

STORYTELLER UNCOVERED :
THE PRESENTATION OF FILM AS REALITY AND THE REVEALING OF FILM'S
SUBJECTIVITY BY THE USAGE OF VOICE-OVER NARRATION

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**Storyteller Uncovered :
The Presentation Of Film As Reality and The Revealing of Film's Subjectivity by the
Usage of Voice-over Narration
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ABSTRACT

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This thesis aims to discuss the potential the usage of voice-over narration possesses in revealing the film's subjectivity, which is otherwise hidden behind the impression of reality created by the functioning of the cinematic apparatus and the concealment of narration. As a reflexive instrument, voice-over narration alters the linear spatiotemporal order of the film and the seeing/showing relationship between the spectator and the film as a result of which the narration is revealed, and thus the storyteller.

Key words: Voice-over narration, narration, reflexivity, subjectivity, reality impression

ÖZET

Ortaya Çıkan Anlatıcı: Filmin Gerçeklik Olarak Sunumu ve Üstses-Anlatım Vasıtasıyla Filmin Öznelliğinin Ortaya Konulması

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Bu tez, üstses-anlatımın filmin – sinema aygıtının çalışma biçimi ve anlatımın gizlenmesinin yarattığı gerçeklik hissinin ardında gizli kalan – öznelliğini ortaya çıkarma potansiyelini tartışmayı amaçlamaktadır. Dönüşlü (reflexive) bir araç olarak üstses-anlatımın filmin doğrusal zaman-uzamsal düzenini ve film ve izleyici arasındaki görme/göstermeye dayalı ilişkiyi bozmasıyla anlatım, dolayısıyla da hikaye anlatıcısı ortaya çıkar.

Anahtar Kelimeler: üstses, kendini-yansıtırma, dönüşlölük, öznellik, anlatım, gerçeklik hissi

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1. INTRODUCTION

Stories are instruments for understanding and transforming the world we live in, because even though they are produced down here in this world, they possess the potential to open doors to other worlds. Since from before history men have been telling stories and they did so in the era of the oral culture and the written culture, too. Rhetoric and memorization were of the most important talents in the oral culture as the stories were essential to sustain the cultures and it was via the storyteller's memory that the cultures were transferred to the next generations. But the stories were never rigid formations stable and unchanging; even the most narrated one of the stories always kept transforming into another story everytime a storyteller started telling it. It's for their ever-creating potential for transformation that they are important; the transformation of the self and the transformation of the world. So from a preoccupation with the very notions of story, transformation, self and world, and from the idea derived from the reply to a question asked earlier – "the storyteller is what makes a story a story" – sprang the starting question for this thesis; "are there stories that hide their storytellers?" That's how I got to contemplating on the form and narrative styles of cinema in relation to our subjective perceptions of reality and the forms of representing them. So the subject of this thesis became the formal and narrative styles of cinema and the nature of the relationship between the spectator and the film and voice-over narration as the instrument of reflexivity that reveals the film's subjectivity.

With regards to the methodology used in this thesis, Bordwell speaks of a *historical poetics of cinema* as a model of understanding that doesn't act with certain pre-determined formulas but is defined by the phenomenon it examines;

"A historical poetics of cinema produces knowledge in answer to two broad questions: 1. What are the principles according to which films are constructed and by means of which they achieve particular effects? 2. How and why have these principles arisen and changed in particular empirical circumstances?" (Bordwell, 1989:s.369-398)

The two questions of historical poetics of cinema constitute the central questions regarding this thesis and the self-defining phenomena this thesis deals

with are the spectatorship experience, voice-over narration, reflexivity and subjectivity. The approach adopted could be described as an interdisciplinary one in the widest sense. I make use of the theories of psychoanalytic film theory with regard to the effects of filmic apparatus on the film-viewing experience and voice-over narration's effects on the perception of filmic elements; Post-structuralist theory is also utilized in relation with the textual and formal analysis of the to and fro relation between the spectator and the text.

The general course followed in this thesis is first determining the problematic issue – the concealment of the film's filmness – and then trying to determine the approaches and applications – applications of reflexivity – that are mainly used to reverse the effects of this problem – the spectator's entrapment in a position of pseudo-subjectivity. Theories and interpretations of psychoanalytic film critics such as Christian Metz and Jean-Louis Baudry set the theoretical framework for understanding the nature of spectatorship, the desires and fetishisms it involves, the psycho-physiological aspects of perception and interpretation; these issues are discussed in the second section of the first chapter. The more thoroughly the functioning and effects of the apparatus and the narration were examined, the more it became clear that 'the ideology inscribed in film' was the stamp of the time and culture cinema was born in. So moving from the question "in what ways is cinema related to the context in which it was born?" I made historical research on the matter and briefly traced cinema's roots in history and tried to determine the aspects of the historical setting of its emergence and its relation to other arts including theater, Renaissance painting and novel; this retrospection constitutes the first section of the second chapter. In the final section of the second chapter, taking "can and how the ideological effects of the cinematic apparatus be inverted?" as the central question, applications of reflexivity and their contribution to revealing the film's subjectivity which is otherwise hidden comprise the issues discussed.

Reflexivity and self-consciousness are two of the key words in this context. These terms are overlapping and consequential to each other. A reflexive artwork is one that contemplates on its own structure and contents through various applications that are self-consciously present within the artwork. Applications

within the pattern of events that break the sense of rationality, exaggerated acting of the characters, the usage of photographs, live interviews and sections of documentaries as inserts, the revelations of the film's filmness via the characters etc. are to name a few of these applications. The self-consciousness of the artwork provides the spectator a potential for becoming conscious and reflexive of the structure, contents and functions of the work as well as becoming self-conscious and reflexive of his own position within the relationship between himself and the artwork and also his position within the power structure within the wider body of other texts and contexts in which he is a character; the community, the local regime, the global regime etc. Meanwhile a non-reflexive artwork is closer to blocking any path towards providing the spectator such space for a critical position for such potential to take place. My decision to examine specifically the voice-over narration among the applications of reflexivity – all of which aim to display the film's contemplation upon its own constructedness and construction – lies in its distinction from others as it is the only one in which the storyteller becomes apparent directly. So in the third chapter first the question 'are all instances of voice-over narration applications of reflexivity?' is discussed, and then the experience of the spectator of a voice-narrated film is examined with 'how does the use of voice-over narration reveal film's subjectivity?' being the central question; the same questions set the aims for the film analysis section which closes the chapter.

2. (Re)presentation Of The Film And The Spectator's Experience

Taking “what is the nature of the relationship between the film and the spectator” as the central question, this chapter aims to understand, with a psychoanalytic approach, how the faculties of perception and interpretation of the spectator function and how these faculties are affected by the cinematic apparatus and filmic narration. Towards this aim, in section 1.1. Cinema As Objective Reality, cinema will be discussed first (in sub-section 1.1.1. Cinema As A Modern Practice) in relation with the essential characteristics of the context it was born in and the other artforms. Along this direction, the key concepts individual, subjectivity/objectivity, voyeurism/exhibitionism, visuality, representation, self-consciousness and perspective will be briefly traced back in the history of modernity – being the age cinema emerged in – and the preceding ages and in other artforms – which in many ways constitute the older relatives of cinema – including Renaissance painting, drama and novel. Next (in section 1.1.2. Functioning Of The Apparatus), regarding Metz’s and Baudry’s arguments concerning the ideological effects of the cinematic apparatus as the main entry points, the key concepts mentioned above will this time be traced in the structure and the functioning of the film (both in means of the apparatus and narration) and in the spectator’s experience of viewing it. In the final section 1.2. Inversion Of The Ideological Effects Of The Cinematic Apparatus, main principles, extents and applications of reflexivity will be discussed in relation to the question ‘how can ideological effects of the apparatus be repressed and a mode of representation be achieved that puts forth its subjectivity instead of concealing it’ – a question derived from the discussions of the earlier sections and one leading the text towards the next chapter’s discussion, the use of voice-over narration as an application of reflexivity.

2.1. Cinema As Objective Reality

2.1.1. Cinema As A Modern Practice

The history of modernity and the previous events of hundreds of years that set the stage for it is hardly a different one from the history of the individual. Humanism that in the search for truth valued evidence of the human senses over divine knowledge; Renaissance that is, in its simplest sense, a new way of seeing – one that sets the human eye as the master and the nature, its subordinate; Enlightenment that sets the source of “light” as the human reason by denying significance to all mythos; the French revolution the outcome of which might be considered to be the triumph of the individual over the institutional powers as well as the victory of the bourgeois over the nobles and the priests in the struggle of classes; the rise of capitalism that is basically the freedom and independence of the capital, with the means of production and distribution being mainly privately-controlled; the Industrial Revolution that owed much to the rise of capitalism – that made possible the private financial investment in industrial enterprises and the liberalisation of trade – and the Protestant work ethic – that regarded maintaining wealth through hard working and “worldly success” as a “sign of God’s approval” – fuelled with the “humanist axiom, belief in progress” (Carroll 1993: 106-107); and the post-industrial capitalism that moved the emphasis and the defining drive of citizenship from production to consumption enabling “an aesthetics of consumption” to “replace the work ethic” (Bauman 1999: 52); each of these eras and the sum of notions and ideologies – such as nation state, liberalization, urbanization, democracy, secularization, globalization etc. – surfaced in their joint course that built up to modernity had the individual as their central concern. It wouldn’t be unfounded proposing that even today the modern project in its idealized and improved state has not been fully accomplished, despite the newly deployed terms such as postmodernity, late modernity, hypermodernity etc.; and it seems it’s quite unlikely that it will ever be, firstly because there’s no ending to the progression, and more importantly because the project itself has assumed a self-universalization mission both as a historicist reflex and as a new expansionist marketing strategy the result of which is the state of affairs – modernity is a fetish object on the other/‘underdeveloped’ end of the

affair – called globalization which “in reality been about Westernisation – the export of Western commodities, values, priorities, ways of life” (Morley and Robins 1997: 108). Still, the emphasis of modernity, in keeping with the legacy of the preceding eras, remains to be the individual.

Artforms – and, to a degree, artworks, too – reflect the context they emerge or evolve in. Cinema, a product of modernity, represents this culture of the individual. In its form and effect, Baudry points out, cinema is the inheritor of the perspective ideology;

“Fabricated on the model of the camera obscura, it [camera] permits the construction of an image analogous to the perspective projections developed during the Italian Renaissance... [T]he resulting ideological effect is... defined in relation to the ideology inherent in perspective. The dimensions of the image itself, the ratio between height and width, seem clearly taken from an average drawn from Western easel painting” (Baudry 1974: 288-289).

The discovery of the perspective, among the philosophical, ideological and artistic innovations of this post-medieval course towards modern times, perhaps, was the most influential one, and one that roughly summarizes the collective stance these revolutions come to produce. In fact it was the re-enactment of a known technique rather than a discovery, as according to Pavel Florenski “the true origins of perspective is in theater” (Ancient Greek theater that is) (Florenski 2001: 61)¹ – a claim we will return to later – and it is known that as early as 11th century Al Hassan Ibn Al Haytham (also known as Al Hazen), ‘the father of modern optics’ had used perspective in his experiments with his invention, the camera obscura, the ancestor of the modern camera, and the latin translation of his magnum opus, the Optics, influenced medieval scientists such as Bacon and Vitelo and preserved its canonical status even for the 17th century mathematicians such as Kepler, Descartes, and Huygens (Sabri 2003). Besides, Ancient Egyptians had advanced in geometry enough to be able to produce representations using perspective, but they chose not to (Florenski 2001: 53-54). The same thing could be said of their American pyramid-builder counterparts, the Mayas, and most probably for the Chinese, also. From the first use of the technique’s primitive

¹ All quotations from this title were translated by the author of this text.

version in the 13th century by Giotto di Bondone till modern times the geometrical and philosophical principals of perspective constantly continued to be developed by artists and mathematicians including Filippo Brunelleschi, Leone Battista Alberti, Piero Della Francesca, Leonard da Vinci, Dürer, Federico Commandino, Egnatio Danti, Giovanni Battista Benedetti, Guidobaldo del Monte, Girard Desargues and Brooke Taylor; relatively the more recent contributions of the famous 18th and 19th century mathematicians Gaspard Monge, Michel Chasles and Jean Victor Poncelet are also worthy of mentioning. The need to mention all the names of the major contributors to the development of perspective is significant for understanding that the usage of the technique is not a trait of a particular setting or time, but rather a way of seeing gradually developed along the course mentioned before. And yet, the governing principles of it, as displayed in Alberti's *De Pictura* dating back to 1436, had been formulized from the very beginning: "A painting is the intersection of a visual pyramid at a given distance, with a fixed centre and a defined position of light, represented by art with lines and colours on a given surface" (O'Connor and Robertson 2003).

A frequently related account of a demonstration of Brunelleschi's not only shows that these principles had already come to a quite mature state very early in the chronology of the development of perspective, but also clearly displays the authoritative positioning of the spectator and the intention to replicate the world through the use of perspective. Sometime between 1410 and 1420, Brunelleschi "stood inside the door of Santa Maria del Fiore which is located at one side of the Piazza del Duomo and took out a small board with a peephole in the middle. This board was set up so that people could see through this hole the Santo Giovanni di Firenze, the baptistery in the center of the Piazza del Duomo" (Nagakura 1997). Then passers-by were asked to look through the peephole. "In this way Brunelleschi controlled precisely the position of the spectator" (O'Connor and Robertson 2003). "He then took out a flat, lead-backed mirror, which had just begun to be produced in Venice, and raised it at an arm's length in front of the board with the peephole. This mirror, obstructing the view toward the baptistery, instead reflected the backside of the board with the peephole. And on this backside of the board, Brunelleschi had painted a reversed image of the baptistery" (Nagakura 1997). Then he moved away the mirror leaving the

spectators in amazement because the real Baptistry and the painting depicting it – which is regarded as the first accurate perspective picture – were so similar. Between 1460 and 1470 Piero Della Francesca, in his three volume treatise, *On Perspective For Painting*, manifests a list of priorities; “First is sight, that is to say the eye; second is the form of the thing seen; third is the distance from the eye to the thing seen; fourth are the lines which leave the boundaries of the object and come to the eye; fifth is the intersection, which comes between the eye and the thing seen, and on which it is intended to record the object” (O'Connor and Robertson 2003). The peephole in Brunelleschi's painting marks the hole through which “the light emanating from the looker's eye” (Florenski 2003: 126) pours, extending in a pyramidal spectrum towards the objects making them visible; an Euklidian proposition once refuted by Al Haytham (Erdoğan 2006: 64). According to Nezih Erdoğan it wasn't for a metaphor that Alberti called the rays moving from the eye towards the object “the prince of beams” as it was usually the prince or the king (considering it was them or the few rich families who ordered the painting in the first place) who “occupied the most privileged point in the perspective system” (Erdoğan 2006: 61). Later, as the new system kicked in, all king's subjects would learn a new meaning of subjectivity as it was as if the looking alone that created all that is seen inside the frame, and looker alone that was the owner-master of the depicted palaces and mountains.

Brunelleschi's peephole also marks a “unique and extraordinary point in infinite space attributed with a special meaning; this is an absolute point and the only thing special about it is that it indicates the position of the artist, or rather the position of his right eye.[...] Thus, this point is declared to be the center of the world” (Florenski 2003: 127). In fact the infinite space – and along with it the notion of infinity itself – is no longer infinite; it is measured in metric system and layed before the privileged eyes, as seen in the detailed formulization of the world in Leonardo's writings: “If you place the intersection one metre from the eye, the first object, being four metres from the eye, will diminish by three-quarters of its height on the intersection; and if it is eight metres from the eye it will diminish by seven-eighths and if it is sixteen metres away it will diminish by fifteen-sixteenths, and so on. As the distance doubles so the diminution will double”

(O'Connor and Robertson 2003). In her introduction to the Turkish edition of Florenski's *Inverted Perspective*, Zeynep Sayın elaborately explains that

“this way of seeing that is peculiar to the New Age[...] this artistic method that determines what will be in the front and what will be in the back and what will be in the distance and what will be near in the space depicted in the picture is an extension of the Cartesian dominance by means of what the world is tamed and transformed into an extent that can be looked at from across and controlled.[...]the eye perceives the space depicted in the picture as an accomplished [captured dead] body positioned across him.[...] According to Florenski [...] ‘this is a demeanour that chains the spectator... to his seat... just like the prisoners in Plato’s hell’ and one that ‘forces him to act as if he had only one eye and what’s more, that eye is motionless.’ [...] What is important is not a looking that looks from different angles and one that is dynamic, but a generalization of the eye that has slipped out of its subjectivity and its physicality. For this reason Florenski defines the look that is peculiar to the New Age as – on the contrary to the very argument of Modernism – one that is distant from subjectivity and personality. [...] Such a way of seeing] not only looks at the world from its own central position, but by manifesting itself as a one-eyed giant it also assumes the entirety of existence to be motionless and totally invariable; it supposes to be the center of the world when in fact it’s stating its own passivity” (Sayın 2003: 10-11, 22).

At this point, it would be beneficial if we summarize briefly what aspects of perspective discussed above constitutes the analogy Baudry claimed to exist between it and cinema. First of all in perspective the looking spectator-subject is pre-constructed by the art-object because it is fully pre-dominant over the looking, which in a way turns the supposed subject into the real object. Second, Brunelleschi’s story and continuous study conducted by many artists and mathematicians over hundreds of years to eliminate imperfections regarding the representation of the world with perspective clearly shows that the primary intention is to create an impression of reality which itself becomes problematic the moment it’s proposed that it can be measured and determined scientifically. So the deception the spectator is caught in is a double-layered one; first, he is propelled to believe its his eyes that created the picture and that he is the subject, when his looking and his subjectivity is only a construction and second, he is led to believe what he is seeing is an unmediated, true representation of reality ‘as it is perceived by the eye’, which again reinforces the belief that it’s his eyes that the picture is a creation of, which once more, leading to a vicious circle, means that what is seen is not a creation but reality itself.

Before we proceed to the other end of the analogy, ‘subject-positioning’ and ‘reality impression’ in cinema which will be discussed in detail in the next sections, it should be mentioned that other ancestors of cinema also have strong relations with these notions. Camera’s antecedents the phenakistoscope, the zoetrope and the stroboscope of the 1830’s, the zoopraxiscope and the praxinoscope of the 1870’s and 1880’s were all animation devices designed in the 19th century built on the principle of displaying a rapid succession of images to produce the illusion of motion. This still remains to be fundamental as to how the cinematic apparatus functions. It is crucial to note that ‘motion picture film’, just like perspective painting, is not an invention of a particular setting or time, but rather the machine of a collective of research and experiments. It is not surprising that around the time Thomas Edison, Muybridge and Eastman invented the kinetoscope and started public screenings in the United States in 1891, Charles-Émile Reynaud started his public screenings with his invention the theatre optic in France in 1892, and not much later, in 1895 in France Lumiere Brothers built their own machine, the cinematograph and started public screenings around at the same time with Skladanowsky Brothers in Germany who had developed their own film projector, which was followed by the invention of the theatrograph (aka the animatograph) by Birt Acres and Robert W. Paul in 1896 in Britain. The first of two striking details is that starting from as early as 1896, French magician and filmmaker Georges Méliès started developing the first special effects in the history of film for which he came to be known as the Cinemagician; the second is that Muybridge and Edison had discussed adding sound to moving pictures in 1888, three years before they made the kinetoscope; considering all the noise the first talkies would create many years later and all the research to be conducted much later on film-sound and special effects, looking back from today, it seems like they (Edison, Muybridge and Méliès) must have had creating the best of reality impressions in their mind. All these indicate that cinema didn’t just come into being as an invention of a genius scientist all of a sudden, but that it is the product of a culture; a visual culture of the individual; it wouldn’t be going too far, I believe, to say ‘had they had the technology to build one, the Renaissance scientist-artists would definitely not fail to do so.’

Cinema's link with novel, to my observation, is weaker compared to its parallelisms to painting, photography and drama. Yet Metz claims that "the film is exhibitionist" – made for the purpose of being watched – "as was the classical nineteenth century novel with its plot and its characters which cinema is now copying (semiologically), continuing (historically), and replacing (sociologically, since the written text has now moved in other directions)" (Metz 1975 A: 546). To add to that, novel, a product of the age of the individual itself, was made for the individual, just like cinema. Still there's a major difference regarding the senses involved in perceiving the two types: "Psychophysiology makes a classic distinction between the "senses at a distance" (sight and hearing) and the others all of which involve immediate proximity and which it calls "senses of contact" (Pradines): touch, taste, smell, coenesthetic sense, etc." (Metz 1975 B: 261). Voyeurism and exhibitionism always deal with senses at a distance, hence cinema's exhibitionism and novel's coincide only up to a degree; film and novel are both created for private exhibition, but the latter does not necessarily involve scopic or invocatory drives. Moreover, cinema's tools are image and sound which are also aspects of reality as we perceive it, hence the danger proposed by the impression of reality; whereas novel is made up of words, instruments of signification, but ones probably not bearing the risk of being mistaken for what they signify. Lastly, cinema, drama, and painting rely heavily on hardware for their representations, whereas it's not quite the case for novel, which needs to be clearly emphasised for it is the applications of hardware – 'the apparatus' – by which the impression of reality is created in cinema, painting and drama.

As for drama... Florenski's claim that the true origins of perspective is in theater does not only refer to the very first use of the technique in the Ancient Greek theater in stage decoration; "the representation of the world in perspective is theatrical. This is also the source of the reality impression and a view of the world without a consciousness of responsibility. According to such a view of the world, life is no more action, but only a spectacle" (Florenski 2003: 61). According to him the objective of stage decoration was to "switch the places of reality and illusion as much as possible" (ibid. 56). The result of this cycle is the disappearance of the difference between the two; hence Brecht's thrust for a

revolution in theater in the mid 20th century; his method of alienation could as well be called ‘the unreality impression.’

2.1.2. The Functioning Of The Cinematic Apparatus

Metz makes a distinction between theater and cinema in means of voyeuristic regimes involved in each. Since they both are created for viewing and appeal to the scopic drive of the spectator, they are exhibitionist (the co-involvement of the invocatory drive in the experience of watching a film is also speakable, though Metz’s emphasis is in the presence/absence of each party in the to and fro relation in the voyeurism/exhibitionism so the focus is mainly in seeing/being seen). According to him theater’s is a “true exhibitionism” which

“contains an element of triumph, and is always bilateral, in the exchange of phantasies if not in its concrete actions; it belongs to the discourse rather than story, and is based entirely on the play of reciprocal identifications, on the conscious acceptance of the to-and-fro movement between I and you [...] in the never-ending alternation of its sides: active/passive, subject/object, seeing/being seen. If there is an element of triumph in this kind of representation, it is because what it exhibits is not exactly the exhibited object, but via the object, the exhibition itself. The exhibited partner knows that he is being looked at, wants this to happen, and identifies with the voyeur whose object he is (but who also constitutes him also as subject)” (Metz 1975 A: 546).

In theater the actor and the spectator are in each other’s presence during the performance, both party in awareness of each other’s position in the play. In cinema during the shooting the spectator is unpresent and at the time of the screening the actor is absent. This makes cinema both exhibitionist and non-exhibitionist and the regime it involves is the “key-hole regime;” in which “seeing is no longer a matter of sending something back, but of catching something unawares” (ibid. 547). In fact it’s only the film that does not know it’s being watched; the institution that is present in every film, the ideology that is ‘cinema’, so to speak, knows. So this lack of awareness is only a design which “allows the voyeur himself to be unaware that he is a voyeur” (ibid. 548). In the dark moviehouse there’s nothing *seen* but the uncommunicative fantasy-object. “[A]n object presented by an agent who hides rather than confronts our gaze;[...] to

some degree, we become the authoring agency as we make sense of an unfolding story that no one seems to tell.” (Nichols 1985: 543) “Authoring agency” is one of the keywords in the statement for truly understanding what happens to the spectator in such a regime; mark that the authority is withdrawn from the authoring agent – who seems to be unpresent – and granted to the spectator. Mark that this is not the sort of authority that is inherited through ‘the death of the author’ as Roland Barthes calls it, the sort supposedly equipping the spectator with space for creative and individual interaction; this is one that is in fact merely an illusory authority, because the authoring agency, far from being dead, is not more than hidden. “Insofar as it abolishes all traces of the subject of the enunciation, the traditional film succeeds in giving the spectator the impression that he is himself that subject, but in a state of emptiness and absence, of pure visual capacity (‘content’ is to be found only in what is seen)” (Metz 1975 A: 548). Again, as in the perspective painting, it’s the impression that what is seen is the creation of the seeing alone that leads the spectator to identify with himself, like in the mirror phase, but this time it’s not the image of his body that is on the screen but the image his seeing created; so his identification is with a seeing self, with “himself as a pure act of perception” (Metz 1975 B: 253). And once more, as in the perspective painting, the spectator-subject’s looking is pre-constructed by the art-object for what is seen is restricted to what is shown within the frame, and the seeing is determined by whose seeing determines the contents of the screen; that is the camera. What the spectator sees is what the one-eyed camera sees – or rather, has already seen. In other words, Cinema

“insist[s] on the role of monocular perspective (hence of the camera) and the “vanishing point” that incribes an empty emplacement for the spectator-subject, an all-powerful position which is that of God himself, or more broadly of some ultimate signified. And it is true that as he identifies with himself as look, the spectator can do no other than identify with the camera, too, which has looked before him at what he is now looking at and whose stationing (=framing) determines the vanishing point” (ibid. 253).

Further elaboration on the process shows that the whole film-viewing experience is maintained through a chain of mirror reflections; the fantasy that is film ‘emanating from the spectator’s eyes’ are reflected onto the screen, while

from behind his back, the projection machine is also pointed towards the screen. Simultaneously, the retina of the spectator's eyes, perceiving/capturing the images on the screen, consists a second screen.

During the performance the spectator is [...] duplicating the projector, which itself duplicates the camera, and he is also the sensitive surface duplicating the screen, which itself duplicates the filmstrip. [...] Releasing it, I am the projector, receiving it, I am the screen; in both these figures together, I am the camera, which points and yet which records (ibid. 254-255).

So the chain of mirror reflections, as it appears, in a sense, take place in the form of light entering a dark chamber (the meaning of *camera lucida* in Latin) – through a keyhole or a peephole – and moving in a closed circuit of mirrors all reflecting and receiving it simultaneously. In fact this metaphor of multiple mimesis that is at work within the movie theater – which itself duplicates at once the dark chamber that is the camera and the other that is the 'dark room' used for *developing* photographs – work even on a further level; the inner structure of the camera – with its "series of mirrors, lenses, apertures, and shutters, grounded glasses through which the light passes" (ibid. 255) – is a duplicate of the spectator's eye itself. The resulting effect is that the spectator becomes only an indistinguishable part of the machinery, or rather, the camera, the projector and the screen – the whole apparatus – becomes articulate organs of the spectator, as Jean-Louis Baudry argues; "the usual forms of identification, already supported by the apparatus, would be reinforced by a more archaic mode of identification, which has to do with the lack of differentiation between the subject and his environment, a dream scene model which we find in the baby/breast-screen relationship" (Baudry 1975: 313). Such disappearance of difference helps intensify the impression that the spectator himself is the authoring agency whose veiling is only a matter of design and ideology.

"The ideological mechanism at work in the cinema seems thus to be concentrated in the relationship between the camera and the subject. [...] Ultimately the forms of narrative adopted, the "contents" of the image, are of little importance so long as an identification remains possible. [...] Everything happens as if, the subject himself being unable - and for a reason - to account for his own situation, it was necessary to substitute secondary organs, grafted to replace his own defective ones, instruments or ideological formations capable of filling his function as subject. In

fact, this substitution is only possible on the condition that the instrumentation itself be hidden or repressed" (Baudry 1970: 295).

According to Baudry, it's the impression of continuity created by the film that hides its mode and means of functioning; the film consists of still images joined and projected in a rapid succession in order to create an illusion of motion. Adjacent images are slightly different from each other but "in consequence of an organic factor (presumably persistence of vision)" (ibid. 290) the eye is deceived and the illusion of motion is maintained. Persistence of vision is claimed to be a phenomenon – a defect, to some – of the eye (or the brain) as a result of which the image is retained by the retina for a fraction of a second. Hypothetically this allows for each frame to be smoothly superimposed upon the previous one, thus the brief discontinuities between the film frames escape perception. This theory and those theorists who use it, especially Baudry, are fiercely criticized for utilizing this invalidated "myth". Nichols and Lederman explain that "the impression of movement is not due to the persistence of vision" – which in fact should be called "positive afterimages" – but actually related to two perceptual phenomena known as "visual flicker" and "apparent motion" (Nichols and Lederman 1981: 294). Joseph and Barbara Anderson who claim to be the first ones to invalidate the theory in question in 1978, revisited the subject in 1993 because of the ongoing "lack of careful scholarship among film writers" (Anderson and Anderson 1993) which was one of the main reasons the persistence of vision theory entered the film literature in the first place.

Those engaged in film study cling to persistence of vision because they need it. For film scholars, it is our myth of creation. It answers our central question of origin: Why, when we look at a succession of still images on the film screen or TV set, are we able to see a continuous moving image? [...] And just as the story of Adam and Eve explains not only the mechanism by which people originated and reproduced but also specifies the relationship of human beings to God, the myth of creation for the motion picture contains not only the mechanism for the origin of motion, but implies the relationship of the film to the viewer. The viewer implied by the Myth of Persistence of Vision is a passive viewer upon whose sluggish retina images pile up. [...] Indeed, in the past decade, psychoanalytic-Marxist film scholars have retained the model implied by persistence of vision: theirs is a passive viewer, a spectator who is "positioned," unwittingly "sutured" into the text, and victimized by excess ideology. (Anderson and Anderson 1993)

In Joseph and Barbara Anderson's article, it's quite explicit that their interest and intention far exceed the demythologizing of this inaccurate theory; they quite openly take a furious stance against the creationist belief and against what they call psychoanalytic-Marxist theory and they even seem to be disturbed by the fact that this Europe-oriented theory found many followers in America. Both couples, Nichols and Lederman, and Joseph and Barbara Anderson are particularly concerned about the implication that the persistence of vision posits that the human body is imperfect. In their articles they quote James Monaco and Frederick A. Talbot respectively explaining it's a "defect" of the human eye that accounts for the impression of continuity in film viewing. Nichols and Lederman call explanations involving persistence of vision "catechism" – book containing the main principles of Christianity – and the Andersons describe scornfully Talbot's elaborations on the matter as "most colorful explanations." It's clear that the attitude adopted by both articles is one championing the anthropocentric view of the Universe (hence the anti-creationist/evolutionist commentary playing down the implication of a probable deficiency in the human body): the very ideology Baudry attempted to expose in film, and Florenski, in Renaissance painting.

According to the Andersons, the collapse of the theory of persistence of vision brings down the whole argument regarding the construction of the pseudo-subjectivity of the spectator by the film and so film studies must now take a new turn.

"If there are indeed two separate computational strategies or two separate anatomical modules employed by the visual system for processing closely spaced stimuli and widely spaced stimuli, then the motion picture falls within the limits of the closely spaced category. [...]"

Motion in the motion picture is, as we have said, an illusion, but since it falls within the short-range or "fine grain" category it is transformed by the rules of that system – that is, the rules for transforming real continuous movement. The visual system can (and does) distinguish between long-range and short-range apparent motion, but it seemingly cannot distinguish between short-range apparent motion and real motion. To the visual system the motion in a motion picture is real motion.

If this is true, if to our perception the successive still images of a motion picture are processed in the same way and are indistinguishable from the unbroken motion of the natural world, then what are the implications? How must a theory of the cinema be modified to accommodate such a finding? There is, of course, the housekeeping chore of reevaluating

recent film theories in the light of a new paradigm. For example, one would expect to find support for Metz's early assertion in *Film Language* that motion in the cinema is not a re-presentation, but a presentation, not the re-experience but the experience of motion (Metz 7-9). Equally, one would expect to expose the essential irrelevance of Baudry's concern about effacing differences and suppressing the "discontinuity inscribed by the camera", i.e. the spaces between the frames of a motion picture (Baudry)" (ibid). (*underlining theirs*)

Baudry's claim was that the functioning of the apparatus takes advantage of "an organic factor (*presumably* persistence of vision)" to create the impression of motion in film; so we learn now in fact it is another factor called "short range apparent motion" which is responsible for this effect and it is by the same phenomenon that our eyes perceive real motion, so they (the Andersons) propose that the argument concerning the negation of differences becomes irrelevant as to the ideological effects of the cinematic apparatus supposed to exist by Baudry. According to him, the negation of differences between the frames during the projection is crucial, because it is the only way it could create the impression of continuity; the projection has to hide the differences between the frames to create an effect of motion. It's the Andersons again who give us the technical details about the motion picture; "In the motion picture, a series of rapidly presented, closely spaced images, the duration of each image (34.72 ms with two interruptions of 6.95 ms each), the interval between images or interstimulus interval (6.95 ms), and the spatial displacement from one frame to the next (generally less than 15' of visual arc), fall well within the parameters of short-range apparent motion" (ibid). Such technical precision is needed, because otherwise the illusion of motion cannot be created; for instance if the interval between the projection of each frame was longer, the frames would be perceived not as continuous movement, but as separate still images perceived at different times and the differences between the frames would be exposed. (Similarly, it is known that in the early days of film, experiments proved that frame rates per second below 16 caused the eyes to see flashing images; today 24 frames per second has become a standard and to reduce the appearance of flicker, projector shutters are designed to add additional flicker periods, typically doubling the flicker rate to 48 Hz.) So it's clear that the cinematic apparatus is designed to cover up/obscure/hide/repress the differences between frames by projecting individual frames at a certain speed and certain times per second with certain

flicker rates; the total result of these arrangements create the effect that is short range apparent motion. What's more is that the effect is not due to a defect as it was proposed to be according to the persistence of vision theory, but due to a limitation of the eye which "*cannot* distinguish between short-range apparent motion and real motion" (ibid).

What is more important is that the illusion of motion is crucial to the extent that it helps create the impression of reality, the impression that the movement of the camera is the movement of our eyes and that we are face to face with an objective, unmediated reality. So all in all, even if the differences were not effaced by the projection as the Andersons claim, it wouldn't change the fact that the film presents itself as reality through the primary identification of the spectator, that is with the camera. The so-called psychoanalytic-Marxist theory emphasizes the passivity of the spectator not because the images pile up upon his sluggish retina, but because the film-viewing experience reinforces him to identify with the camera so that the film can pass itself off as reality, when it is not. As for the Andersons' call for re-evoking an understanding of motion in cinema as *presentation* and not *re-presentation*, it's one approach Metz himself had renounced.

"In the early essays Metz took for granted a lot of commonplaces about the cinema, deriving notably from the Bazinian tradition, such as the notion of a possible unmediated representation of "reality." In the essays the notion of reality is taken as unproblematic. [...] In *Language and Cinema*, however, there is no such stable implicit starting point. The book revolves entirely around the concept of signification itself, with no assurance that what is being signified is ever in any simple sense "the real." The processes of signification in the cinema are in fact, as Metz himself had already discovered, extremely complex" (Nowell-Smith 1976).

The very ideological effects of cinema add up to its intention to pose as the unmediated presentation of reality, in other words, the spectator's inclination to perceive it as the projection of his own perception of reality. Putting forth the fact that "to the visual system the motion in a motion picture is real motion" indeed reinforces the argument that the spectator is inclined to perceive it as reality. Whereas it's "always a reality worked upon, elaborated, selected" (Baudry 1970: 290). In this sense, the notion of continuity is not only a matter of perception of motion

maintained through the projection of still images in rapid succession, but it is also an aspect of narration. What is essentially intended from the writing of the script till the formation of the “finished product” through complex editing processes – the preparation of the storyboard, selection of settings, costumes, lights, camera angles etc. before and during the shooting and selection and organisation of separate shots and sequences, and sounds and special effects etc. after the shooting – is the maintenance of a coherent/homogeneous/continuous spatiotemporal order. Entrance to this order is only through looking that is synonymous in film with locking onto the camera; as long as the continuity of this order is sustained, the primary identification will perpetuate. “It is a question for preserving at any cost the synthetic unity of the locus where meaning originates [the subject] – the constituting transcendental function to which narrative continuity points back as its natural secretion” (ibid. 293). So it’s the precise arrangements in the designation and the functioning of the apparatus that forms and preserves the formal continuity and it’s the precise organisation of the narrative elements through which the spatiotemporal continuity is maintained. Due to the pace (both in means of the projection of images in rapid succession and the pace/rhythm of spatiotemporal movement of the film) and consistency of the narrative the attendance/engagement of the spectator also becomes a construction, or rather a pre-construction. “Rhythm in narrative cinema comes down to this: by forcing the spectator to make inferences at a certain rate the narration governs what and how we infer” (Bordwell 1985: 76).

If we get back on track; the film hides its subjectivity by posing as a story that is told by no one; by reinforcing primary and secondary identifications, it gives the spectator the impression that indeed he himself is the storyteller. But then, the spectator resembles the dreamer, more than the storyteller. Because while the meaning seems to be originating from the spectator forcing him to assume the role of the authoring agency, he’s not more than a witness as the film always runs at present-continuous tense – even during flashbacks; in the film “the narrator's presence is only salient at the moment he or she speaks. Otherwise, the combined force of the diegetic visual and sound images dominate, giving the impression that things are happening right there before us” (Chatman 1999: 328). The past tense of the story always puts forth explicitly that it is a “finished”

account, that the storyworld and the act of telling it are of distinct spatiotemporalities. On the other hand, the cinema experience is one that resembles the dream state in which the meaning originates from the unconscious of the dreamer, yet, unlike the storyteller, all he can do is pursue the flow of the dream-events and make decisions as they occur while he cannot distinguish between the dream he is in and reality.

2.2. Inversion Of The Ideological Effects Of The Cinematic Apparatus

This section revolves around the question ‘can and with what means the ideological effects of the cinematic apparatus be repressed?’ Certain keywords in Nichols’ passage – quoted below – criticizing Baudry’s approach to cinema serve as entry points to the discussion regarding this question. In his criticism of Baudry's approach to cinema, he writes:

"[According to Baudry] The cinema is ideologically tainted from square one – by the work of the technological apparatus. An ideology is embedded so deeply that no discourse, no text is conceivable that would not fall prey to it (even films reflecting upon, say fusion like Sharits's "T,O,U,C,H,I,N,G" must do so with the taint unquestioningly). Besides, as we have noted earlier, the imaginary realm and the constitution of the self-as-subject are not wholly ideological in a negative sense.[...] What is at stake is how this subject is placed within a larger, and, ideally, controlling context of symbolic exchange. Politically revolutionary cinema need not necessarily denounce its own technological base and refuse to present a coherent, stable world of successive images in apparent movement. The self-as-subject can be the locus of social change as well as the anchor point of ideology. Brecht, for example, envisioned an art that would call forth conscious subjects desirous of realizing their capability to change the way things are for how they might be. Conceptions of ideology like Baudry's run the risk of eliminating any site from which contestation and change might issue. There is a danger of fetishizing the materiality of the cinema, of valorizing critiques of the technological apparatus above and beyond questions of the use of the apparatus so that the possibility of a thorough deconstruction or critique of the cinema as a social institution becomes remote" (Nichols and Lederman 1981: 300-301).

Summarizing briefly at first the ideological effects of the cinematic apparatus would be beneficial: the primary identification maintained through the formal (regarding the projection of images in rapid succession) and narrative

continuity the spectator is fixed to a position of pseudo-subjectivity; the result is that the film hides its subjectivity and passes itself off as the witnessing of an unmediated, objective reality. The ideology it posits is the individualistic ideology of modernity it is a product of; while the freedom attributed to individualism itself is questionable, the constructed subjectivity the film provides the spectator is certainly controversial. If we refer to the previous discussion on the perspective painting, it should be re-emphasized that a fixed viewpoint does not denote freedom but entrapment in limited space; consequently, the movement effect created by many still images displayed in rapid succession does not provide a multiplicity of viewpoints, but a multiple number of fixed subject positions, the movement being from one fixed subject position to the next. So the “self-as-subject” in cinema is not more than an impression of subjectivity created by the film; the target of Nichols’ criticism Baudry had in fact expressed the falsity of the spectator’s subjectivity in his famous article:

“It is evident that cinema is not dream: but it reproduces an impression of reality, it unlocks, releases a cinema effect which is comparable to the impression of reality caused by dream. The entire cinematographic apparatus is activated in order to provoke this simulation: it is indeed a simulation of a condition of the subject, a position of the subject, a subject and not reality” (Baudry 1975: 316).

The positive sense of the term self-as-subject requires a selective consciousness, while in cinema the elements of the spectator’s consciousness are pre-selected – his viewpoint is constructed, what and how he will make inferences and at what rate is governed by the narration (as Bordwell explains). In this point it is essential to emphasize that what the politically revolutionary cinema always primarily attempts is indeed to drive the spectator out of that constructed subject position; only then he will attain a critical standpoint of his own. This is only possible by disrupting the continuity of the spatiotemporal order of the film that is maintained by the continuity of formal and narrative motion. So while seeking a form of stillness, I agree with Nichols and Lederman, the politically revolutionary cinema need not necessarily denounce its own technological base and refuse to present a coherent, stable world of successive images in apparent movement, but then it needs to continually repress it, because the machinery is designed to conceal itself, its functioning and its state as film. The moment the continuity is

impeded, the mode and means of the film's production is exposed and like in some dreams the dreamer comes to realize he is in a dream, through the applications of reflexivity the spectator is provided with a potential passage to true subjectivity and a similar state of self-consciousness.

“The term [Reflexivity] was first borrowed from philosophy and psychology, where it originally referred to the mind's capacity to be both subject and object to itself within the cognitive process, but was extended metaphorically to the arts to evoke the capacity for self-reflexion of any medium or language. In the broadest sense, artistic reflexivity refers to the process by which texts foreground their own production, their authorship, their intertextual influences, their textual processes, or their reception” (Stam, Burgoyne and Flitterman-Lewis 2002: 200).

A reflexive artwork is one that contemplates upon itself. If we refer back to Metz elaborations on the difference between the film and the cinema institution, the film is unaware of it's being watched and the type of voyeurism it leads to is a keyhole regime that is uncommunicative, monological, and one in which the spectator forgets that he himself is a voyeur. Reflexive artwork is one that is self-conscious of it's own constructedness and means of construction; such a film knows it's being watched and that it was made to be watched. The film revealing it's own features evokes self-awareness in the spectator, too, allowing him to realize his own position as to viewing a film and not reality.

As for the question of how a film reveals its own principles of construction, it covers a wide range of applications, and not only displaying the cinematographic instruments within the film, as the term “revealing its own means of construction” literally means, which is frequently done. Abbas Kiarostami, for example, is seen with his crew and equipment shooting the film in the final scene of *Taste of Cherry*, and in *Through the Olive Trees* multiple “takes” of a scene's shooting including the dialogues between the director and the actors are displayed. The main intention always comes down to disrupting the continuity; that includes disrupting it literally and also creating counter-continuities or multiple spatiotemporalities within the film. Kiarostami's laying bare the act of shooting not only disrupts the continuous concealment of the apparatus – concealment of the film's filmness – but it also creates another

spatiotemporality (or diegesis) juxtaposed to the filmic diegesis, that is of the director and his crews’.

It was Russian Formalist Shklovsky who first used the term *ostranenie* or defamiliarization “to denote the way art heightens perception and short-circuits automatized responses” (ibid. 10). This approach broadens our understanding of continuity even further; “subverting routinized perception [...] by the use of unmotivated formal devices based on deviations from the established norms of language and style” (ibid) disrupts the continuity of the presence and the effects of the cinema institution engraved in every film. This method corresponds especially with the double distancing (between the actor and the part and between the actor and the spectator) technique of Bertolt Brecht; double-distancing achieved through, for instance, exaggerated acting, not only makes obvious the acting of the actors instead of presenting them in resemblance to reality, but also disrupts the established norms regarding acting, both on stage and in social life. So dealing a blow to established methods of using the apparatus and forms of narration – for example, instead of zooming into the face of the actor and blurring before a flashback to draw a clear line between the present and the past or the memory, Tarkovsky, in *Nostalgia*, deliberately avoids distinction between multiple spatiotemporalities of dream, remembrance and reality – evokes in the spectator an awareness concerning the conventional applications of the apparatus and narration, thus exposes the film’s subjectivity while challenging the settled perceptions of “normality” both in film, and in the milieu of the spectator.

All of the applications characteristic to the Brechtian theater, double distancing, use of the *gestus* and alienation affects etc. could be listed under the category of reflexivity and the central concern throughout coincides with what I have been attempting to signify by the phrase *disrupting the continuity* – formal, narrative and institutional continuity. “The dominant narrative strategy” in the Brechtian theater “was one of montage, the juxtaposition of self-contained units rather than of organic growth and the evolution of a homogeneous structure” (ibid. 198-199). As well as alienation affects such as revealing the instruments such as the lighting and scaffolding of the sets, direct address to the spectator,

exaggerated acting etc., *radical separation of the elements* was one of Brecht's main principles:

“[A] structuring technique which functioned both ‘horizontally,’ i.e. each scene would be radically separated from its ‘neighboring’ scenes, and ‘vertically,’ in that each ‘track’ was to exist in tension with other tracks. The Brechtian aesthetic set scene against scene and track – music, dialogue, lyric – against track” (ibid. 200).

The narrative approach Brechtian theater adopted was discontinuous and fractured, presenting itself as a heterogeneous being, made up of parts – continually displaying its madeness and the functioning of its parts. The same can be said of the cinema of the likes of Godard and Resnais who applied Brechtian techniques to film. Keeping the spectator conscious through applications of reflexivity such as using inserts (photographs, writings, interviews), episodic narration, multiple diegesis etc. is their main concern. Voice-over narration is also another method used extensively in a reflexive manner; the characteristics of voice-over narration constitutes the subject of the next chapter. But it should be noted plainly that in Godard and Resnais voice-over is also an instrument of mixing the mediums; bringing literature along with theater to film.

“As a critic, I [*Jean-Luc Godard*] thought of myself as a filmmaker. Today I still think of myself as a critic and in a sense I am, more than ever before. Instead of writing criticism, I make a film, but the critical dimension is subsumed. I think of myself as an essayist producing essays in novel form or novels in essay form: only instead of writing, I film them” (Hillier 1992: 59).

Superimposing mediums on one another – in correspondance with using multiple diegesis and mixing genres – mediums are deconstructed and the aim is to repress the effects of the cinema medium, both in means of its technological infrastructure and narrative processes: simply – well, not so simply – because “the medium is the message” (McLuhan and Fiore 2000); the ideology that constitutes the form is far more significant and effective than that is in the content (hence the medium is the *message*), and each form delivers its own decryption method which in a way relaxes / relieves tension from / makes indolent the *muscles* of perception and interpretation (therefore the medium is the *massage*). The phrase *deconstruction of the medium* alone summarizes the principles of

reflexivity, and not only regarding the use of voice-over by the Brechtian filmmakers, but as the main characteristic of all attempts of reflexivity in all artforms. The visible brush strokes of Van Gogh, the metafiction of the likes of John Fowles, Italo Calvino and Michel Butor, the self-referential and fractured music of the 70s' progressive (and 80s' neo-progressive) rock groups such as Pink Floyd, Van Der Graaf Generator and Marillion etc. all set out to lay bare the topographic properties of the mediums in which they present their works.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the ideological effects of the cinematic apparatus can only be repressed or bypassed but never nullified or destroyed because the totalitarian ideology of the pseudo-subjectivity is installed in the camera which inherits the monocular perspective, as discussed earlier. The repression of this effect is only possible by continually interrupting the formal, narrative and institutional continuity to expose the form, narration and institution the film bears for they are all hidden behind the coherent, continuous homogeneity of the spatiotemporal order they together create. This way the film's filmness, its subjectivity can be put forth by the film itself, inverting the impression that the fantasy that is film emanated from the mind of the spectator, allowing him to take his own critical stance in a dialogical relationship between himself and the film.

3. Voice-over Narration As The Reflexive Instrument Of Subjectivity

In this chapter the potential the use of voice-over narration creates for revealing the film's subjectivity will be explored. Towards the realization of this aim the primary questions that ask to be answered – 'are all instances of voice-over narration applications of reflexivity?' and 'what are the properties of the type of voice-over narration that reveals the film's filmness?' – will be discussed in section 2.1. Voice-over Narration And Authentic Reflexivity. In section 2.2. Film's Subjectivity Revealed by the Voice-over Narration the questions of 'how does the use of voice-over narration reveal film's subjectivity?'. 'What are the qualities of the relationship between the spectator and the film when a voice-over narration is used?' will be examined in relation with the key terms reflexivity, narration, spatiotemporality, identification and subjectivity.

3.1. Voice-over Narration And Authentic Reflexivity

Voice-over narration is not an uncommon technique in cinema; it is used quite frequently in films of all currents, waves and nations since the first talkies. Its roots are in the storytelling traditions of thousands of years, the chorus of the classical theater, different narrative forms of literature, the intertitles and live commentators of the silent era and the radio shows of the 1920's preceding the deployment of sound in films. It has been rejected, along with sound (and even more fiercely than sound), by many filmmakers and critics for various reasons including its 'easiness' and 'redundancy' and the potential it (and it's heritage) harbours for contaminating the essence of cinema that was supposed to be a 'pure' art of the image. Numerous types of voice-over narration varying in tone and style with different narrative functions and structural purposes are used in films. My argument is that even the mere superimposition of voice-over narration – with it's difference from other sounds in film including dialogue, music and sound effects etc. in taking on the role of being the main source of narration during it's employment – upon the image-driven film is enough to attribute it with

a *potential* for reflexivity. However it must be stressed that not all utilizations of voice-over narration fulfills that potential and creates reflexivity. Before we go on and try to come up with a generalising sketch of a definition of the type of voice-over narration that lays bare the film's filmness, two modes of reflexivity needs to be touched upon.

Robert Stam, Robert Burgoyne and Sandy Flitterman-Lewis posit that despite the major intention of Althusserian movement to equate 'realist' with 'bourgeois', 'reflexive' with 'revolutionary' and 'Hollywood' with 'passivity-inducing' (equations which they don't support), Brecht "distinguished between realism as "laying bare society's casual network – a goal recognizable within a reflexive, modernist aesthetic – and realism as a historically determinate set of conventions. His critique of realism centered on the ossified conventions of the nineteenth-century novel and naturalist theater, but not on the goal of truthful representation" (Stam, Burgoyne and Flitterman-Lewis 2002: 201-202). It's crucial to note that in terms of Brechtian aesthetics 'truthful representation' and 'realist representation' signify quite distinct economies, only in similar words; to put it simply and to keep the bourgeois/realist discussion brief, in Brechtian theater, the world is not represented via a mirror in the realist sense, instead the reflection is of a reworked image that has the power to alienate. Next they (Stam, Burgoyne and Flitterman-Lewis's) move on to arguing that 'reflexive' need not necessarily be equated with 'progressive' or 'revolutionary' since realist films and even commercial TV are also reflexive but do not evoke self-consciousness in the spectator.

"[...] the reflexivity characterizing films, such as *Singing in the Rain*, which foreground cinema as an institution, which emphasize spectacle and artifice, but ultimately within an illusionistic aesthetic which has little to do with subversive, demystificatory or revolutionary purposes or procedures. The reflexivity of a certain avant-garde, similarly, is eminently cooptable within an 'artsy' Formalism. One might speak, similarly, of the postmodern reflexivity of commercial television, which is often reflexive and self-referential, but whose reflexivity is, at most, ambiguous.[...] Many of the distancing features characterized as reflexive in Godard's films also seem to typify many television shows: the designation of the apparatus (cameras, monitors, switches), the 'disruption' of narrative flow (via commercials); the juxtaposition of heterogeneous slices of discourses; the mixing of documentary and fictive modes. Yet rather than trigger 'alienation effects,' television is

often simply alienating in a different sense. The commercial interruptions that disrupt fiction programming, for example, are not intended to make the tele-spectator think but rather to feel and to buy. The self-referential humor signals the spectator the commercial is not to be taken seriously, and this relaxed state of expectation renders the viewer more permeable to the commercial message” (ibid. 202-203).

The very reason I attempted to define reflexivity as continuous disruption of the formal, narrative *and* institutional continuity and not as mere self-referentiality is because the applications should be considered as inseparable from the conscious intentions of the artwork and the resulting state of consciousness it creates in the spectator, otherwise the applications alone will not exceed being just formal and narrative plays or fashionable aesthetic elements – as in the case of *Singing in the Rain* and the “certain avant-garde” Stam, Burgoyne and Flitterman-Lewis mention. As for the reflexivity supposed to exist in the fiction programmes and shows on commercial TV, what immediately raises question is the exclusion of commercials out of the narrative flow of the fiction films on TV by saying it is interrupted by commercials. The term “commercial TV” alone is an explicit confirmation of commercials’ role as the leading one. What’s more, disruption should not be considered as the full-stopping of the film; none of Godard’s films stop at certain points in the film and then it’s called disruption of the flow; a reflexive disruption of the flow of a film is by creating countercurrents, fracturations, moments of stillness even while the projector is working and the film still going. It’s obvious that the cameras, monitors and switches seen on certain programmes are there to create a realist intimacy, rather than a reflexive distancing. How solid an argument would it be to claim that the adjacent slices of discourses in a TV programme are in tension with each other and that they are of a heterogeneous order when in fact all that is intended by gathering of all these slices together is to keep the spectator watching? Keep the spectator watching until the next round of commercials. Unsurprisingly even the commercials themselves started using those applications generally considered to be of reflexivity; should we call them meta-commercials now because they are self-referential and they show the spectator the innerworkings of the commercial world? The commercials, just like other TV programmes, do not narrate, but try to persuade, and when they contemplate upon themselves it is to introduce an improved technique for persuasion, if not deceit. In fact in their concurrence in their expectations and

concerns regarding the market, customers and revenues and in keeping the emphasis on consumption, the flow of films, serials, shows, news and commercials altogether constitute the very continuity of the capitalist system, hence they reinforce the institutional continuity, let alone disrupt it. That's why Roemer van Toorn distinguishes between *authentic reflexivity* and *narcotic reflexivity*;

“With authentic reflexivity, the spectator is actively involved. With many television programmes, by contrast, the consumer remains passive and is swamped with narcotic, culinary experiences. Television acts here like a rubber wall. You try to communicate with it, but every action simply bounces back at you. Brecht's goal was not to satisfy audience expectations but to transform them, whereas the central impulse of commercial television is to transform only two things: the audience's viewing habits and its buying habits. Brecht's goal was not to be popular in box-office terms but to become popular, that is, to create a new public for a new theatre linked to modes of social life, whereas commercial television's goal, at least from the point of view of its managers, is to be popular in the crudely quantitative terms of 'ratings'” (van Toorn 1997).

So while it's hard not to agree with Stam, Burgoyne and Flitterman-Lewis in their analysis regarding what happens to the spectator in the described relationship, it's doubtful that 'mixing of documentary and fictive' modes is a failed attempt at reflexivity for reversing this alienation-in-a-different-sense, rather than being one of the very reasons of it. According to Neil Postman “Entertainment is the supra-ideology of all discourse on television. No matter what is depicted or from what point of view, the overarching presumption is that it is there for our amusement and pleasure” (Postman 2004: 102). So the co-existence of such contradictory modes side by side on TV (commercials followed by entertainment shows followed by news – which in Turkey is much worse because the news itself is a mix of entertainment and serious news) causes the difference between serious and unserious, real and unreal be destroyed. This may also be responsible for the disappearance of what Stjepan G. Mestrovic calls “the bond between emotion and reason which is supposed to exist for action” (Mestrovic 1999: 51-52)² ending in the passivization of the spectator; a news video footage from an ongoing war, for instance, moves the emotions for the time-being but does not fuel action. Because, the news is not more than a simulation, like everything else on TV – and so are our temporary emotions, it could be argued, moving on

² Translated by the author of this text.

from Mestrovic's argument. So it wouldn't be going too far, I believe, to say reflexivity on TV is also a simulation.

To conclude this discussion of authentic and narcotic reflexivities, I'd like to propose a question – which is not rhetorical, but the answer to which remains unknown to me also. May it be that applications of reflexivity required to deconstruct a medium not necessarily be applicable to another medium? Maybe each medium or even a text determines the means of laying bare its mode of functioning just as it determines the features of the relationship it sets between itself and its spectator or reader. For instance, from the perspective of psychoanalysis, cinema is secretive because it reveals less than it should in order to allow the spectator to take a critical stance and its cloak of secrecy is its continuity in various means, hence the continuous disruption of it creates reflexivity. On the other hand, TV is secretive because it shows too much; Neil Postman argues that instead of Orwell's model of disinformation (or lack of information) in *1984* in which the public knew little and only what the Party had strictly censored and modified, Huxley's model in *Brave New World* is the one that suits the current information regime, that is being lost in a sea of information. "Orwell feared those who would deprive us of information. Huxley feared those who would give us so much that we would be reduced to passivity and egoism. Orwell feared that the truth would be concealed from us. Huxley feared the truth would be drowned in a sea of irrelevance" (Postman 2004: 8). So a reading of TV in this vein leads us to ask; may it be that the means of its deconstruction does not lie in disrupting its continuity but in inverting its information policy?

To get back on our track towards determining the boundaries of the type of voice-over narration that is capable of revealing the film's subjectivity – meaning, one that is not an application of narcotic reflexivity – it should be stressed that reflexivity is not the category of the formal and narrative applications but of the self-conscious direction and action towards making the spectator self-conscious of his own position. So it should also be made clear that my attempt will be to formulate a generalisation only and that each voice-narrated film indeed needs to be considered in its own terms of consciousness and the experience of the spectator.

In her book *Invisible Storytellers - Voice-over Narration in American Fiction Film* (1988), when defining voice-over narration Sarah Kozloff explains;

"...in 'voice-over narration' all three words are fully operative.[...] *Voice* determines the medium: we must hear someone speaking. [...] *Over* pertains to the relationship between the source of the sound and the images on the screen: the viewer does not see the person who is speaking at the time of hearing his or her voice.[...] *Narration* relates to the content of the speech: someone is in the act of communicating a narrative – that is, recounting a series of events to an audience" (Kozloff 1988: 2-3).

In the instant we mention 'narration' we're talking about a *story* that has been *completed* in the past and thus has reached before this moment the state in which it can be *related*. It should be remembered that what the film hides is its narration; the very impression that what is being presented is reality automatically blocks the idea of the existence of a narration. The unveiling of the narration will be discussed in the next section, but now it needs to be emphasized that the voice-over narration immediately brings in the pastness of narrative instead of the present continuousness of 'reality'. What is meant by the term 'pastness' is not the verb tense used in voice-over narration – even though it's the past tense that is usually used – it's the tense of the narrative, so to speak. Kozloff quotes Willam Labov stating that

"Narrative clauses are clauses with a simple past tense verb (or in some styles a verb in the simple present).[...] Complete narratives break down into six elements: the abstract (a short summary of the story that is about to be provided); the orientation (identification of time, place, characters, and activities); the complicating action (the unfolding of the story's events); the resolution (the climax); the evaluation (commentary elucidating the point of the story); and the coda (an epilogue, often bridging the gap between story time and the time of narrating). Thus, while the complicating action and resolution generally use simple past tense constructions, orientations, for instance, often contain past progressive verbs" (ibid. 3).

As mentioned earlier, generally the past tenses constitute the verbs of the narration, but it's not a necessity, as long as what I call *narrative tense* is managed to be kept as past. What is crucial for the film's filmness to be revealed is that the spatiotemporalities of the narrated and the narration be distinct; the time and space of the narration and the time and space of the story-world depicted in the film must be different and the difference put forth in the film. (At this point it needs to be

mentioned that embedded (also doubly-embedded) voice-over narrations are not capable of revealing the film's subjectivity; since these narrators are situated in a story in the main story of the film, even though their spatiotemporality is different from the story-world they depict, they themselves are parts of the story-worlds they are told from. To simplify, the type of voice-over narration that exposes a film's filmness is always one in which the voice-over narrator is situated up one level from the main story depicted in the film.) So since the story-world is always a world that existed in the past (for the narrator), the perspective of the narrative is always directed backwards from a time in the future of the events in the story. (Of course when narrating a fantasy that is yet to take place or putting into words a prophecy about a future time, the direction would eventually be reversed.) But the verb tenses used can be selected from a variety of tenses. For example, a story that took place in the past can be told using present or present continuous tenses and it still can be indicated clearly that the events narrated are not happening in current time but already happened in the past; 'A man who wants to get rid of his past realizes one day that if he told every single memory he has, his memory will be erased. So he starts looking for someone to tell all that is in his mind...'

Likewise, although Labov's formulization of the elements of complete narratives is accurate, since voice-over narration in a film may consist a part of a narrative and also because language could be used in endless ways, none of the narrative elements mentioned may not be present but still a comprehensible narration be maintained. For instance a technique based on flow of conscience or conversations could be used to tell even the whole story; the style adopted by the voice-over narration can vary as long as it's not mistaken for internal monologue, soliloqui, delusional voices echoing in a character's mind or film dialogues because all these belong to the diegetic world of the story. Of course, each case is to be considered individually; for instance Kozloff mentions that sometimes "interior monologue can be so interlaced with narration that the blend is undefinable (e.g., *Raw Deal* [Mann, 1948])" (ibid. 6). In such a case, like in every other case, one of the most important pre-determined criteria is that the potential for creating authentic reflexivity in each usage of the voice-over narration in fact lies in whether it helps the film give the impression that the events are happening right there at our presence or not. In many films voice-over narration is used for

the sole purposes of tying scenes, giving certain orientation information quickly, creating intimacy with the viewer, introducing characters, triggering flashbacks etc. and they are never used again throughout the film or till the end of the film. According to Kozloff the consistency of the voice's presence throughout the film is not important:

"Frequency of narration per se does not make that much difference; voice-over is like strong perfume - a little goes a long way. Critics charge that voice-over preludes that anchor a film to a character who never narrates again, as in Hitchcock's *Rebecca* (1940), are a cheap trick for creating instant nostalgia. The trick may be cheap but it is also completely effective. More narration would keep our attention focused on the narrator rather than the action, but would not be responsible for establishing the pose that the film is Mrs. De Winter's personal story, not an objective account from a removed image-maker. As Eric Smoodin puts it, 'Once the presence of the voice-over narrator has been established, the entire film serves as a sort of linguistic event, as the narrator's speech even when there is none'" (ibid. 47).

My argument is that for the subjectivity of the film to be revealed, the voice must appear more than a few times during the film; otherwise it will just become an aesthetic element or an auxiliary instrument in presenting the film as reality in present tense, instead of turning it into a reflexive narrative. I have discussed thoroughly in the previous chapter that the film tends to obliterate its traces of its filmness by hiding its means and mode of functioning, always keeping the spectator hooked to the present continuous tense of the camera. As Kozloff admits, less narration keeps our attention focused on the action rather than the narrator, whereas a voice that continually makes his presence realized throughout the film keeps our attention focused on the narrator, on the narration itself that means.

So the answer to the question 'what type of voice-over narration reveals the film's subjectivity?' is that it is one that is situated in a different space and time from that of the storyworld and which makes itself heard continually throughout the film in order to lay bare the narration and deal a blow to the impression of reality created by the continuous flow of the film. 'By what means or how this type of voice-over narration reveals it's subjectivity' will be discussed in the following section.

3.2. Film's Subjectivity Revealed by the Voice-over Narration

Regarding the voice-over narrator's relationship to the narration Sarah Kozloff explains that "behind every film we sense a narrating 'voice,' a master-of-ceremonies figure that presents and controls the text" (Kozloff 1988: 1).

"along with critics such as Edward Branigan, Tony Tipolo, and Ellen Feldman I believe that behind the voice-over narrator there is another presence that supplements the nominal narrator's vision, knowledge, and storytelling powers. This presence is the narrating agent of all films (with or without voice-over). [...] Thus, if behind the voice-over narrator we can always find the real narrator, the image-maker, and distinguish (in Feldman's revealing phrase) *another level of narrative*, voice-over narrators could never actually occupy the catbird seat, could never be responsible for primary diegesis. They are always embedded within the image-maker's discourse" (ibid. 44-45).

She says "such narrating agents are difficult to define" (ibid. 44) and calls forth a passage from Metz's *Film And Language* (1974):

"The impression that *someone is speaking* is bound not to the empirical presence of a definite, known, or knowable speaker but to the listener's spontaneous perception of the linguistic nature of the object to which he is listening; because it is speech, someone must be speaking. [Kozloff intervenes here: 'Because narrative films are narrative, someone must be narrating.'] The spectator perceives images which have obviously been selected (they could have been other images) and arranged (their order could have been different). In a sense, he is leafing through an album of predetermined pictures, and it is not he who is turning the pages but some 'master of ceremonies', some 'grand image-maker'" (ibid.).

According to me, the presence of such a figure called the 'image-maker' is taken for granted by Kozloff and the critics she mentions; indeed it is evident in her claim that *sensing* is their only basis for attributing presence to this image-maker. I have discussed in the first chapter and the previous sections that the film not only hides its means and mode of production and its functioning, but it also hides its own state as a film. As a matter of fact, by 1975 Metz clearly seems to have changed some of his opinions; "Insofar as it abolishes all traces of the subject of the enunciation, the traditional film succeeds in giving the spectator the impression that he is himself that subject" (Metz 1975 A: 548). To make it clear,

let me emphasize that the absence of the subject of enunciation means that *someone is not speaking*; and since the film presents itself as an unmediated presentation of reality, and not as a narrative, to the perception of the spectator the selection and organisation of the images are *not obvious*. So coming to a conclusion such as the one mentioned in Kozloff's intervening comment ('because narrative films are narrative, someone must be narrating') can only be based on our subjective presumptions, but not on a definite indication that can be detected in the film.

Many of the terms used in the field of film are borrowed from literary criticism owing to the parallelisms considered to exist between film and language due to their both being sign systems. Of course, relations between fields and trading of terms and methodologies etc. are absolutely normal and even necessary. However the transfer of certain terms or concepts from one medium to the other brings forth shortcomings or inadequacies as to that terms' definition, content, extent and usage in the new ground. The term image-maker (who, Kozloff explains, "is also the conveyor/maker of all dialogue, sound effects and music" [ibid. 45]) seems to correspond with Booth and Chatman's *implied author* – who is imagined to be situated at a position between the narrator and the author and is silent – or Susan Lancer's *extrafictional voice* – who is the most direct textual counterpart for the historical author, carries all the diegetic authority of its (publicly authorized) creator and has the ontological status of historical truth – or the other derivatives of the *textual author* of written texts. All these terms are invented to serve in relation to one of the main questions in literature: 'who speaks?'. Indeed in written texts characters, narrators and textual authors, they all speak – and they all use words. It's only natural to ask 'who speaks?' and depending on their tone, style, knowledge etc. they all can be detected in the text and be distinguished from each other. But in film the narration – another term borrowed from literature – is carried out via images and sounds. And since the image-maker does not speak although he is the organising force behind the film he cannot be detectable, but only be presumed to exist. In fact, unlike her presumption of the image-maker's existence from the perspective of a film theoretician, Kozloff admits that as a spectator *we* don't sense the image-maker's presence;

“[I]n general, there are powerful inducements for viewers to bend over backwards to accept the voice-over as the teller of the film. [...] As critics we may be skeptical and vigilant, but as spectators, we tumble for the ruse again and again. To summarize, a homodiegetic voice-over narrator is always subsumed by and thus subordinate to a more powerful narrating agent, the image-maker who dramatizes the story on the screen. But as viewers, we are generally eager to overlook the less definable, less familiar image-maker, and unless the film plays upon the distinction and deliberately frustrates us, we embrace the character as the principle storyteller” (ibid. 48-49).

Since the emphasis of this thesis is the relationship between the film and the spectator, the experience of the spectator that is, what the film formally posits and its effects will be valued over the pre-acceptance of the presence of what in fact *cannot* ‘always be found behind the film’. What’s more, we learn from Kozloff that the image-maker is very limited in its powers in creating irony; in other words, its narrating can hardly comment on, distance from or contradict itself, which means it can hardly create a separation between the narration and the narrated.

“In non-voice-over films, the image-maker can be ironic to a certain extent. He can wink at the audience over the characters’ heads by catching the word ‘Rosebud’ just before the sled burns in *Citizen Kane*, or by intercutting shots of a prancing peacock with shots of Kerensky in *October*; he can use lighting, camera framing, and editing to comment on the characters – he can certainly add ironic musical scoring. But as expressive as these instruments may be, the image-maker is hampered – even in comparison with the oral storyteller – by his silence. Moreover, like an oral storyteller, he is condemned to constant reliability, constant authority; I can think of no methods by which an image-maker could cast grave or persistent doubts upon his own adequacy or truthfulness. Even if the film contained discrepancies between the image and sound tracks, lapses of continuity, or other distortions or interruptions, I believe the viewer interprets these anomalies as purposeful, as a deliberate flouting of convention (witness Godard’s films), rather than as the unconscious, inadvertent revelations of an inadequate narrator” (ibid. 110).

Notice that for Kozloff, an image-maker’s (the organising entity behind every film) *casting persistent doubts upon his own adequacy or truthfulness* is a matter of *unconscious, inadvertent revelations of his adequacy*. What this implies is that the *expressive* instruments the image-maker uses to create irony could also be read (by the critics again) as undeliberate manifestations of his failures in maintaining the coherence and consistency of narration. Similarly, to the viewer

constant reliability and authority of the image-maker only stand for coherence and continuity in narration, but not a selective attitude which is constant but is nevertheless conscious. To make it short, the presence of the image-maker is not felt, or rather it cannot make itself felt in the film. That is unless voice-over narration is used.

When voice-over narration is used – or according to Kozloff it is adopted by the image-maker – “the teller has a voice and can employ all kinds of verbal ironies. Moreover, now we find a doubling source of the narrative, an imagemaker and an imitation storyteller; thus, should the filmmaker wish, he or she can create an ironic distance between these two sources” (ibid.). Kozloff also explains that “films often create the sense of character narration so strongly that one accepts the voice-over narrator as if he or she were the mouthpiece of the image-maker either for the whole film or for the duration of his or her embedded story” (ibid. 45). So to summarize the relationship between the image-maker and the voice-over narrator it should be mentioned that, according to Kozloff, behind every film there’s an image-maker which is the real narrator, but he is silent and limited in making the narration be felt, but when he uses voice-over narration we feel the presence of the narration and mistake the voice-over narrator for the real narrator. On the case of manifestation of the narrative, contrary to her presumption regarding the automatic derivation of a film’s state as a narrative, Kozloff also admits that the film indeed hides its filmness;

“Non-voice-over films are narrated, but their image-makers’ nonverbal narration is not as conspicuous as voice-over; indeed one of the hallmarks of the classic Hollywood style has been to make the narration invisible and promote the illusion that one is watching an unmediated reality. By making the ‘voice’ more obvious and exploitable, voice-over films highlight the double layering effect discussed by narrative theorists – the text can now clearly be seen as the interplay between the narrative action, the story, and the process of telling it, the discourse” (ibid. 53).

According to this theory, since the voice-over narrator seems as if it’s the image-maker’s “mouthpiece”, in the use of the voice-over narration the image-maker is still not exposed. According to Kozloff, the image-maker has

“varied and powerful tools at his disposal [note that these tools were missing prior to the use of the voice when needed to create irony] to

undercut the voice-over narrator's statements at the moment they are made. Thus in certain cases, [...] if the narrator's commentary and the image-maker's scenic representation are disparate enough, the viewer will gradually nullify his or her contract with the narrating voice and realize that the story is actually being presented by a wiser, heterodiegetic image-maker"(ibid.48).

Why, I would like to ask, when the only condition that the presence of the image-maker can clearly be put forth is the disparateness of the narration of the voice and the scenic representation, should we presume the existence of such an extrafictional and intratextual entity to assume the responsibility for the text in other films also, in which voice-over narration is either unpresent or coherently present with the scenic representation? Why should we not attribute the responsibility for the text to the extratextual narrator, that is the real author/director himself, because he carries all the qualities associated with the image-maker; he is not heard in the film behind which he is the organising mind? Isn't it true anyway, that the spectator is also inclined to mistake the voice of the voice-over narrator for the voice of the director – which in fact sometimes coincides with reality as we know that Orson Welles, John Houston, Carol Reed, Cecil B. De Mille, Jean Cocteau, François Truffaut and Jean-Luc Godard narrated their own films (ibid. 76)? Can't we assume, if we are to assume anything, that the author/director accomplishes the act of taking a stance / reshaping into a posture / entering a narrative mode / adopting a style (in short, taking on a role: the role of the man who would narrate this story through this style etc.) at his desk or chair outside the text?

So why all this discussion of the existence of such an entity called the image-maker? Because through this discussion the path to arguably the most important aspect of the voice-over narration that reveals the film's subjectivity is put forth; that it reveals the narration itself. Because whether we accept that the voice-over narrator becomes the mouthpiece of the image-maker which is situated at a higher level or we don't and take the voice-over narrator as the entity responsible for the whole film, through the use of the voice-over narration the storyteller of the film is uncovered. Even when the voice-over narration is used only to expose the image-maker through disparateness created between the voice and the scenic representation, the tension between the two puts forth the interplay

between the narrated and the narration. This way, the spectator is moved to realize that he is not the subject of the enunciation, but the storyteller is – no matter if it's the voice-over narrator or the image-maker – and that indeed he is facing a narrative, that is the story, the text, the film.

It's not only the manifestation of the otherwise hidden narration that makes it a reflexive instrument that reveals the film's filmness; whenever the voice speaks, the relationship between the film and the spectator ceases to be centered around the act of seeing/looking and showing because another source and sort of data comes into play. (It should be noted that dialogue and internal monologue, diegetic music and sound effects are not primary sources of narration, but parts of the scenic representation, and non-diegetic music does not tell, but implies mood, emotion etc. Whereas the type of voice-over narration that is capable of putting forth the film's filmness is considered to be always non-diegetic; why embedded or doubly embedded voice-over narrators are excluded from this category of storytellers have been discussed in the previous section.) Because whenever the voice speaks the story-world depicted becomes *enveloped* by or *contained* within the spatial body of the voice; in a way we become guests in the narrator's place. The temporal quality of the voice – which is relatively closer to the present time than the imagery of the storyworld – makes the image out of its central place and renders it secondary. In other words, the spectator's attention moves from the spatiotemporality of the narrated to the one of the voice-over narration, so the voice moves into the focus, instead of the image. This spatiotemporal distance is not only placed between the spectator and that what is shown (in means of images/action), but also between him and that which shows, that is the camera; as a result, the viewer who assumed to be the locus where the meaning originates because he had locked onto the camera will come to realize that in fact he is not that narrating agent, but the voice is.

As for the question regarding whether the spectator experiences an identification with the microphone or the loudspeaker – the apparatuses related to the voice – similar to the one he experiences with the camera, it's a matter of difference between mimesis and storytelling. The First of two things that make the spectator's identification possible with the camera is that the eyes mime the

camera by looking alone, for what they mime is the camera's looking, so the images it shows can pose as images of reality as the eyes perceive it; whereas the spectator's mouth do not simulate the content of his hearing – the speech of the voice – by speaking. The second is that the images shown by the camera are both contents of the world as we perceive it and also tools for signifying it, while on the other hand the words of the voice heard via the loudspeakers are tools for signifying the world and not perceiving it; so the words cannot pose as reality they signify as the images do. Since it's the capacity of the images to be able to pass themselves off as reality that leads the spectator to identify with the camera, the words which cannot pass themselves off as reality will not lead to a similar identification. Instead, while in the former the differentiation between the camera and the spectator vanishes (the requirement for the repetition of the archaic mode of identification in the mirror phase), in the latter the act of listening and narrating propose distinct identities at each end of the relationship between the loudspeaker and the spectator: that are of the storyteller and the listener. What's more, we have discussed that the lack of a narrating agency which hides from our gaze instead of confronting it is the reason why we assume the role of the subject of enunciation; in the case of the voice-over narration, the impression that what we hear is what *we* have spoken is blocked before it even forms because the storyteller steps forward to claim responsibility for the story right away by its concrete act of enunciation – which is not mimed by the mouth of the spectator, but heard by his ears, which again reinforces his role as the listener, and the voice's as the storyteller. This way the mode of narration the voice-narrated film involves is similar to certain modes of narration the antic storyteller adopted in which the switching between mimesis and narration changed the position of the listener constantly, keeping him in awareness of his own place in the play and of each mode's functioning and features.

Getting back on our route, the displacement of the eye from the center is not the only spatiotemporal effect of the use of voice-over narration. Whenever the voice speaks, the continuity of the film is disrupted. The voice of the storyteller is one that looks back from a time and space situated in the future of the events depicted in the story and contemplates upon already-accomplished segments of time (the scene that the voice is simultaneously speaking over) or the whole

duration that the film covers. Its retrospective gaze treats these segments as still moments or monobloc segments of stillness, even while the action is going on on the screen. That's why while it's speaking, the voice transforms these moments of action into durations of stillness in which the spectator can step out of the scene and take his moment of stillness to contemplate upon the film.

In classical Hollywood film, space is usually constructed as a subordinate to temporality. What determines the consecutive order of spaces is the linear progression of time that serves to set the bonds of rationality. Film always consists of the progression of a character (or characters) on a horizontal axis from point X in time towards point Y using places as steps that always lead to the next. The events evolve in a chain of cause and effect; each event creates the next. Even in the film *Memento* (2000) by Christopher Nolan, it's the linear horizontal axis on which the events move, only backwards in time. Whenever the voice interrupts, while the action continues to go on on the horizontal axis, it constitutes a vertical axis. Vocal data serves neither as cause nor effect in the evolution of the events; it may comment upon the cause or effect of the previous or the following scene but it's not a cause nor effect to them and in fact, it cannot be, since the voice belongs to another time and space than that of the events. The voice does not contribute to the linear flow of events, even if it may choose to comment upon their progression. It's direction of flow is not forwards but deep-wards. Information it possesses (although not always tells) is more valuable or more in-depth than the information that the progression of events can ever produce, because all progression towards resolution is either a remembrance to him (in the case of first-person voice-over narrator) or just another equal part to narrate in his story (in the case of third-person voice-over narrator) but not a means of coming to a realization or the unfolding of a mystery. That's why every manifestation of the voice is a disruption of the linear continuity of the film.

Disruption of the linear continuity of progression also influences the form of the relationships between the spectator and the characters of the story. Secondary identification may be defined as the spectator's journeying along the course of progression of the story and experiencing the story-events together with the character (or a group of characters). In many films the spectator is informed

about many things the character doesn't know about; for example, the identity of the killer is revealed to the spectator, while in the film the character keeps on trusting this killer. This reinforces the feeling of suspense and even though his knowledge exceeding that of the character's distanciates him from the character at first, it strengthens the process of secondary identification because the spectator still experiences the events that are presented in present continuous tense together with the character. On the other hand, in a voice-narrated film, may it be first-person or third-person, when the voice gives the spectator certain information (as discussed above this information is usually an insight or in-depth knowledge about the character or the story) that the character doesn't know, the spectator becomes distanciated from the character because his experiences transform becoming double layered; looking back and contemplating upon the events together with the narrator who is closer to him (the spectator) in means of space and time and still going through the events together with the character in the story. As a result, the spectator takes his position somewhere between two spatiotemporalities and two entities, as the disappearance and manifestation of the voice alienates and bonds simultaneously or consecutively.

To summarize and to conclude, it should be emphasized that a voice-over narrator who is situated at a different space and time than that of the (main, not embedded) storyworld, appearing to narrate continuously throughout the film has the potential to put forth the film's filmness. The appearance of the voice-over narrator exposes the narration itself, which otherwise is hidden. Everytime the voice manifests to tell the story, the voice becomes the main source of narration, breaking the process of primary identification, that is with the camera; and deals a blow to the rhythm of its flow by creating islands of stillness out of seperate moments of motion. The spatiotemporal difference of the narration and the narrated represses the impression that the events are taking right before our eyes; disrupts the continuity of the linear progression of the film by continuously interrupting it's flow and by creating a counter-current with another direction of information; and alters the form of the process of identification with the character(s). Altogether these aspects of the voice-over narration uncover the film's subjectivity and provides the spectator a chance to determine his own critical perspective of the story.

3.3 Film Analysis: Subjectivity Revealed by the Voice-over Narration in Fight Club

In this section the voice-over narration in the David Fincher film *Fight Club* (1999) will be examined in relation to the potential it bears for putting forth the film's subjectivity. This film is selected in accordance with two criteria; the first is that its voice-over narration successfully reveals the film's subjectivity creating for the spectator a potential for self-consciousness. The second is that it does so even though it's coming from the stronghold of the illusionist cinema that conventionally adopts the narcotic effects which in this thesis I attempted to approach the potential means of repressing, Hollywood.

It's been previously mentioned that the process of secondary identification of the spectator with the character acquires a split nature in the instance a voice-over narration is used. His position becomes unstable in a range between two identities of two spatiotemporalities. In this analysis I will try to duplicate his to and fro movements between these two points. I will try to follow the film in accordance with the unfolding of the story, that is in the film's displaying order of events that the spectator encounters. And in the meantime I will also try to appropriate the retrospective gaze of the voice-over narrator who is narrating from a future time and space than that of the events depicted in the story. This means that I will use the information I gathered from having watched the film multiple times before in the examination of narration and the interpretation of elements of the story. I don't mean to suggest that this deployment of double perspective in the meaning making of the film is the identical process of doubling of the identification experience of the spectator who views the film for the first time; by doing so I'm simulating an imaginary spectator who upon reaching the end of the movie remembers all the details and makes his inferences accordingly. This method will also correspond with the doubling of the characters in the story.

In the opening credits sequence the camera travelling along an obscure plane perpetuates its movement which gradually becomes apparent to be a zoom-

out and pulls back out from what first starts to look like the inner-lining of an organ (thanks to our past experiences with documentaries, we have knowledge about what the inner-linings of an organ looks like) and then turns out to be the extreme close-up of someone's skin. This is the sweaty skin of the face of Jack who is looking with eyes wide open towards us and at the camera. Immediately this look makes us associate it with the voice speaking over it:

"People are always asking me if I know Tyler Durden."

In the following shot we see him from the profile with a gun put in his mouth and the man who we later learn is Tyler says:

"Three minutes. This is it: Ground zero. Would you like to say a few words to mark the occasion?"

Jack mumbles but it's not clear what he says. Voice-over narrator explains:

"With a gun barrel between your teeth, you speak only in vowels."

Then we see Tyler remove the gun from his mouth and Jack's reply comes out:

"I can't think of anything."

Jack's narrating Voice provides us insight on this second of absent-mindedness:

"For a second I totally forgot about Tyler's whole controlled demolition thing and I wonder how clean that gun is."

Then Tyler approaches the window to look down and says:

"Getting exciting now."

Jack turns his head to look towards Tyler's direction as the Voice-over narrator says:

"That old saying, how you always hurt the one you love, well, it works both ways."

Then, as the camera moves through the walls freely to show us the bombs planted at the bases of nearby buildings, the voice gives us the details of Tyler's "demolition thing" mentioned earlier:

"We have front row seats for this theater of Mass Destruction. The Demolitions Committee of Project Mayhem wrapped the foundation columns of a dozen buildings with blasting gelatin. In two minutes, primary charges will blow base charges, and a few square blocks will be reduced to smoldering rubble. I know this, because Tyler knows this."

Tyler looks at his watch and tells us how much time is left before the explosions:

"Two and a half. Think of everything we've accomplished."

As the camera zooms into Jack's face in accompaniment of the sound of a rapidly ticking clock, the voice-over narrator starts telling what happened up to this point in the story.

"And suddenly I realize that all of this: the gun, the bombs, the revolution...has got something to do with a girl named Marla Singer."

At this point the film goes into a flashback mode and in the next 121 minutes we watch the events that led the story to this state. All through the film the voice-over narrator tells us about his past life, his job, his habits and his contemplations upon what happened to him after he left all these. And the film progresses until it gets us back to the opening scene.

When Jack opens his eyes after a brief black screen following his rolling down from the stairs in the previous scene, he finds himself sitting on a chair with a gun put in his mouth by the hand of his double he created in his mind, Tyler, who says:

"Three minutes. This is it. The beginning. Ground zero."

At this point the voice-over narrator makes his last appearance:

"I think this is about where we came in."

Tyler fulfills his role in the *deja-vu*:

"Would you like to say a few words to mark the occasion?"

Jack mumbles something. Tyler removes the gun from his mouth and says:

"I'm sorry?"

Jack replies:

"I still can't think of anything."

And Tyler says:

"Ah, flashback humor."

Then he approaches the window and says:

"It's getting exciting now."

He checks his watch and continues to speak:

"Two and a half. Think of everything we've accomplished, man. Out these windows, we will view the collapse of financial history. One step closer to economic equilibrium."

Six and a half is how long it takes from this comment to the end of the film and the beginning of the ending credits. In between, Tyler rejects Jack's request to

call the plan off, they quarrel about matters regarding their mutual existence, Jack figures out he can get rid of him, that is technically by taking control of his imagination and shooting himself (their mutual self), the guys in the Project Mayhem bring in Marla, and the two of them watch the buildings explode and collapse.

Since the voice-over narration disappears after the story loops back to the point it started in the opening scene, the part narrated by it may at first seem to be an embedded-story which, as discussed earlier, is not the ideal condition for a voice-over narration to reveal the film's subjectivity; because in the case of a voice speaking over an embedded story, the storyness of the story within the main story will be put forth, but that will not (or should we say, not necessarily) hold true for the whole story. However there are various indications in the film that makes us attribute the responsibility for the whole film to the voice-over narrator (and even if we accepted it to be the mouthpiece of the image-maker, that would not make a difference).

First and foremost, the voice-over narrator's final comment, "I think this is about where we came in." implies that he treats the whole film as a story; because calling that moment in the film "this" automatically sends "this" to a past time in relation to the narrator. So we understand that the voice-over narrator is not narrating from a brief moment between Tyler's two comments "Three minutes. This is it. The beginning. Ground zero." and "Would you like to say a few words to mark the occasion?" Since this comment ("I think this is about where we came in.") is about a point in the upper-most narrative level while the flashback only consists of the narrative level below, we interpret that the voice speaks over the main story of the film, and not the embedded story within it, that is the part covered by the flashback.

This way, the changes in the dialogue and certain changes in the camera angles of the repeated section which otherwise could very well have been argued to prove the existence of an ironic image-maker that is wiser appear to be within the narrative scope of the voice-over narrator because they are changes in the upper-most narrative level he comments on (first or frame narrative level in

Gerard Genette's terminology. Embedded story is also a term coined by him (Genette 2004: 244)). So it shows, at least, even if we were to accept that there's an image-maker in every film, in this film the voice-over narrator acts as his voice, in other words, is equal to him (It has previously been discussed that in the case of such an equation of these two entities, one of them could as well be denied of existence). Furthermore, these differences in fact show that the section of the film in question have not been repeated but narrated twice; so the voice-over narrator who comments on the first scene is also the one from whose narration the images seem to be emerging.

We also see that the awareness regarding the double narration of the scene is also shared by the characters in it. Tyler who should not have any clue as to the flashback refers to it – which also functions as a reference on the narration of the whole film. Likewise, Jack's comment "I still can't think of anything" touches upon the length of time it took for the voice-over narration to round the story back to that moment of "absent-mindedness"; if it was only the part the flashback covers that the voice was speaking over, it would have been an imaginary narration (or rather remembrance) in Jack's mind that happens in a "flash" and it wouldn't consume time in the main story.

There's another aspect to the shared awareness of the two characters and the voice-over narrator; they all inhabit the same mind, that is Jack's (Later in the film we learn that Tyler Durden was his real name, but to avoid confusion I'll call him by the name he is addressed initially in the film). Towards the end it appears that in fact Tyler is Jack's creation, a higher-self; and the voice-over narrator is in fact Jack speaking from a time and space in the future of the events depicted in the storyworld. So, though not overlapping in means of psychological (Jack versus Tyler) and spatiotemporal (Jack and Tyler versus the voice-over narrator) perspective, they all are inhabitants of the same mind. Early in the film, Jack's condo burns down and he calls Tyler even though they had just met. They have a few drinks at a bar and as they are leaving Tyler asks Jack to hit him as hard as he can. This would lead to their first ever fight but is at first absurd and unacceptable to Jack. The image of Tyler is frozen on the screen for a moment when the Voice-over narrator intervenes and says "let me tell you a little bit about Tyler Durden."

Then the voice-over narrator suddenly becomes a character-narrator in the story looking directly at the camera and starts telling with a documentary tone about Tyler's jobs and personality. Thing to take note of about this scene is that times, places and identities all become intertwined as one. First of all, the voice-over narrator who is situated at a time and place in the future of the storyworld, in a way journeys back in time and in distance, trespasses the first narrative level, then enters the second that is the flashback level and finally infiltrates Tyler's work environments which are the projection room of a movietheater and the kitchen of "the luxurious Pressman Hotel" where he sometimes works as a banquet waiter. There he takes physical form, not one, but two, and becomes character-narrator(s); while Jack talks to the camera, Tyler is shown working (well, if we could call that working) and to him Jack is not at all like the Ebenezer Scrooge of Dickens' *A Christmas Carol* in which he is not seen by those he visits in his journeys to the memories of past, present and future in the guidance of The Ghost of Christmas Past, The Ghost of Christmas Present and The Ghost of Christmas Yet To Come. Tyler is fully aware of Jack's presence and role as the temporary character-narrator and from time to time he contributes to the documentary-like narration by looking at the camera himself to give certain details about his job while still continuing with what he does. Towards the end we realize it could only be Jack's mind this meeting place where consciences, perspectives and voices all collide. In fact Tyler's knowledge about the flashback is also due to this shared mind that is spread all over the narration and the narrated. Even Marla is included. After having beaten insomnia after he started attending certain support groups, Jack loses sleep again because he cannot cry when Marla who is also a faker like himself is around, so he decides on and imagines about telling her next time that he knows she is a faker. Later when he partners up with her in one of the groups they both attend and tells her "So, you're a tourist. Ok? I've seen you? I saw you at melanoma, I saw you at tuberculosis and I saw you at testicular cancer!" Marla says "I saw you practicing this." Jack replies: "Practicing What?" And she says "Telling me off. Is it going as well as you hoped..." How did Marla become aware of Jack's imagination? If we were to regard her also as a character made up by Jack, then the film's ending with the expiry of delusion with Tyler's death and everything else would have to be reconsidered. Or we may take her as a living surface reflecting the self-consciousness of the narrative with its bits of narration

scattered everywhere. So if we get back on our track, in the projection room we learn about Tyler's tricks – including inserting in films an image of a penis in one of the twenty four frames shown in a second. At the end of the film, after we see the buildings explode and collapse the film goes into a slow-motion mode for a short time and then speeds up; before resuming normal speed and the film ends, for a brief moment the image of a penis is seen. It may be read merely as a self-referential humor. But then it may be regarded as the stamp of Tyler Durden who is the double of Jack who is the younger face of the voice; another evidence for taking the whole film as an account from the conscience of the voice-over narrator.

So far we have discussed “who narrates?” and “from where?” and these two questions alone enabled us to refer to the film’s self-consciousness scattered all over it making every character and action in the film react to the commentary by the voice-over narrator, the effects of spatiotemporal distinctions between the voice and the characters, the rate and rhythm of the voice’s continuous interruptions, how it turns a scene with a gun in somebody’s mouth into a monobloc segment of time in the past over each second of what it hangs to contemplate and to comment and the continuous explicitness of narration inverting the effects of the reality impression and putting forth the subjectivity of the film. Everytime the voice speaks, it transforms the scenes into stable photographs; the voice-over narrator’s gaze from the future moves upon the scenes and creates moments of stillness out of the events while the character goes on experiencing them. For example, the voice treats not only the meetings of Fight Club in the basement of Lou’s Tavern altogether as a monobloc segment of past with generalising comments, it also treats individual moments in it as photographs; while we watch the action on the screen as Ricky and another guy are fighting, the voice crawling between punches and crowd’s cheers talks over and of the heated action as if he was explaining a friend about who the people are in the photo and when it was taken:

“This kid from work, Ricky, couldn't remember whether you ordered pens with blue ink or black. But Ricky was a god for ten minutes, when he trounced the maitre d' of the local food court.”

In the same scene, even though the action takes place right before our eyes and we hear all the noise from the punches and bodies hitting the ground, the voice says:

“Sometimes all you could hear were flat, hard packing sounds over the yelling, or the wet choke when someone caught their breath and sprayed...”

Then he shows us another photo of Ricky. This is a photo of their encounter at work; the boy looks at him briefly while passing by:

"You weren't alive anywhere like you were there. But fight club only exists in the hours between when fight club starts and fight club ends."

Right after that comes a scene in which he comes upon one of the club members in the restaurant he works as a waiter. He approaches Jack, sets a refill soda down on the table, throws a fleeting glimpse and walks away to serve other customers. But the voice speaking over the scene turns it into a photo in which they both are caught looking at each other;

"Even if I could tell someone they had a good fight, I wouldn't be talking to the same man. Who you were in fight club is not who you were in the rest of the world. A guy came to fight club for the first time, his ass was a wad of cookie dough. After a few weeks, he was carved out of wood."

There are more photographs. This one was taken in a department store while we were selling the soaps we had made from the bags full of fat we had stolen from the biohazard waste dump site of a liposuction clinic:

"It was beautiful. We were selling rich women their own fat asses back to them."

And this photo's from that day I threatened the boss and freaked the hell out of him. Look at this ridiculous tie he's wearing:

"He was wearing his yellow tie. I didn't even wear a tie to work anymore."

Every detail, every event and every sentence in a dialogue, the voice has got something to say about them. Continuous, never leaving the images alone. And none of his comments are either the cause or the effect of the previous or the following events, it guides the narration from one to the other, but it doesn't lead them forward in the linear axis of progression. So even while we experience the thrill of the events together with the character, we also find the means of looking at these events from an external point of view together with the narrator and the ground for considering them as accomplished events of the past right at the very moments we encounter them. Even at moments in which the action and tension are at their peak, the voice interrupts to give us information that is of a distinct direction than that of the visual data. When Tyler pours a bit of the flaked lye onto Jack's hand and rejects letting go of it or putting on vinegar to neutralize the pain and while the burning, foaming hole goes on swelling and we are carried away by the action and intensity of the scene, who the voice forsakes is his younger character in pain and instead, it's us who he comes down and rescues by interrupting so calmly, looking back from the future:

"If guided meditation worked for cancer, it could work for this."

And moments later, after a little bit more pain, he interrupts again:

"I tried not to think of the words 'searing' or 'flesh'."

The final words should be on the political stance of the film and the authenticity of its reflexivity. From its first moment to the last, *Fight Club* is about rejecting the model of modernity that is the production of the reigning capitalist civilization. The film attempts to create a consciousness in the techno-hypno-robot-citizens created by the endless cycle of emphasis and anchorage of meaning on consumption to feed the giant machines of the masters with insatiable production rates. This goes to prove our earlier point that reflexivity is not random and it is not dependent on the formal applications as much as it is on the conscious intention in the transformation of the world and the conventions of perceiving it.

Fight Club knows its message cannot be allowed to be swallowed by another form of consumption, image-consumption that is, introduced by the visual order of the individual age, so the film, from head to toe, by turning its narration inside out and laying bare the interplay between it and the story makes explicit and obvious its existence as a film that is not out to narcotise it's viewers. Hollywood's commercial-mode of image bombardment is continuously jeopardized by its voice and its subjectivity is put forth constantly, making the spectators realize their own potential subjective positions with regards to the story and to the larger body of texts they are a character of outside the story.

4. CONCLUSION

To begin with, the issues discussed in this thesis needs to be summarized briefly... The film hides its state as a film, its subjectivity, by concealing the functioning of its apparatus and narration; by posing as the unmediated presentation of reality and by reinforcing primary and secondary identifications it gives the spectator the impression that indeed he himself is the locus where meaning originates. The posing of the artwork as reality and the positioning of the subject in a pre-determined order are elements of a form of a monological relationship inherited by film from the Renaissance painting and from the ages of the previous five hundred years of visuality, reasoning and individualism. The ideological effects it creates can be inverted through applications of reflexivity; by displacing the eye and the seeing/showing relationship from their central role in the relationship between the spectator and the film, and by continuously disrupting the linear order of spatiotemporality and rhythm in the film, voice-over narration breaks the process of primary identification, that is with the camera, and alters the form of secondary identification(s), that is with the character(s): as a result, it uncovers the film's narration which otherwise is hidden, and thus the subjectivity of the film which otherwise passes itself off as objective reality.

At this point, the notion of subjectivity needs to be touched upon. Mary Ann Doane emphasizes the authoritarian qualities of voice-over narration by pointing out that "space, for the child, is defined initially in terms of the audible, not the visible" and that the voice "even before language, is the instrument of demand" (Doane 1980: 342). Likewise, Michel Chion links it to the mother's voice, "the first image-presenter" (Chion 1999: 49). My argument is that voice in narration – also depending on the tone, style and phrasing etc. – can be authoritarian, but it's not more authoritarian than the conventional film with its image-driven narration. That sets the motivation of this thesis in approaching the voice-over narration as an application that possesses the potential to expose the film's subjectivity. This doesn't mean that in a voice-narrated film the spectator is not presented a pre-edited, pre-organised text with its ideological significations; what is meant by it is that it presents itself openly. With the positions of each

element in the play openly defined – the film knows it's a film, and it lays it's filmness bare; the spectator knows he is a voyeur – it's the spectator's call to take his critical position, even though the voice carries an archaic quality of authority.

The potential contribution of this study to the field of film theory is its examination of the voice-over narration – which has been touched upon here and there as a sub-category among other filmic elements, but understudied as an issue on its own – from the psychoanalytic perspective in relation to matters of spectatorship and perception and around the central axis of the notions of reflexivity and subjectivity. In this context, the areas that have not been covered by this thesis and demand further research, moving on from the examinations and arguments posited by this thesis appear to be whether there are other artforms or cultural devices which have adopted similar or other forms of covert narration or communication styles and illusionistic aesthetics. In addition, the information regime in the media and especially TV which has been briefly discussed in this thesis indicates to be worthy of close examination specifically with regards to the relationship it establishes with its spectator.

If we try to see the cultures as massive and complex texts and sign systems... in the vein of the questions this thesis put forth, whether the Western modernity projects itself as the unmediated presentation of the collective and unqualifiable sum of values and norms of humanity and whether it does so by concealing its discourse and the functioning of its instruments and its effects beg to be asked. Whether many countries of the world including Turkey, with their governmental, economical, educational and public institutions and with their arts and media identify with and turn into a fetish object this absolute version of modernity begs to be asked. In a related context, this thesis may be considered to be proposing humbly to film theory and film art in Turkey to conduct studies and create films that pursue other ways of seeing and thinking.

Lastly... What is meant when we speak of “the spectator's delusion in assuming the position of the subject of the enunciation because the film hides its filmness” should not be mistaken for a state even remotely similar to that of hypnosis. Filmgoers may not verify the existence of such a replacement and even

for many film critics putting too much emphasis on the unconscious may be unacceptable. But I believe this fantasmatic experience of the spectator is linked to an ever-unfulfilled desire for the disappearance of the differentiation between ourselves and our environment. This is to say there's no difference between the mode of identification of the viewer who cries at a sad film and that of the child who starts crying the moment he witnesses another person crying. Still we reject that we were deceived by the workings and tricks of the film.

“[B]ehind any fiction there is a second fiction: the diegetic events are fictional, that is the first; but everyone pretends to believe that they are true, and that is the second; there is even a third: the general refusal to admit that somewhere in oneself one believes they are genuinely true. [...] ‘Long ago we used to believe in the masks’ (these masks are used to deceive children...); in other words these societies have always believed in the masks, but have always relegated this belief to a ‘long ago’. [...] This ‘long ago’ is childhood, when one really was duped by masks [...which is] attributing credulity to the child and to former times.” (Metz 1975 B: 270-271)

We reject it, but somehow we all want to believe, too. In a sense, knowing with one side of our minds that the film we're watching is imaginary becomes eclipsed by the darker corner of our minds that wants to believe. In fact it's what we expect from all artworks, we want to get carried away, away from whatever that contains us to the spot that's ourselves. This desire of unification with whatever's outside that's not us dates “back to a very early mental stage [...] a time when the ego had not yet marked itself off sharply from the external world” (Freud 1955: 236). All our lives are led by the desire and striving to close the gap created by this departure and we're searching for our ways back home, to a greater and more meaningful form of existence than ourselves, “to the former heim (home) of all human beings, to the place where each one of us lived once upon a time and in the beginning” (Freud 1955: 245).

We live to compensate for this lack, without knowing. And the modern world continually produces new substitute pieces for its unconscious – unconscious of the lack – citizens; workhabits, shoppinghabits, consumptionhabits, timetables, “all in one” multitasking cellular phones with built-in cameras calculators and TV receivers, total entertainment combat video

games, politics and other sorts of competitive sports, discount coupons, countdown from top 40 hit songs, bigger house faster car more lively hair most best supreme skin care advertisements, happy hours...

In this context, what attitude art should take on is not claiming – like the modern world – to be adequate for compensating for this lack. Art which is inspired by this lack, should inspire, show other pursuable paths and other ways of existence, instead of providing substitutes. In this manner, the film should put forth the fact that it's somebody else's subjective story and imply to those who follows this story the potential existence of another world.

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