a very tricky situation, as they could no longer claim that they were blocking the way to the Axis advance into the Middle East. The Axis were now retreating and a new formula had to be found to counter the British pressure." (Deringil, p. 141)

Britain had accepted the Turkish argument that Turkey should not provoke Germany, and stay out of the War. Such understanding was reflected in Hugessen's diary: "We had been carefully balancing the advantages and disadvantages of Turkish belligerency throughout this year and had decided that the existing situation, whereby Turkey acted as a bulwark or 'protective pad' against German penetration into Middle East was much the most useful in the circumstance" (Hugessen, p. 180) However the situation was changing. The Germans were thrown out of the Northern Africa and the Soviets were moving west from Russia and Ukraine. Both the British and the Soviet thought that a second front in Europe would shorten the war. "Turkish reaction to this predicament was to stress that they were still radically short of all necessary war material and to insist that the Germans might want to lash out against Britain with a prestige victory, their contention being that Turkey was ideal for such an attack" (Deringil, p. 141) The Turks also did not want to waste their scarce resources and more importantly they wanted to be strong enough for a possible postwar confrontation with the Soviets.

The British were aware of Turkey's reservations regarding Soviet Russia. When Hugessen reported to the Foreign Office about Menemencioglu's claim regarding a possible German attack on Turkey with a 'mad dog' psychology, the Foreign office regarded the view as 'non-sense', the Germans never behaved as such, the fact was that the Turks were afraid of Russia. (Deringil, p. 141)

1943 began with yet another blow to the Turkish policy. In Casablanca Conference (January 14-24) the Allies adopted the principle of unconditional surrender, meaning complete destruction of the Axis. As a country with few capabilities, but masters of balance of power politics, the Turks preferred as many centers of power as possible. They believed eradication of Germany would leave the Soviets too powerful in Europe. The Soviet intentions were already well known. The Turks had to steer back to Britain, but also had to stay out of the war.

Churchill met İnönü, Saraçoğlu and Menemencioğlu in Adana on 30 and 31 January 1943. The Turks expressed their dual fear of Soviet domination and a costly German retaliation. Churchill outlined his plan (code named operation of Hardihood) for reinforcing Turkey and offered 'Adana List', lavish promises of military equipment. There was no concrete outcome of Adana. Both parties were intentionally obscure. The Turks were once again emphasizing their alliance to Britain but was short of solidly committing to war. Realising Turkish reservations, Churchill was also not pushing the Turks to the War. (Gürün, V.III, p.397) Immediately after the conference, On 2 February 1943 Churchill sent a copy of his 'morning thoughts' to both Roosevelt and the Turks. However copies were not the same, while the American copy mentioned "Turkey coming into war as a full belligerent, and her armies advancing into the Balkans side by side with the Russians on the one hand in the north and the British to the south", the Turkish copy did not mention any Turkish entrance into war but emphasized Turkey's being full partner at the peace conference and the need for Turkey to be strong to resist invasion. (Deringil, p.144)

As always Turkish mind set could be read from the press. While some wrote that postwar problems were discussed and conference had "broadened the scope of the Anglo-Turkish Alliance", others stressed the neutrality servicing to both sides and impossibility of Britain's tricking Turkey into war. Amid this cloudy atmosphere probably Hugessen's comment in his diary best depicted the outcome of the conference. "It seemed understood between ourselves and the Turkish Government that we could count on them if required as soon as they were adequately equipped." (Hugessen, p.190)

Hugessen was correct to point out "adequate equipment" of the Turkish Army. The Turks believed that the Germans were still powerful enough to cause damage, therefore they decided not to sacrifice themselves. The Turks began operation 'foot drag'. (Weisband, p.153) In order to execute and supervise Turkish armament, British military mission arrived in Ankara in April 1943. The Turks knew that completion of Hardihood meant Turkish entry to war. All kinds of tactics were used to prolong the preparations. At one point İnönü was actually warned by his staff that work was proceeding too rapidly. (Deringil p.149) Other than Turks' intentional stalling tactics, objective hurdles were also present. Aside from poor infrastructure, lack of technical skills on the part of the Turks was a reality. By mid June, British lost their hope on the operation Hardihood.

Following developments proved that the Turks were correct in their estimation of the German power. As Mussolini fell from power on 25 July 1943, and Italy surrendered on 8 September 1943. An opportunity rose for the British to capture the Dodecanese Islands which had been in the Italian hands. Churchill believed that successful capture of control in the Aegean Sea would convince the Turks to turn their backs on Germany. How wrong he was. The British had relied on the help of the Italian Garrison in Rhodes. The Germans attacked fiercely and by the mid September Rhodes was in German hands. Then afterwards one by one, all islands fell. Some of beleaguered troops escaping from German furor were evacuated to Turkey. The cite of British troops in misery was not at all encouraging to the Turks.

However signs of Turks' slow steer away from Germany toward Britain could still be observed. Officially still neutral, the Turks did not allow their airspace to be used by the Allies, but they allowed limited transport of arms, munitions and supplies for the Dodecanese Campaign.

Under these dark news for the Allies, the Moscow Conference started on 19 October 1943, between Eden, Hull and Molotov. The Soviets wanted a cross channel campaign (from British shores to France) and Turkey in the war. The Americans agreed in principle, yet were not keen on a Balkan front. The British knew that the Turks would be asking for the promised supplies (Hardihood) that were not delivered. They were just battered in the Aegean and did not have enough resources. Yet if all three parties asked for the Turkish belligerency the British would be relieved from honoring the Turkish requests alone. Eden describes the situation clearly. The Turkish belligerency "was not a point of view which was held very strongly".(Deringil, p. 152) Nevertheless it was agreed on 2 November 1943 that Turkey would be asked to come in before the end of 1943. Upon American insistence it was also stated that no resources would be committed to the Eastern Mediterranean. In a nutshell, the Americans did not care on a Balkan campaign involving Turkey. The British were not keen on Turkey either for they had just been humiliated in the Eagean and they knew that the Turks would be asking war materials that they could not supply. It was the Soviets who wanted Turkey in the War, the British and Americans only complied.

There was no official information given to Turkey about Moscow Conference.

Through his spy 'Cicero' in British Embassy, Von Papen gave all the information regarding Moscow to the Turkish counterparts. (Gürün, V.III, p.404) The Turks knew that the Soviets were instrumental in such a declaration. The significant point was that both the Americans and the British were supporting the Soviets. The situation that the Turks have long been afraid of was taking place. The Soviets were becoming more powerful and their demands were honored by the British and the Americans.

The Turks immediately steered toward the Soviets, once again through their press. The Soviets, who had brought the Nazis onto themselves, were this time "just" and "peace seeking". The Soviets had not shown expansionism or irredentism. The Nazi-Soviet Pact was a precaution against revisionists. Even the notoriously anti-Soviet Hüseyin Cahit was to write, on 22 October 1943, that "It would be irrational to think that our Soviet neighbors with whom we had friendly relations for so long would have anything but friendly intentions toward Turkey".(Deringil, p.153)

Through Von Papen, the Turks had received valuable and correct information regarding airbases in Turkey. They were prepared to resist the British demands with a new tactic. Eden met Menemencioğlu in Cairo on 5-7 November 1943. The British were asking for airbases in Turkey and Eden threatened Menemencioğlu by pointing out "the unenviable position in which Turkey would find itself vis-a-vis the Russians in the event it declined to meet British wishes". (Deringil, p. 154). Menemencioğlu immediately rejected the British. Turkey would not allow airbases without adequate military support. However, Turks were losing ground and did not want to lose Britain as a powerful ally against the Soviets. Thus came Turkish Government declaration on 17 November 1943, which Turkey accepted in principle, that she would come to war.

However, the Turks were not to give up that easily .The new tactic was to make use of a breach in the Alliance. Turkey still refused to grant bases, but wanted to be included in a general Balkan campaign against Germany. The Turks knew about the Soviet intentions. The Soviets wanted to pull Turkey to war. They wanted Turkey to face the German destruction and consequently a vulnerable Turkey would have become easier to deal in regards to the Straits and other issues. In order to staff off such scenario Turkey proposed a plan that they knew that Soviets would not accept, and the Americans and the British would not have much stomach for. Turkey proposed a full scale Balkan front against

Germany. The Turks knew that their proposal would be rejected. The Soviets would not want Turkish soldiers in the Balkans, the Americans did not care about a Balkan Campaign and the British did not have resources to supply.

The new tactic of Turkey produced limited success. While during the Moscow Conference the Soviets were vehemently asking for Turkish entry to war, in the Tehran Conference (28 November - 31 December 1943), Stalin did not seem to be anxious anymore. He argued that allies could not even break the "Winter Line" in Italy, and operation Overlord should not be delayed further for a Balkan campaign.³⁴ In reality, the Soviet Army was confidently moving to west, and only few days had left to reach the Polish border. The Soviets did not need a Balkan front, on the contrary, the Turkish proposal of a Balkan wide campaign would hinder Soviet's ability to collect the spoils of the war in the Balkans after the war. (Gürün, p.400) Soviets wanted to be alone in the Balkans. A campaign with the Turks, the Greeks, the Serbs, the British and possibly the Americans fighting in the Balkans would not have left Stalin enough space to instigate his post-war plans.

Thus Stalin was against Turkish entry. The Americans had always been cool to the idea for they believed that all resources should be dedicated for operation Overlord. Faced with American-Soviet opposition to his favorite idea, Churchill this time tried to pull Stalin to his side by vetting his appetite for the Straits. He proposed that Turkey should be threatened by changes in Montreux if she refused to join the war. Stalin jumped to the idea. He guessed that the Turks would refuse to join the war anyway and in addition to the Balkans he would also take Straits. Three parties agreed that Turkey would be forced into war.

İnönü was invited to Cairo. Only ten months ago, the Turks argued that the constitution did not allow the President to leave the country, thus Churchill and İnönü had to meet in Adana. Yet, the structure was radically changed now, the Turks had to move toward the Allies. This time, İnönü accepted the invitation and went to Cairo on 4 December 1943 to meet Churchill and Roosevelt. The Turks complained that the arms in 'Adana List' was not provided and Germans were still powerful. Churchill wanted the

³⁴ The Winter Line was a series of German military fortifications which ran across the peninsula just south of Rome. It took the Allies from mid-November 1943 to late May 1944 to fight through all the various elements of the Winter Line.

Turks to provide a date for entry. İnönü insisted on a Balkan campaign, complained about the inadequacy of war supplies and rejected to give a date. He proposed yet another plan for Turkish preparations and cooperation with the Allies for a Balkan Campaign. On final day, 6 December 1943, in private, Roosevelt also asked İnönü to join the war effort by 15 February 1944. The Turks were asked to allow the use of airbases by the Allies.

The Turks were left in a difficult situation, either 'in' or 'face the consequences'. However Menemencioğlu realised that even though seemingly all three parties of the Allies were putting pressures on Turkey, they were not completely united. At one point during the proceedings, he overheard Eden whisper to Roosevelt: "But Mr. President, you are forgetting our commitments to the Russians".(Deringil, p. 161) There were still disagreements between the Americans and the British regarding Turkey's role in the war effort.

On the other hand, both through Menemencioğlu and his spy Cicero in the British Embassy, Von papen was well informed about Cairo conference and requests for airfields. After the Turkish delegation returned to Ankara, German ambassador made it clear that even one Allied aircraft on Turkish soil meant war with Germany, strengthening Turkish hand against the Ally demands.³⁵

İNönü was to make a very important decision. Both the Allies and the Germans were threatening. The President asked for the chief of staff Çakmak's opinion regarding the state of military. Çakmak painted a dark picture. Only one third of the aircrafts were operational, and the anti-aircraft equipment lacked crews who could operate them. The Germans could destroy Turkish cities, the industrial centers and other vital areas within 24 hours.(Deringil, p. 164) İnönü decided that he could not risk the country at the present, for a benefit to come in the future (the British and the American assistance against the Soviet demands). On 12 December 1943, the Turkish Government gave official reply to the Allies. Turkey was not to allow use of airfields as the material condition of the Turkish Armed Forces was not adequate to resist a German attack. Turkey was to continue military preparations and insisted on a general plan for Balkan campaign.

³⁵ The British accused Menemencioğlu for giving information about Cairo Conference to Von Papen. In his book Robertson states British accusations. (Robertson, p. 204) on the other hand Gürün claims that there was no need and accusations were baseless because by then British knew about Cicero. Deringil who uses Menemencioğlu's unpublished memoirs state that Menemencioğlu actually informed Von Papen and the latter double checked through Cicero.

The Turks did not want to suffer losses without any gains. By asking only airfields the British were putting Turkey at risk against both German retaliation and post war Soviet ambitions. The Turks could join the war effort as a part of all inclusive Ally campaign. However the use of airfields only, would leave the Turks face a German retaliation and thus reduce Turkey's capabilities. Consequently, the Turks also would become easy target for the Soviets. On the same day, Menemencioğlu gave Hugessen a list of equipments required by Turkey for a proper defense and a Balkan Campaign. The Foreign Minister was bitter and hard. He was not shy regarding his reservations about the Soviets. He noted to Hugessen that "Turkey was being sacrificed to a bargain with Russia". (Deringil, p.164)

At least some among the the British acknowledged the nature of Turkish attitude. When another ultimatum to İnönü was discussed, Cadogan advised against it on 22 January 1944. He argued that there was no point in threatening them because "we get the impression that they have decided on balance they have more to gain than to lose by remaining neutral and that in particular they are confident that it will not be in our interest to give the Russians a free hand with them after the war ..." (Robertson, p.200)

According to Gürün, the British had already given up the idea of Turkish belligerency but still sent a military mission to Ankara in order to keep the Germans expecting an aerial attack from Turkey. On 23 December 1943, in his memoir, Churchill noted that he had unwillingly given up the Rhodes Campaign and accepted the Turkish neutrality. (Gürün, V.III, p.446) To keep the Germans on alert, Air Marshal Linnel and his delegation arrived in Ankara in early January 1944. They were to supervise the Turkish air defenses and airfields, However they abruptly left on 4 February 1944. Hugessen was instructed to "put up his shutters and lie low".(Deringil, p.166) The ostracization of Turkey had begun.

The Turks felt relief when Linnel mission left. They had staved of yet another attempt for belligerency. The British aloofness was only a small price the Turks had to pay. Solid sanctions did not add up to any level of significance. "Cutting of supplies was confined to military supplies proper. Work in progress on various projects was not suspended nor were instructors withdrawn or training facilities for the Turkish cadets in Britain abolished. Supplies of oil were not out except for aviation spirit and civilian supplies remained unaffected". (Robertson, p.205)

However İnönü knew that, short of becoming belligerent, Turkey had to move further to the Allies. An opportunity arrived on 19 April 1944 when the Allies asked Turkey to cut chrome supplies. The Turkish chrome sales to Germany were not very significant. However, other neutrals were taking their cues from Turkey. Spanish and Portuguese had been selling wolfram to Germany and were refusing to cut supplies as long as the Turks sold chrome to Germany. Having already the upper hand in the war, the Allies wanted to end this 'nuisance'. To the amazement of diplomatic circles, the Turks immediately accepted to cut the supplies on 20 April 1944. (Robertson, p. 219)

The Turks made further gestures. "The Wealth Tax" targeting the non-Muslims had already been repealed by the end of 1943. Actions against Pan-Turanists were to follow. The Turkish press began to write on menaces of Pan-Turanism. The Turanists were likened to the fascists and were accused to exploit Turkish nationalism. A prominent Pan-Turanist, Nihal Atsız was convicted and many others were to follow his fate. German supported 'Turkische Post' was to be suppressed and even, Von Papen's would-be assailant, a Soviet citizen was freed from prison.(Ataöv, p.124)

Another opportunity to please the British arrived on 3 June 1944, when Hugessen filed a strong protest to Menemencioğlu regarding the passage of the German military supplies through the Straits. Dispute was not a new development. The Turks had been strictly following the Montreux Convention, but the Germans were able to transport military supplies inside commercial vessels. Actually, the situation had been used by the Turks as an argument to acquire complete control of the Straits. However İnönü had decided to please the British. The German vessel 'Kassel' was stopped, searched and found to be heavily armed. The British had been accusing Menemencioğlu for being "pro-German" for a long time. "It thus became obvious to İnönü that rapprochement with Britain required a public sacrifice. Menemencioğlu was the obvious choice".(Deringil, p. 171) On 17 June 1944, Menemencioğlu's resignation was made public. Chief of Staf Çakmak was to follow the same fate.

The British was not contend and wanted to corner Turkey. On 13 June 1944, Hugessen asked the Turks to break off diplomatic relations with Germany. The cynicism of the British was evident. The Germans were already losing. Turkish rupture of relations could not accomplish anything but a retaliatory attack on Turkey. On 12 July 1944,

Churchill sent a message to Stalin stating that " the break in relations would be a step forwards war as Turkey would be involved in a 'vengeance' attack from the air."(Deringil, p.173)

The Turks were in acknowledgment of the situation. Situation was similar to that of after Cairo. The Turks were being sacrificed for the sake of the Allies. However, while after Cairo, the Turks sincerely feared a German attack, the situation had changed. Although still important a German attack was not the main concern anymore. The Turks had already took many actions against Germany but the Germans had not retaliated. The Turks were trying to get a favourable seat during the post war settlements, and more importantly, they did not want to be left alone dealing with the Soviets demands.

Therefore they decided to make the same argument they had made after the Cairo Conference but they were to take a step further. The Turks argued that rupture of relations was meaningless. Turkey should be included in a 'general' Allied Campaign. The British reply was that there was no Allied plan for the area. (Deringil, p.173) This time Saraçoğlu proposed that Turkish troops enter and sweep the Germans out of Bulgaria with the Soviets troops. (Gürün, p. 525)

The British had been bluffing and the Turks saw the bluff. The Turks were correct in their considerations that the British were throwing Turks into fire. By summer 1943, the British had already moved their vital military equipment from the Eastern Mediterranean. (Robertson 233) They were not in a position to assist the Turks in a Balkan campaign. All the previous pressures on the Turks to become belligerent was baseless. Turkey had long been pressured to enter the war. When Turks finally accepted, it was British who were dragging their feet.

Through skilled diplomatic maneuvers, the Turks accomplished not only to reduce the Allied pressures on her but also to crystallize the rivalries between the great powers, to which Turkish independence had always been based on.

The Soviets wanted a Turkish declaration of war. They did not understand why Britain was asking for only break up of relations which was only 'a half-hearted attempt'. (Robertson,p.234) The British tried to convince the Soviets that this was a two-stage plan. Turkey was to break off relations first and declare war later. The British did not have the capacity to supply any more arms to the Turks. This way, a long haggling about supply of

war material and military cooperation would be avoided. However, the Soviets were not to be convinced, and were to protest severely after Turkey's decision to break off relations arrived.(Robertson, p. 234)

The Americans were also becoming annoyed with the British tactics. They were asking "what Britain was getting at with Turks". If Turks were ready to declare war, they wanted to know why they should not be allowed to do so. (Robertson, p.235) Americans were favourable to the Turkish belligerency but "definitely opposed to the diversion of resources from the approved operations in Italy and the Western Mediterranean". (Deringil, p.173) Therefore, they came to agree with the British on two stage plan because they did not want any supplies to be spared for Turkey.

Hugessen was instructed to ask the Turks "to break relations with the Germans as a first step toward ultimate belligerency".(Robertson, p.236) Hugessen was also to tell Saraçoğlu that by taking the necessary action, Turkish government would restore the alliance with Britain to its former position. Turkey broke off relations with Germany on 2 August 1944. The ostracization of Turkey was over.

Many aspects of the Allied pressures on Turkey during the last few months of 1943 and early 1944 can be easily analysed. The American stance was the clearest of all. They did not care for Turkish involvement because they were preparing for Anvil (South of France) and Normandy. For them, a Balkan campaign including Turkey was only a waste of time and resources. They agreed to exert pressure on Turkey to please the Soviets and the British but they did not refrain to state that they would not spare any military supplies for a Balkan campaign. They did not even help the British during the failed Dodecanese Campaign. And more importantly the Turks were in realization of the American attitude and sought their help whenever British exerted pressure.³⁶

Initially, the Soviets asked for Turkish involvement because they were desperate. They welcomed any action that would partially divert German attention. However after they militarily gained the upper hand, they were not keen on Turkish troops fighting in the Balkans. The Balkans had considerable ethnic Turkish populations and could fall into Turkish sphere of influence, reducing the Soviet influence in the region. Therefore, in the Tehran Conference, Stalin was cool to Turkish involvement. The Soviets were also absent

³⁶ Roosevelt's sympathy for Turkish non-belligerency is well known.

in Cairo. Years later Menemencioğlu commented that Soviets were hiding "behind a curtain which was not yet iron" (Deringil, p. 161) Stalin did not actually want Turkey in the war, but he hoped that Turkish refusal would cause her isolation. The Soviets could than realise their intentions on Turkey.

The British insistence toward the end of the war is the most difficult to explain. When war started the British naturally asked for Turkish belligerency. However as German military capabilities surpassed all expectations they came to understand that Turkish non-belligerency and/or neutrality was more to their benefit. By late 1942 they, once again, started exerting pressure. The primitive idea that while British soldiers were dying Turks should not enjoy the spoils of the war is only a partial explanation. According to Robertson, rather than rational policy for Britain, the Balkan campaign was a "personal prerogative" for Churchill. "Dardanelles had haunted him for 25 years" and he could not "see the wood for trees". (Robertson, p.268) It was in the British interest that Turkey should not waste her resources and stay relatively strong against the Soviets after the war. But Churchill failed to see that until the last minute.

Another argument is that Churchill knew that the Turkish belligerency was not needed or required. During the Quebec Conference (17-24 August 1943) , months before Moscow, Tehran and Cairo conferences, it was he who told the South African Prime Minister Smuts that a Balkan campaign was not desired. Nevertheless pressure might have been kept on Turkey in order to divert German attention to the Balkans. (Gürün, V.III, p. 404)

It can also be argued that the British were trying to find out the post-war Soviet intentions by using Turkey as bait. Or even more cynical view is that the British was throwing the Turks into fire on purpose. After a German retaliation Turkey would be beleaguered and dependent on Britain against the Soviets.(Deringil, p.175) It has also been claimed that Anglo-American rivalry in the Middle East had already begun. According to Menemencioğlu, he had realised the rivalry when a British and an American aeroplane came to Adana to take the Turkish delegation to Cairo. (Deringil p.161) Britain was slowly but assuredly losing her global influence. A Balkan campaign was a British plan. By insisting on its execution, Britain was trying to have a say in international affairs.

Another more radical argument would be that British were deeply irritated by the

American dominance, and were toying with the idea of a possible Anglo-Soviet joint sphere of influence against that of the Americans. On 9 October 1944, In absence of any American diplomat, Stalin and Churchill were dividing Europe on a piece of paper, (Percentages Agreement) and Churchill did not inform Roosevelt about it.(Gürün,V.III, p. 525)

Whether or not any of these arguments carries more or less weight is not the concern of this study. The important fact is that the Turks were aware of these considerations and took a calculated risk. They decided to stand against the pressures and refused to risk their country in the short run with the hope that they would not be isolated in the long run. They started to wait for their fate.

"Throughout the war İnönü and the formulators of Turkish foreign policy had been pursuing a calculated gamble. This gamble was based on one of the basic foundations of the Turkish foreign policy - Turkey's vital strategic location. It was hoped that any short-term falling out with Britain would be remedied after the war when the British would realise that Turkish goodwill was a geopolitical necessity for their empire" (Deringil, p. 174)

By summer 1944, the Axis was in ruins, the Soviet intentions was starting to take precedence in the British considerations. The British had to play safe. The Communist influence in the Balkans and the Eastern Europe was rising. Britain still hoped to keep some influence in the region therefore, the friendship of the Soviets was still desired.

A dilemma similar to that of before the war surfaced in the British foreign policy. In the short term, the British tried to restrain Germany knowing that in the long run this would possibly cause much greater confrontation. The British were only regretful to have agreed to the breakup of Czechoslovakia when the Allied troops were killed by the Czech equipment that Hitler had acquired without the loss of a single German soldier. The case with the Soviets was similar. They did not want to offend the Soviets thus made concessions while knowing that in the long run those concessions would cause them dearly.

Under these considerations Yalta Conference convened in early February 1945. On 8 February 1945 Stalin brought up the Montreux Convention. It was "out dated and ought to be revised". A year earlier, in Tehran, Churchill had brought up the matter to whet

Soviet's appetite. Thus the Premier had to agree. Unless there was a clear conflict of interest, in matters related to Turkey the Americans usually followed the British policy, therefore the Americans also agreed to a revision of the Montreux Convention. Another outcome of Yalta Conference was that 1 March was deadline to declare war against the Axis for countries who wished to attend the first United Nations conference to be held in San Francisco. On 23 February 1945, Turkey dutifully declared war on Germany and Japan. The Soviets were in Berlin suburbs and Americans were near Cologne.

The Turco-Soviet Friendship Pact of 1925 was to expire in on 7 October 1945. The deadline for renewal was 7 May 1945. Realising the Soviet anti-Turkish attitude, the Turks had been expecting Soviet refusal for renewal.(Gürün, V.III, p. 647) On 19 March 1945 the Turkish expectations were realised. Molotov informed the Turkish Ambassador Sarper, that the Soviets refused to renew the pact before "disputes" were resolved.

After returning from the San Francisco Conference, on 7 June 1945, Molotov called for Sarper and presented the Soviet demands. Turkey had to agree on frontier rectification along the Eastern border, Kars and Ardahan was to be given back to Soviet Union. The Turks were too weak to defend the Straits, thus Soviets were to be given bases for joint defense. Montreux had to be revised giving more control to the Soviets.

As said before, Turks had been expecting such a move from the Soviets. The Turkish reply had already been agreed on, and was relayed to Moscow on 12 June 1945. The Turks rejected the territorial demands and bases on the Straits. The Montreux Convention was a multilateral agreement and could not be negotiated bilaterally. The Turks immediately informed both the Americans and the British about the Soviet demands and asked for their support in order to resist. The Turks believed that long term interests of the British and the Americans laid on Turkey being independent from the Soviet Union. It was only matter of time the Americans and the British was to acknowledge the significance of Turkey.

The Turks were once again correct in their calculations. Tides were turning against the Soviets favoring Turkey. In principle, the Americans accepted a revision to the Montreux Convention but vehemently refused any attempt against Turkish independence. (Gürün, V.III, p.656) The British also accepted a revision of Montreux but argued that border rectifications were matters of the United Nations and should not be discussed in

Potsdam.

Soviets realised the change in the Western attitude. In the Potsdam Conference, 16 July-6 August 1945, Stalin acted as if there was no territorial dispute between Turkey and the Soviet Union. The Soviets focused on the Montreux Convention and the bases on the Straits. In order to dissuade Stalin, Churchill argued that Turkey would never accept bases on the Straits. However, the Americans and the British did not want to agitate the Soviets any further. They accepted to reconsider Montreux without specifying any particular revision. The Turkish calculations were once again correct. The Cold War began. The Soviets were not allies anymore. Turkey joined the western camp, the revision of Montreux was simply forgotten. Up to this date the Montreux Convention is still in effect.³⁷

³⁷ There is an argument that in order to seek better relations with the West, and keep on receiving the Western credits and assistance, the Turkish decision makers exaggerated the Soviet expansionist threat. (Nasuh Uslu, p.15) Truman administration also manipulated the Soviet threat. (Leffler, p.78) Disregarding the Turkish archives about Molotov-Sarper talks, in June 1945, regarding the renewal of the friendship treaty as mentioned above, the proponents of this argument claim that even though the Soviets asked for revision to the Montreux Convention, they did not "officially" ask for border rectifications in the Eastern Anatolia. The Turks exaggerated the threat based on an article published on 14th of December 1945 in a Georgian daily regarding the need of Georgia to take back several towns in the Eastern Turkey and following supporting articles in Izvestia and Pravda. Putting aside the fact that whatever written on these papers could not reflect anything other than Soviet intentions, it has also been established by the findings in the United States archives that the Soviets actually brought up the matter during the Moscow conference in December 1945. Stalin explicitly asked for Kars and Ardahan regions to be returned to the Soviet Union. (Foreign relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers (FRUS) 740.00119 Council/12-1745).

5. The Conclusion

What a spectacular feat in diplomatic history, the Turkish decision makers managed to stay out of a war they did not want to be a part of. They were allied to Britain but managed to sign a friendship treaty with Germany, receiving credits, war materials and trading with both sides. Needless to say, the Turks were not alone in their wishes. Many countries also hoped to stay out of war, yet very few managed, most were stamped by one or the other.

A combination of factors facilitated such outcome. As a perfect example to study level of analysis, international, internal and the decision making level factors were instrumental. In a system with competing super powers, the Turks were able to play one side against the other because of their valuable geo-strategic location. The country was poor, yet stable, and more importantly Turkey also possessed able decision makers.

Scholars on the subject are generally in agreement on these factors, yet emphasise one or the other factor. Weisband gives his preference to the Soviet threat. For him, friendship of Britain or Germany did not matter for the Turks, as long as a protection from the Soviet Union was maintained. Ataöv and Deringil emphasize rational decision making. According to them, the Soviet threat was not, at all times, the most important. The precedence of the Italian, the German and the Soviet threats continuously changed and the Turks rationally adjusted their policies according to their national interests. Tamkoç goes further emphasizing on the Turkish decision makers and their perception of the national interest. For him a peculiar Muslim-Turkish and anti-foreign national character was instrumental in producing a foreign policy based on a strict self-interest principle.

All arguments have merits and deficiencies. National character does influence decision making. A dichotomy of 'us and others' is a prerequisite in the international system. The Turkish decision makers were inheritors of an Empire that had been recently dismembered by the 'others', Turkish decision makers' disposition for suspicions of others' intents and against the alliances was, to a certain extent, instrumental in their following a policy based on strict self-interest. It can be argued that the Turkish decision makers were more self interested than, say the French socialists. However, the Turks were not paranoiac, they cooperated with other nations, signed treaties, pacts and formed alliances.

Understandably, being the most powerful neighbor, the Soviets had always been a consideration for the Turks. It is true that when the Axis started retreating, the most important consideration became to be the Soviet threat. The policies after 1942 can be best explained as the Turks trying to prevent the realization of the Soviet intentions on Turkey. However, the Soviets were not the only consideration. Especially during the initial phases of the War, first Italy than Germany were more important considerations.

Rejecting the implicitly static nature of the arguments regarding national character, and a chaos of states seeking expansion, the rational actor model best suits the Turkish case. The chaotic structure is a background factor, yet can not explain all instances of the Turkish foreign policy. The structural changes are so variant and rapid that no argument that entails a static feature is adequate. The Turks, at times, were pro-German, pro-Allied, even pro-Soviet. The Turks entered into alliances, than reduced their commitments and even broke them. At times, the Turks were revisionists and at others non-revisionists. The rational actor model does not reject the structural constraints but reject grand theories that tries to explain too much, too simply.

In order to understand the reality better, one needs to focus, in detail, the actors and their rationale behind their decisions. This study uses the rational actor model, yet tries to draw attention to the transparency factor.

To argue that information and perception is crucial in decision making may seem to be as if only stating the obvious. What this study is trying to argue is not only the importance of these aspects, but the significance of the transparency variable, that affects the quality of information and perception. High transparency facilitates better information, perception and better calculation. When the transparency is high that means information about actors' capabilities and intentions are high, leaving less room for misperception thus also reduce miscalculation.

This study argues that the transparency factor was high in issues regarding Turkish foreign policy during the Second World War. The following list is given to draw attention to the possibilities that could have occurred if the transparency was low.

Transparent Factor	Effects	Less Transparency	Effects
Homogeneous, hierarchical, authoritarian, enlightened and rational Turkish governing elite	There was no internal strife to be exploited by foreigners.	Faction ridden Turkish Polity	Foreigners could find proponents among Turkish elite and use them to further their interests.
	Foreigners had take into considerations only the President who was not challenged by any other center of power in Turkey.	Various centers of power in the country	Foreigners would have had to consider different centers of power and their analysis of Turkish actions and intentions would be more complicated. Foreigners could make use of these ideals to find proponents among Turkish elite.
Turks bleak economic and military capabilities	Self interested rationality of Turkish decion makers was so acute that foreigners could not affect Turkish decision making by utopian ideals.	Say Turkish leaders being affected by ideals such as liberalism, socialism, Islamism, Anti-Imperialism etc.	
	Turkey was not considered to be significant aggressor against the Axis.	Say Turkey had capabilities en par with Czechoslovakia.	Turkey could have been a target of a German pre-emptive strike.
	Possibility of Turkey's being a liability rather than an asset reduce Allied pressures on Turkish belligerency.		Allies could have increased their pressures on Turkish belligerency.
	Turks could not risk belligerency even when territorial gains were offered.		Turkish decision makers could have contemplated territorial gains from the War.
High costs of invasion of Turkey	Compelled Germans to seek Turkish neutrality through diplomatic means	Invasion of Turkey being less costly	Germans could have concentrated their attacks on Turkey trying to reach Middle East in order to cut supplies to the West.
Immense destructive capability of Germany	Compelled Turks to reduce commitments to the Allies	The case of Germans' Western front not as successful	Allies could have increased their pressures on Turkish belligerency.

	Possibility of Turkey's being a liability rather than an asset reduced Allied pressures on Turkish belligerency		Turkish decision makers could have contemplated territorial gains from the War.
Clarity of Soviet expansionist intentions on Turkey	Enabled Turkish decision to take pro-active precautions against Soviet Union	Soviet intentions less transparent	Turks could have let their guards down against Soviets.
Reluctance of Allies in fighting against the Axis	Reduced Allied pressures for Turkish belligerency		Allies could have increased their pressures on Turkish belligerency.
Non-adventurism of Turkish decision makers	Compelled Turks to reduce commitments to the Allies	A determined stand against Germany	A global War might not have started.
	Reduced the Turkish threat perceived in the International arena.	A case of Turkish ambiguity for non-revisionism	Turks might have been considered a threat by neighboring states.
Impossibility of a firm alliance in the Balkans	Convinced Turks to the spread of war in the Balkans.	A seemingly more firm stand against the Axis	Turks could have been less prepared for the War.
	Reduced Turkish commitment to Alliances		Turks could have committed to the Alliances and repeat the mistakes of WWI.
Turkish decision makers effectively communicated with their counterparts	Turkish actions were expected thus did not produce surprise effect.	Less able Turkish decision makers	Overreaction to shifts of Turkish policy
	Turkish capabilities and intentions were well known by foreigners		Over or under estimation of Turkish capabilities
German intelligence gathering	Reduced the threat of Turkish belligerency against Germany.	Less able German Diplomacy	Over reaction to Turkey's alliance with West
	Compelled Turkey to keep strict neutrality even when Germany was losing.		Turkish provocation of Germany
	Enabled Turks to take advantage of breaches in Anglo-Soviet alliance		Turks could not have taken advantage of breaches among the Allies effectively

Both clarity of the structure and actors' conscious actions contributed to the outcome. Understandably the transparent structure enabled better calculation, yet did not determine the outcome. Able decision makers have to be in constant search for transparency. As Morgenthau says the quality of diplomats are "the most important of all the factors that make for the power of a nation". (Morgenthau, p.140) The Turkish decision makers were an able bunch, who took calculated risks, and profited in return. The transparency of the structure helped their calculations but they also sought transparency through active diplomacy and consequently made use of valuable information to their benefit.

One may claim that this study's argument is based on too many 'could have', 'would have' 'should have's. It is true that a certain hypothetical element is used in order to draw attention to the effects of transparency. In social sciences one can not help but make hypothetical analysis a posteriori. However this deficiency does not render argument's usefulness.

The argument does make a powerful hypothesis. Less transparent structure leads to miscalculation. As argued by many, after the end of the Second World War, the international structure became bipolar, and as Turkey joined the Western camp, she also lost a certain amount of autonomy in foreign relations. Yet it should not be forgotten that Turkish decision makers' job became much easier. They did not have to consider so many variables as their predecessors did during the Second World War. Transparency argument is especially relevant today because the structure is moving from bipolarity to some unknown shape. Thus the Turkish decision makers have to be more active and alert, trying to read the structure more correctly in order to make correct decisions.

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ÖZGEÇMİŞ

Bülent Oğuz MAVİOĞLU

Kişisel Bilgiler : Doğum Tarihi 18.6.1974
Doğum Yeri Ankara
Medeni Durumu: Evli

Eğitim :

Lise	1985-1990	Kadiköy Anadolu Lisesi
Lise	1990-1991	Fairport High School New York USA.
Lisans	1991-1994	City College of City University of New York (B.S. Computer Science)
Yüksek Lisans Çalışması	1994-1997	Graduate Center of City University of New York Political Science
Yüksek Lisans Master	2004-2008	Yeditepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimleri Enstitüsü (Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler)