

**T.C.
ATILIM UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
THE THESIS OF MASTER OF ARTS**

**NATIONAL IDENTITY AND THE OTHER:
THE OTHERISATION OF “THE GREEK”
IN TURKISH NATIONALIST DISCOURSE**

SİRAY LENERLİ

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**ADVISOR
Assoc. Prof. A. NURİ YURDUSEV**

Ankara, 2006

(cannot be photocopied)

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Müdürlüğü'ne,

Siray Lengerli'ye ait 'National Identity and The Other: The Otherisation of The Greek in Turkish Nationalist Discourse' başlıklı tez, jürimiz tarafından Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalında YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ olarak kabul edilmiştir.

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ÖZET

“İnsan yalnızca kendinden sorumlu bir ada değildir. Her insan ana karanın bir parçasıdır; bütünün bir bölümüdür. ... Herhangi bir insanın ölümüyle ben de azalırım, insanlığın bir parçası olduğumdan...” diyor bir eserinde John Donne insanlar arasında hiçbir ayırım gözetmeksizin. Kişisel duygular söz konusu olduğunda milyonlarca insan bu fikre katılır gibi görünmektedir. Ancak, uluslar ve ulusal duygular göz önüne alındığında ulusal kimlik ve ona mensup bireylere duyulan sempati belirginlik kazanmaktadır. Aynı zamanda “diğeri”ne duyulan soğukluk ve sevmelik de hız kazanmaktadır. Bu gerçeği vurgulayarak, bu tezde ulusçuluk akımı ortaya çıktıktan sonra ulusa ve ulusal kimliğe atfedilen önem analitik bir bakış açısıyla sunulmaktadır. En güçlü duygulardan biri olan bir gruba ait olma içgüdüğü, bu bağlamda ulusa, Türk kimliği bağlamında ele alınmaktadır. Türklerin nasıl bir ulus olarak ortaya çıktığı , hangi duygu ve gerçekleri onları motive ettiği tarihsel bir bakış açısıyla ele alınmaktadır. Bütün bunlarla birlikte bu tezde amaçlanan bir diğer nokta da bir ulus olarak Türklerin ulusçuluğu nasıl özümledikleri ve kendilerini savunmada bunu nasıl ele aldıklarıdır. Komşu ülke olarak Yunanistan’ın Türkler için nasıl ve neden bir “öteki” durumuna geldiği Türk tarihine damgasını vuran ve Türklerin ulusal duygularını perçinleyip, Yunanlılar’ı öteki konumuna getiren üç tarihsel olaya atıfta bulunularak ele alınmaktadır: Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı, 1955 6-7 Eylül Olayları ve 1996 Kardak Kayalıkları krizi.

ABSTRACT

As he did not accept any discrimination among people, in one of his distinguished poems John Donne, writes that “No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main. ... Any man’s death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind”. If personal feelings are concerned, millions of people are likely to accept this idea. However, in modern sense, when nations and nationalist sentiments are taken into consideration, national identity and the sympathy that is shown for the members of the same nation gain salience. At the same time, the antipathy towards the others gain momentum. By focusing on this fact, in this thesis the importance of nation and national identity after the emergence of nationalism are mainly defined from an analytical point of view. Being one of the strongest feelings, the feeling of belonging to a group, namely to a nation, is analysed while taking the Turkish experience as the empirical part of the study. How the Turks became a nation, what facts and sentiments stirred and motivated them are explained from a diachronic perspective. As well as these, the thesis seeks to explain, how the Turks, as a nation, developed nationalism to defend themselves and their nation. As a neighbour country, how and why the Greeks became the “other” of Turkish nation is also explained by referring to three events: The Turkish Independence War, 6-7 September Events in 1955 and Imia/Kardak Isles Crisis in 1996, which have marked their seal to Turkish history as the triggers of nationalist feelings among the Turks and antipathy towards the Greeks.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis is an attempt to understand the real meaning of nation and national identity. It also intends to comment on the established explanations of nation related concepts and put forward an analytical view on these topics. What made me study on this field is my interest and curiosity about the situation of Turkish identity in a national context. As well as that, how the Greeks were perceived in some certain periods of time in Turkish history aroused my interest.

While I was studying on this topic, I was encouraged by a lot of people, who have a really special place in my life. I am grateful to them.

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0INTRODUCTION

Being one of the most comprehensive and complicated terms of the literature of history and international relations, nation has always kept its magnetism while analysing political and social events in the world. Definition of nation is unavoidably necessary to analyse, explain, define and comprehend the historical, social and international events. Yet, definition of nation is still a challenging one.

One of the main concerns of this study is to examine what nation is. The introduction chapter is designed to give an overall idea of the general framework of the thesis. What the main concern of the study is, what kind of steps are followed in the thesis, which concepts are defined, what historical events are studied and which method is pursued are to be covered in this brief chapter.

In the second chapter, definitional background and analysis of “nation” are primarily discussed. General definitions, used in the study are explained and discussed. The first and the most outstanding concept in the study is “the nation”, the definition of which has been under discussion since the emergence of the modern nation. As nation is a complex concept, it is divided into components. The word nation, each letter of which is analysed separately, is taken up as an acrostic. The components are notion, adoption, autonomy, target, territory, tongue, identity, inspiration, otherisation and narration. After defining these terms from an analytical point of view, the indisputable elements of nation, identity, national identity, nationalism and discourse are defined and analysed in detail. When the concepts, stated above, are put into practice, it is not wrong to claim that, nations, in modern sense, (have) otherised (an)other one(s) in order to emphasize its own strength and identity and to identify or name the threat or the enemy. Lastly, in this chapter, the problem of the other and otherisation is taken up.

Turkish identity and its main components take place in the third chapter. In this chapter, to begin with, Turkish identity and how the definition of Turkish

identity has changed in the course of time are stated. So as to indicate and emphasize the transition to Turkish identity, the period between *Tanzimat* and The Turkish War of Independence are dwelt on. The process, including some remarkable spots in this period, is touched upon by focusing on their influence on Turkishness. Also, in this chapter, the idea of Turkish citizenship will be explained, because “acquisition” of citizenship is one of the most important components when building up a nation.

The fourth chapter is on “Greek the other”. As a rival and suspected country Greece has rarely been perceived as a real and eternal ally and friend of Turkey and Turkish identity. The reasons for this are analysed in this chapter.

The fifth chapter is the empirical part of the study. By focusing on newspapers as the representatives of nationalist discourse, fifth chapter sums up the theoretical and definitional background of the study by studying and analysing nationalist discourse. In order to analyse nationalist discourse, some representatives of the press in Turkey are chosen. The expressions in Turkish national newspapers, used against the Greeks as the other of Turkish identity, are analysed with a commentary point of view.

In the conclusion chapter, an overall explanation and summary of the thesis are stated with necessary comments and conclusions. In this chapter, besides pulling together the findings, the answer to the question of whether the Greek Identity has been otherised by the Turks or not in Turkish nationalist discourse is answered.

GREECE AND TURKEY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE THESIS

Every neighbour may be a kind of a potential enemy, especially if a country perceives itself to be located on a strategically important part of the world. The situation is the same for Turkey because a considerable public opinion in the world admits Turkey’s geographical importance, especially those who are mainly interested

in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. However, the main concern of the study is not to explain or analyse Turkey's geographical importance and its relations with its neighbours. Instead, only one neighbour is considered: Greece. Although Greece and Turkey share some cultural similarities including eating habits, courtesy rules, traditions, music, life style, common frontiers and geography, they share the same kind of problems and threats against each other. By focusing on relations between these two countries, identity factor is mainly analysed. As stated in the above paragraphs, otherisation is a prevalent element of national identity, and the situation was of no difference for Turkish identity. Especially in some periods in Turkish history in the twentieth Century, Greek identity was otherised.

The War of Independence, which was one of the most significant determiners of Turkish identity, was the most remarkable period in Turkish history. When the War of Independence was over, a new Turkish identity was proposed in order to vaccinate national sentiment to the Turks instead of abandoning them to their own fate. As it is a well-known fact, some states of Europe occupied Turkish territory in the aftermath of the First World War. They occupied this land, but after the War of Independence, they went away. However, one of them had to stay because its own land was contiguous to the land of the Turks, who were about to become a nation with the triggering power of the War. Therefore, in those years it was clear that with this neighbourhood and enmity these two nations had to renew their relations. Unfortunately, main problems (minorities, The Aegean Sea, Western Thrace) were going to cast a shadow on the relations of both states. It was not too difficult to guess the future problems between these two countries. These fragile relations caused identity and perception problems between these two nations.

That the Greeks have always been seen as a rival for the Turks in the twentieth Century, has been reflected in some problems such as Cyprus question and the Aegean Sea dispute.

LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHOD

Nation and national identity constitute one of the most striking and bulky topics of the discipline of international relations. As it is impossible to look over and scrutinize all the sources on these concepts, in this thesis, the most available ones are chosen to draw an overall framework.

In the thesis, almost seventy five sources are studied and looked over to develop a clear idea about what nation and its elements are and how they are defined. The second chapter has a theoretical and analytical point of view. It forms the backbone of the thesis, because it defines the terms and topics used in the following chapters. The third and forth chapters adopt a historical and definitional approach, in that Turkish and Ottoman history -in terms of their relatedness to national identity- are defined by focusing on historical events, that are of paramount importance when identity and otherisation are taken into consideration. In the forth chapter the place of “the Greek” in Turkish identity and its otherness are defined by adopting a causal viewpoint. Two questions, why the Greeks have been otherised and what the diachronic and synchronic reasons for this are, are analysed.

The fifth chapter concretises the historical and theoretical background of the thesis. In this chapter three periods are taken into consideration: The Turkish War of Independence between 1919 and 1922, 6-7 September Events in 1950s and finally, Imia/Kardak Rocks Crisis in the early 1990s. However, the main aim of the chapter is not to explain these events by referring to history and historical events. Instead, the real purpose is to connect them with the place of “Greek the Other” in Turkish nationalist discourse. While doing this, newspapers are applied to as the main sources of nationalist discourse. In the first section of this chapter (1919-1922), secondary sources are used, because in these sources the newspapers of the period are translated into Turkish from Ottoman. The expressions, under the effect of warfare, used against the Greeks are considered and examined. In the second section of the study, 6-7 September Events, related to Turkish identity and “Greek the Other”

are analyzed. While doing this, three newspapers are studied on: *Hürriyet*, *Cumhuriyet* and *Vatan*. A fifteen-day period is taken in these newspapers; from the 24th of August to 8th of September. The expressions against the Greeks and Greek Cypriots are commented on. Imia/Kardak Rocks Crisis in the study, on the other hand, focuses on a thirty-day period; from the 25th of January to the 23rd of February. The same steps are followed in this section; the expressions against the Greeks, used in these newspapers, are emphasized in this section. The newspapers are *Hürriyet*, *Cumhuriyet* and *Zaman*. To analyse the newspapers in 6-7 September and Imia/Kardak Crisis Period, Library of the Turkish Parliament and National Library were applied to. For the literature review sections, *Bilkent* and *Hacettepe* Libraries and National Library were chosen. The last chapter, conclusion, on the other hand is designed to draw an overall point of view by dwelling on the comments about Greek the other.

The newspapers used in the thesis have been chosen randomly. Their ideological outlook is not taken into consideration. As these matters and crises fall into a national category, the ideology that the newspapers pursue(d) was not considered within the study.

CHAPTER ONE

NATION

1. NATION

Nation is one of the most complex and controversial terms of the social sciences including the discipline of international relations. Since nation has a broad meaning, I propose to write this word as an acrostic, each letter of which has a comprehensive content.

1.1. DEFINITIONAL ANALYSIS OF NATION

Nation is the “N” of notion, the “A” of adoption and autonomy, the “T” of target, territory and tongue, the “I” of identity and inspiration, the “O” of otherisation, and lastly the “N” of narration.

The “letters” stated above are explained consecutively in a related context:

1.1.1. NOTION

Each nation has a soul, which is created and kept deliberately by its members, a soul not given by the God but a group of people. It is a mental image being formed in human mind. Kept in mind willingly, nation is a “notion” in the minds of a people. This notion is the idea of being a member of a group.

For Benedict Anderson¹, a nation is an imagined community, because the members of even the smallest nation never know most of their fellow members, meet them or hear of them, yet the image of their communion is kept willingly in the

¹ Benedict Anderson **Imagined Communities: Reflections on The Origin and the Spread of Nationalism**. London. 1991, p.6.

minds of each member. That is to say, when people have an idea and feel sure that they are the members of a group, they also feel better and secure.

Notions are the inventions of the mind. Similarly, nation becomes the invention of the collective mind of a people. After experiencing great successes or frustrating failures, heroic wars or suffering losses, diplomatic achievements or lack of success in politics, the members of a group create their own discourse, which is the product of these common experiences. This created discourse is also consolidated by nationalist sentiment as a result of these experiences. Therefore, Benedict Anderson's expression "imagined communities" appears on the stage. Nation is created and designed by the members of a group who share a common history, which teems with shared memories.

1.1.2. ADOPTION

Nation is like an adopted parent. It has a parental role because one feels certain that even if s/he becomes alone one day, there is an available community, members of which are all his fellows. In this case nation is more like a family than a group of strangers.

National sentiment is such a strong feeling that it is adopted by the effect of society. In addition, one recognizes and adopts other members of his group as "fellow members". At this point "one for all" rule emerges. Love of nation is such a deeply internalised sentiment that one can sometimes sacrifice his own for the rest of the group. Elie Kedourie² rightly suggests for the nationalists that "the whole is prior to, more important, and greater than all its parts".

Adopting one's own nation might be considered as an unconscious event because people are born into a society, which has been designed in advance, before their birth. However, feeling sympathy to nation is an exactly conscious and willing

² Elie Kedourie **Nationalism**, London, Hutchinson, 1985, p. 37.

process. To illustrate, even the most indifferent people are interested in the result of the football matches in the World Championship, in which their country's team takes part.

AUTONOMY

Independence and self-government are the most widely used keywords to explain autonomy. This definition is rather superficial because achieving and keeping autonomy may become difficult when it is pronounced only with nation because the groups of people, sharing a common history and future ideals, may not be in the category of nation. Whether it is a minority, a colony or a dominion, every group of people who share common values, rights and duties tend to strive for gaining their independence. Similarly, giving up its independence can never be a matter in question for a nation. It keeps its independence at all costs.

Being one of the components of nation, self-government is another concept to be emphasized. Nation is considered as a whole, says Kedourie³:

A nation is a body of people to whom a government is responsible through their legislature; any body of people associating together, and deciding on a scheme for their own government, form a nation, and if, on this definition, all the people of the world decided on a common government, they would form one nation. But such an inference, though correct, is merely academic. Another inference could, however be drawn, the effects of which were not as negligible. Suppose a number of individuals, living under a certain government, decide that they no longer wish to continue under it; since the sovereignty is theirs, they may not form a new government and constitute a nation on their own.

As for autonomy, no nation forgoes its independence. Consequently, it should be admitted that autonomy is an indispensable need for a nation and a state. Anderson focuses on the sovereignty of the state. According to him, a nation is sovereign because nations always dream of being free and the emblem of this freedom is the sovereign state⁴.

³ Kedourie, **Nationalism**, p.15.

⁴ Anderson, **Imagined...**, p.7.

1.1.3. TARGET

Members of a nation long for common ideals and try to do their best in order to attain these ideals. Each member of a nation contributes to these ideals, at least by supporting. The indispensable ideals of unity for a nation, according to Anthony Smith,⁵ are indivisibility of the nation, social and political integration, autonomy and self-determination. These components provide nation with unity that ensures the independence of a nation and its autonomy among the others.

TERRITORY

Throughout history, due to nutrition, economy or power, territory has always been one of the most protected properties of people. However, with the advent of nationalism, territory started to be looked upon with greater consideration, being the symbols of nation and its home.

Anthony Smith divides identity into categories. One of the most fundamental categories is territory, says Smith, that is never permitted to be vulnerable. Also, he makes a categorisation on what makes a homeland special, unique and motherland. Motherland is the place where the people's heroes, saints and descents lived. It is the place where their culture has cumulated and gained current position and their stories and myths emerged. And; motherland is the place where the people are ready to fight for, which was done by their ancestors many years ago. As a result, by focusing on Smith's categorisation and inference, it can be said that one of the most fundamental features of national identity is an historic territory or homeland⁶.

This idea is rife among people because land has always reminds people of motherland due to the common experiences of people. The events such as losing a town, defending a village at any cost or regaining a city after a hot war, bind people

⁵ Anthony Smith **National Identity**, London, Penguin Books, 1991. p. 76.

⁶ Smith, **National...**, pp.8-14.

of a country to one another and make them raise a common sympathy towards their land. As a result, territory becomes motherland.

The members of a nation expect that their state should keep territorial and political unity. E. J. Hobsbaw⁷ equalizes the following three components:

The equation nation, state, people and especially sovereign people, undoubtedly linked nation with territory since structure and definition of states were now essentially territorial.

A. Smith puts forward a similar idea that nations must possess compact, well-defined territories, and in Western model of nationalism, people and territory must belong to each other⁸.

As a result, one can claim that territory is perceived as one of the most concrete elements, which makes a people nation. Land is not only perceived as a constituent of a nation, but it is also adopted most sincerely. To illustrate the situation, it might be convenient to set a poem as an example. In one of his salient poems⁹, the notable Turkish poet Nazım Hikmet illustrates territorial identity and adopting this identity; and “fellow members” as such:

Gallop from farthest Asia
Like a mare's head reaching for the Mediterranean
This country is ours
Wrists drenched in blood, teeth clenched, feet bare and soil smooth as a silken carpet
This hell, this paradise is ours¹⁰

⁷ E.J. Hobsbawⁿ **Nations and Nationalism: Programme, Myth, Reality**, Cambridge, CUP, 1993, p.19.

⁸ Smith, **National...**, p.9.

⁹ Nicole and Hugh Pope **Turkey Unveiled Atatürk and After**, London, John Murray Pub. Ltd., 1997 p.7.

¹⁰ The poem was translated by Nicole & Hugh Pope in their book **Turkey Unveiled**, p.7.

TONGUE

When historical progress is taken into consideration, it becomes notably clear that the invention of printing press was a real breakthrough in the fifteenth century because after that, mother tongue awareness became widespread and the importance given to mother tongue gained momentum. Sacred and literal texts were translated into several languages and the demand for literacy increased. As a result of the development in printing press, translation, increasing number of the literate and native language awareness, the prestige of Latin went into decline. People became conscious about their mother tongue and identity so they forwent the indiscriminate superiority of Latin. As it is seen, behind this process were quite practical reasons such as mutual understanding among the members of a community. And, as a result of this mutual solidarity, a shared outlook emerged thanks to mother tongue.

Today, there is a widely accepted viewpoint: Language means expression and one's own identity. E. Kedourie¹¹ emphasizes that "language is the means through which a man becomes conscious of his personality". Since it is inherited from the parents and the society, it spontaneously becomes mother tongue, being acquired not learnt. Therefore, identity awareness is the initiative of mother tongue acquisition. It is the medium between the individual and his "fellows" with whom he shares his life experiences. Kedourie¹² also dwells upon the historical role of language that it is not only a vehicle for national propositions; it is also the outer expression of an inner experience, the product of a particular history and the inheritance of a different tradition.

Mother tongue is a distinct symbol of nationality. For Kedourie "language is the most important parameter that distinguishes one nation from another". He adds that "the world is a world of diversity and humanity is divided into nations whose

¹¹ Kedourie, **Nationalism**, p. 62.

¹² Kedourie, **Nationalism**, p.62

differences are distinguished externally and visibly due to mother tongue”¹³. Smith’s views seem to be similar with Kedourie’s. He thinks that “language is one of the common elements, which are more concrete to differentiate a population from another one”¹⁴.

1.1.4. IDENTITY

It might not be free from curiosity whether “I” is morphologically derived from “Identity” or not, but what is of real importance in this case is that “I” is the core of existence. People live only for themselves, that is, they cannot eat, speak, live or die for the sake of someone else. “I” is unchangeable and indispensable. That’s why, it is invaluable. The first thing to be said about identity is that it is an individual thing. Identity, in the first place, belongs to psychological sciences that studies behaviours, thoughts and feelings of an individual say Göka and Beyazyüz ¹⁵. Identity, on the other hand, is a “multiple entity” as Anthony Smith suggests. A person might be a father, a doctor and fan of a team. In the meantime, he might be an Asian, a Turkish man and a supporter of a political party. All in all, it is clear that “I” is the collection of multiple identities.

With the emergence of humanism and rationalism in the early modern period people started to place themselves in the society as an individual and they began to think individually. The main aim of humanist movement was to appreciate human, emphasize the importance of individual and to withstand the humiliation of human beings. The aim of humanism was to encourage individuals to establish their own political system in which they would be free. By that way people would be aware of their own self and be able to defend their identity by thinking and acting individually.

¹³ Kedourie, **Nationalism**, pp.63-64.

¹⁴ Smith, **National...**, p.23.

¹⁵ Erol Göka and Murat Beyazyüz, “Yeni Dünya Düzeninin Kimlik Siyaseti: Psikolojik Bir Bakış Denemesi”, **Türkiye Günlüğü**, 83 (2005), p.16.

Today, on the other hand, identity is accepted as a “multiple entity”. According to A. N. Yurdusev¹⁶, identity stands on eleven columns, which concretises this claim:

In the first place, identity is a social phenomenon. That means, one cannot acquire identity on his own; this formation is a process coming into existence reciprocally in a social environment.

In the second place, identity is a description of existence, which means it has two components: the one who acquires an identity (the identified) and the other one who gives the identity (the identifier). To illustrate, individuals acquire and society gives the identity.

Another column of this phenomenon is the existence of “the other”. All identities exist with their other. For instance, a Turk is the one who is not a Greek, French and English. “The other” determines and consolidates one’s identity.

In the fourth place, identity acquisition is a multi-dimensional, dynamic and perpetual process. While people are mastering their present identities, they acquire new ones.

Fifth column is the multiplicity of identity. Individuals have more than one identity, such as being a citizen of Turkish Republic, a Muslim and a member of the Turco-British Association.

The sixth column of identity is historical. Belongings are not inborn. In contrast, they emerge in a historical and social environment.

The effect of identity is another column. Identity has an effect on individuals. In addition to this, the more the scale of identity waxes, the more its effects wane.

¹⁶ A.Nuri Yurdusev, “Avrupa Kimliğinin Oluşumu”, **Türkiye ve Avrupa: Batılılaşma Kalkınma Demokrasi**, (Ed. Atilla Erarp), Ankara, İmge Kitabevi, 1997. pp. 18-29.

That's because, the effect of ethnic and national identities is deeper on individuals than the effect of empires.

The eighth column of identity is the subjectivity and objectivity it comprises. The members of a society share objective elements such as customs and traditions, knowledge of history, compulsory education and language. On the other hand, subjective elements are the components of objective ones. That means a person is conscious about sharing the objective elements with the other members of the nation.

That there are two categories as given identity and acquired identity is the ninth column. Familial, civil, national and social identities are given (natural) identities. Whereas, being a student, teacher or a scientist is in the category of acquired identities (voluntary).

The tenth column is that gaining a social identity contributes to acquiring new identities or consolidating present ones. That territorial identity determines both social and national identities is a well-known phenomenon.

The last column of identity, that Yurdusev states, is about mutual perception. A social identity takes "the other" away because in general two rival identities perceive each other as a negative entity.

The very affinity between identity and nation is evident, and it seems clear that, one of the most important categories of identity is national identity that will be discussed in the following parts.

INSPIRATION

Being a kind of social cement, in order to ensure its own presence, nation is inspired by some elements, the function of which is to bring people together and remind them of their national identity. History teaching is the most important source

of inspiration, in that although people don't have any idea about their "fellow members", they support and feel sympathy to them due to having a collective past, which has been prepared for them by their ancestors. And also, the members of a nation are inspired by the idea that they are unique.

Besides these sentimental elements, there are three theoretical constituents, which inspire a nation. Nationalism, as a thought system, will be discussed in the following parts. However, in this part of the study it will be explained under two headings and in relation to inspiration. "Nationalism is an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining the autonomy, unity and identity of the nation"¹⁷. Different approaches on nationalism adopt different styles of inspiring people and binding them to their nation and government. In his article Ayhan Akman¹⁸ defines ethnic and civic nationalism as such:

Ethnic nationalism makes substantive claims regarding ethno-racial make-up of the "nation". It bases solidarity and national identity on the homogeneity and ethnic purity of the population. Civic nationalism, on the other hand, is more procedural than substantive: it claims to unite people around a common political idea.

Ethnic nationalism presents people solidarity and also establishes emotional bounds among their "fellow members" by focusing on their origin. Being aware of the fact that they come from the same origin, inspires them to establish brotherhood. They feel sympathy to primarily their own nation. For Walker Connor¹⁹ nation is a group of people whose members believe they are ancestrally related. This approach is supported by ethnic nationalism.

Whereas, the main aim of civic nationalism is to bind people to the state. Its purpose is to create ideal citizens and citizenship by decking the people out with

¹⁷ Smith, **National...**, p.74.

¹⁸ Ayhan Akman, "Modernist Nationalism: Statism and National Identity in Turkey", **Nationalities Papers**, 32,1 (2004), p. 25.

¹⁹ Walker Connor, "The Nation and Its Myth". **Ethnicity and Nationalism**. (Ed. Anthhony Smith). Leiden. E.J.Brill. 1992. p.48.

civic elements such as common civil rights and duties. Compulsory education, participating in the elections, constructing a regular army, and the like can be counted as the elements which civic nationalism uses to give rise to a nation being inspired by civic essentials.

In spite of the difference, both types can be summarised as such: governments supply civic and ethnic essentials in order to achieve loyalty of the people towards their nation and the government.

1.1.5. OTHERISATION (OTHERING)

In order to define “self”, “other” is needed because everything contains its opposite in its own. Everything is defined with its other. Belonging and identity gain meaning and are defined with the existence of “the other” says Yurdusev ²⁰. The situation is the same for the nations. Had there been no diversity between nations or had there been only one nation in the world, it would be purely meaningless to define what nation is and how it differs from others. Otherisation is also mentioned in more detail in the last section of this chapter.

1.1.6. NARRATION

Narration is the telling of happenings. The style to narrate an event changes from person to person. That’s why, it can be said that narration includes subjective elements. The choice of words is a distinctive event worth paying attention to understand what ideology a person supports. While narrating an event a person can hardly be objective if his identity is involved in the subject. Narration is determined by multiple identities such as being a father, a worker, a German or a fan of a team. To illustrate, if a person watched a football match and his team was beaten, it could be rather difficult for him to appreciate the other team or the referee. In view of one’s national identity, generally, it is difficult for a person to put his national sentiment

²⁰ Yurdusev, “Avrupa...,” p. 21.

aside and support another country. It is very difficult to talk about or narrate an event regardless of national identity. Therefore, it can be suitable to say that language is an informer when ideology is concerned whether it is national, familial, religious or territorial. National identity and national sentiment find their existence in narration.

It is obvious that nation is too comprehensive and complex to define. Brubaker labels nation as “a category of practice, a political idiom and a claim”²¹. Nation has practical, political and ideological ties. That means it is very difficult to find a pervasive definition of nation. All the definitions above show that nation is not an easy term to identify. Ruth Wodak emphasizes the impossibility of defining nation clearly and she says that “there is no generally accepted definition of a ‘nation’ nor is there any general consensus on the time from which one can speak of a nation, quite apart from the exceptions that can be found for every definition of the term nation”²². As well as these scholars, Göka and Beyazyüz lays the focus on the difficulty in defining nation and reducing it into an explanation, which only consists of ethnicity and social reflexes. They say that the most important factor is awareness of unity; that is, the community should be able enough to unite socially, culturally and politically²³. In spite of the difficulty in defining nation concisely and quite clearly, considering all these definitions and explanations, it won’t be wrong to define the nation as such: when the time is ripe for a group of people to narrate common moral, spiritual, cultural and emotional discourses and to form political, bureaucratic, institutional and civic formations; and when all these are acknowledged as a whole by the other states in the world, it is time to define this group of people as a nation.

In the light of this analysis, it is evident that nation is not an easy concept to be identified in one single sentence. It is like a capsule that includes different kinds of constituents, having different functions but serving to the same aim. With the

²¹ Rogers Brubaker, “In the Name of the Nation: Reflections on Nationalism and Patriotism”, *Citizenship Studies*, 8,2 (2004), p.115.

²² Ruth Wodak, *The Discursive Construction of National Identity*, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1999, p. 18.

²³ Göka and Beyazyüz, “*Yeni Dünya...*”, “p.22.

hitherto explained definition of nation and also other concepts relating to it, there will be a more clear picture of the nation for the following sections and the chapters. In the second section of this chapter, national identity will be discussed.

1.2. NATIONAL IDENTITY

“Identity has been a topic of a wide variety of logical, philosophical, psychological, sociological, political and other discussions for quite some time”²⁴. This definition shows the “multiple” character of identity. The identities an individual may have vary from the smallest one, family, to the largest one, mankind²⁵. “National identity is ubiquitous” says Smith²⁶. Identity has been within the framework of different kinds of disciplines. It is also an area of concern in the field of international relations because it shows a crucial and unavoidable affinity with nation for several reasons.

“The nation also exists in the process by which individuals become aware of themselves as having national identity”²⁷, so the relationship between nation and identity is indispensable. It is inevitable for each nation to create their own national identity because only by that way citizens will be at the back of the nation and the state. Similarly, some national elements such as civil rights and duties aim at presenting people some essentials which they don’t want to lose because only by doing this a government can achieve loyalty of the people towards their nation and the state. Erdenir puts forward a similar idea “identity is directly related to legacy since individuals only acknowledge and approve a government, which they feel akin to themselves”²⁸. Ruth Wodak touches upon Stuart Hall’s idea on nation; “people are not only legal citizens of a nation; they participate in the idea of the nation as

²⁴ Göka and Beyazyüz, “Yeni Dünya...,” p.10.

²⁵ Yurdusev, “Avrupa...,” p.23.

²⁶ Smith, *National...*, p.143.

²⁷ Ross Poole, *Nation and Identity*, London, Routledge, 1999, p. 114.

²⁸ Burak Erdenir, *Avrupa Kimliği: Pan-milliyetçilikten Post-milliyetçiliğe*, Ankara, Ümit Yay., 2005 p. 16.

represented in its national culture”²⁹. Consequently, it can be inferred from the explanations that when identity is problematic among the people of a nation, the foundations of the nation, national identity and national culture may get damaged.

Apart from governmental and civic elements there are a number of tangible and intangible essentials that turn a group of people into a nation. Social values, traditions, monuments, cenotaphs, ceremonies, anthems, and symbols such as national heroes and flag strengthen national identity. They all provide self-awareness towards national identity. Such as nation, national identity also comprises intangible essentials: collective memory, solidarity, sameness, difference and uniqueness. These items are all explained in the following paragraphs:

Collective memory:

Memory is the mental accumulation of one’s own life experiences. It, on the other hand, is the accumulation of the experiences of a nation. As a whole, a nation experiences wars, disasters, invasions, revolutions, riots or victories; political, economical and social achievements throughout its history. All these bitter and pleasant events make a nation more mature. A number of social and national essentials take their meanings from a collective past, says Anderson³⁰:

...All these monuments to the fallen – ceremonies of remembrance, statues to heroes and celebrations of anniversaries – however newly created in their present form, take their meanings and their emotional power from a presumed and felt collective past.

Members of a nation prefer recalling past and commemorating the events, counted above, in order to realize their ideals. “Identity does not draw its sustenance from facts but from perceptions; not from chronological/factual history but from

²⁹ Wodak, **The Discursive...**, ctd in Stuart Hall, p.22.

³⁰ Anderson, **Imagined...**, p.159.

sentient, felt history”³¹. Therefore, a nation’s unforgettable history will certainly shed light to its desired future.

Solidarity:

Solidarity has manifold forms such as familial solidarity, gender solidarity, professional solidarity, religious solidarity and national solidarity. The main concern of this part is national solidarity, however. National solidarity is a substantial essential for members of a nation.

There may be conflicts between the members of a nation within the boundaries of the country. However, the members hardly stir up opposition as regards an attack or injustice coming from international arena or other nations. Correspondingly, in case of such an event they express solidarity, get together or even organise vociferous demonstrations.

Sameness and difference:

That national identity accepts the “similar” and excludes the “different” is an indisputable and perennial fact. The most outstanding example given to this difference is the use of “us” and “them”³². Either consciously or unconsciously, in nationalist discourses people tend to use “we” for their nation to expose their belonging.

Supporting the idea of sameness, Bozkurt Güvenç defines national identity as a common element in a society. He thinks that regarding the existence of state, nation, society and culture; identity is the phenomenon that the members of a society

³¹ Walker Connor, “The Timelessness of Nations” , **Nations and Nationalism**, 10, 2 (2004), p. 45.

³² “us” and “them” situation is also discussed in Ruth Wodak’s book, **Discursive Construction of National Identity** in detail. She focuses on nationalist discourse in Austria and “us” and “them” discourse according to the Austrians.

become identical within a common existence, ideals, symbols, worries and pride³³. When his definition is analysed it is clear that “common” is a keyword to identity and sameness. He, on the other hand, tells his idea about difference: Differences are the sources of identity awareness³⁴.

Uniqueness:

Though the definition of nation is accepted as common to all nations, it is a widely accepted tendency that each nation is unique. Since their collective memory, symbols, traditions, culture, ideals, institutions, language and the like differ, their uniqueness is accepted. Tom Nauerby suggests that there is a contrast between the universality and the particularity of the single national culture³⁵:

The national idea has for some time now been a worldwide phenomenon, entitling it to be considered as a global discourse through which individual nations have been able to articulate their singularity and sovereignty – in terms of language, culture and politics- as opposed to other nations, at an international level.

All the elements emphasized above are the components of national identity. As it is understood from the definitions and explanations, similar to nation, national identity is quite difficult to be explained in a few statements. Therefore, it will be satisfactory to continue explaining other phases of national identity. Ross Poole makes a comprehensive definition of national identity and points out that, national identity is a process, Poole states³⁶:

We pick out one stretch of territory and one collection of historical narratives as ours, and we recognise one group of people as fellow members of our nation. And even the horrors have another side. Nations have called forth heroism and sacrifice as well as murder and torture. People have risked their lives to restore democracy and civil rights in their own country, when they could easily have chosen comfortable exile elsewhere. Programmes of health

³³ Bozkurt Güvenç **Türk Kimliği-Kültür Tarihinin Kaynakları**, Istanbul, Remzi Kitabevi, 2000. p.353.

³⁴ Güvenç, **Türk Kimliği...**, p.353.

³⁵ Tom Nauerby **No Nation is an Island: Language, Culture and Identity in the Farea Islands**, Aorus University Press, North Atlantic Publications, 1996, p. 2.

³⁶ Poole, **Nation...**, p.1.

reform, social welfare and environmental repair have gained political support because they appeal to a sense of national identity.

All these steps that Poole counts are the cornerstones while forming, acquiring and adopting a national identity. Due to all these essentials people feel that they belong to a real, tangible group being supported not only by spiritual and moral elements but also by legal and governmental powers. These prerequisites of national identity are pointed out in Smith's classification. For Smith, national identity today has a pervasive character. That is, it has three aspects. The first one is cultural aspect, which comprises a whole range of assumptions, myths, values, memories, laws, institutions and ceremonies. The second one is social aspect that provides social intercourse by distinguishing the outsider. Lastly, he defines the political aspect of national identity that regulates everyday lives of each citizen by determining policy goals and administrative practices³⁷.

It is obvious that national identity consists of a number of essentials that each is of crucial importance. As a result, it can be suitable to say that national identity is an intangible system, each component of which has its own functions, values and rules. When one is missing, it may not be possible to mention a whole and an accurate system.

True is that, national identity is nourished by nationalism. People became aware of their fellow members through nationalism and its outcome such as nationalist discourse and ideology, which are explained in the following sections.

1.3. NATIONALISM

What the world map means to people today is a rather difficult case to be understood. Apart from this, whether the world map today is the visual consequence of nationalism or not is another contradictory question. Behind this visual

³⁷ Smith, **National...**, pp. 143,4.

consequence, there are great wars. What wars have done to earth and how nationalism has shaped the world are quite complex matters to be answered. Smith points out that nationalism plays a considerable role in determining when and where nations will be formed³⁸. The main concern of this section is to touch upon nationalism and the discussions on nationalism.

Nationalism today is not difficult to be described only when a popular definition is provided³⁹:

Being a thought system, nationalism has shaken about our world since it first emerged. As soon as it first appeared on the stage, it awoke the stagnant nations, reminded them of their identity, rescued them from oppression of another nation or a monarch and still more regardless of any value it joined them with their own state.

Comprehensive as it is at first sight, this definition is rather superficial when nationalism is deeply studied. Ernest Gellner, classified the history of mankind according to foraging, agricultural stage and scientific/industrial society. Each includes the idea of nation; regarding their era. He thinks that nationalism arose for pre-agrarian societies because they considered some large areas as their own land⁴⁰. By focusing on pre-agrarian communities Ernest Gellner states that⁴¹:

Nationalism does, however arise for such pre-agrarian societies when they survive into the modern world: their exiguous numbers (compared with agrarian and industrial populations) , and the relatively large areas they occupy, mean that they tend to be swamped by alien populations in the areas they consider their home, and incorporated into larger political units dominated by other and much larger ethnic groups.

As understood from the quotation, notion of nationalism in the pre-agrarian age was directly related with land.

³⁸ Smith, **National...**, p.99.

³⁹ Ozan Erözden **Nasyonalizm**, Istanbul, Yön Matbaası. 1996. p. 9.

⁴⁰ Ernest Gellner **Nationalism**, New York, New York University Press, 1997. p. 14.

⁴¹ Gellner, **Nationalism**, p.15.

For Gellner, similar to pre-agrarian age, in the agrarian age the problem of nationalism arose because of the expansion in population, increase in food production and increase in the division of labour and social organisation. Due to the existence of state and the cultural differentiation of the societies, the question what the relationship between political power to culture emerged⁴². Therefore, the problem of nationalism emerged as Gellner suggests⁴³

...it would have been perfectly possible for someone to propose the theory that the legitimate political unit is one which embraces all the members and nothing but the members of a given culture.

In the age of industrial society Gellner asks a notable question: Although Europe was based on dynasties, religious and territorial institutions rather than linguistic and cultural base, how did it turn into a fully nationalist condition? ⁴⁴ For this process he puts forward five stages:

1)The Viennese Situation: While drawing the map of Europe, leading powers of Europe attach importance to dynastic interests, religion, balance of power, local institutions, rights and privileges and territorial continuity. So, the political system was totally non-nationalist⁴⁵.

2)The Age of Irredentism: While explaining the age of irredentism, Gellner firstly discusses Greek nationalist movement, being the first nationalist uprising after Vienna Congress. The uprising of Greeks is a notable illustration. "This uprising had a different character, that is, as the first Greek rising didn't even take place in the territory considered Hellenic, whether in antiquity or in modern times, but what is now Romania, and in territory in which Greeks didn't constitute a majority or

⁴² Gellner, **Nationalism**, p.15.

⁴³ Gellner, **Nationalism**, p.16.

⁴⁴ Gellner, **Nationalism**, pp.37, 8.

⁴⁵ Gellner, **Nationalism**, pp.38-40.

anything like it , but were, interestingly, they were privileged and powerful intermediaries between the populace and the Muslim over lands”⁴⁶.

In the Balkans, also, there were two more distinct processes, points out Gellner⁴⁷:

One of them is the turbulence which is normal in the agrarian world at the mountain or desert edges of empires, where local groups and chiefs make use of any weakening of the imperial centre to make themselves autonomous or independent. Furthermore the Christian faith they more or less shared with the West was a kind of conductor: the Enlightenment and Romanticism which followed it , were both, so to speak, here is within Christendom. ...Leaving aside Italy and Germany, the interesting thing is that, politically, nationalism didn't achieve all that much.

3)*The Age of Versailles and Wilson*: Since the peace treaties, signed just after the war, were unjust, political system in Europe was deeply affected. For Gellner, at Versailles Settlement a system of states was set up in the name of self-determination. The system set up was completely feeble; so it collapsed. The reason for this collapse was the weakness of the new, inexperienced, small, opportunistic and greedy states, which were including the weakness of the empires because these newly established states were minority haunted⁴⁸.

What had been built at Versailles had no stability, no staying power. The states born of the principle of self-determination went down easily to a new empire or empires; some offered taken resistance, some none; some joined the new masters with a redirected opportunism. The application of Wilsonian principles in 1918 didn't work⁴⁹.

4)*Ethnic Cleansing* : Gellner states that ethnicity is mainly defined with and associated with culture. By the same way, it demands that everyone who lives within the same political unit, be of the same culture which means one culture, one state. The apogee of this process in Europe was the 1940's⁵⁰.

⁴⁶ Gellner, **Nationalism**, p.41.

⁴⁷ Gellner, **Nationalism**, pp.41-2.

⁴⁸ Gellner, **Nationalism**, pp.44-5.

⁴⁹ Gellner, **Nationalism**, p.45.

⁵⁰ Gellner, **Nationalism**, p.45.

5) *Attenuation of national feeling*: When Gellner divides history of mankind into three classes and meanwhile expresses destiny of nationalism in five stages, he mainly means that the attenuation of national feeling is closely related to the third classification; industrial/scientific society. Since the importance of industry and science gained popularity and momentum, ethnic sentiments in political life lost favour because the more progress was facilitated in industry, the more societies resembled to each other. As a result ethnic and nationalist discourse about territory was proven inaccurate⁵¹.

The symbolism of land continues to be potent in the emotional poetry of nationalism . Nevertheless a great ideological change has come over much of the world since 1945: the brilliant success of the two major defeated nations and the economic malaise of some of the victors have made it plain that what makes you big, important, rich and strong in the modern world is not acreage, but rates of growth. It is a contributory factor to the diminution of nationalist ardour⁵².

When Gellner's classification is compared to the general and ubiquitous definition of nationalism, it is apparent that his explanation is quite satisfactory. However, when compared with Smith's study, it is rather diachronic. The practical influences of nationalist ideology on people's political and social life, and the soul of nationalism as an ideology are analysed by Smith in detail.

Anthony Smith, on the other hand, relates ideology and national identity with nationalism. For Smith, nationalism is an ideological movement in order to attain and maintain the autonomy, unity and identity of the nation⁵³. Every movement is nourished and supported by ideology. Unless nationalist ideology was supported by the nation, it wouldn't be easy for a nation to struggle for its unity, autonomy and identity because an ideology such as nationalism, is not a regional, country-wide or rural thought system. Its effects would be impressive. According to Smith, "a

⁵¹ Gellner, **Nationalism**, p.48.

⁵² Gellner, **Nationalism**, p.48.

⁵³ Smith, **National...**, p.74.

nationalist ideal of unity has four components: indivisibility of the nation, social and political integration, autonomy and self-determination”⁵⁴.

All these four components, valid today, have found their practical results as soon as nationalism appeared on the stage. The primary aim of a nation is to keep its political, cultural and national indivisibility in order not to cause an awkward situation or consequence, because it is a common idea that once indivisibility gets damaged, social dissolution emerges. As Smith emphasizes, one of the components of ideology of nationalism is the thought that the nation is the source of all political and social power and loyalty⁵⁵. When social and political integration autonomy and self-determination are intended, it is essential to keep the “body” entire . Kedourie states that⁵⁶

Nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the 19th century. It pretends to supply a criterion for the determination of the unit of population proper to enjoy a government exclusively its own, for the legitimate exercise of power in the state, and for the right organisation of a society of states. Briefly the doctrine holds that humanity is naturally divided into nations, that nations are known by certain characteristics which can be ascertained, and that the only legitimate type of government is national self-government.

Although invented in Europe, nationalism is a global thought system, which presents an ideology to the nations individually. How this ideology is internalised and applied rests for the nation and its self-determined government. Turkish political scientist A. Taner Kışlalı states the practical aspect of nationalism⁵⁷.

Nationalism is an ideology meeting the needs of the people who live in the same land and share similar conditions including the needs of defence and solidarity against the strangers. When used as a medium of beneficial disputes, it is regressive; whereas when used as a medium of benefits towards other nations, it is progressive.

⁵⁴ Smith, **National...**, p.76.

⁵⁵ Smith, **National...**, p.74

⁵⁶ Kedourie, **Nationalism**, p.9.

⁵⁷ Ahmet Taner Kışlalı **Siyasal Sistemler: Siyasal Çatışma ve Uzlaşma**, Ankara, Imge Kitabevi, 2000. p.142.

If nationalism is a tale having characters, a story, a main idea, a beginning and an end, it has also a climax. For Hobsbawn the apogee of nationalism was the period between 1918-1950. According to him, the end of the first World War was the triumph of nationalism because it gave birth to two developments. The former one was the collapse of empires and the latter one was the Versailles Agreement. The Versailles settlement revealed another new phenomenon: the geographical spread of nationalist movements and the divergence of the new ones from the European pattern⁵⁸.

People may define themselves as nationalists, which is quite normal when their own feelings and love towards their motherland and nation are taken into consideration, but nevertheless, nationalism is not an individual phenomena. This means, it is both the outcome and the output of collective memory of a nation, also having future targets and ideals. Poulton defines nationalism as a form of the state of belonging and group identity. According to him, nationalism mainly signifies the state of belonging, group identity and the devotion of an individual; the devotion to the group members, sharing the same ideals and memories⁵⁹.

1.4. DISCOURSE

Whether thinking forms language or language forms world-view and thinking has been an ever lasting dilemma in linguistic circles. Whatever the right answer to this question is not the main target of this part. Instead, constitutive nature of ideology on discourse is explained.

⁵⁸ Hobsbawn, **Nations...**, p.136.

⁵⁹ Hugh Poulton **Silindir Şapka, Bozkurt ve Hilal: Türk Ulusçuluğu ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti**, (Trs. Yavuz Alogan), İstanbul, Sarmal Yayınevi, 1999. p. 11.

Discourse, Ideology and Nationalist Discourse

One of the most eminent figures in modern linguistics, Ferdinand De Saussure⁶⁰, suggests that as language has its own micro and macro-level units, rules, functions and intra relations among its units, it is a well-organised “system”⁶¹. The main purpose of this part is not to focus on micro-level units, but to explain macro-level; that is, the level including discourse. At macro level, the functioning of this system gets complicated due to outer elements. At that level, on the other hand, language itself has nothing to do with its own systemic nature. Getting involved in this system outwardly, thought and ideology spontaneously find their place in language. Gunther Kress summarises the relationship among discourse, ideology and language⁶²:

The relation between language and ideology depends on the category of discourse. Any linguistic form considered in isolation has no specifically determinate meaning as such nor does it possess any ideological significance or function. It is because linguistic forms always appear in a text and therefore in systematic form as the sign of the system of meaning embodied in specific discourse that we can attribute ideological structure to them.

Also, Foucault⁶³ separates the surface level of language and its core:

Once the existence of language has been eliminated, all that remains is its function in representation: its nature and virtue as *discourse*. For discourse is merely representation itself represented by verbal signs. But what, then, is the particularity of these signs, and this strange power that enables them, better than any others, to signalise representation, to analyse it, and to recombine it? What is the peculiar property possessed by language and not by any other system of signs?

⁶⁰ Ferdinand De Saussure is accepted as the father of linguistics due to his theory that claims “language is a system”. After that scientific studies on language started to be accepted as “modern linguistics”.

⁶¹ After Saussure’s death his students gathered his ideas and course notes in a book named “Course in General Linguistics”.

⁶² Gunther Kress, “Critical Discourse Analysis”, *Annual Review of Applied Linguistics*, 11, 84-99, (1990), p.84.

⁶³ Michael Foucault *The Order of Things: An Archeology of Human Sciences*, London, Routledge, 1970, p.81.

It is a truism that primary function of language is to convey messages. However, “message” seems to be a bare word. It is rather an inaccurate word to explain all functions of language because one of the primary functions of language is to represent ideas. Thus, that language is fulfilled with thought, is an undeniable acceptance. Language established itself deeply at social life as a practice of social consciousness, that is also called ideology⁶⁴.

Discourse, the sum of ideas and their reflection to speech, is determined by thought and ideology. In other words, it is the representation of ideology. It is quite easy to discern what idea a person supports due to his discourse and narration.

It has been relatively difficult to define ideology. The most superficial definition of ideology is that; it is a body of opinions, perspective or worldview of an individual, a group or a nation. The well-known political theorist and follower of Karl Marx, Louis Althusser defines ideology as a system of dominant ideas: Ideology is the system of all dominant ideas in the mind of an individual or a group⁶⁵. Ideology is a system of ideas, norms and categories, which people apply while explaining the world, says Oktar about ideology and she also focuses on the relationship between language and ideology. Language has a great role in the establishment of ideology, its reformation and transformation⁶⁶.

Through the ages, there have been both dominant and indistinct ideologies, some of which have disappeared and some of which have still been existing. However, with the lapse of time, it gets clear that ideology is a cumulative process which is the output of political, economical and social systems. How one internalises it, depends on his own preference, experience or environment. He is also free when conveying this ideology due to its relationship between discourse as language is the

⁶⁴ Lütüye Oktar, “Yuvarlak Masa: Gazete Söylemi ve İdeoloji İlişkisinin Dilbilimsel ve Toplumsal Çözümlemesi”, **XII. Dilbilim Kurultayı Bildirileri**, 14-16 May 1998, Mersin University, p.280.

⁶⁵ Louis Althusser **İdeoloji ve Devletin İdeolojik Aygıtları**, (Trs. Yusuf Alp), Mahmut Özışık, İstanbul, 1989, p.39.

⁶⁶ Lütüye Oktar, “Gazete Söyleminde İdeolojik Yapılar” Yuvarlak Masa..., p.293.

surface level of ideology. People are free while using the grammatical structures, choosing the words and eliciting the information that they want to convey. How our ideas and discourses are shaped by the ideology we believe is answered quite interestingly: According to Engels; in a palace human thinks different from when s/he is in a hut; that is all ideas and belief systems are the consequences of the conditions into which they have been born⁶⁷. This thought can be adapted to nationalist ideology and discourse. People of a nation are in general reluctant to let their nationalist sentiment, enthusiasm and identity die. The most practical way to keep these feelings alive is to narrate their national identity via their discourse that is deliberately fulfilled with nationalist ideology. Wodak⁶⁸ enumerates five fundamental aspects of a narration of national culture stated by Stuart Hall:

- 1) Narrative of the nation: It is represented in national narratives, in literature, in the media and in everyday culture and it creates a connection between stories, landscapes, scenarios, historical events, national symbols and national rituals which represent shared experiences and concrete triumphs and destructive defeats. This narration lends meaning and security to monotonous existence and ties everyday life to a national destiny.
- 2) Emphasis on origins, continuity, tradition and timelessness: National identity is represented in narratives of national culture as the original identity which is present in the nature of things but sometimes lies dormant and has to be awakened from slumber. This aspect aims at an image (which manifests itself in discourse) of national character as an unchanging, unbroken and uniform being.
- 3) Invention of tradition: Invented traditions make historical confusion and defeats understandable; they transform disorder to community.
- 4) Foundational myth or myth of origin: The origin of a nation is often set so far back in time that it is lost in the fog of and is no longer real, that is, it exists somewhere in mythical times.

⁶⁷ Kışlalı, **Siyasal...**, p.105.

⁶⁸ Wodak, **The Discursive...**, ctd. in Stuart Hall, pp. 24,25.

- 5) Fictitious idea of pure original people or folk is employed to support national identity.

Whether verbal or written, every text in national arena is an output of a thought. It is not uncommon to encounter these kind of texts in every practice of life such as press, media, literature, myths, politics, and especially in commemorative speeches. To illustrate, during a remembrance meeting for a special hero, the most important emphasis is put on his national significance and accomplishments of such kind. It is sometimes done deliberately by dominant powers which are counted above.

The respective national identity is shaped by state, political, institutional, media and everyday social practices, and the material and social conditions which emerge as their results, to which the individual is subjected. The discursive practice as a special form of social practice plays a central part both in the formation and in the expression of national identity⁶⁹.

Secondly, in order to prevent advent of an aimless nation, focusing on a common origin, religion or at least a desired bright future is of utmost importance in nationalist discourse.

In the third place, as it is stated in the first aspect, it is important to cover up failures and change them into face-saving and understandable events by euphemising some certain defeats or confusions occurred in the past.

In the fourth and fifth items it is clear that almost every nation displays a tendency to regard itself as the origin of the mankind and reflects this intention to its discourse. They sometimes narrate original or ethnical company; and make up legends to keep the nation together.

As a result it is quite possible to infer this comment: discourse is community based. Even if it is enriched with individual preferences and experiences, discourse is

⁶⁹ Wodak, **The Discursive...**, p.29.

a community based phenomenon which is also determined and shaped by shared or dominant ideologies among the people of a nation.

As understood from the above mentioned information, it is indubitable that nation, nationalism, national identity and nationalist discourse are closely related concepts to one another. The following section is focused on the place of “the other” and “otherisation” in national identity.

1.5. THE OTHER AND OTHERISATION IN A NATIONAL CONTEXT

Though “the other” is a newly articulated and interpreted concept in many disciplines, it has been a tacit component of identity. Identity awareness is reinforced by the existence of the other. It would be too meaningless to name the identity, if there weren’t any differences among people.

The case is the same for nations; unless there were differences among nations, it would be pointless to name them. National events such as history, myths, anthems, flag, culture, solidarity, language, ideals and the like render a nation different from the others. These values originate and take shape in time. And they take their place in the minds of a people. When a conflict, war or a dissension occurs between two countries, these events play their role in nationalist discourse against the other(s). To illustrate, wars, in terms of nation and national interests, unite the members of a nation and create the other(s) and the unwanted. Wars, naturally, cause negative perception and it takes quite a long time to change this.

National identity is to some extent nourished by the other. Every nation claims to be unique and to have a different identity from others⁷⁰. Smith’s definition of nationalism can also be adopted to this situation: “Nationalism, the doctrine that

⁷⁰ Ayla Göl, “Imagining The Turkish Nation Through Othering Armenians”, **Nations and Nationalism**, 11,1, (2005), p. 121.

makes the nation the object of every political endeavour and national identity the measure of every human value, has since the French Revolution challenged the whole idea of a single humanity, of a world community and its moral unity.”⁷¹

Otherness is directly related with perception. There is a unanimity in the opinion that “we are what the other is not”⁷². With the help of this kind of a discourse, the acts of the other are observed carefully in order that they could be used against. Another important point occurs when equality is in question. One of the most outstanding constituents of otherisation is that, “the other” is not looked upon as equal as the self and is sometimes despised⁷³. And, people sometimes begrudge the other everything, such as some rights, actions, behaviours and the like.

In international relations there is not a mentality like “eternal enemy” or “friend”. Everything is determined through the course of events and interests (mutual or single-sided). Therefore, “others” are named through the course of history. It is neither easy nor immediate to decide “the other”. Gerard Delanty defines the emergence of “the other” and its role in identity by emphasizing European identity⁷⁴:

European identity now is quite different from the local identities of the 19th century. What impressed me at that point is that European identity was emerged from enmity; and kept its existence by separation and disputes instead of reconciliation and peace.

The role of othering in nation is defined in the following statements:

- Existence of “the other” provides identity awareness and self awareness.
- The more one loves and admires his nation and thinks it is the dearest in the world, the more he excludes “the others”.
- As far as “the other” is concerned, one’s national identity seems very dear to him.

⁷¹ Smith, **National...**, p.18.

⁷² Aslı Özgür Peker, Situating The Question of National Identity: The Turkish Case in A Global Context, Unpublished Master Thesis, Ankara, Bilkent University, 1998, p.47.

⁷³ Nuri Yurdusev, speech on “Caricature Crisis”, AGAM (Ankara Global Araştırmalar Merkezi), 25.02.2006.

⁷⁴ Gerard Delanty **Avrupa’nın İcadı**, Trs: Hüsamettin İnaç, Ankara, Adres Yay, 2004, p. VII.

-Creating “the other” and regarding it as a potential foe or a rival is a face saving situation for the nations, especially if they are perennial rivals, because when a crisis occurs between two nations, it will be easier to blame “the other” for creating crisis.

-Even though a nation is not careful enough while observing itself, it observes “the other” more carefully⁷⁵, so that the output of this observation can be used at a later time to strengthen nationalist discourse.

Otherisation is a totally comprehensive topic that encompasses religious, ethnic, regional, and continental matters, which are not in the framework of this study. In this section othering, related to nation and national identity is briefly defined.

To sum up, this chapter, in the first place, discusses nation, nationalism and their relatedness to national identity. Meanwhile, the relationship between “the other” and national identity were explained. This chapter pursues an analytical point of view in the light of the literature on nation and national identity. As understood from the explanations and analyses, nation is a complicated entity that is not easy to explain concisely and clearly. That’s why, it is suitable to take advantage of some other terms such as notion, authority, identity, language, otherisation and narration, explained in the first part of the chapter. Another main title, explained, in this chapter is national identity. One of the most outstanding terms related to nation that requires utmost importance is national identity, the existence of which has been going hand in hand with the existence of nation. After explaining national identity and nationalism, one of the most necessary concepts to understand and comprehend nation, are analysed. In this chapter, also, another key term, otherisation, being one of the indispensable and inevitable components of nation and national identity, are discussed.

⁷⁵ Herkül Millas **Türk ve Yunan Romanlarında Öteki ve Kimlik**, İstanbul, İletişim Yay, 2005, p.10.

While taking advantage of the terms analysed and defined in this chapter, the transformation of Ottoman Turks into a nation is to be discussed in the next chapter. What kind of misfortunes and incidents the Ottoman Empire had experienced while turning into Turkish nation are to be discussed in the third chapter. As well as this, the most important events that impressed a stamp on the formation of Turkish identity will be discussed in the third chapter.

CHAPTER TWO

THE EMERGENCE OF TURKISH NATIONAL IDENTITY

In the literature of International Relations and History a great majority of the titles of the books concerning Turkish history include a keyword: modern. What made Turkey a modern country and what does modern mean in this sense?

After being a totally diversive empire and being proud of its size, how did the Ottoman Empire become Turkish nation? The answer to these comprehensive questions would require voluminous books. That it was an afflicting process which was partly alleviated when the War of Independence ended, is the most superficial and simplest answer, however. In this chapter this process is discussed in terms of identity.

2.1. LATE 18th and 19th CENTURY IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

*Had there been no great powers, they might have succeeded; but the empire did not exist in a vacuum.*⁷⁶

It is a well-known fact that the very idea of novation of the Empire in Western sense appeared in the seventeenth century, because that date overlapped with the Defeat of Vienna, 1683. It was clear that if Turkey did not reform, first her army, and then her system of government, the end of the empire wouldn't be far off⁷⁷. With the lapse of time, the Empire arranged improvements. Especially, the advent of printing press in 1728 into the Empire was a considerable development. Also, technical and military schools were founded in the eighteenth century. In addition to these, a new army was founded, because reforming the army was of great importance in those years, for the Empire was losing blood with defeats. In the late eighteenth century Ottoman elites noticed the decline in the Empire compared to her

⁷⁶ Roderic Davison **Turkey: A Short History**, Huntington, The Eothen Press, 1988, p. 84

⁷⁷ Philip Price **A History of Turkey from Empire to Republic**, London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1961, p.70.

European rivals, that led the Empire to a key reform; that is, military reform, the dissolving of the *Yeniçeri Ocağı* (Janissary Army) and forming a new one, instead⁷⁸.

The nineteenth century witnessed more comprehensive and radical reforms, in particular at governmental level. One of these developments was the ratification of *Sened-i Ittifak* constitution in 1808. This document had a symbolic value, for it was restricting the rights of the Sultan before the senates. And in 1876 another constitution, which remained in effect till 1878, was declared. That occurrence was the forerunner of a new regime; that is, constitutional monarchy. The Constitution accepted that all people, whether Moslem or non-Moslem, who were living on Ottoman land would be equal before the law; so political principle, which was aiming at creating an Ottoman *millet*, was succeeded⁷⁹. Ottoman statesmen during the nineteenth century strove after adopting European models of reforms in government administration, education and army, because they expected that these European origin models would revive the Empire, prevent European interference and cease the separatist activities of non-Moslems⁸⁰. However, there were still problems because creating such a community was not easy enough to be immediately adopted. Subject communities, living under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, had once realised the taste of independence so these subjects and European governments, that were commanding the fate of nationalism in Europe wanted to enjoy that situation. As Ayla Göl points out, “the number of *millets* changed throughout Ottoman history and new millets were created as a consequence of pressure from great powers .”⁸¹

On paper, everything about the reforms seemed unproblematic, but that venture meant that neither the Sultan would abdicate from the throne, nor the public greeted the Constitution with enthusiasm. As a result, it is clear that as Georgeon⁸²

⁷⁸ Poulton, *Silindir Şapka...*, p.69.

⁷⁹ Francis Georgeon *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Kökenleri: Yusuf Akçura(1876-1935)*, (Trs. Alev Er) , Ankara, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yay., 1996, p. 12.

⁸⁰ Gül Tokay *Makedonya Sorunu Jön Türk İhtilalinin Kökenleri (1903-1908)*, İstanbul, AFA Yay., 1996, p.12.

⁸¹ Göl, “*Imagining The Turkish Nation Through Othering Armenians*” p.124.

⁸² Georgeon, *Türk...*, p.12.

states, transformation of the aged Empire into a constitutional monarchy was a consequence of numerous efforts, struggles and ideas which generally sprouted after 1839. In the following paragraphs the importance of *Tanzimat* period is discussed.

All those developments meant that the Ottoman Empire determined to turn its face to the West. It was quite clear in those years that among the rapidly developed countries of Europe, it was high time for the Ottoman Empire to redress the system in order not to let the country dismember socially and territorially any more. Therefore, the Sultan, Abdulmecid, resorted to restoration which was a turning point in Ottoman history, because the restoration was a vital necessity for the Empire's survival. Nevertheless, it was not only internal based, resulting from inner needs, but it was also under the effect of Western powers, who were supporting the non-Moslem population so as to undergird and strengthen their role and place in the Empire. As a matter of fact the time had already been ripe for changes, because the Empire had been disintegrating for some time. Nevertheless, despite every negativity and intervention, it is rather difficult to claim that the Ottoman government was between the devil and the deep blue sea, because the Sultan and his men were quite conscious about the importance of keeping the subject communities together, that is, they should have remained under the protection and patronage of the Ottoman government and imperial identity. They had no doubt that nationalism was conquering Europe. They would have to bring forward such a strong alternative that the Empire would become enable to fight with this boundless ideology. "On behalf of Ottomanism doctrine, providing non-Moslems with equal rights was paid particular attention."⁸³ However, nationalist ideology, the supporters of this ideology and real desire behind this ideology were as determinant as Ottoman authorities, because this inviting land not only had a meaning for the people living on it, but it also had a different meaning for the foreign powers. The Ottoman Empire meant lion's share to the great powers of Europe. The real question was how to continue dismemberment. Davison⁸⁴ states that:

⁸³ Tokay, **Makedonya...**, p.12.

⁸⁴ Davison, **Turkey...**, p.84.

Among groups of Greeks, Bulgars and finally, even Armenians- the last often called the “loyal millet” by the Turks- distinct trends towards separatism grew rapidly. The concept of Ottomanism, despite the advances made toward equal treatment of all subjects, never won their general acceptance. In an age of growing nationalism the Ottomanist goal was perhaps unrealistic, yet the Ottoman leaders had to try to make it work. Had there been no great powers, they might have succeeded; but the empire didn’t exist in a vacuum.

Davison says that two challenges came from the West to destroy the Empire; and adds that, owing to the supports, in the name of nationalism, coming from the great powers of the West, the nationalist virus spread first to the Greeks, then to the Serbs and Rumanians⁸⁵. There was no need to defer reorganization; *Tanzimat* Edict, a decree for political reforms, was declared. Sultan Abdülmecid wanted to prove to Europe that he could establish a modern and liberal political system, so Ottoman *nazırs* (ministers) prepared and declared *Gülhane Hatt-ı Serif*,

Tanzimat (Reform) Edict on the 3rd of November in 1839⁸⁶. “A great gathering of Rayahs –Catholics, Greeks and Jews- and the European diplomatic corps witnessed its solemn promulgation.”⁸⁷ The contents of the Edict was not too comprehensive. In other words, the Edict was solely covering some basic political and social rights concerning the equality of all the people before the law. That document was mainly dwelling on education, security of life, property and honour regarding *Seriah* -religious law- finance, taxation and government institutions. It was well-known that although the reformers endeavoured to carry out novelties, especially Muslim population, hadn’t been longing for such restorations. Ottoman government was now on the horns of a dilemma. Whereas religious prejudice towards non-Moslems was prevailing among Moslem population, the government felt sure to take a turn for the better. At first, social fabric was to be redressed. *Tanzimat* Edict, proclaimed in 1839, was not satisfactory for the non-Moslem population living in the Empire, according to the Western powers. And, Ottoman

⁸⁵ Davison, **Turkey...**, p.73.

⁸⁶ Bernard Lewis **Modern Türkiye’nin Doğuşu**, Çev: Metin Kırıtlı, Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2004, p. 107.

⁸⁷ William Stearns Davis **A Short History of the Near East: from The Founding of Constantinople**, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1949, p. 307.

government didn't want Western powers to cold-shoulder the Empire. Therefore, another reform Edict was issued in 1856. Lewis states that for most Europeans the touchstone of Turkish sincerity was the treatment towards non-Moslems⁸⁸. This Edict was a revised version of 1839 Decree. Equality before the law was guaranteed again. The principles of 1839 Edict were confirmed one more time, and more definite and particular expressions were used by ignoring religious differences⁸⁹. According to Price the effect of Tanzimat reforms would be psychological because the government created such an atmosphere that Moslem population was supposed to be tolerant towards non-Moslems, so the Moslems deduced that non-Moslems of Turkey would have equal rights with them⁹⁰. Henry Elisha Allen⁹¹ explains the scene as such:

.....Abdul-Medjid brought about numerous social and administrative reforms, including adoption of fez as the national headdress to replace the turban, which symbolised conservatism, and a proclamation of new rights and equal treatment for the subject Christian populations. The difficulty with the new reforms, however, lay in the fact that they were too much imposed from above and met with little co-operation from the people of Turkey. The reactionary demonstrations which greeted each attempt at Westernisation at this early period showed how far the country was from being ready to throw off its oriental ways.

It is understood from the scene that, Turco-Moslem population had intensively internalised religious identity rather than liberal or national identity. Davis has a similar setting with Allen. For Davis, at first the declaration of the Edict was received by the Moslems with silence, but received by incredulity by the Christians. But, says Davis, when it came to translating the fine promises of the Edict into action, the powerful "Old Turk" element throughout the Empire made bigoted opposition to anything squinting towards ending their privileges and favouring the Giaours⁹².

⁸⁸ Lewis, **Modern...**, p. 115.

⁸⁹ Lewis, **Modern...**, p.116.

⁹⁰ Price, **A History...**, p.74.

⁹¹ Henry Elisha Allen **The Turkish Transformation**, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1935, p.6.

⁹² Davis, **A Short...**, p.308.

Needless to say, it would be an erroneous assumption that Turco-Moslem population of the Empire would be showing a notable national identity awareness, because religious identity was immensely accepted and adopted by them. Therefore, the acceptance of the Edict without any reaction might have been surprising. “The impact of Western forces”, says Allen⁹³, “however powerful, might not have succeeded in breaking through the protective crust of Moslem population”. As they internalised Islam gladly and willingly, in those years non-Moslem population can be named as “the other” for the majority of the Moslems. After the declaration of the second Edict, non-Moslem groups were attracted much attention by Moslems. “Especially after the Edict of 1856”, says Zürcher⁹⁴, “they saw the great pashas of the *Tanzimat* as subservient to the European powers and their interests of the Christian communities whose wealth and power were rising visibly, and a Muslim reaction set in during 1870’s”. This consequence takes us to an inference like this: though the Ottoman Empire in governmental level made an effort to restore the institutions and establish at least a covert idea of Ottoman citizenship, the Turco-Moslem population hadn’t reach the age of maturity yet to grant citizenship, which was taking its nourishment from ethnical and national sources. This kind of consciousness had emerged from non-Moslem population before the ratification of the Edict due to the advent of the spirit of French Revolution into the Empire. Before the Edicts in 1839 and 1856, French Revolution had shaken territorial integrity of the Empire. First, the Greeks as a subject people revolted against the Empire and achieved their independence in 1829⁹⁵. After that, Serbia, Bulgaria and Albania won their independence and established nation states. So as not to allow the Empire fall into pieces any more, the government performed a series of reforms which are mentioned above. Ahmad summarizes *Tanzimat* period as in the paragraph below⁹⁶:

⁹³ Allen, **The Turkish...**, p.12.

⁹⁴ Eric J. Zürcher **Turkey: A Modern History**, London, I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd., 1997, p. 70.

⁹⁵ Greek Movement of Independence intensified in big financial centres such as Istanbul and Odessa, and in the places which were mainly inhabited by the Greek such as Mora and the islands near it. Stefanos Yerasimos, **Milliyetler ve Sınırlar: Balkanlar, Kafkasya ve Orta Doğu**. Istanbul, İletişim Yay, 1994, p.55

⁹⁶ Feroz Ahmad **Modern Türkiye’nin Oluşumu**, (Trs.Yavuz Alogan), İstanbul, Kaynak Yay, 2002, p. 14.

Turks observed the powers which were set free by European revolutions, and learnt that Ottoman political and social institutions could no longer survive against continual intervention of modern societies. Therefore, the Empire had to keep abreast of the times and forgo Eastern despotism, which neither acknowledged the immunity of private property nor considered the honour of the owner of that property. Consequently the Sultan was to be persuaded to forgo his absolute authority and let the community derive benefit from some basic rights and liberty. This goal was partly achieved by engendering 1839 and 1856 Edicts and 1876 Constitution.

All in all the nineteenth century reformation era attached importance to two fields. The first one was that, by ignoring racial and religious differences and by focusing on Ottomanism ideal, the ones, who were the subordinates of the Ottoman Empire, were regarded as Ottomans⁹⁷. The second field was the reformation itself. The first reforms were implemented on military and education. Military and medical schools were of primary importance. However, it was clear that there was an explicit problem of language. At first, this problem raised on second language. Lack of people who knew a foreign European language was a thought-provoking matter, because the developments in the empire required information transfer from the West. Therefore, Moslems, who could master a foreign language, were urgently needed to learn and teach Western sciences, translate textbooks into Turkish and to find Turkish equivalents of new and scientific expressions and also to transfer new subject and concepts to Turkish language⁹⁸. Developments in every field of language such as translation, introduction of new concepts and as a natural consequence of this, derivation of new words were achieved. At that point it should be reminded that, purification of language was of course not for the first time attempted in the first quarter of the eighteenth century. As Aydıngün⁹⁹ states, it goes back *Tanzimat* period and simplification of language was defended by various intellectuals.

In addition to military and medical schools stated above, reform on education continued and went a little bit further. The most striking peculiarity about those

⁹⁷ Selçuk Akşin Somel, "Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Türk Kimliği", **Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik**, Nuri Bilgin (Ed.), İstanbul, Bağlam Yay., 1997, p.74

⁹⁸ Lewis, **Modern...**, p.86.

⁹⁹ Ayşegül Aydıngün & İsmail Aydıngün, "The Role of Language in The Formation of Turkish National Identity and Turkishness", **Nationalism and Ethnic Politics**, 10,3, (2004), p.417.

schools was that, they were on the way to secularise. As Lewis suggests, apart from incumbents, new teachers were employed and new curricula were applied¹⁰⁰. That's why, those developments on education can be regarded as a step to the notion of secular education in the Empire. Another important development on education was the establishment of Imperial Lycée of Galata¹⁰¹ (*Galataray Sultanisi*) in 1868. Foundation of this secondary school was of symbolic importance. At that point, Lewis says that for the first time a Moslem government made a real attempt at establishing such a school, which was going to provide a modern secondary level education in a Western language¹⁰².

Certainly those efforts didn't prove to be ineffective. Novelties started to bore fruit slowly. Ideas and reforms, gradually imported from the West, had an impact on Ottoman imperial identity. Transition from Ottoman and Islam based identity to Turkishness is analysed in the next part.

2.2. FROM OTTOMANISM IDEAL TO TURKISHNESS

It might be difficult to claim that the effect of the French Revolution had known no bounds. This might be true for Christian subject peoples of the Ottoman Empire. However, the essence of French Revolution had not been successful enough to penetrate easily into the Moslem population of the Empire because Islam and religious fabric in the Empire were untouchable. Steps had to be meticulous in order not to lead to a resistance movement or restlessness among public. Every attempt, closely concerned with religious identity, might have caused misunderstanding due to the fact that Moslem population was oversensitive to different kinds of identification. "For Muslim *millets*, the religious character of the Ottoman State meant that the primary mark of self-identification was *umma* as the great community

¹⁰⁰ Lewis, **Modern...**, p.114.

¹⁰¹ This translation was taken from Hans Kohn in his book "A History of Nationalism in the East", p. 224.

¹⁰² Lewis, **Modern...**, p.121.

of believers”, says Göl¹⁰³ and she continues, “hence, Islam was a stronger unifying force than ethnic ties in the definition of the traditional Ottoman Identity”. In addition to these social disadvantages, there were some other indisputable obstacles to build a new and western-based identity and to pave the way for tolerating the “others”. Ayla Göl lays the focus on institutional differences between non-Moslems and Moslems¹⁰⁴:

...ethnicity as the basis of nationalist ideology can not explain how institutions such as the church or a dynasty play a major role in developing a modern national identity. These issues are crucial in exploring why nationalism emerged first among the non-Moslem *millets* of the Ottoman Empire and why it was delayed for Muslim *millets*. ...Religious sentiments were deliberately used by Christian churches to create Balkan (Bulgarian, Serbian, Greek) and Armenian movements; however, Muslim millets didn't have similar means to develop a separate nationalism since there is no institutional equivalent of the church in Islam.

In spite of these drawbacks, efforts on governmental and intellectual level to westernise showed that there were slight but decisive moves, which would prove effective in the long run, but not immediately. Kılınçkaya briefly evaluates the impact of French Revolution and the West on Ottoman Empire and the consequences of Ottoman reforms. Although everybody was like-minded against the aggravating attacks of the West, the institutions, structure and mentality had to be changed because of their insufficiency. He adds that, both the power of traditions and incomplete knowledge about the West that was taken as model prevented the Empire from putting forward sound solutions¹⁰⁵. Ergün Aybars has similar ideas on this issue. Europe witnessed macro and micro level nationalisms such as Germany and Italy as macro level and Balkan states as micro level, during the nineteenth century. Yet, the Ottoman Empire was quite far from those new values because while the Europeans were weaving new cultural, judicial, political, economical and social values and systems, the Ottoman Empire was dealing with backwardness, dismemberment, and fall. She tried to get rid of the shock that was brought by the

¹⁰³ Göl, “Imagining The Turkish Nation Through Othering Armenians”, p.124.

¹⁰⁴ Göl, “Imagining The Turkish Nation Through Othering Armenians”, p.124.

¹⁰⁵ Derviş Kılınçkaya et al., *Atatürk ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi*, Ankara, Siyasal Kitabevi, 1998, p. 37.

French Revolution, but she was unable¹⁰⁶. With a critical and rather pessimistic point of view, Arnold J. Toynbee, approaches the Westernisation of the Ottoman Empire¹⁰⁷, which can be accepted as quite straightforward when the ideological and governmental steps are taken into consideration:

In fact, though the Ottoman Empire, by adopting Western methods, has achieved what seemed impossible to a century ago and has survived – even though with diminished territory and sovereignty - until our day, it has never so far gone much beyond the minimum degree of Westernisation necessary to save it, at any given moment, from going under. It has borrowed more technique than ideas, more military technique than administrative, more administrative than economic and educational.

Nonetheless, it would be wrong to claim that anybody didn't even think of the consequences of the Revolution and wasn't affected by the idea that French Revolution had spread. Certainly, all those efforts wouldn't happen without any immediate effort. It was inevitable that Turkish population would sooner or later be affected by Western ideas. Penetration of Western spirit into the Empire was not too late. It started from the educated layer of the Empire. Allen divides Turkish educated class, who opened the way to Westernisation, into two categories. The first group were those who didn't leave the country, but pursued European books and became acquainted with new customs. On the other hand, others, who fall into the second category in Allen's grouping, did leave the country voluntarily as travellers or involuntarily as exiles¹⁰⁸. As a consequence of this, Western ideas started to penetrate into the Empire. It was clear that the Empire was not exempt from Western ideas. According to Davison, "once the door had been opened to westernisation, it could not easily be shut; so knowledge of the West and of modern thought, particularly in science and literature, increased apace."¹⁰⁹ The results of this could easily be seen in common practice. Literature can be taken as a salient example. Western views first happened to appear in literature, which can be regarded as the

¹⁰⁶ Ergün Aybars, "Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Ulusal Kimlik Oluşumu ve Batı'nın Etkisi", **Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik**, Nuri Bilgin (Ed.), Ankara, Bağlam Yay., 1997, p.160.

¹⁰⁷ Arnold J. Toynbee **The Western Question in Greece and Turkey, A Study in the Contact of Civilisations**, London, Constable and Company Ltd., 1922, p.13.

¹⁰⁸ Allen, **The Turkish...**, p.12.

¹⁰⁹ Davison, **Turkey...**, p.96.

representative of ideas. Lewis also states the importance of literature in social practice and its contribution to the dispersion of ideas: in the late nineteenth century the dispersion of Western ideas among Turks and the impression of Western social and political viewpoints gained momentum, because a new kind of Turkish literature appeared on the scene, which differentiated from classical Ottoman literature both in style and content¹¹⁰. By the time Ottoman intellectuals became fully conscious that liberalism and nationalism had been infiltrating into every corner of Europe, they decided to make a move. They undertook an important mission henceforth: popularising these ideas and instilling them in collective mind. The best way for this was to set the ideas in motion by using a really effective medium. This medium was the press. Scholars in the Empire, benefited mainly from press, because it was conspicuous that press was of great significance to them to spread Western-origin ideas.

As mentioned above, majority of Moslem population were opposed to the reforms owing to religious reasons. On the other hand, there was another group who did not feel at ease. In fact, this group was not against the notion of reform; they were against the application of reforms; because they wanted the reforms to be anchored to a stronger basis. The reforms were not public based and public supported; on the contrary they were top-down. Novelties were only done due to some political and territorial necessities. Moreover, they were the consequences of Western force. They should have been carried out for the public, however. By attaching importance to this dual problem Ottoman intellectuals tried to find more influential and fruitful ways. Referring to reformation history, Zürcher's striking example should be cited¹¹¹:

Another type of opposition to the reforms was that which developed among the reformers themselves. A number of typical representatives of the reformist group of bureaucrats with Western type training (most of them had served in the Translation Bureau of the Porte at one time or another) through their knowledge of French had become acquainted with the European currents of thought of their time, notably the ideas of "1848", liberalism and

¹¹⁰ Lewis, **Modern...**, pp.135-6.

¹¹¹ Zürcher, **Turkey**, p.70.

nationalism. They have been described as the pioneers of an Ottoman intelligentsia. ... Because they were excluded from the centre of power, they had to look for other ways to make their mark and some of them found this in a trade which was new to the Empire: journalism.

The function of newspapers was surely important in the nineteenth century. Indubitably, the circulation of the newspapers were not big, they, nevertheless reached a variety of people because social life was still maintaining its established forms, and the newspapers were circulated in coffee houses and bazaars and also they were passed on during visits¹¹². Intelligentsia took advantage of the power of journalism in order to not only expound ideas but also liven up nationalist feelings. David Kushner states the function and impact of newspapers in social practice and states four factors affecting this process. Firstly, since discussion on domestic politics were forbidden, these men of ideas attached much importance to international events. As a result of this, translation took place. Also, press learnt lessons from the events in the West; so this led the public to follow the events in the West. Thirdly, cultural and historical events written in newspapers gained great importance. As well as this, Greco-Turkish War (1897,1898) kept newspapers too busy, which might be perceived as a trigger alerting Turkish nationalism¹¹³.

These arguments became widespread among public, so they affected nationalist awakening in Turkey. That Turkish Intelligentsia had a considerable role in the building of nationalist sentiment, is undeniable. This group also tried to clarify the language; and leave the overloaded and complicated style of Ottoman language. They contributed to a more clear Turkish. Some of the writers, convinced that clarity was preferable to the harmonious but turgid elegance of the official Ottoman style, strove to write so they could be more easily understood, to use more Turkish words in place of Arabic and Persian, to shorten sentences, to clarify spelling¹¹⁴. Therefore, no one can deny the key and leading role of language and purification of language in

¹¹² Hans Kohn **A History of Nationalism in The East**, (Trs. Margaret M.Green), New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1929, p. 227.

¹¹³ David Kushner **Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Doğuşu 1876-1908**, (Trs. Şevket Serdar Türet), Rekin Ertem, Fahri Erdam, İstanbul, Kervan Yay., 1979, p. 21.

¹¹⁴ Davison, **Turkey...**, p. 84.

Turkish identity in modern sense. Behar regards language as one of the chief elements of the definition of nation and nationalism. Pointing out the Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth century, she says that language was one of the main instruments which was used in the definition of nation and nationalism, because it was the strongest factor and it wasn't contradictory to the principal policies¹¹⁵. Also Hans Kohn allots an important place to language. According to him, "in Turkey, as elsewhere, modern nationalist sentiment arose simultaneously with the creation of a new, unaffected, and natural literally language akin to the vernacular, and this resulted, further, in the supersession of a type of humanism inseparable from mediaeval, classical speech and form"¹¹⁶. As a result, fortune favoured Ottoman scholars and they found an open door to leak Western ideas.

All those steps, stated above, are of course not the sole constitutive elements of national awareness among the Turks. What Europe was thinking about the Turks and how they were perceiving Turkishness were on the other side of the coin. This was important for the Turks because there was a shared opinion that Turks and Islam had been the common enemy of the Europeans. Here Yurdusev states that, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries; in treaties, which were signed among European states, Turks were described as the common enemies of Christian world¹¹⁷. So, how come this negative and partly ahistorical perception gained importance among Turks and got them to consider their position among European societies? Kushner points out three important viewpoints, widespread among Europeans since the first half of the eighteenth century : First one was the one that assumed Turks as barbarians. Europeans started to search Ottoman history thoroughly for self-defence. Secondly, there was also an opinion which was praising Turks. Finally, there was a growing interest and curiosity towards Asia and Asian culture. Besides these, Kushner adds a

¹¹⁵ Büşra Ersanlı Behar **İktidar ve Tarih: Türkiye’de Resmi Tarih Tezinin Oluşumu 1929-1937**, İstanbul, AFA Yay. 1996, p.77.

¹¹⁶ Kohn, **A History of...**, p.225.

¹¹⁷ Yurdusev, **“Avrupa Kimliğinin Oluşumu ve Türk Kimliği”**, p.63.

stimulant: grammar books on Turkish. Especially the one, written by Arthur Lumney in 1832, had already awakened Turkish concern on their own self ¹¹⁸.

As understood from the above information, stated briefly, Turkish identity has had an organic body. It was born and nourished. It crept. It reached the age of maturity. Then, it made friends and had enemies. The rest of this chapter is dealing with the age of maturity of Turkish identity and its “others”. Main focus of the chapter is to emphasize the rise of Turkish nationalism, Turkish identity and the posture of Turkish identity figure against the others.

2.3.ORGANISATIONAL ATTEMPTS AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON TURKISHNESS

It was not possible to observe strong oppositions to the government in the Ottoman Empire via regular and governmental institutions. However, those were the scholars who said something and criticised the government.

In 1865 a secret organisation, aiming at criticising the acts of the government, was established. Lewis states that for the first time in 1860's in the Empire, the government and its program were exposed to a liberal criticism ¹¹⁹. He adds that these ideas first appeared in a circle which was conducted by Şinasi, Namık Kemal and their friends, who were also prudently making advantage of the press. Şinasi and Namık Kemal were the forefathers of two concepts in the Ottoman Empire: liberation and motherland¹²⁰. Affected by the soul and ideas of the French Revolution, they focused on the importance of those two to gain full independence. The name of this organization was *Genç Osmanlılar* (Young Ottomans), which was the first opposition movement proved to be effective. As understood from the name of the organization, these young scholars were not defenders of a Turkish identity, at all. They were strongly maintaining full independence of the Ottoman Empire with a

¹¹⁸ Kushner, **Türk...**, p.12-3.

¹¹⁹ Lewis, **Modern...**, p.151.

¹²⁰ Lewis, **Modern...**, p.151.

constitution, based on Western thought. “They were not and couldn’t be Turkish nationalists, even though some were interested in the Turkish past and the Turks of Central Asia; for they ardently wished to preserve Ottoman soil intact¹²¹. The scholars connected with this organization accomplished at learning a foreign language and then transferring Western ideas into the Empire. Political programme of the Young Ottomans mainly included some items as Kılınçkaya counts. First of all, Members of the Ottoman *millet* was to be equal before the law and this equality had to be ensured. Also, Public was to be treated justly. Ottoman population was to be united with the love of motherland. And lastly, so as to achieve these aims, Ottoman regime was to be changed into constitutional monarchy¹²². All in all Toynbee summarises this programme in one sentence, young Turkish programme of “Ottomanism” meant that all Ottoman nationalities were to enjoy equal cultural liberty and that all were to be represented in parliament and in the public service on a proportional basis; and, in practice it meant that the non-Turkish elements were only to be enfranchised, or even tolerated, in so far as they were willing to come on to Turkish ground¹²³.

Young Ottomans also introduced some novel concepts, which the population was not familiar with. Although they weren’t successful enough to penetrate into the minds of the masses, they introduced some new concepts: constitution, monarchy and patriotism. In no aspect of thought were they more influential than in the development of patriotic sentiment¹²⁴. In this case patriotism carried a more different meaning in that, it would certainly be related directly with national identity in the following years. Patriotism was a new subject which had to be reflected thoroughly, because it was arousing interest to entirely different thoughts other than religion. As far as identity awareness and its importance for the Turco-Moslem population were concerned, patriotism was of great importance, especially for a public which was on

¹²¹ Davison, **Turkey...**, p.86.

¹²² Kılınçkaya et al., **Atatürk...**, pp.26-7.

¹²³ Arnold Toynbee & Kenneth P. Kirkwood, **The Modern World: A Survey of Historical Forces Volume VI: Turkey**, London, Ernest Bann Ltd., 1926, p.53.

¹²⁴ Davison, **Turkey...**, p.86.

the edge of a hot war. Ottoman patriotism and love of motherland laid the foundation of a future consciousness on Turkishness.

On the other hand, there was a considerable drawback through the path to westernisation and patriotism. This was the intention of Abdulhamid II to abrogate the 1876 constitution. Both abdicating his sole absoluteness and permitting Islam to lose its power seemed to be troublesome. As the prisoner of these ideas, Abdulhamid II pleaded The Ottoman Russian War of 1877-1878 and dissolved the parliament and sent Midhad Pasha, the architect of *Kanun-i Esasi* and his men to exile¹²⁵. Hans Kohn, also, lays the stress on Abdulhamid's intention¹²⁶:

Abdulhamid regarded the awakening of nationalist sentiment as the harbinger of a democratic movement, an attack upon the absolute authority of the monarch, and, moreover, as a menace to the existence of the Ottoman Empire with its medley of races. He regarded Islam as a uniting force hallowed by custom and faith ...

Taking their nourishment and motive from opposite ideas, progressive movements felt to make haste against Abdulhamid. II. Another considerable organisation was the Committee of Union and Progress, founded as a secret organisation in 1891. It was the belated political wing of The Young Ottoman movement. Their aim was to struggle with the regime that was quite a constraint one. However, since they were an opposition group, the government arrested some of its members and sent them into prison or exile. Luckier ones managed to escape Paris. This can be regarded as an intellectual centre for the members. They found a chance to observe European life of thought and learn about political systems. Therefore, they conduct their studies and publications in favour of the unity and preservation of the Ottoman Empire, transfer of European science into the Empire and rethinking of the Ottoman political and governmental system and revising the 1876 Constitution, but

¹²⁵Gül Tokay touches upon this subject in her book "**Makedonya Sorunu...**" in more details: II. Abdulhamid was aware of the dangers that the Empire would face and he was determined to protect the Sultanate. That's because he, at first, was in favour of the constitution: Mithad Pasha was promoted as the grand vizier by the Sultan; and Kanun-i Esasi was declared on the 23rd of December in 1876. The Sultan was disturbed due to the support that Mithad Pasha took from the public. He pleaded the international crisis and dissolved the parliament. pp. 28-9.

¹²⁶ Kohn, **A History of...**, p.229.

at the same time they were against foreign intervention in the name of reformation. The aim of this hectic Young Turkish movement was neither to awaken Turkish nationalist sentiment among public, nor to create a homogenous Turkish society. “Their aim” according to Kohn “was to subdue the other peoples by force and so erect a predominantly Turkish Empire.”¹²⁷ These young men were indifferent to ideologies and social formulations. The real matter that interested them was the unity and permanence of the Ottoman Empire under a constitutional system.

Young Turks’ being uninterested to Turkish ethnic ties didn’t prevent Turkish nationalism from bearing fruit. According to Lewis despite the failure of young Turkish movement, it was of utmost importance because the country had a chance for discussion and trial, which she had never experienced¹²⁸.

The Empire was not in a position, which consistent voices were prevailing. Intellectual life was teeming with differentiating ideas. Christian subject peoples were naturally against Ottomanism and being ruled by the imperial government. As mentioned above the Empire was at the edge of a bitter territorial dismemberment. But, the worst was the desire for regression. Nevertheless, it was certain that governmental authority had to be redressed because the glorious name of the Empire was about to turn into notorious. Lewis focuses on this complicated situation in the Empire: ¹²⁹

...They met with a little resistance. Rebels, mullahs and theological school students joined them. Other groups got together in different canters of the city. Rebels’ desire was simple: ‘Seriah is loosing its power. We want Seriah order’ .

Religion and Moslem identity, once having been one of the blood vessels of the Empire, were now causing the Empire lose blood. Regression knew no bounds. Bigotry tended to drag the country along the past again. This event that Lewis mentions above was recorded as *31 Mart Olayı*. It happened on the 13th of April

¹²⁷ Kohn, **A History of...**, p.234.

¹²⁸ Lewis, **Modern...**, p.212.

¹²⁹ Lewis, **Modern...**, p.215.

1909 and spread around Anatolia. This radical movement was repressed by a special Independence Army. The saviours arrived in Istanbul on the 23rd of April and fought with rebellions.¹³⁰ The event showed that the Empire was no longer omnipotent, because after tremendous successes, it became perplexed with such kind of domestic matters.

Was the Turco-Moslem population ready for confronting with a new identity? If external and internal affairs and experiences are taken into consideration, the Empire had to provide this. It had already lost the luxury of sustaining ventures of emperors. Nobody was dubious about a new reform.

As known well, CUP members had been in side of constitutional monarchy for a long time, because the first attempt was a setback. Their ultimate goal was to declare the Constitution again. They did. As well as that, their efforts proved influential. The Sultan was no longer taking notice of internal and external problems . After having been pressurised by the CUP, he ratified the Constitution in 1908.

However, everything went from bad to worse and external situation deteriorated the moribund Empire, that was dealing with The Battle of Tripoli and the Balkan Wars. Not only the warfare had embittered the situation, but lack of ideal unity among the governors, opposition forces and the population led the country to new rifts between these groups and segregation. Ottomanism dreams came to an end says Lewis and he continues, spread of nationalism among the subject peoples of the Ottoman Empire and eventually deployment of nationalist virus among even the dominant ones, Turks, put an end to Ottomanism ideals¹³¹.

When Ottomanism began to lose its credit, three influential and considerable motives of thought occurred: Westernisation, Islamism and Turkishness. First group was in favour of adopting every single value and development from the West. On the

¹³⁰ Lewis, **Modern...**, p.215.

¹³¹ Lewis, **Modern...**, p.217.

other hand, advocates of Islamism were defending Islamic life style, but at the same time, were aware of the importance of technical information, adoption of which was inevitable. Nascent of Turkishness forms the very subject of the following section.

In the following section, advent of Turkish identity is discussed by focusing on nascent Turkishness, its far-reaching effects and otherisation of the Ottoman Empire.

2.4. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TURKISH IDENTITY AND NATIONALIST IDEAL IN THE EARLY 20th CENTURY

Turkish identity has always been tantamount to Islam for the majority of the Europeans. The soul of Christianity, and of Islam; Western and Eastern cultures had prevailed in European and Ottoman history for ages. That Turkey remained the main “other” of the European subconscious as a social, political and cultural image of threat throughout history, is a widely held view¹³². As a natural consequence of this, mutual prejudice and otherisation dominated the relations.

Nuri Yurdusev states the situation of Christianity and Islam as such; similar to Christian identity, which had been the basic constituent of European identity till the second half of seventeenth century; up to the nineteenth century, main constitutive of Turkish identity had been Islam¹³³. Hence, it is impossible to claim that there was a sharp turn from Moslem identity to Turkish identity. Yurdusev continues by focusing on a ramification: as a result, European and Turkish identity had perceived each other as “the other” because they were the members of rival components of a whole: religion¹³⁴. Whether for political or religious aims, religion has always been a question between Europe and Turkey.

¹³² Erdenir, **Avrupa...**, pp.208-9.

¹³³ Yurdusev, **Avrupa...**, p.61.

¹³⁴ Yurdusev, **Avrupa...**, p.61.

In the twentieth century Turks were still proud of being Moslem. However, imperial identity was gradually losing its dominance among Turks. Last resorts proved futile, and the magnificence of the Ottoman Empire was on the edge of being a vague name in vain. Some more important values, which had a constitutive role among Turkish population such as motherland, national sovereignty and independence started to gain priority. As an expected consequence of these ascending values, enmity against the enemies, especially Europeans, occupying Turkish land, ascended too.

As far as the Balkan Wars and the War of Independence are concerned, it is quite certain that nobody is dubious of the importance and influence of territory. As the starting date of Turkish Independence War, 19 May 1919 is the officially accepted date. This was a real struggle conducted against occupation forces, which were coming from the West. However, on the other side of the coin, there was to some extent another fight being waged against Ottoman government, in other words Istanbul Government. This was also as challenging as the other one, which will be discussed in the following sections.

Having a narrow sense, the concept of “motherland” had meant homeland until the nineteenth century, but it changed in *Tanzimat* Period¹³⁵. This change was a progressive one and reached its peak at the War of Independence after the seriousness of occupations was realized. Motherland was the principle concept, on which different arguments started to engender.

The situation of the country and territory was so vague that different ideas were rambling all around the country, and what the most reasonable and effective expedient would be was being thought by some groups. İlhan Tekeli and Selim Ilkin focus on three differentiating views on the same problematic topic. After the War, there were three types of views on independence, prevalent within the country. According to the first one, borders of the Empire had to be kept just like they had

¹³⁵ Kushner, *Türk...*, pp. 77-8.

been before the War. This group was against nationalist ideas because of their closeness to palace milieu. The second view was in favour of regional independence. According to the defenders of this view, if new states were to be found in controversial territories, these territories had to be under the control of the Turks, who were dominant. Unlike these two groups, the last group became the most prevailing and far-reaching one. On the territory, that was defined in “National Pact”, would new Turkish state be established. Mustafa Kemal, being the leading figure and symbol of Turkish nationalism, was in this group. He took over the command and at his command Turks and nationalist bands would be opening fire against occupation¹³⁶.

Mustafa Kemal, supporting National Pact and the salvation of Turkey, was still uneasy, because according to him, three irritating views were spreading in order to get off the losses and trouble of war. First group was defending mandate carried out by the British. Second group was in favour of American protection and mandate. And the last group was advocating the idea of regional liberation. Mustafa Kemal, on the other hand, maintained one viewpoint, which for him could pave the way for liberation; that is, the foundation of a fully independent Turkish state which would be unconditionally based on national sovereignty¹³⁷.

National sovereignty is based upon nationalist ideals. Ayhan Akman argues about modernist character of Turkish nationalism. As far as Turkish experience is concerned, national identity is mainly grounded on a social and political transformation rather than ethnic or racial purity¹³⁸. Turkish nationalism emerged in parallel to the idea of constructing a new political identity represented by a modern nation-state¹³⁹.

¹³⁶ İlhan Tekeli & Selim Ilkin **Cumhuriyetin Harcı Köktenci Modernitenin Doğuşu**, İstanbul, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yay. 2003. pp. 166-8.

¹³⁷ Mustafa Kemal Atatürk **Söylev Cilt I-II**, (Ed. Hıfzı Veldet Velidedeoğlu), İstanbul, Cumhuriyet Kitap Kulubu, 2001, pp.42-3.

¹³⁸ Ayhan Akman, “**Modernist...**”, p.23.

¹³⁹ Göl, “**Imagining The Turkish Nation Through Othering Armenians**”, p.25.

As far a Turkish identity is concerned, Akman mainly lays the stress on modernist nationalism because it attaches importance to identity on a national basis but not in terms of race or ethnicity. For him, cultural model of the West is of primary importance, so on behalf of Westernisation, democratic participation is found risky due to its traditional, religious and local dimension and their ties with identity¹⁴⁰.

Mustafa Kemal adopted modernist nationalism, including Westernisation, secularisation and boundless development, whose watchword has been “reaching the level of contemporary civilizations”. Western cultural model and its universal principles would shed light to Turkish national construction on a rational, contemporary and modernist base by pointing out positive sciences and knowledge, states Akman¹⁴¹. Large scale transformations and revolutions give a new identity to a country¹⁴². Turkey is of this category. Allen draws a picture of this situation in the following paragraph¹⁴³.

Turkey changed its status from an Islamic country to a national one. National needs and national development came to occupy Turkey's thoughts and activities and she sought to develop into a strong, unified and self-sufficient state similar to her European neighbours, whom she was taking for a model.

When Turkey slipped off its imperial ties and the dominant opinion of Ottomanism, she chose to pursue the path of nationalism and the creation of a national identity.

Turkish identity in the early twentieth century is briefly discussed in this section. Next part is dwelling on the perception of nationalism in Western and non-Western communities. Also, under this heading Ottoman and Turkish cases are emphasised.

¹⁴⁰ Akman, “**Modernist Nationalism: Statism and National Identity in Turkey**”, pp.25-6.

¹⁴¹ Akman, “**Modernist Nationalism: Statism and National Identity in Turkey**”, pp.38-9.

¹⁴² Behar, *İktidar...*, p.19.

¹⁴³ Allen, *The Turkish...*, p.54.

2.4.1. FROM THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE TO TURKISH NATION

With the advent of ideas spread by French Revolution, nationalism had led to a destructive impact on empires, because of the change in the perception of state and the rising importance in ethnical ties. Anthony Smith focuses on the unplanned character of the formation of nations in the West. After the French Revolution, people became more interested in and conscious about their ethnic ties in linguistic, spiritual and ideational sense. With the advent of the significance of rationalism, the idea of liberation and liberty were attached importance. And as a natural consequence of this, nationalist thoughts blossomed. As the time was ripe for forming new nations, the West witnessed the formation of nation states one by one. At this point it would be appropriate to summarise Smith's words; outside the West the formation of nations followed the diffusion of nationalism, because in non-Western communities nations were largely the result of nationalist purposes and movements and they were created by deliberate design, but in the West, as a natural result of suitable conditions, nations were acquired by accident¹⁴⁴.

Smith compares Western and non-Western cases in terms of nationalism and the adoption of nationalist ideology. Nation formation in Western countries was spontaneous, because nation formation process was a natural consequence of nationalism. For Smith Western nations owed much to nationalism and a movement to create a "nation where none existed". Whereas, explains Smith, the situation in non-Western countries was different for, nation formation was not spontaneous. That's because, they didn't adopt the elements that were naturally brought by nationalism. Since non-Western countries adopt the ideology of nationalism, it was a second hand experience for them¹⁴⁵.

The case was not composing any substantial difference for Turkish nationalism. Westerners usually regarded the Ottoman Empire as "Turkey" and the

¹⁴⁴ Smith, **National...**, p.100.

¹⁴⁵ Smith, **National...**, p.100.

people as “Turks” but the Turks named their own empire as “high Ottoman State”, which meant lack of ethnic identity...¹⁴⁶. However, Turkish identity and national awareness forged in time and the Ottoman Empire narrowed gradually. Eventually, by means of Turks and Turkish nationalists the Ottoman Empire turned into Turkish nation with a new identity.

Smith sets four routes that empires followed while changing their imperial character. These routes initiated the formation of nations. According to him, the first route is the aristocratic base in a lateral *ethnie*. There are both demotic elements and aristocratic culture and traditions which were permeated with religious influence. The Ottoman Empire had demotic ties, which were used by ordinary people. Unaware of their identity in national or ethnic sense, people, especially Turks, were perpetuating their traditions, cultural and religious duties and daily life. Also, the governors were prevailing their power by focusing on imperial strength and religious ties. The second route according to Smith is inclusion of significant ethnic minorities. In the Ottoman case, ethnic ties can't have been as important as the greatness of the Empire. Regardless of their ethnic ties, every subject people had to live under the protection of the Ottoman Empire. Third route is the modernising character of bureaucratic states. He continues that, this represents the consolidation of a dominant ethnic core and ruling class over subordinate *ethnies* and classes. The last route that Smith states is the frequent use of official and institutional nationalism. Institutional nationalism is firstly seen in educational programme, because homogenisation of the population and creating a compact nation depend on a national educational programme¹⁴⁷. By referring to Smith's gradual explanation, it gets clear that rise of nationalism and awareness in the Ottoman Empire had no difference from the situation that he explained. Starting from *Tanzimat* Edict, national awareness, whether because of worries about segregation or not, started to become visible. The last seventy years of Ottoman rule witnessed successive attempts to reform the basis of the Empire (*Tanzimat*), including a resort to

¹⁴⁶ William Hale **Türk Dış Politikası 1774-2000**, (Trs. Petek Demir), Istanbul, Mart Matbaası, 2003, p.3.

¹⁴⁷ Smith, **National...**, pp.101-2.

“Ottomanism” through equality and citizenship for all subjects and to “Islamism” under Abdulhamid II, which promoted the welfare of the Islamic inhabitants without abolishing citizenship for all ¹⁴⁸.

Nevertheless, it remains true that, the last route gathered momentum in the Republican era, in the 1920s. However, the problems didn’t lapse into an end, because relics of the past tailed after nationalist ideals. To some extent, national ideals were elusive due to religious sensitivity, which was a heritage rooted in strong Moslem character of the Ottoman Empire. According to Smith, attempts to form national identity were of elusive character because of Islamic loyalties. Once again the content, if not the form, of Turkish national identity, proved elusive¹⁴⁹. While coping with those kind of hindrances, nationalists, including Mustafa Kemal, made up their mind to awaken Turkish national sentiments. For them, territory was not an ordinary land, it was the motherland, deserving sacrifice. Anatolia was the land, on which not only the Ottomans landed, but also other former Turkish descendants and communities prevailed and lived. “Realizing that territorial and civic concepts of the nation require a solidary basis in a national cultural identity, the Kemalists attempted to furnish the necessary ethnic myths, memories, values and symbols by utilising the theory of Turkish origins in Central Asia, their unbroken descent from Oghuz Khan and the antiquity of their (purified) original language (the Sun Language Theory)”¹⁵⁰.

After all these explanations, it is yet very difficult to mention a certain type of identity for the Turks at the beginning of the twentieth century. It is not easy to defend that Turkish identity is totally ethnic or political. Nevertheless, it remains true that, Turkish national identity today has acquired experience from numerous events, both pleasant and harrowing.

Turkish identity has had three components: ethnic identity, national identity and historical identity. “Being a Turk”, that is, having been born from a Turkish

¹⁴⁸ Smith, **National...**, pp.103.

¹⁴⁹ Smith, **National...**, pp.104.

¹⁵⁰ Smith, **National...**, pp.104.

mother and a father, falls into the first component, ethnic identity. Not only inborn factors affect ethnic identity, but also customs and traditions, language and culture are closely related with ethnic identity. Secondly, national identity is about being a member of a nation. Therefore, it might be suitable to say that ethnic identity has deeper and older ties than national identity. Ethnic identity has been existing for two thousand years. Whereas, national identity was mainly introduced by French Revolution and it has a history of two hundred years. National identity has pragmatic roots, on the grounds that it provides members of a nation with easiness. There is a political meaning in national identity, because it includes polity providing citizenship; and certain rights and duties as a result of this citizenship. The last component of Turkish identity is historical based. Historical elements emerged in the late nineteenth century and consolidated in the Republican period. Turkish historical identity is mainly in the collective mind of Turkish people. It has been designed and created by nationalist discourse and history teaching. Historical Turkish identity comprises the Ottoman Empire, but by focusing on Turkish ties. It might be right to defend that history teaching instils historical identity to the collective mind, by referring to ethnic, national and political ties. Tanıl Bora states that there remained a dual-faceted Turkish identity in the early period of the Turkish Republic. National identity had an ambivalent character in the early Republican period. On one hand, there existed a definition of a judicial kind of identity determined by citizenship and motherland; and on the other hand a definition of an ethnic identity based on uniqueness¹⁵¹.

In this section, how Turkish identity made progress has been mentioned in brief. It was a period of construction. In the following part constituents and steps, which consolidated Turkish identity, will be analysed while focusing on The Independence War and “Ottoman, the other”.

¹⁵¹ Tanıl Bora, “Cumhuriyetin İlk Döneminde Milli Kimlik” **Cumhuriyet Demokrasi ve Kimlik**, Nuri Bilgin (Ed.), İstanbul, Bağlam Yay., 1997, p. 53.

2.5. THE INDEPENDENCE WAR: A MATTER OF DEFENCE OR AN INJURED PRIDE?

Enumerating the reasons of the First World War is tantamount to perpetuating a stereotype; so under this heading not the reasons of the War but its cumulative effects on Turkish national identity will be discussed.

Admittedly, no one was dubious about the subversive effects of the French Revolution on empires. Similarly, international situation and warfare didn't destine the Ottoman Empire for permanent dominion and sovereignty. While nationalist movements were dismembering the country, new expedients were searched for as effective alternatives. Among these Ottomansim, Islamism, Westernisation and Turkishness can be counted. With the lapse of time, except Westernisation and Turkification, others fell short of international requisites. Therefore, Turkish nationalism gained momentum. In the following paragraphs the Empire's relatedness to war is briefly dwelled on.

There was a growing uneasiness about the international situation in the Empire and it was also trapped by international tension. Which one, belligerency or neutrality, would redress the Empire's situation in Europe? Neutrality would have been the wrong choice, in that European countries were rapidly forming blocks. As a result, the Empire called for alliance to Britain and France, but the result was rather disappointing. Zürcher sets the scene¹⁵²:

Ever since the First World War a debate has raged in Turkey over how and why the Unionist government of the day decided to join the central powers in that war. ... The Unionist Government of the Ottoman Empire tried to interest the major powers in the conclusion of an alliance. The Balkan War had shown up the Empire's diplomatic isolation and the unionists were convinced that continued isolation would mean the end of the empire. Basically they were prepared to accept any alliance rather than continued isolation.

¹⁵² Zürcher, **Turkey...**, p.116.

Ottoman state went to the War with Germany, and accordingly, had to fend for itself since then, because alliance with Germany meant fishing in troubled waters. Moreover, for that reason, great powers cold-shouldered the Ottoman state. Two ships belonging to German fleet, then named in Turkish, bombed two harbours in the Black Sea. The retort was not too late. Russia and other great powers declared war to the Ottoman Empire. In consequence of this, Ottomans found themselves struggling in the midst of a subversive war. Great powers had already been overzealous in Ottoman territory. They occupied the land in practice, but they also occupied the Ottoman land on paper by secret agreements. Lewis¹⁵³ draws the scene in the following paragraph:

The land was amputated, people became destitute and demoralised and the population decreased. It seemed that Turkish public was ready to submit to almost all demands of victorious powers.

After those irksome defeats, public needed something to reactivate: motivation or exasperation.

The following part is analysing this question. In this part otherisation process of the Ottoman Empire is the main focus.

2.6. LOOK BACK IN ANGER¹⁵⁴: OTHERING THE OTTOMAN

Greek landing at Izmir on 15 May 1919 was the last straw. Public could not endure any more. It was understandable that Great powers occupied the country, because they were great powers and independent nations. However, the situation was not the same for the Greeks, because they were subject peoples only a few decades ago. This was unbearable for the Turks. And above all, the government was not

¹⁵³ Lewis, **Modern...**, p.241.

¹⁵⁴ “Look Back in Anger” is a play written by John Osborne. It was first set on the stage and performed in 1956 in Great Britain. Affected from “Angry Young Man Movement”, emerging in Great Britain, John Osborne wrote “Look Back in Anger”.

taking steady steps. In contrast, the government sent buffer troops to calm down the tension in the country. The scene was rather unpleasant as briefly stated above. Ottoman government was not capable of organizing and leading a nation-wide movement, according especially to the nationalists.

At the same time with a growing tension, Mustafa Kemal and his men had been organising the suitable background of a national resistance since the 19th May 1919. The action was not only directed to the invaders, but they also had misgivings with the Ottoman government. Having laid the foundation of the new state, Mustafa Kemal took over a mission to secure national liberation. Mustafa Kemal¹⁵⁵ sets the scene in the Empire in his Speech,

Enemies attacked the Ottoman state and its country and decided to dismember and share it. The Sultan and the Caliph are thinking of nothing except for their life and comfort. The state is of no difference. ... Unaware of their treachery, the nation and the army are loyal to their Sultan and the Caliph with true allegiance, which has been rooted by religion and traditions for ages. Preserving Ottoman descent and state would surely cause an immeasurable damage to Turkish nation. ... It is high time to react against Ottoman government, sultan and the caliph; and to foment a public uprising against them.

“The puppet Sultan sent armed expeditions into the interior of Anatolia for a trial to suppress the nationalist movement”, says Price¹⁵⁶. In addition to this problem, another more serious one occurred. Turkish land had already been shared and dismembered by European powers via secret agreements. In the aftermath of a series of conferences in London and San Remo, a treaty was negotiated and worked out and finally, signed by Allied forces and the Ottoman representatives on the 10th of August in Sevres¹⁵⁷. This was the notorious Sevres, which was abandoning the Turks to a helpless position. However, this treaty has been accepted as an abortive one since it was never ratified.

¹⁵⁵ Atatürk, **Söylev...**, pp.41-4.

¹⁵⁶ Price, **A History...**, p.118.

¹⁵⁷ Lewis, **Modern...**, p.247.

Whether it was ratified or not has never been as serious as the signature of the government. This was the approval of defeat and the submission of oppression. According to the nationalists, this was totally unacceptable, for especially those, who adopted a mission to reach liberation. The cost of this act was being labelled by treachery and unfaithfulness. This is a “look back in anger” situation even now. The Ottoman government was the first “other” for the Turkish nation to be. Signing the Sevres was not the only reason, however. For the modern nationalists, Ottoman identity had already fallen short of the requirements of the international situation. Turkey had to renew its institutions, conditions, collective mind and ideas in order to prove its modernisation and change conclusively if it was desiring to be acknowledged as a fully independent country on the international arena. However, for the ones who were desiring to form a nation-state, the Ottoman Empire was, from now on, far from meeting these prerequisites, because it couldn’t achieve modernisation owing to its imperial and religious sensitivity. Modernisation was the true path to success. For nationalists, the die was cast and modernisation and liberation had to be achieved at all costs. Ayla Göl poses a question and provides its answer. She asks that why Turkish nationalists preferred Western type of modernisation and the construction of a modern nation, to the Ottoman system and the religious communities of Islam? According to her, the answer is related with the oppositional relationship with Turkish nationalists and their predecessors, because it should be accepted that there was a historical continuity between the modernisation attempts of the Young Ottomans, Young Turks and the nationalists. The differences cumulated in the operations. Turkish and Ottoman modernizers operated differently. This means Ottoman modernizers adopted Western experience partly; whereas Turkish modernisation turned its face to the West totally and was opposed to Ottoman-Islamic experience. Ayla Göl continues that, with the emergence of Turkish nationalism, the modern Turkish nation’s past was Ottoman and Islamic, but its future was secular and European¹⁵⁸. As a result of this, ties were cut with the Ottoman past. Nationalist discourse was loaded with this theme during the warfare. The Ottoman government, its actions, traditions and its reason of existence were

¹⁵⁸ Göl, “**Imagining The Turkish Nation Through Othering Armenians**”, p. 126.

criticised. For the nationalists, its existence would jeopardize Turkish awakening and self-defence so it was labelled as the “other”.

After these arguments it gets clear that, otherisation is not only related with a totally different culture, country or people. It is directly related with the “unwanted”. This leads to otherisation and construction of a new phenomena which the “other” did not achieve. The Ottoman Empire met the same end.

Before closing this chapter it can be reasonable to mention a striking memory of Ahmet Cevat Emre with Mustafa Kemal¹⁵⁹:

After the first Congress of Turkish language, Ghazi, demanding a new grammar of Turkish, called me and said that: ‘ I scrutinized grammar books, you shall write the new grammar; but be careful, there shouldn’t be any writings that praise the Sultans’.

It was wrong to claim that the Ottoman Empire was the sole entity that was otherised. Other than the Ottoman Empire, the Armenians, the English and Arabs were otherised due to warfare, and internal and external reasons. However, these are not in the framework of this study.

In this chapter, some important events, that can be regarded as important turning points in Turkish history are touched upon starting from the *Tanzimat* period. However, these events are defined in terms of identity. How imperial identity evolved and turned into Turkish identity is the main focus of this chapter. The main goal of the following chapter is the otherisation of the Greeks.

¹⁵⁹ Ahmet Cevat Emre **Atatürk’ün İnkılap Hedefi ve Tarih Tezi**, İstanbul, Ekin Basımevi, 1956, p.5.

CHAPTER THREE

HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF GREEK “THE OTHER”

3. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

It is arguable that the Greeks are the most hated people in modern Turkey, but that they have been perceived with a negative imagination is not a nascent phenomena. It was the outcome of incipient nationalist feelings mainly brought and aggravated by the Independence War.

For Adamantios Polyzoides Greek and Turkish contacts have been natural for the last seven hundred years due to geographical and ethnic conditions¹⁶⁰. That means, Greek and Turkish involvement under the same circumstances had not been due to the trick of fate. They have shared ethno-geographic conditions and in addition to this, historical involvement. Being an imperial power in the Balkans, the Ottoman Empire gave administrative and economic presence to its subjects, the Greeks. As a result of this, both shared a lot of common historical, economic and cultural ties as well as a certain regional affinity and a sense of common collective identity¹⁶¹.

It is an established fact that the year when an entanglement in the Empire occurred was 1821. Greek revolt in 1821 created a turmoil in the Empire and ignited negative perception towards the Greeks. In the following paragraphs the process that the Turks and Greeks involved are mentioned.

The interwoven relationship between the Greeks and Turks, in fact, roots back seven hundred years. The Ottoman Empire had a great number of population which gained momentum after the fall of Constantinople in 1453. “The year 1453

¹⁶⁰ Adamantios Polyzoides, “Greeks”, **Modern Turkey**, Eliot Grinnell Mears (Ed.), New York, The Macmillan Company. 1924. P.76.

¹⁶¹ Othon Anastasakis, “Greece and Turkey in The Balkans: Cooperation or Rivalry?” **Turkish Studies**, 5-1 (2004), p46.

was neither the beginning nor the end of great shift in power from Christian to Muslim hands in the Byzantine lands of the Eastern Mediterranean”¹⁶². This means, the Ottomans would be able to utilize the situation for military reasons. According to Adamantios Polyzoides, Greek race fared badly in the first two centuries of the Ottoman domination owing to the Ottoman military system, on the grounds that, since the Greeks came to the help of Ottomans and supply its healthiest boys for the service of the Sultan¹⁶³. That’s because, Ottoman military system was based on such a regime.

Apart from their military values, Greeks played an important role when it comes to economy. “Due to being seafarers Greeks were superior to other peoples within the Empire¹⁶⁴”. In military and business Greeks were one of the most remarkable constituents of the Empire, and they also had an outstanding governmental control. This, of course, did not mean that they gathered the authority into their own hands immediately, but this rather meant those advantages would bore fruit at some future time. Polyzoides points out the gains that Greeks enjoyed ¹⁶⁵:

Such high offices as the governorships of Wallachia and Moldavia were open to them, ambassadorships and high palace posts were given freely to them, and the whole diplomatic service of the Empire was fast passing into their control. The Ottoman Empire in the middle of the 18th century was giving a larger control of the public affairs to the Greeks and had the Hellenic race been pleased to remain a permanent subject of the Sultan, there might have developed a joint control of the fortunes of the Empire.

In addition to their presence in the army and control over governmental level, there had been some spontaneous developments for the Greeks, that also enabled them to be more than being the yes-man of the Empire. The advent and spread of printing press in the Empire led the languages prevail their existence. As part of the modernisation policies, the use of printing press and a standardised language played a vital role in the emergence of nationalism within the Ottoman Empire, says Ayla

¹⁶² C.M. Woodhouse **Modern Greece: A Short History**, London, Faber & Faber, 1991, p.97.

¹⁶³ Polyzoides, “**Greeks**”, p.78.

¹⁶⁴ Polyzoides, “**Greeks**”, p.80.

¹⁶⁵ Polyzoides, “**Greeks**”, p.80.

Göl and she continues; although most of the Greek were on religious topics at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the ideas that the French Revolution brought changed the agenda of the Greek print media by drawing attention to more secular topics¹⁶⁶.

The last words of Polyzoides and Göl are of particular importance because if the Greeks hadn't demanded their independence and hadn't started a struggle in 1821, they wouldn't have taken an accursed place in Turkish nationalist discourse in the following years, when they stepped into Anatolia. For Polyzoides the Greek Revolution of 1821 and independence in 1829 made the whole Greek nation suspected by the Turks¹⁶⁷. Nicole and Hugh Pope put forward a similar idea about the Greek War of Independence and its aftermath¹⁶⁸:

On the whole, the Turkish memory of the Greek War of Independence and these territorial losses is muted; they are thought of as only one part of the complicated story of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the growth of the Turks' own sense of national identity.

Perceived as a subject people, the Greeks had already lost their credit by revolting against the Empire and causing a chain of uprisings in the aftermath of their independence. Greeks were considered to be the greatest danger to Turkey's successful attainment of solid and strong nationhood, that is, understood from Allen's words, even though they were not scattered as widely over Anatolia as Armenians, their neighbourhoods might have been dangerous due to their borders in critical parts such as Istanbul, Izmir, Samsun and Trabzon¹⁶⁹.

Being one of the main characters of the Balkan Wars, Greeks played a great role in Turkish identity. Therefore, Turkish identity owe much to the Balkan Wars . In the following section, the importance of the Balkan Wars will be discussed.

¹⁶⁶ Göl, "Imagining The Turkish Nation Through Othering Armenians" p.128.

¹⁶⁷ Polyzoides, "Greeks", p.81.

¹⁶⁸ Pope & Pope, *Turkey...*, p.114.

¹⁶⁹ Allen, *The Turkish...*, p. 74.

3.2.THE BALKAN WARS

The Independence War was the most triggering initiatives of Greek othering among Turkish people. However, before this War, the Balkan Wars and their relatedness and contribution to Turkish identity awareness and negative perception against the Balkan states should be briefly mentioned.

While the Ottoman Empire was trying to throw off its shackles in the Battle of Tripoli, Balkan states were in pursuit of new territorial gains. Since Bulgaria gained its independence, she was naturally watching for an opportunity to gain new territories. And, the other Balkan states were carefully eying every step that Bulgaria took. With the help and encouragement of Russia, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro initialled an agreement with Bulgaria against the Ottoman Empire, because they were ensured by the Great Powers that even if they were defeated, their frontiers would not change¹⁷⁰. The Ottoman Empire had to face an enormous territorial loss in a very short time. Four countries of the Balkan League, Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro attacked altogether to the last European territories of the Empire so the Ottomans were in a helpless position says Hale, and if the Balkan Army hadn't consisted of the troops of four countries, the Empire would have defeated them one by one¹⁷¹. Ottoman army was routed almost all frontiers and lost her European territories in one month¹⁷². The first Balkan War had ended in 1913 with an agreement signed in London, that was terribly unfavourable to the Ottoman Empire. The second step of the Balkan Wars resulted from the disagreement among the Balkan states that were unable to share territories they gained. Taking advantage of this misty air, the Ottomans regained Edirne.

Under all these circumstances, micro-nationalism raised its head in the Balkans again, but this time the aim was different from it had been years ago. Once having struggled for their independence, Balkan states now were displaying a

¹⁷⁰ Kılınçkaya et al., **Atatürk...**, p.42

¹⁷¹ Hale, **Türk...**, p.23-4.

¹⁷² Ahmad, **Modern...**, p.51.

tendency to send the Moslem population which had an influence in the awakening of Turkish nationalism. Dilek Güven, at this point, sets out an important inference. She states that the defeat in the Balkan Wars, was mainly based on the insufficient national awareness among public¹⁷³. Nevertheless, the scene changed after the War. Turkishness, not powerful and tough enough hitherto, now gained momentum with the arrival of Turkish immigrants from the Balkans¹⁷⁴.

Ergün Aybars points out two important events that affected Ottoman Turks: The Balkan Wars and the First World War¹⁷⁵. The latter one will be analysed in the following section. Aybars summarises the effect of Balkan Wars on Turkishness. During the Balkan Wars under the impact of micro-nationalism, Balkan states had a tendency to massacre which also provoked Turkish nationalism. The massacre that Serbian, Bulgarian, Greek and Montenegrin armies carried out towards the Moslems and the policy to startle and lead them to leave the territories, thousands of Moslems (Turkish, Bosnian, Pomak, etc) had to leave the Balkans. As a result of micro-nationalism in the Balkans, the idea of building up a Turkish nation taking its inspiration from a Turkish territory and Turkish state got clear. In consequence, after the Independence War and Lousanne Treaty 1.300.000 Greeks were sent to Greece and 350.000 Turks came to Turkey¹⁷⁶.

It is understood from Aybars's words that, the population exchange can date back not only the Independence War but also the Balkan Wars as a ramification of the exiles and massacre. Also, Toynbee states the same matter. He says that "after the Balkan Wars the plague of racial warfare spread – with the streams of Moslem refugees – from Macedonia to Thrace and Western Anatolia."¹⁷⁷

¹⁷³ Dilek Güven, Cumhuriyet Dönemi Azınlık Politikaları Bağlamında 6-7Eylül Olayları, Published

Doctorate Thesis (Trs.Bahar Şahin), İstanbul, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2005, p.81.

¹⁷⁴ Kılınçkaya et al., *Atatürk...*, p.43.

¹⁷⁵ Aybars, "Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Ulusal Kimlik Oluşumu ve Batı'nın Etkisi", p.162.

¹⁷⁶ Aybars, "Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Ulusal Kimlik Oluşumu ve Batı'nın Etkisi", p.162.

¹⁷⁷ Toynbee, *The Western...*, p.17.

Other than being a hot War, the Balkan Wars contributed much to Turkishness and affected negative perception against the Balkan States. Since our subject is only concerning with the Greeks, Greek otherisation is laid the main focus. Next part is analysing The War of Independence by focusing on the roots of Greek otherisation in Turkey. Greek occupation of Izmir, having a symbolic value regarding nationalist feelings and Greek step into Anatolia are discussed.

3.3. NATIONAL AWARENESS AND SEEDS OF GREEK OTHERISATION

*In 1918, the Turks lost an Empire but gained a nation healthy once more, as the Osmanlis were when they first emerged from Asia Minor six hundred years before*¹⁷⁸

Great Britain turned its back and had an alliance with Russia. Moreover, those great powers, also including France and Italy, were about to shape the “sick man’s” - as they called the Ottoman Empire “the sick man” - destiny. The Balkan defeat, partition plans over the country, the loss of Macedonia and the lack of national power to resist all, were about to brake the back of the Empire. However, the Empire had not died yet. Blood was still flowing in the veins: Turkish blood. Turkey was becoming a one-nation state without Christian minorities by a policy of blood and iron¹⁷⁹.

For the Ottomans, the Greeks had already been marked off and written to the blacklist when they initiated a revolt in 1821. However, ninety years later, a new nation was about to emerge from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. Where would the members of this infant nation place the image of “the Greek” in their mind?

¹⁷⁸ Price, **A History...**, p.95.

¹⁷⁹ Price, **A History...**, p.91.

What cannot be cured, must be endured: this understanding could no longer be the fate of Turkish public. It was exasperating that the Greeks set foot in Turkish land. Something urgent was to be done. After the perception of the seriousness of the incident, exasperation became the sole guide for the nationalists. Any other occupation didn't hurt Turkish pride too deeply except for the Greeks. The most thorny questions in the minds of the nationalists were ; "How dare could such a former subject community occupy Turkish land? Wasn't it humiliating?" The scene from Turkish side was like this. Lewis sets the scene as the following¹⁸⁰.

"...It seemed that Turkish public was ready to submit to almost every demand of victorious powers. Almost all demands, but not all, because when Greek Army, under the protection of Great powers, landed on Izmir in May 1919, Turk's burning anger was impossible to alleviate. It fell into an ungovernable rage. ... It was an unbearable shame and danger that a neighbour and a former dependant community got to the heart of Anatolia."

Though they met with hostile reception from the Turkish population, there was no well-organised resistance as yet, says Price, and there were only irregular bands, he adds¹⁸¹. Yet, it was unacceptable to the Turks turning a blind eye to their neighbour's march into the heart of their land. Turkish reaction was severe and sudden¹⁸². The first pessimistic feeling to come into the collective mind was *Megali Idea*¹⁸³. This cannot have been allowed to blossom in Turkish land and had to be eradicated.

Neither were armies and reactionary movements well-organised, nor the government and diplomacy were consistent. All these irregular bands and public opinion had to be reminded of nationalist sentiment more efficiently. There was another serious problem to be kept in mind, however. Nationalist ideologies had been

¹⁸⁰ Lewis, **Modern**, p.241.

¹⁸¹ Price, **A History...**, p.119.

¹⁸² Lewis, **Modern...**, p.242.

¹⁸³ In his master's thesis "Yunan İhtilali Öncesinde Siyasal İdeolojiler (Political Ideologies before the Greek Revolution)" Herkül Millas explains *Megali Idea* as such: Megali Idea, that means Great Greece, emerged in the 19th Century. The expression was first uttered by the Prime Minister I. Kollettes: "Due to its geographical position, Greece is the centre of Europe; her right hand holds the West and her left hand holds the East and unites them. After that, the term *Megali Idea* turned into a slogan of an expansionist policy. p 194.

responsible for the catastrophes which the Empire faced, according to the Sultan and his men; so they intended to discourage nationalist resistance, that they thought, would threaten the previous regime¹⁸⁴.

The capital, Istanbul, was no good for this required movement. Nationalists were thinking that, resistance movement was in need of new plans, expedients and sufficient enthusiasm. What's more public had to be reminded of their identity, but not in a religious or imperial sense. Therefore, discourse had to have such a strong and an impressive character that, people could be awakened. Direct discourse was indicating "Turkish Anatolia", because for the nationalists, Istanbul, the capital, was not carrying out its duties. They maintained that, Turkish identity didn't deserve to be a phantom in the foggy atmosphere of Anatolia. That's why, delusion had to be under attack by motivating public who were ready to defend their land at all costs.

In the aftermath of Greek invasion, Mustafa Kemal arrived in Samsun on the 19th of May in 1919. Accordingly, Davison states the commencement of national resistance in the following paragraph¹⁸⁵.

"From there, Kemal went on to organise military resistance, to forge political cohesion among the Turks, and to gain diplomatic recognition for the nationalist movement. ... A decisive spur to the movement was the ill-advised landing of Greek forces at Izmir which had taken place four days before Kemal reached Samsun. ... Turkish resentment immediately flared up against this attack by a people whom they regarded as subjects, conquered in the early Ottoman days."

From the Turkish nationalist side, the result was enmity and hatred. Interminable warfare, unacceptable invasion and insurmountable poverty led to an indescribable misery among Turkish public. In consequence of this, hatred and reaction were inevitable. Othering Greeks come out due to the unavoidable and natural result of these unfortunate events. Not any other date had a stronger impact for the Turks than the 15th of May 1919 at the Independence War. After Mudros

¹⁸⁴ Lewis, **Modern...**, p.245.

¹⁸⁵ Davison, **Turkey...**, p.121.

Armistice was initialled on the 30th of October in 1918, Ottoman survival was at the lowest ebb. Occupation of the land, poverty, lack of regular armed forces, the wait-and-see policy of the Ottoman Government and lack of unity among the population, inevitably led the country to a desperate and awkward situation. Local irregular bands occurred against occupation forces. However, they were not strong enough to offer a determined resistance due to their irregular character.

15th of May 1919 marked a turning point in Turkish history. That is, the date was the outbreak of over patience. Allen comments on Turks behaviour when they realized the danger waiting for their land. He says that, it is possible that Turkey would have suffered her defeat and not raised a hand to protest against the partitioning of her homeland had it not been for one act which cut Turkey's wounded pride to the quick and stirred the nation to a heroic struggle for independence¹⁸⁶. The trigger, causing Turks to act, that Allen mentions, was the occupation of Izmir. This occupation of a part of their country by their deadliest foe was quite enough to awaken heroic spirit and to unite the people in the accomplishment of a patriotic feeling¹⁸⁷. Allen also interprets their feelings. When they thought that their territories were violated, their homes were invaded and their religion was insulted by the hated infidels, it was enough to ignite a burst of hidden energy¹⁸⁸. Stubborn resistance against the enemies was about to take a more regular shape, because the 15th of May, also, constituted a turning point in the otherisation of local bands. After that, it got clear that the policies of the Istanbul Government were not applicable¹⁸⁹.

Greek Army was aiming to penetrate into Anatolia. However, for the Turks regular army handicap seemed insurmountable at first sight because Greek troops were marching and it was impossible to stop them through irregular bands. Nevertheless, horizons were not too misty. With the participation of old soldiers and politicians, trying to organise the resistance movement, irregular bands get

¹⁸⁶ Allen, *The Turkish...*, p.42.

¹⁸⁷ Allen, *The Turkish...*, p.42.

¹⁸⁸ Allen, *The Turkish...*, p.42.

¹⁸⁹ Tekeli & Ilkin, *Cumhuriyetin...*, p. 174.

crowded¹⁹⁰. Also, Mustafa Kemal was surely aware of the fact that the army was the backbone of national struggle¹⁹¹:

Gentlemen! It is an important matter that national struggle should be supported by the army and as well as that the efforts and work of the public and the army should be compatible.

The key to this problem was national resistance movement and the principle and watchword of this movement was: “motherland is a whole, it can not be partitioned”. Motherland had to be protected in its entirety, not regionally. This principle naturally gave birth to territorial definition of the nation in the aftermath of the Greek occupation.

The ontology of nation building in Turkey encompasses two inevitable constituents, one of which is territorial integrity, also being the basic principle of the National Pact, and the other one is, as opposed to the Ottomans, one national, preferably homogenised by ethnic ties, society. At this point Atatürk’s famous saying has always been under discussion: “The might that you need is in your noble blood”. It is now suitable to convey Ayla Göl’s words on this detail : Two areas are given priority in the national project. One of them is territorial state and its definition and the other one is homogenised Turkish nation. As Ottoman land encompassed a lot of cultural and religious groups in various parts of the Ottoman territory, the emergence of a new nation state was inevitable. The inhabitants of those lands were Balkan peoples in Europe and Arabs in the Middle East. As a direct consequence of this, Ottoman territory turned out to be an arena of struggle for the land of dominance among Turks Kurds, Armenians and Greeks¹⁹². This situation was rather unacceptable if a Turkish nation state was to be established. There was no need and permission to the others. After the Armenians and Greeks, being the backbone of

¹⁹⁰ Tekeli & Ilkin, *Cumhuriyetin...*, p. 175.

¹⁹¹ Atatürk, *Söylev...*, p.65.

¹⁹² Göl, “*Imagining The Turkish Nation Through Othering Armenians*”, p.30.

Ottoman city life had gone, a new identity, a new concept of the Turk had to be rebuilt¹⁹³.

As stated above intolerance against the Greeks was, quite naturally, at the highest ebb when they stepped into Izmir. The direct effect of this intolerance was a regular resistance movement under the command of Mustafa Kemal, who landed on Samsun four days after the occupation to awaken nationalist feelings. “The Greeks, becoming one of the cornerstones of Turkish national identity, has been perceived with a certain prejudice”¹⁹⁴ much stronger than the past since then.

As it was noted many times before, the occupation of Izmir created an incredible tension among Turkish public, which led Mustafa Kemal and the nationalists to hold conferences and protest meetings all over the country. The common gist of the conferences in Turkish motherland was the emergence of the need to awaken national sentiment. Being a local one, Balıkesir Congress was held on 26-31 July. Every step had to be meticulous. The Greeks had to be unhesitatingly got rid of. That’s why the main focus of the congress was to eradicate this impermissible entanglement that the Greeks caused. Kılınçkaya illustrates the intolerance in the following words¹⁹⁵:

Anatolian Turks are determined to fight until they retrieve the horizons of their motherland from Greek flag. No advice and resolution, which extends the main goal, will be acceptable.

When belated Turkish nationalism is analysed, it gets clarity that Turkish Independence War had a deep influence on nationalism with a Greek factor. When Turkish nationalism is compared with Greek nationalism diachronically, Greek

¹⁹³ Pope & Pope, **Turkey...**, p. 95.

¹⁹⁴ Herkül Millas, 1821 Yunan İhtilali Oncesinde Siyasal İdeolojiler, Unpublished Master’s Thesis, Ankara,

Ankara University. 1996, p.188.

¹⁹⁵ Kılınçkaya et al., **Atatürk...**, p.91.

nationalism came the first with nourishing Turkish one. Greek nationalism gave momentum to Turkish nationalism¹⁹⁶.

By pointing out Turkish and Greek cases Millas states that a common history is the responsible for the difference¹⁹⁷. Common history creates common interests or expectations. When either of these clashes, negative perception is developed. The same occurred between Turkish and Greek nations. In addition to historical anger, common borders, common interests in the same waters and on the islands fed this process. As a result of all these, these two nations reached such a point, which has made them ready to fight even for a trivial reason. Consequently, says Millas, the Turks and the Greeks have had totally different images¹⁹⁸ against each other.

As a result of historical, geographical, territorial and demographic reasons these two countries have developed negative perceptions to each other. On the other hand, when these reasons are pulled together and today is interpreted in the light of these facts, a tripod explanation came to the light. For Millas the “us” and “the other” matter has three components: pride, shame and lack of confidence. The first one is identified with boasting honour, victory and exalt, which are ascribed to “us”. The second one is not emphasized when failure or defeat is on “our” side. The second one, shame, on the other hand, can easily be attributed to the “other”. Even it is exaggerated. And finally, lack of confidence emerges when a nation is seized with fear for its independence or sovereignty¹⁹⁹.

It is true that, otherisation of the Greeks is the result of a historical process. The first outrage against the Greeks were felt in the Turkish War of Independence and started actively by utilising a more organised way. These cumulated unfortunate events led to a more concrete reaction: the need to press and its emergence. The

¹⁹⁶ Herkül Millas **Tencere Dibin Kara:Türk Yunan İlişkilerine Bir Önsöz**, İstanbul, Amaç Yay, 1989, p.140.

¹⁹⁷ Herkül Millas, **Daha İyi Türk Yunan İlişkileri İçin Yap-Yapma Kılavuzu**, İstanbul, Numune Matbaacılık, 2002, p. 19.

¹⁹⁸ Millas, **Daha İyi...**, p.19.

¹⁹⁹ Millas, **Daha İyi...**, p.20,1.

Turkish press emerged first locally, but then it dressed up with national enthusiasm. In the following chapter press of the Independence War, 1919-1922, and its attitude towards Greeks is discussed by focusing on some citations from the newspapers of the period. The attitude towards Greeks and some remarkable expressions in the newspapers of the period form the first section of the fifth chapter. Following this, secondly, 6-7 September Events in 1955 related to Greek othering, and, mainly, their reflections in nationalist discourse -in the newspapers- are analysed. Lastly in the fifth chapter, 1996 Imia Rocks Crisis in newspapers and in terms of the Crisis Greek othering are discussed.

CHAPTER FOUR

PERCEPTIONS OF GREEK “THE OTHER”

4.1. PRESS AT THE INDEPENDENCE WAR

So violently had the primitive feelings and passions on both sides been aroused in the years from 1919-1922 that it was plainly impossible for the two peoples to continue living side by side²⁰⁰.

On the 28th of May Mustafa Kemal sent a message to the majors of the Army-corps in Erzurum, Ankara, Diyarbakır and Konya²⁰¹.

Landing of the enemy at Izmir and unfortunately then at Manisa and Aydın made the future danger clearer. So as to keep our unity in our motherland, reactions must be shown more overtly.

Ömer Sami Coşar mentions the insurmountable difficulty in finding and revealing the newspapers in the regions that were severely affected by the Greek invasion. Only were some of the copies of these newspapers or their names were found²⁰². Also, there was another problem, impossible to be ignored. Due to the conditions of the war, poverty and lack of financial sources and as a result of this lack of paper brought problems for the press. Especially some newspapers *Açıksöz*, in Kastamonu, *Albayrak*, in Erzurum, and *Emel*, in Amasya, suffered much both from the absence of paper and lack of financial aid²⁰³.

Since it was a very short period of time that the news about the occupation of Izmir was heard and it was occupied, the news on this issue didn't have a considerable place in the newspapers. In spite of this, on the following days, a lot of protest meetings were held and telegrams were sent to the headquarters of the

²⁰⁰ Allen, *The Turkish...*, p.77.

²⁰¹ Atatürk, *Söylev*, p.49.

²⁰² Ömer Sami Coşar *Milli Mücadele Basını*, Gazeteciler Cemiyeti Yay. No: 5, p. 154.

²⁰³ İzzet Öztoprak *Kurtuluş Savaşında Türk Basını*, Ankara, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1981, p.32.

occupation forces²⁰⁴. However, despite all these communicational, financial and military reasons, press more or less managed to convey the news and organise national resistance. While doing this especially, secret agents, the news that the correspondents in Europe and America sent, the news that were published in foreign newspapers in other countries and foreign newspapers in Turkey were mainly benefited from²⁰⁵.

The matters that press in the years of the Independence War worried about were quite serious due to the fact that, the war was a matter of life and death for the Turks. In the second half of 1919, the number of news concerning economical and commercial matters was evidently fewer than the news touching upon political and military subjects²⁰⁶. This means, urgent national matters were of certain priority. National unity was urgently needed and the press was to provide this because Greek occupation could not be put up with due to their being the subjects of the Ottoman Empire only eighty years ago. *Doğrusöz* was one of these newspapers which focused on that occupation:

Last Thursday the occupation of Izmir by the Greeks harassed our public in all. Since then, Muslims and Turks can't help crying²⁰⁷.

Turks would choose either independence or death. Up till now the Turks have gone into war for independence ... This country never wants to experience the sovereignty of another country. Especially, Greek control and dominance over Turkey is rather unacceptable. Turks have not forgotten the bad experience that the Greeks did in Mora, Thesaly and Crete. Nobody can ensure that the Turks will not have the same experience²⁰⁸.

Izmir was the symbol of the Independence War, so just after its occupation, some newspapers started to occur in different places all over Anatolia. *Izmir'e Doğru* was one of these newspapers, published in Balıkesir.

²⁰⁴ Öztoprak, **Kurtuluş...**, p.92.

²⁰⁵ Öztoprak, **Kurtuluş...**, p.33.

²⁰⁶ Öztoprak, **Kurtuluş...**, p.55.

²⁰⁷ *DOĞRUSÖZ*, 22 . 05. 1919. ctd. in Coşar, p.14.

²⁰⁸ *DOĞRUSÖZ*, 5. 07. 1919. Ismail Hakkı, ctd. in Coşar, p. 15.

“In order to prepare the future and save our brothers suffering from the Greeks and dying under their wilderness, here we go brother!”²⁰⁹

According to Ömer Sami Coşar, there was another thing which was attached considerable importance on those days. This was the participation of the public into the national struggle. In order to reach this aim, *Izmir’e Doğru* published such kind of copies²¹⁰.

Famous Gökçen Efe, unfortunately died in Ödemiş struggle. It is impossible to think a Muslim, who won’t be sad for his death. We are sure that people of Ödemiş will take the revenge²¹¹.

Also in the same copy Hüseyin Vasıf wrote his editorial titled “murders on behalf of Civilization”. He told that Turks will no longer be responsible for the bloodshed, the responsible will be the miserable Greeks²¹².

It is evident that, the centre of national struggle was Sivas, an Anatolian city, which was thought to be the safest. For Atatürk, national resistance movement had to be supported by press in order to make a headway against enemy forces and alter the picture in the moribund country. Nationalist discourse was about to throw off its vague shape and become vociferous when *Irade-i Milliye* was encouraged by Atatürk in person to be published in Sivas. It was first published on the 14th of September in 1919. For the safety of the nationalist movement and people, writing for *Irade-i Milliye*, had to keep their names and signature secret. Coşar states that, the copies were delivered to other cities secretly. The copies of the newspaper were put in the envelopes and affixed the seal, belonging to Sivas Veterinary Office²¹³.

The newspaper and its publishers were unconditionally supporting national awakening as understood from the below mentioned excerpt from *Irade-i Milliye*.

²⁰⁹ *İZMİR’E DOĞRU*, 28.11.1919. ctd. in Coşar. p.28.

²¹⁰ Coşar, *Milli...*, p.29.

²¹¹ *İZMİR’E DOĞRU*, 7.12.1919. ctd. in Coşar, p. 28.

²¹² *İZMİR’E DOĞRU*, 7.12.1919. Hüseyin Vasıf, ctd. in Coşar, p. 28.

²¹³ Coşar, *Milli...*, pp. 114-5.

...We wonder if the world understands that Turkish nation doesn't need mandate. Instead, they need a bit of peace and to develop.
 Turkish peasants are industrious.
 Turkish youth is intelligent.
 Turkish soil is fertile.
 Turkish state governed justly the peoples for ages even though they were the members of other religions and languages²¹⁴.

The life of *Irade-i Milliye* was not long enough to be published all over the country. Atatürk had to leave Sivas on 18 December and he wanted to publish it in Ankara but the members of *Sivas Müdafa-i Hukuk* Committee didn't want to leave the paper²¹⁵.

One year later than the first edition of *Irade-i Milliye* in Sivas, another newspaper called *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* was published by Mustafa Kemal in Ankara in January, 1920. The latter one was going to announce the victorious upshot of the country. After leaving Sivas and reaching Ankara, Mustafa Kemal was again so enthusiastic about publishing a new paper. It was essential that a newspaper be published because Mustafa Kemal knew that while fighting against the sultanate, enemy forces and Greece, newspaper would play a key and leading role²¹⁶.

Greek attacks were preventing the journalists and volunteers from publishing the newspapers regularly. That's because, Greek armies were destroying every single corner that they stepped, as mentioned at the beginning of the section. Also, there is another serious problem. Due to financial handicap and Greek attack the newspapers can not be published regularly, that is, they should have been daily, to reach reactionary accomplishment more quickly. *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* was to be a daily newspaper in order that nationalist reaction could gain momentum. However, this was not possible due to the Greek attack²¹⁷.

²¹⁴ *IRADE-I MILLIYE*, 2.09.1919. ctd. in Coşar, p.116.

²¹⁵ Coşar, *Milli...*, p.118.

²¹⁶ Coşar, *Milli...*, p. 122.

²¹⁷ Coşar, *Milli...*, p. 128.

At the moment, while we are writing these lines, there is a harsh fight at the Western frontline. Encouraged by Ethem and taking advantage of the information that he divulged, Greeks marched towards Eskişehir. Exploiting treason, the enemy immediately landed on Eskişehir and now wants to gain Eskişehir frontline²¹⁸.

All the newspapers were longing for the same steady aim, that is, they were trying hard to supply strong public opinion. “*Babalık*” was one of them. It was a Konya-origin newspaper, published in 1910 and became a daily one on the 5th of April in 1921. Just two days before its being a daily one, it had declared the victory of Turkish Army. The newspaper was proud of the triumph of the army in Eskişehir and Uşak. 4th of September was of no difference:

Dear people of Turkey, dear brothers,
Turkish Army put Greek Army to rout. Greeks are leaving their guns hither and thither, and are running away aghast. The ones, who have been surrounded, are immediately surrendering. Greek soldiers are torturing everybody, setting the villages and harvest on fire and torturing the women and the children.
Don't get afraid. God blessed our army with victory. Hide your women and children to secure places while the enemy is running away²¹⁹.

Öğüd, first started to be published in Afyon in 2/3 January 1918, was also published in Konya and Ankara. However, copies, published in Afyon couldn't be reached²²⁰. As others the main target of this newspaper was to awaken nationalist feeling against Greek forces and others.

On the 24th of 1920 *Öğüd* had a call-for the deserters :

...Deserters! The enemy is breaking into our house and you are working in your shops, sitting or hiding in your houses. Come out of the holes that you are hiding, take your food and go to the battlefield. Or, we'll not be patient any more²²¹.

²¹⁸ *HAKİMİYET-I MİLLİYE* 12.01.1921. ctd in Coşar, p. 129.

²¹⁹ *BABALIK*, 4.09.1922. ctd in Coşar, p. 149.

²²⁰ Coşar, *Milli...*, p.155.

²²¹ *ÖĞÜD*, 24. 08. 1920. ctd. in Coşar, p.161

Those were evil days for patriots. They were firing with a zeal to do their best for the motherland. For them, it would be tantamount to treason just to sit and wait. *Yenigün*, founded by Yunus Nadi, continuously focuses on Greek threat:

Turks, if you want, you can easily eradicate and get rid of the Greeks. Do your job. There is no need to wait for encouragement and invitation²²².

Greeks advanced to Anatolia and this astonished everybody. The whole world is now waiting for the time that Turks will react²²³.

Enemy never sleeps. Don't even think that the Greeks sleep. Before they raise their head, we must do it.²²⁴.

If the enemy is a flea, you should see it as a camel. Don't disdain the Greek. Don't sit comfortably. The fire should be extinguished when it is just a flame²²⁵.

Yunus Nadi, the founder of *Yenigün*, ends almost all his editorials with this sentence: Greece should be collapsed and it will²²⁶.

Işık, published in Giresun was worried about the Greek population in the city. Another grief that patriots in Giresun were suffering from was the rumour circulating around. Greeks would establish Pontus-Greek Republic on the coast of the Black Sea. This was unacceptable.

Everyday a Greek ship was coming to Giresun Harbour. One of the writers of *Işık* İbrahim Hamid did not hesitate to react Damat Ferit Government due to accepting those Greek citizens²²⁷.

A Greek ship came to our harbour again. ... Rum Committee that killed our brothers and dragged them along in mud, is at work now. Their people are in Giresun now²²⁸.

²²² *YENİGÜN*, 3 . 09, 1920. ctd. in Coşar, p.180.

²²³ *YENİGÜN*, 5.09. 1920. ctd. in Coşar, p.181

²²⁴ *YENİGÜN*, 13.09.1920. ctd. in Coşar, p.181.

²²⁵ *YENİGÜN*, 15.09.1920. ctd. in Coşar, p.182.

²²⁶ Coşar, *Milli...*, p.155.

²²⁷ Coşar, *Milli...*, p.230.

²²⁸ *IŞIK*, 25.05.1919 . İbrahim Hamdi, ctd in Coşar, p.230.

As stated throughout the section, nationalist movement through press against the Greeks was gathering momentum all over the motherland. Occupation of Izmir was a local one at first. However, press all over the country showed that, this matter was adopted as a national one rather than being the problem of the Aegean Region only. One of the building blocks of this one for all situation was in being in Antalya and Bursa.

Our victorious army is blowing like the wind and going to Izmir, the liberty of which Anatolian people have been longing for, for three and a half years.... Where is the great, boastful Greek army? Where is Constantine, imitating Alexander; and where is their pride, conceit and swagger?²²⁹

Türkoğlu was being published in Bursa. The aim was the same. Criticizing the Ottoman Government, encouraging nationalist reaction and protesting Greek occupation.

Greeks are running away. Eastern policy of the English has collapsed²³⁰.

The Greeks cannot know what to do because the victory of Turkish Army in Sakarya and its Western part broke their back. They are begging for peace in Europe. ... The Greeks have already been accustomed to be crushed with Turkish fist. This time their name will be erased from history²³¹.

As clearly seen from the above information, press did its best as if they had started a campaign. It was a quiet propaganda process by using limited sources. As well as local press, a national and official one was required, which would serve to the whole nation. That's why, Anatolian Agency was founded and joined the others as a semi-official one. This time nothing would be managed by clandestine methods. Anatolian Agency would be overt enough.

²²⁹ *ANTALYA'DA ANADOLU*, 7.09.1922. ctd. in Coşar, p. 260.

²³⁰ *TÜRKOĞLU*, 18.09.1921. ctd. in Coşar, p.297.

²³¹ *TÜRKOĞLU*, 2.10.1921. ctd. in Coşar, p.297

Anatolian Agency was proposed by Halide Edip Adıvar. It was established in order to announce the real and right aim of the Independence War to the whole world. The name was chosen as Anatolia because being the heart of Islam and the Sultanate, Istanbul was occupied by enemy forces. For this cogent reason, Turkey was in need of expressing the events in order that the country could be aware of the latest events truly. Anatolia had the potential to rescue the country in all . Anatolian Agency stated that every news would reach even the farthest corners of the country²³².

In this section, as a symbol of nationalist discourse, some newspapers published in the years of the Independence War are studied. Due to the warfare and Greek occupation of the Turkish land, Turkish people were nervous and angry with the Greeks and the occupation forces, which can be clearly seen in the newspapers. Otherisation in terms of nationalist discourse was natural and expected. Next section is discussing the 6-7 September period and its reflection in nationalist discourse. Three newspapers, *Hürriyet*, *Cumhuriyet* and *Vatan* are studied.

4.2. PRESS AT THE 6-7 SEPTEMBER PERIOD

There has always been a conflict between Turkish and Greek nationalisms as for critical matters such as Cyprus and the Aegean Sea are concerned. These issues are the most outstanding stimulators of patriotic feelings for both countries. Particularly, Cyprus has been one of the most important issues that the Turks develop nationalism for.

Cyprus question is not the target of this section. Instead, due to Cyprus issue, Turkish nationalism against “Greek the other” is the main focus under this heading. While doing this, 6-7 September Events and the role of newspapers are taken as sample.

²³² Safa Tekeli **Atatürk ve Anadolu Ajansı**, İstanbul, Anadolu Ajansı Yay., 2002, pp.17,18, 19, 24.

Turkish and Greek nationalisms have already blossomed on the island when the Greeks wanted to discuss the situation of Cyprus on an international arena in 1954, that is, Greece conveyed the matter to the United Nations. Then, everything became uncontrollable. Before dwelling on 6-7 September, some flashbacks are inserted into the section.

It is a truism that Russia always wanted to reach the Mediterranean Sea. As a result, she became the most hated for the Ottoman Empire for centuries. In order to prevent Russia from occupying Cyprus and having a Mediterranean harbour, The Ottoman Empire leased Cyprus to England in 1878 provided that Turkey herself would be the sovereign. However, in 1914, England declared the annexation of Cyprus. Turkey ratified this transfer in the Lousanne Conference in 1923, 23rd of July.

Thanks to Atatürk and Venizelos, Turkey and Greece developed alliance after the First World War. Fellowship had been kept during the inter-war period. After Korean War, Turkey and Greece entered into NATO alliance in 1951. In addition to this, in the Balkan Pact, Turkey and Greece came together again with the participation of Yugoslavia, in 1953. However, as soon as the future of Cyprus was taken into consideration in detail, fragile relations between the two countries came to a break off.

As far as the future of Cyprus was concerned, the point which two countries reached, showed that Greek and Turkish relations did not advance an inch. Everything became knotty and Cyprus issue appeared on the agenda again, but this time more strikingly when England declared that she would withdraw from Cyprus. However, this didn't form the only rift between Turkey and Greece. Moreover, the archbishop of the Orthodox Church, Makarios, in Cyprus, took an oath for Enosis. Because of the fact that Makarios, having been the Archbishop of the Orthodox Church on the Island in 1950, took an oath for pursuing the policy of Enosis, Turkey,

after England and Greece, put Cyprus issue on the agenda in a very short time²³³. Unification with Greece was a wished-for development and this oath was not clandestine, that embittered the relations and formed as a facilitator for the Turks to regain Cyprus. Now, there appeared three main characters on the stage: Greece, Turkey and England. Greece, the antagonist, declared that she would apply to the United Nations in 1954 and convey this incipient matter to an international actor. Yet, Turkey was looking upon the matter as an internal affair of England.

Greece was insistent on self-determination for Cyprus, because she knew that for the Greek majority in Cyprus, self-determination would do some good and open the door to annexation to Greek mainland. This kind of a change in status-quo couldn't be a negligible one; so leaving the policy that she had pursued, Turkey decided to participate in the discussion actively.

The rejection of Cyprus issue in the United Nations was a pleasant pace for Turkey. However, nothing had been at the lowest ebb yet.

As a result of the provocation of Makarios, in order to receive support from the United Nations, new demonstrations and incidents appeared on the island, at first against England as a colonial and unjust state. All these demonstrations would definitely find their response. Committee of "*Kıbrıs Türktür*" (means, Cyprus belongs to Turkey) was founded in response to the efforts of the Greeks.

Nadav Morag argues for the clash of Turkish and Greek nationalisms and puts forward seven factors affecting the clash. The first and second ones according to Morag is geographical and topographic setting. The third one is demographic changes and realities. The next one is about social and cultural elements like education, religion and language. The fifth one is internal impact of the colonial power. The sixth one is about governmental formation in Cyprus and the last one is

²³³ Şerafettin Turan **Türk Devrim Tarihi: Çağdaşlık Yolunda Yeni Türkiye, 2. Bölüm: 14 Mayıs 1950-27 Mayıs 1960**, Ankara, Bilgi Yayınevi, 1999, p.174.

the geopolitical position of the Island²³⁴. In this section, in the framework of 6-7 September, the first four factors will be focused on.

In the first place, it should be mentioned that, both countries are focusing on demographic elements. They are making an approach to the same argument from different ways, however. Greece maintains that the majority of the population in Cyprus is Greek, so self-determination is inevitable. Most of the Greek Cypriots and many mainland Greeks are strongly in favour of the idea that the island should be united with Greece for demographic reasons and they want to enjoy this advantage for the right to self-determination²³⁵. On the other hand, Turkey puts forward Western Thrace. After the Independence War, when Turkey demanded self-determination for Western Thrace, regarding the majority of Turkish population, Greece disagreed with Turkey; so what for was this insistence now? Wasn't it an inconsistent policy? These were the questions in the perplexed minds of the Turks.

In response to Greece's insistence on population density, Turkey puts forward topographic setting, on the grounds that Cyprus lies 960 km southeast of Greek mainland, but only 64 km south of Turkey²³⁶. This thesis was also uttered in the London Conference. This strategically advantageous position of Turkey could not be ignored and abandoned to the traditional enemy.

Other than demographic and geographical claims and realities, cultural and social elements play a leading role in the arguments of both countries. As a social and cultural factor religion has a key role. As it is easily understood from the nationalist discourse of both countries religion has always been a controversial factor. In fact it might be accepted as a classical argument since the conquest and fall of Istanbul in 1453, as it has been stated as the salvation of Istanbul from Christian

²³⁴ Nadav Morag, "Cyprus and the Clash of Greek and Turkish Nationalisms", **Nationalism and Ethnic Politics**, 10:595-624, 2004, p.595.

²³⁵ Morag, "Cyprus and the Clash of Greek and Turkish Nationalisms", p. 598.

²³⁶ Morag, "Cyprus and the Clash of Greek and Turkish Nationalisms", p. 596.

sovereignty. It is possible to easily understand the effects of this event on nationalist discourse in relation to religion even today.

As regards 6-7 September, the role of the Orthodox Church and its reflections to Turkish nationalist discourse shouldn't be forgotten. Archbishop Makarios's religious identity was strongly emphasised in Turkish newspapers. How dare could a rector awaken nationalist feelings among Greek Cypriots and how dare could he attempt to affect the Greek government about self-determination? With what right and what political identity could he have a say on the future of Cyprus? Would the fate of Cyprus and Turkish Cypriots be abandoned to a rector? That was impossible. Other than religion, education played an immense role on the development of nationalism on Cyprus. Greek nationalism followed an Enosis line at first as an opposition to English rule. English rule did not intend to create two different nationalist ideologies or identities. Either the Greeks or Turks, both communities living on the Island are Cypriots. When the British rule became dominant on the Island in the late nineteenth century, it may have still been possible to develop a Cypriot identity among the Greeks and Turks regardless of their differences²³⁷. However, in the 1930's Greek Cypriots were identified with Greece and moreover it would be futile to create a Cypriot identity since then²³⁸.

As far as identity is concerned, the situation was not different for the Turks on the Island. They, too, developed a Turkish Cypriot identity which might be accepted as a further form of Turkish identity and which is related with Turkish mainland. Turkish Cypriots' aim was not too different from the Greek Cypriots', in that they felt more like Turkish rather than Cypriot due to the Turkish system of education that contributed much to their identity. However, for the Turks on the Island English rule was not as unacceptable as it was for the Greek Cypriots. The reason for that was Atatürk's nationalist policy which did not expand out of Turkey's boundaries²³⁹. Hence, a dual situation was overt in Turkish side of Cyprus. With respect to identity,

²³⁷ Morag, "Cyprus and the Clash of Greek and Turkish Nationalisms", p. 605.

²³⁸ Morag, "Cyprus and the Clash of Greek and Turkish Nationalisms", p. 606.

²³⁹ Morag, "Cyprus and the Clash of Greek and Turkish Nationalisms", p. 606.

it might be suitable to say that Turkish Cypriots felt gladly more like Turkish and had already internalised Turkish identity. However, politically it is difficult to claim so, because they were in favour of English rule for which they thought as a viable alternative to Enosis ideals. Morag has an argument on this fact²⁴⁰:

...Consequently as Turkish Cypriots became “more” Turkish, they also became more supportive of Britain’s control of the Island. Not because they couldn’t live without the British, but because they feared that the alternative to British rule was hated prospect of enosis.

In this section arguments of both countries related to Cyprus and 6-7 September are discussed very briefly. Next section is dealing with how the Greeks and Greek Cypriots were otherised in relation to 6-7 September and what the role of press in this process are discussed referring to excerpts from three newspapers mainly: *Hürriyet*, *Cumhuriyet* and *Vatan*.

4.2.1. 6-7 SEPTEMBER IN NEWSPAPERS: A REPRESENTATIVE OF NATIONALIST DISCOURSE

In order to find a satisfactory solution for Cyprus problem, London Conference was decided to be held among England, Turkey and Greece. The convener was England. However, this kind of a meeting did of course not lapse into popularity without reason. Greece, in 1954 applied to the United Nations for the discussion of Cyprus question, in that England did not intend to give the right of self-determination to Cyprus. As a result of this application, Cyprus question became an international problem. From Turkish side, the viewpoint was totally different because Turkey was not in favour of self-determination for the Island. Hence, she supported England and claimed that Cyprus was an internal affair of England.

²⁴⁰ Morag, “Cyprus and the Clash of Greek and Turkish Nationalisms”, p. 606.

Each came up with a thesis to the Conference. Turkey puts forward historical and topographic reasons and the preservation of present status-quo. Turkey's primary preference was the presence of Cyprus under English sovereignty, if this wasn't possible, Cyprus had to return to Turkey²⁴¹. Turkish government claimed that due to the nearness of the Island to Turkish mainland and its Ottoman history, the island should be annexed to Turkey if the status-quo was to be changed. In contrast, due to the majority of Greek population, Greece defended self-determination. On the other hand, England was in favour of an autonomous Cyprus, whose defence would also be guaranteed by Turkey and Greece.

London Conference lasted ten days with no solution. It was just the last day of the Conference that 6-7 September Events broke out and the conference came to an end on the 7th of September 1955²⁴². During that period, it was rather impossible for Turkish public and government to feel at ease. Cyprus couldn't be abandoned to the Greeks. 6-7 September Events was the natural consequence of this discontent. Press, played a salient role in that disquiet, especially during the London Conference and just before it.

That everything, every incident is mutual, rather than being one-sided, is a usual ramification of relations between these two nations. Therefore, it is clear that, there is no point in blaming one side of being solely responsible of all events. In the light of this argument otherisation of Greek identity in Turkish nationalist discourse through newspapers, will be analysed in the following paragraphs.

Newspapers were teeming with news about the London Conference. What would be discussed during the conference, what the theses of the sides were and what the possible result would be, were the main questions that the newspapers focused. Newspapers also focused mainly on the 28th August extermination day, which Greek Cypriots declared against Turkish Cypriots.

²⁴¹ Erol Mütercimler & Mim Kemal Öke, **Düşler ve Entrikalar: Demokrat Parti Döneminde Türk Dış Politikası**, İstanbul, Alfa Yay, 2004, p. 314.

²⁴² Morag, "Cyprus and the Clash of Greek and Turkish Nationalisms", p. 317.

After Greek Cypriots threatened Turkish Cypriots with extermination, Ankara government took action to secure Turks life. According to Turkish government and ministry of foreign affairs, in order to keep peace in the Middle East, Turkish and English governments have to act together. Otherwise, Turkish government wouldn't stand still before the threats of the Cypriots²⁴³.

We delivered a note to England about Cyprus. We unconditionally demanded the security of Turkish Cypriots against the Greek terrorists²⁴⁴.

Do the Greeks think that we forgot Lousanne? Greece sets her eye on Cyprus in 1955 and wants plebiscite. Greeks wanted Western Thrace in 1922 in the Conference of Lousanne but they certainly didn't want plebiscite because they knew that if a plebiscite was conducted, Turkish population in Western Thrace would be overwhelming so they only claimed that Western Thrace historically belonged to Greece. There is a dilemma in this situation because now in 1955 they do want plebiscite in Cyprus due to the Greek majority²⁴⁵.

Ankara is worried about the terrorist actions that Greek Cypriots have been conducting and their threats that the 28th of August will be a massacre day. Ankara has taken action to convey this matter to the London Conference²⁴⁶ ... Our government is keeping its silence in order to keep peace and balance in the Middle East. However, the threats that Greek Cypriots are uttering have been going bad to worse. From now on Ankara government can not keep quiet²⁴⁷.

Due to the threats of the Greek Cypriots under the leadership of Makarios, papers were full of news against not only Greek Cypriots, but also the Greeks in the mainland. It is also understood from *Cumhuriyet*'s news because it reminds the readers of the Lousanne Treaty and the "inconsistent" manner of the Greeks. And some words such as "threat, threaten, massacre, terrorist, extermination" naturally and inevitably trigger negative feelings against the Greeks. On the 25th of August Menderes's ideas were in the newspapers:

Menderes, the prime minister, declared that they were worried about a sudden movement whose consequences would be impossible to compensate so they expected the Greeks to behave prudently like the Turks²⁴⁸.

If a change is concerned, it will be suitable to annex Cyprus to Turkey. Referring to the manners of Greece government, the prime minister Menderes said "What kind of a government is Greece government that it treats a rector as if he was a real statesman?"²⁴⁹

²⁴³ *HURRIYET*, 24. 08. 1955, p.1.

²⁴⁴ *CUMHURİYET*, 24. 08.1955, p.1.

²⁴⁵ *CUMHURİYET*, 24. 08.1955, p.3.

²⁴⁶ *VATAN*, 24. 08.1955, p.1.

²⁴⁷ *VATAN*, 24. 08.1955, p.7.

²⁴⁸ *HURRIYET*, 25. 08. 1955, p.1.

²⁴⁹ *CUMHURİYET*, 25. 08.1955, p.1.

Prime minister : “Cyprus forms the continuation of Anatolia. If the Greek Cypriots on the Island behave cruelly and unconsciously Turkish Cypriots won’t be alone. ...

Menderes addressed to the Greek imperialists: Did you come to Ankara by thinking of the majority of the population? What were you doing in Izmir? Prime Minister added that “The minimum thing that we can accept is the protection of the status-quo. We can not stand any other change²⁵⁰ .

With the tension, prevailing between the two countries, othering the Greeks became unavoidable. Newspapers published excerpts from Menderes’s speech. What was common in all of them was both the focus on the meaning and the value of the motherland and its defence²⁵¹ .

Motherland is not a piece of fabric which can be easily given to a tailor. In fact, motherland is a part of geography whose borders have been drawn under the deep influence of history. It is nourished by ethnic reality and political, economical, military and territorial events .²⁵²

Menderes thought and said in his speech that as well as Turkish mainland, Cyprus is a part of our motherland and it can not be thought separate from Anatolia. One day later, prime minister’s speech received complete and strong support from not only his party and the minister of foreign affairs, but also from the opposition party.

Opposition party leaders also supported the prime minister because this was seen as a national matter²⁵³ .

Opposition parties fully approved of Menderes’s speech. We are going to concentrate fully on this subject. Not only our foreign affairs, but also domestic policy will be closely related with Cyprus question. Showing this to the world is our mission²⁵⁴ .

National solidarity is perfect for Cyprus question. Opposition side stated that they are like-minded with the government²⁵⁵ .

²⁵⁰ VATAN , 25. 08.1955, p.1

²⁵¹ Apart from *Hurriyet*, whose news on the topic is given in here, *Cumhuriyet* and *Vatan*, stated the same news on the same day.

²⁵² HURRIYET, 25. 08. 1955, p.5.

²⁵³ HURRIYET, 26. 08. 1955, p.1,7.

²⁵⁴ CUMHURİYET, 26. 08.1955, p.1.

²⁵⁵ VATAN , 26. 08.1955, p.1

Loyal support from newspapers to the government was naturally given. Besides, the atmosphere in Greece were defined. Athens government felt uneasy and at panic after learning Turkey's constant decision. How the church propagated Greek Cypriots was also touched upon in *Cumhuriyet*, as stated below:

Upon learning the firm declaration that the prime minister held on the eve of the London Conference, Athens felt uneasy about the determination of Turkish side. The speech that was held by the prime minister caused panic in Athens²⁵⁶.

Greek agitators are pursuing impossible dreams. They are unaware that they play with fire. They are unable to calculate the results of their dreams. If they insist on changing the status-quo of Cyprus, we'll want to complete the works which seem incomplete. Cyprus is a part of Anatolia.²⁵⁷

'Greece felt at panic'. Greek newspapers started to guarantee that on the 28th of August Cyprus Turks will not be disturbed. Not only official but also political circles felt uneasy upon learning Turkey's absolute decision²⁵⁸.

Both the church and the terrorists, with whom the church is going hand in hand, have organised demonstrations for the 28th of August. They say that on that day there will be too much blood. They threaten the Turks. However, after Menderes's speech one of the members of the Committee of Kıbrıs Türktür said that: 20 million Turks are with us. We are not worried²⁵⁹.

On the 27th of August Greek commission set off for the Conference. They arrived in London on the same day. On the 27th of August almost all newspapers were focusing on the thesis of both sides. But, Turkish side was overwhelmingly strong. This strength is reflected in newspapers directly.

According to London Turkish thesis is stronger²⁶⁰. Not only the West but also America is supporting Turkish thesis for a balance in the Middle East.²⁶¹

Objective political circles state that Greek thesis has already failed. Today in London Menderes's speech is mentioned. English politicians don't conceal that they have approved the speech²⁶².

²⁵⁶ *HURRIYET*, 26. 08. 1955, p.1.

²⁵⁷ *VATAN*, 26. 08.1955, p.1

²⁵⁸ *CUMHURİYET*, 26. 08.1955, p.1.

²⁵⁹ *CUMHURİYET*, 26. 08.1955, p.7.

²⁶⁰ *HURRIYET*, 27. 08. 1955, p.1.

²⁶¹ *HURRIYET*, 27. 08. 1955, p.7.

²⁶² *CUMHURİYET*, 27. 08.1955, pp.1,7.

Cyprus won't be left to spoil Greece. After Greece's imperialist policy was revealed, everything has taken a new shape. ... It is clear that Turkey doesn't intend to extend its borders. ... On those days, when we assumed Greece as a fellow and an ally, which is exposed to the same threats with us, we could think about the Aegean Sea more tolerantly. However, after the events in Cyprus, everything has taken a new shape²⁶³.

As well as both of the theses, there was another concern. This was the tension that the priests caused and agitated:

Priests caused confusion yesterday. They stated that they don't approve the decisions of the London Conference. Priests and the men that they agitated demonstrated against Menderes's speech. ... Priests said that these demonstrations are just the beginning. The main ones will be on Sunday. They are trying to startle the Turks²⁶⁴.

On the 28th of August preparatory meetings started officially. During these meetings the only demand that Turkish commission maintained was the preservation of the status-quo. If there would be any changes, these had to be in favour of Turkey, that is the annexation of Cyprus to Turkey. As well as being the date of the official meetings of London Conference, 28th of August was the date that Greek Cypriots had declared massacre against Turks before.

A masked Cypriot attempted to kill a Turkish policeman but he wasn't able to. Upon learning this, Committee of Volkan declared that even if one Turkish Cypriot was killed, they would kill four in response²⁶⁵.

Turkish Cypriots are calm and brave on the day of massacre....Greeks on the Island are preparing for carrying out a massacre. All roads are blocked in order to prevent the events²⁶⁶.

In Turkish public opinion and nationalist discourse, there has been a dominant idea: Megali Idea, which has always been a direct reference point when othering the Greeks.

²⁶³ VATAN, Mustafa Elöve, 27. 08.1955, p.1,7.

²⁶⁴ CUMHURİYET, 27. 08.1955, pp.1,7.

²⁶⁵ HURRIYET, 28. 08. 1955, p.1.

²⁶⁶ VATAN, 28. 08.1955, p.1

Greek Megali Idea has risen from the grave again.... We have experienced and learnt from the events that relying on Greek common sense is a fault²⁶⁷.

Another eye-catching news appeared on newspapers and Turkish politics. Due to the fact that Cyprus is of utmost importance for Turkish national identity and territorial integrity, domestic politics turned its face to this vital issue. Opposition parties put other issues and rivalry aside and concentrated on Cyprus matter giving complete support to the committee. The leader of CMP Bölükbaşı said that “motherland is of primary importance, than comes party oppositions.”²⁶⁸ Bölükbaşı also made a trip to the West and he had meetings with public without touching upon political affairs but one of his questions to the villagers and their reply was quite interesting:

The leader of CMP Osman Bölükbaşı has visited Manyas, Edincik and Erdek today. He has decided not to talk about internal affairs till the end of the London Conference. As a result, he didn't talk about domestic affairs. However, at the end of his speech he made joke on Cyprus problem and Thrace: ‘Greeks will come to Thrace, what do you think?’
In response to his question, a villager replied: ‘They can come, we need dung for the soil’²⁶⁹.

According to Turkish press, Greece was inviting a great trouble not only for herself and Turkey, but also for the whole world. They were threatening world peace and status-quo in the Middle East. This troublemaker couldn't reach anywhere with its irrational thesis.

Turkey belongs to the Turks and Cyprus belongs to Turkey. ...Enemies of peace will take advantage of the disagreements which may occur in any country, being independent and longing for the same ideal.... As Adnan Menderes mentioned Greeks are putting a trouble for the whole world. This irrational and infertile thesis of the Greeks is rather far from reality. Greece should behave calmly. Our noble silence and peace were disturbed²⁷⁰.

²⁶⁷ *HURRIYET*, 28. 08. 1955, p.5.

²⁶⁸ *HURRIYET*, 28. 08. 1955, p.1

²⁶⁹ *HURRIYET*, 28. 08. 1955, p.1,5.

²⁷⁰ *HURRIYET*, 29. 08. 1955, pp.1,7.

In 1955 it was the 33rd anniversary of 30 August Victory Day. Newspapers published expected news about the value and importance of that day. Besides being the Victory Day in Turkish history, 30th of August has a symbolic value for the Turks, in that it was a triumph achieved over the Greeks. This triumph was also collaborated with the current situation. The Greeks were the same Greeks and their ideal was the same ideal for the Turks. London Conference was expected to be a lesson for the Greeks like Lousanne.

...Our greatest festival. 30 August is our history, present day and future. We are keeping Atatürk's will. Wherever he is, either in motherland or in London or Cyprus, every single Turk feels the same things. We are celebrating this day by testing daily events. When Greek army first landed on Izmir, the first drop of blood was like a stone which was thrown to water and circled gradually²⁷¹.

On the last day of August the London Conference started to take a shape, at least the views of the sides got their latest shape. However, this didn't change anything. The argument between Turkey and Greece on self-determination was still casting a shadow to the conference. Added to that, England declared that she wouldn't leave Cyprus. Apart from that, according to the Turks, Megali Idea was on the stage again.

England is not forgoing its right on Cyprus²⁷².

England will not leave Cyprus. She warned Greece about the enosis ideal²⁷³.

MP of Bursa Haluk Şaman: Greeks tend to act to disquiet the Mediterranean. Greek government is also affected by the church and the communists. Turkey will oppose to this destructive policy at all costs. The Greeks must understand that Turks will never tolerate Megali Idea²⁷⁴.

It is not vital for a conference to end with compromises. There are three countries: England and Turkey have rights on the Island, but on the other hand there is an extra country, Greece, having no rights. Turkish-Greek fellowship is constructed on equilibrium. Longing for the extension of frontiers means Megali Idea and imperialism.²⁷⁵

²⁷¹ *CUMHURİYET*, 30. 08.1955, p.1.

²⁷² *HURRIYET*, 31. 08. 1955, p.1.

²⁷³ *VATAN*, 31. 08.1955, p.1

²⁷⁴ *VATAN*, 31. 08.1955, p.1,7.

²⁷⁵ *CUMHURİYET*, 04. 09.1955, p.7.

Time was passing, the conference was supposed to advance, but nothing was changing. As it was stated in the newspapers it seemed impossible for Greece to take a backward step. The same was valid for Turkey. And, self-determination was irrational for Turkey, at all.

The same, boring, repeated story:

As usual Greece claimed that Cyprus matter is not an internal and territorial affair of England, it is a question of self-determination. If Cyprus question is accepted as a matter of self-determination; and in consequence of this annexed to Greece, England bases will be kept and she will be allowed to found bases in Greece²⁷⁶.

Today Turkish Commission refutes Greek claim. ... If Greece calls for modification in Lousanne Treaty, Turkey will propose some amendments to the Treaty It is understood from Greek prime minister's speech that Greeks will be insistent upon self-determination. This means they want to profit from the first item of the United Nations Charter²⁷⁷.

Cumhuriyet approaches to the same matter from a different point of view. In *Cumhuriyet*, it is stated that the Greeks were about to soften their voice but they tended to reach the same target. Nothing has changed. Also a cynical news appeared on the first page.

Greece minister of foreign affairs Stefanopulos stated that they are not intended to annexation. As soon as he said this, he implied plebiscite and said that ' it is none of our business, we should let Cypriots decide for themselves.' ²⁷⁸

Look at the buffoonery!

The Greek performs a play well. The only place that he is best at is the stage! When the photograph above is concerned, it is impossible to conceal that they ridicule the work in this place. The woman with chains in her hand in this photo is representing the Greeks in Cyprus, who are lack of freedom." ²⁷⁹

The thesis that Greece was putting forward was a handicapped one according to Turkish government because of the impossibility of annexation of Cyprus to Greece. Cyprus is a part of Anatolia that can not be even thought of being separate.

²⁷⁶ *HURRIYET*, 01. 09. 1955, p.1.

²⁷⁷ *VATAN*, 01. 09.1955, p.1.

²⁷⁸ *CUMHURİYET*, 01. 09.1955, p.7

²⁷⁹ *CUMHURİYET*, 01. 09.1955, p.7

In London Conference F.R.Zorlu stated the territorial, geographical and climactic relatedness of Cyprus to Anatolia. ... Greece has a double-faced and imperialist policy. They are changing their mind every day²⁸⁰.

Ahmet Emin Yalman's letter about Cyprus was published in Times:

... Turkey must unconditionally reject Greek demands. The reason for this is the sad experiences that Turkey had due to pan-Hellenist ideals. This ideology sent Greek armies to Ankara. In Anatolia Cyprus is the only place that we can take a breath among Greek islands."²⁸¹

On the sixth day of the London Conference, the meetings were still inconclusive. Turkish newspapers were continually bringing calmness among Turkish citizens into focus. In contrast to the tension that the Greeks caused, Turks avoided shattering the calm.

Turkish citizens are waiting for the results of the London Conference with a great calmness²⁸².

Both AKEL and EOKA avoid attacking the Turks because they know that in case of such an attack, they will lose much. By the way they are nourishing grudge against the Turks. Turks, on the other hand, are quite calm as if there was nothing²⁸³.

In contrast to their neighbours, Turks were waiting for the results with great calm. They preferred legal and democratic ways to raise a clear but firm voice. They would hold a meeting in London on the 5th of September. Turks would highlight two alternatives in the meeting. Also, Minister of Foreign Affairs F.R. Zorlu emphasized that Greece had to choose only one of the alternatives; either Cyprus or Turkish alliance and fellowship. This meeting would be the last warning to Greece:

'Last warning to Greece from Turkey! Greece must forgo either Turkish alliance or Cyprus. ... If Greece will pursue over nationalist policy of Venizelos, there will be no reason for Turkey to forgo the "peace at home, peace in the World" policy of Atatürk.'²⁸⁴

Menderes: forgo Megali Idea! ... If Greece insists on her claims, she will always finds the Turks against²⁸⁵.

²⁸⁰ *HURRIYET*, 02. 09. 1955, p.7.

²⁸¹ *VATAN*, 03. 09.1955, p.1,7.

²⁸² *HURRIYET*, 03. 09. 1955, p.7.

²⁸³ *CUMHURİYET*, 03. 09.1955, p.7

²⁸⁴ *HURRIYET*, 04. 09. 1955, pp.1,7.

The meeting in London was held on the 5th of September. Turks did not cause any confusion. They defended their right proudly which was also appreciated by the Londoners. The newspapers' views centred on this kind of a pride.

The demonstration which was held by the Turks in the afternoon was quite orderly and calm. More than five thousand Turkish Cypriots performed the meeting. They were quite ambitious and dignified peculiar to their race²⁸⁶.

... Flags in their hands thousands of Turks took this oath: 'Cyprus will remain Turkish'...The slogans were: 'the Greeks are hungry. Cyprus cannot belong to Greece.' Turks will never accept concession" 'Greece doesn't have a right for a say, whole Turkey is with us, Enosis means war.'²⁸⁷

Everybody was carrying flags and placards 'Cyprus is Turkish and will remain Turkish. ...Enosis is threatening world peace.'²⁸⁸

As well as *Hürriyet*, *Cumhuriyet* and *Vatan*, scrutinized in detail in the study, *Istanbul Express*, which is shown as the major provocateur of 6-7 September events, also had a comment on the meeting:

Cyprus strategically belongs to Turkey. This fact is also acknowledged by England. ... Rosettes on their clothes, Turkish flag in their hands, more than five thousand Turks walked proudly, peculiar to their race, in the streets of London. The leaders of the Turks in Cyprus, Fazıl Küçük, Ahmet Zaim and Mithat Berberoğlu talked to the demonstrators. They said that none of the twenty four million Turks could accept annexation of Cyprus to Greece. Their demands will force us to make war with the Greeks. It is high time for the whole world to be sure that Turks prefer to die instead of Greek sovereignty²⁸⁹.

True is that, press had a preparatory role in the outbreak of the 6-7 September Events. Public rage was about to become uncontrollable in Turkey. The importance of Cyprus for Turkey and its key role in the London Conference, provocation of the press and sensitivity of Turkish public towards this matter were the forerunners of the impending evil days. Next section is dealing with those days.

²⁸⁵ *VATAN*, 04.09.1955, p.1.

²⁸⁶ *HURRIYET*, 05.09.1955, p.1.

²⁸⁷ *CUMHURİYET*, 05.09.1955, p.1.

²⁸⁸ *VATAN*, 05.09.1955, p.7.

²⁸⁹ *ISTANBUL EXPRESS*, 05.09.1955, p.1.

4.2.2. EVENTS BROKE OUT

Otherisation is inevitable in nationalist discourse. The same is valid for Turkish discourse as far as national matters are concerned. As for 6-7 September, it can be wrong to claim that everything happened only on those days. This might be a fallacy. If newspapers of the period are followed, how the tension was heightened and how it prepared a suitable ground for a social hatred and as a result of this, social eruption, can be understood more easily. Everyday, in newspapers there were some news, claiming that a Greek insulted a Turk²⁹⁰.

In the bulk of the sources²⁹¹ concerning this topic, 6-7 September events are accepted as a plan of the government in order to have supporters for Cyprus matter in the international arena. However, this is not the main topic focused on the study. The real aim, as stated before, is to analyse the role of the press, being the main source of nationalist discourse, in this social eruption.

Before the 6th of September, Turkish public had already been about to declare the Greeks and the Greek Cypriots as enemies. In the following paragraphs some examples taken from the newspapers are stated²⁹²:

33rd anniversary of the salvation of Tire from occupation has been celebrated today. In this vociferous celebration the slogan was: "1 Turk is worth for 4 Greeks. You have forgotten the past quickly. If you drive us mad, we can go much more further than our fathers"²⁹³.

Before Istanbul Express made its second print at night on 5 September, 6 September was a similar day like the others. The news were centring on Cyprus and

²⁹⁰ *SABAH*, Ayhan Aktar, 05.09. 2005, p.19.

²⁹¹ As far as the thesis is concerned some sources on 6-7 September were read. Almost all of them focused on the policy of the government. These sources studied are: *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Azınlık Politikaları Bağlamında 6-7 Eylül olayları* by Dilek Güven, *Türk Devrim Tarihi: Çağdaşlık Yolunda Yeni Türkiye* by Şerafettin Turan, *Düşler ve Entrikalar* by Erol Mütercimler and Mim Kemal Öke, *6-7 Eylül Olayları* by Hulusi Dosdoğru.

²⁹² The same news takes place in *Cumhuriyet* on 05.09.1955, p.5

²⁹³ *HURRIYET*, 05. 09. 1955, p.1.

the London Conference as usual. However, tension has increased not only among the Turks but also the Greeks. The news taken from *Hurriyet* is given below:²⁹⁴:

- A man called Istavro was about to be lynched due to speaking ill of the flag.
- That “Cyprus is Turkish” slogan on a wall was erased by a Greek in Teşvikiye, caused detest and antipathy all over the city.
- A soldier beat two people, speaking Greek loudly in a bus.
- A group, singing songs in Greek was silenced by a few young men on a steamship to the Islands.
- Two friends shouted in Istiklal Street. They said that “Cyprus is Turkish and will remain so.” Then people get crowded²⁹⁵.

In the evening Istanbul express published its second press as soon as Atatürk’s house was bombed in Salonika. The bomb, which broke only the windows, was a small one but its effect in Turkey was enormous²⁹⁶. The headline was written in huge type side and was highly provocative. The important news, taken from *Istanbul Express*, is written below:

Atatürk’s house was damaged by a bomb. The abhorred event happened at midnight and caused annoyance. According to the news on the radio, at four o’clock, a bomb was exploded near Atatürk’s house and caused great damage. The bomb, exploded between our embassy and Atatürk’s house, also damaged our embassy badly. This enemy action led to a deep grief all over our country. ... The importance that should be given to this event must be greater regarding London Conference. Terrorist actions towards Turks in Cyprus now, spread to Greece. Although our government has taken precautions in order not to cause this kind of an attack, Greek government doesn’t attach the same importance. ... That Athens government didn’t expressed the incident although it happened at four, can be attributed to governmental censorship.²⁹⁷

The news spread all around the country and created hatred...

General secretary of the Committee of Kıbrıs Türktür: “We have just learnt from the State radio that the Greeks attacked Great Atatürk’s house. We must clearly say that the responsible of this event will pay it²⁹⁸.”

One day later martial law was invoked in order to prevent possible tension and events caused by the bomb one day before. Martial law was declared at first in

²⁹⁴ The same news takes place in *Vatan* on 06.09.1955, p.1,7.

²⁹⁵ *HURRIYET*, 06. 09. 1955, p.1,7.

²⁹⁶ *SABAH*, Ayhan Aktar, 06.09. 2005, p.19.

²⁹⁷ *ISTANBUL EXPRESS* 05.09.1955, p.1,2.

²⁹⁸ *ISTANBUL EXPRESS* 05.09.1955, p.2.

Istanbul and Izmir. The result was dreadful and impossible to be a negligible one. Geoffrey Lewis focuses on this entanglement. He says that churches, houses and shops were sacked; there was much looting but more wanton destruction. Lewis also adds that Istiklal Street was fully littered with wreckage of belongings such as furniture, refrigerators and radios²⁹⁹. On the 7th of September newspapers were focussing on the attacks to damage Greek belongings in response.

Learning the bomb, exploded near Atatürk's house, Turkish people marched to Taksim Square, saying 'Cyprus is Turkish, death to bombers.' With flags and photos of Atatürk in their hands, the crowd gathered in Taksim Square and pointed out the Patriarchate. On the way they saw a pharmacy without Turkish flag and they stoned there. In various places, shops, houses of Greek citizens, brothels and churches were damaged. Greek flags were torn. ... Not only Izmir and Istanbul but also Ankara witnessed damaging incidents. Especially in Kurtuluş, a church was fully damaged³⁰⁰. Salonika bombing was loathed. It caused anger and anxiety in Ankara. Everywhere, people talked about this incident. Their hatred developed and became deep-rooted due to the previous terrorist attacks in Cyprus and current events³⁰¹.

... It is easy to understand that what kind of an enmity the Greeks aroused to us when we look at their newspapers.... All those newspapers are the fans of Megali Idea." ³⁰²
 "Committee of Kıbrıs Turktur: ... Supporters of these actions and Greek government will meet with an unprecedented response which will be greater than 1922 victory, if the Greeks don't behave decently³⁰³.

The newspapers of the period, which were analysed, did not show grave accusations and direct insults, but the style was overtly orientating the public to othering. News had very deep effects on Turkish public opinion says Güven, and she adds that the antipathy and suspect that Turks felt against the minorities and non-Moslems had just awakened a very short time before the events³⁰⁴.

In the next section, othering Greeks during the Imia/Kardak Rocks Crisis will be analysed in terms of nationalist discourse. By analysing this process three Turkish national newspapers are studied: *Hürriyet*, *Cumhuriyet* and *Zaman*.

²⁹⁹ Geoffrey Lewis, **Turkey**, New York, Frederic A. Praeger Publishers, 1965, p.138.

³⁰⁰ *HURRIYET*, 07. 09. 1955, p.7.

³⁰¹ *CUMHURİYET*, 07.09. 1955 p.1.

³⁰² *VATAN*, 07. 09.1955 p.7.

³⁰³ *VATAN*, 07. 09.1955. p.7.

³⁰⁴ Güven, **Azınlık...**, p.235.

4.3.IMIA/KARDAK ROCKS CRISIS

There is a famous child song, which tells a row between two goats:

On a bridge, came across two stubborn goats.

“Move aside” told the older one, I’ll be the first to pass by.

“No” replied the younger goat, If I move aside I’ll die.

The importance of territory and the dominance over this territory has always been of paramount importance. When one is commanded to leave there, it wouldn’t be easy to give up. He would be ready to carry on a struggle of life and death, particularly if the land that he is expected to leave is of vital importance for his sovereignty.

Greece and Turkey experienced a similar story in 1996. On the 24th of December, a Turkish steamer, named *Figen Akat*, hit Imia/Kardak Rocks. This crash caused a crisis between Turkey and Greece, living on the opposite coasts of the Aegean Sea. However, at first negotiations had been conducted secretly for some time. While both governments unrelentingly conducting secret diplomacy, the crisis was leaked out due to the command of Greek minister of foreign affairs to hoist Greek flag on the rocks. In the upshot, Greek flag was perceived as a spur by Turkey and the story of the crisis between these two stubborn countries commenced. Fuat Aksu conveys the situation and focuses on the role of media. After the attempt had been broadcasted on television, Turkish media was interested in the matter and two correspondents of *Hürriyet* newspaper landed on Imia/Kardak Rocks by a helicopter and hoisted Turkish flag³⁰⁵. He, on the other hand, touches upon the role of both countries’ public opinion. After this struggle appeared on Turkish TV channels,

³⁰⁵ Fuat Aksu, **Türk Yunan İlişkileri: İlişkilerin Yönelimini Etkileyen Faktörler Üzerine Bir İnceleme**, Ankara, Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 2001, p. 196,7.

public opinion of both countries put pressure on the politicians and the struggle got worse³⁰⁶.

This mutual struggle turned into a relay race in a very short time. That was Greece's turn now. Unable to resist the pressure, Greek government, then, sent armed troops to the Isles so that this military power would hoist the flag again³⁰⁷.

One of the most eye-catching and unrelenting problems between Turkey and Greece is the Aegean Sea, which might bring forth an internecine struggle at any moment. And, Imia/Kardak crisis in 1996 was a demo of a pre-war situation, fortunately an unborn one. Fuat Aksu³⁰⁸ gathers the conflicts in the Aegean Sea under some headings³⁰⁹, the related ones to Imia/Kardak are concerned below :

- Extension of territorial waters
- The status of the rocks and islands whose control has not been transferred to Greece via agreements.

At first both countries did perceive the accident as a simple one, but in time the event turned into the claims, centred on a struggle of sovereignty and a claim for land, which, then, formed the theses of Greece and Turkey on this situation³¹⁰.

There wasn't a simple ship accident behind the crisis. Both matters above were the most discussed ones especially in press, being focused in the next section.

³⁰⁶ Aksu, **Türk ...**, p.196,7.

³⁰⁷ Aksu, **Türk...**, p.196.

³⁰⁸ Aksu, **Türk...**, p.59.

³⁰⁹ The others stated in the Aksu's book are, determining the continental shelf, armament of the islands, problems of air space, problems of NATO control, p.59.

³¹⁰ Aksu, **Türk...**, p.199.

4.3.1. IMIA/KARDAK CRISIS IN THE PRESS

*... Turkish and Greek relations hit the rocks again. These two countries cannot manage to march hand in hand ...*³¹¹

*...If Turkish and Greek peoples are friends, who will fight at war? ... This is the common fate of the Turks and the Greeks. ...*³¹²

*It doesn't matter whether an island is rocky or green. A touristic place and a bone-dry stone are of no difference. Because, it is motherland. ... Only a pebble is even sacred*³¹³.

Imia/Kardak Rocks were like a time bomb put in the middle of the Aegean Sea. It fortunately did not explode. Greece perceived the consequence as a rout and shame. Turkey, on the other hand, enjoyed its victory and looked upon the consequence as a lesson to the Greeks. However, this of course was neither an unprecedented defeat nor a glorious triumph. The scene was shown so by the newspapers.

Turkish newspapers *Hurriyet*, *Cumhuriyet* and *Zaman* reported the event as a flag crisis at first.

The Greeks dared to hang out their flag to Imia/Kardak Rocks an Bodrum yesterday. Hurriyet team lowered it and hoisted Turkish flag instead While our team was hoisting Turkish flag the Greeks watched this from a boat and then ran away...
The crash of a Turkish steamer into the rocks, put Imia/Kardak on the agenda. As a result of this, the Greeks got out of control and started a campaign yesterday³¹⁴.

³¹¹ *CUMHURİYET*, Mustafa Balbay, 31. 01.1996. p.1.

³¹² *HURRIYET*, Bekir Coşkun, 31. 01.1996. p.13.

³¹³ *HURRIYET*, Rauf Tamer, 31. 01.1996. p.3.

³¹⁴ *HURRIYET*, 28.01.1996. p.1.

The mayor of Kilimli Island Dimitrios Diakomihalis hoisted Greek flag on Imia/Kardak Rocks. Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that “flag is hung out, then lowered; so Athens itself aggravated the tension” ... In order to bring Turkey’s right up for discussion, Athens commended the mayor of Kilimli to hoist the Greek flag³¹⁵.

Greece’s hoisting flag on the rocks in the Aegean Sea is leading to a crisis. This ignited the note traffic between two countries. Pangalos, triggering Turkey paranoia, declared that he is worried about the latest events³¹⁶.

Papers also stated that real aim behind this manner was to claim ownership on the rocks. This was her usual behaviour and this manner would never change as time went by. This idea is the only one that can be inferred from the newspapers.

Greece lusting after even the smallest rocks in the Aegean Sea, lastly hoisted the Greek flag on Imia/Kardak Rocks, claiming that these rocks belong to Greece³¹⁷.

The Greeks attempted to claim ownership of ‘Imia’ Rocks, the real name of which is “Kardak”. Yesterday, like pirates, they hoisted the Greek flag on the rocks then immediately left there. However, Hurriyet team arrived in the Rocks and hanged out Turkish flag. At that time the Greeks were in great surprise. They boarded on their boats and watched Turkish flag be hoisted on the Rocks and ran away³¹⁸.

According to *Hurriyet*, the Greeks were in a coward-like situation. When they saw Turkish journalist hoisting Turkish flag, they did nothing other than watching. In addition to this, in *Hurriyet* there is a slight but eye-catching detail. The size of the flags are emphasized: Greek flag was 70x50 cm. However, Turkish flag was quite bigger; 2,7 x 1,5 m³¹⁹.

Another striking news in the papers was focusing on dignified Turks and clamorous Greeks. During the crisis the Turks kept their calm and Greeks made a great outcry, according to the papers.

³¹⁵ *CUMHURİYET*, 28. 01.1996. p.1,6.

³¹⁶ *ZAMAN*, 28. 01.1996. p.1.

³¹⁷ *ZAMAN*, 28. 01.1996. p.1.

³¹⁸ *HURRIYET*, 28.01.1996. p.25.

³¹⁹ *HURRIYET*, 28.01.1996. p.25.

Turkey and Greek boats came closer, even 100m. Nevertheless, Turkish general kept his calm and prevented a possible fight. ... Greece herself is trying to create a crisis in the Aegean Sea again³²⁰.

Rock crisis is mounting ... Due to the fact that the Greeks hoisted flag on Imia/Kardak Rocks, Turkish and Greek boats came face to face for Imia/Kardak Rocks, which belong to Turkey. ... Ambassador Batu invited Greece to calm down and avoid spurs³²¹.

While Greece is trying to create a storm in a teacup, Ankara keeps its calm³²². ... Turkey on the other hand, keeps its calm as usual and trying not to aggravate the crisis. She looks for negotiations³²³.

...Turkey has always wanted to keep good relations with Greece, but whenever she wants to shake hands, Greece ignores this and keeps adopting hostile policies towards Turkey³²⁴.

Why the Greeks created this crisis was a widely discussed question. Due their hectic feelings about the Aegean Sea and hostile perception against the Turks, Imia/Kardak Rocks were pawned off to their passion. This view was particularly emphasized in the newspapers.

A Greek mayor hoisted the Greek flag to Imia/Kardak Rocks. It hasn't got an economic value, even a plant cannot live. Doesn't the Greek know this? Certainly he knows. However, the most important thing is to extend its dominance territory and have a right to say that: 'Here is mine.' Our journalists Aykut Firat and Cesur Sert, while flying to Bodrum, saw the flag and got surprised. ... They got angry. ... They landed on Imia/Kardak and replaced the Greek flag with Turkish because even though it doesn't have any economical value, this land belongs to Turkey³²⁵.

...Every year they create the same turmoil... The content of their politics is problems by using domestic politics... Years have been passing, all countries are learning new things, developing new discourses about foreign politics, but unfortunately Greece doesn't do anything...³²⁶.

"The flag will be lowered, Greek landing will be over !" This well-known saying belongs to the Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Çiller. That crisis was a kind of a relay race between the two countries.

³²⁰ *HURRIYET*, 29.01.1996. p.1,14.

³²¹ *CUMHURİYET*, 29.01.1996, p.1,9.

³²² *ZAMAN*, 30. 01.1996. p.1.

³²³ *ZAMAN*, Fikret Ertan, 31. 01.1996. p.5.

³²⁴ *CUMHURİYET*, 23.02.1996, p.8.

³²⁵ *HURRIYET*, 02.02.1996. p.21.

³²⁶ *ZAMAN*, Fikret Ertan, 31. 01.1996. p.5.

Çiller: Kardak/Imia is a Turkish territory. Turks don't allow other countries' troops in her own land. This flag will be lowered, Greek landing will be over³²⁷.

On the 30th of January, the crisis was about to have a subversive effect. Both countries were belligerent enough to prove the ownership of the Rocks. There were three possible methods in Turkish side in case Greece may not have withdrawn from the Rocks. This was unconditionally a *casus belli* (reason for war) for the Turks. *Hürriyet* stated these methods. Firstly, diplomacy would be tried by sending note to Greece to persuade her to withdraw the troops. If not, military would be tried.

Turkish naval forces would blockade the Rocks. If Greece resists, Turkey may land troops to another island having the same status³²⁸.

31st of January was the victory day. Turks landed on the Island. It was a forty-minute operation, which would prove Turkey's claims. This operation was regarded as the triumph of calm, commonsense and just. Turkey gave a lesson to the Greeks and proved that as they did in the past. Turkey would sacrifice lives but never give any inch of her soil. If necessary, we should give a lesson to the Greeks as we did in Cyprus in 1974, said the Minister of Foreign Affairs Deniz Baykal³²⁹.

As a result of a strategically smart operation, started at midnight and lasted forty minutes, a strongly possible war between Turkey and Greece was prevented. When commonsense won the relay race, Greece had to leave the rocks, as stated below :

SAT team landed on the Imia/Krdak Rocks and hoisted Turkish flag at midnight yesterday. Greek teams was shocked to see that unexpected operation³³⁰.

Çiller: we promised Turkish people. We said that we can not give up even one of our pebbles. For that reason, it is impossible for us to give the rocks³³¹.

³²⁷ *CUMHURİYET*, 31.01.1996, p.1.

³²⁸ *HURRIYET*, 30.01.1996. p.21.

³²⁹ *HURRIYET*, 31.01.1996. p.23.

³³⁰ *HURRIYET*, 31.01.1996. p.1.

³³¹ *CUMHURİYET*, 01.02.1996, p.19.

...While Greek soldiers were leaving the rocks, a lot of journalists took their photographs. At the same time, one of the fishing boats, carrying journalists played *mehter marşı* ³³².

In the upshot, the story of two countries, two rocks and some goats came to an end. Common opinion shows that, the crisis was overcome for a short time until a new crisis occur. This will be experienced in time. It might be suitable to mention some opinions on the crisis in these three newspapers.

On the 31st of January Bekir Coşkun dwelled on the common fate of Turkish and Greek nations, which shows hostility in general. It doesn't include any othering towards the Greeks, instead Coşkun emphasized the usual manners of both countries.

...Crisis is mounting in the Aegean. ... Fortunately media is sometimes reminding the public of a slogan: Turkish and Greek peoples are friends. ... If they are friends who will go to war? Is it precedent that ministers of foreign affairs go in for boxing? Or, diplomats of both countries fight? Peoples fight in wars. Peoples die. The rocks whose only function is to drown the ships at dark nights, this time drown the peoples of two countries. This is the common fate of Turkish and Greek peoples ³³³.

As it was stated at the beginning of this part of the study, Aegean Sea and the islands have formed a very problematic issue in Turkish and Greek diplomacy and history. Newspapers and columnists occasionally touch upon this problem :

Greece is the leading problematic neighbour of us. One of the strongest links that has been creating problems between two countries is Aegean Islands since Greek Independence in 1830. The main factor that prevents Greece and Turkey from solving their problems is the lack of mutual confidence ³³⁴.

Some of the ideas may not be as objective as the above mentioned ones. The reason for this idea is mutual perceptions. Both sides always accuse each other of creating the problem without reason. Greece wants to extend its territorial waters to

³³² *CUMHURİYET*, 16.02.1996, p.3.

³³³ *HURRIYET*, Bekir Coşkun, 31.01.1996. p.13.

³³⁴ *CUMHURİYET*, 31.01.1996, p.1,13.

twelve miles and Turkey naturally refuses this. As a result of this, othering becomes unavoidable.

Imia/Kardak Crisis is neither the first nor the last one. Being contiguous countries, sharing the Aegean Sea and a common history, and having divergent opinions, Turkey and Greece will face the same kind of problems for an indefinite period of time if they don't negotiate over their problems. However, it should be kept in mind that Turkey has always been ready for a dual negotiation about the Aegean Sea. In contrast, Greece generally avoided negotiations. Even if they are at the conference table, they did not hesitate to hack off the negotiations. ... Greece is expert at controlling the public opinion so she occasionally created crises and reminded Turkey of the existence of the problems. Imia/Kardak Crisis is a usual example of Greece's manner³³⁵.

The case is a matter of sovereignty in the Aegean.

When it comes to the military side of the issue, stop there... Be sure of our power... If Greece will still motivate its domestic politics with Turkish enmity, Greek nationalism isn't worth a penny. Because Greece will surely be put on her place, immediately and badly. ... Do not force us to do this... Do not play with fire. ... You'll regret. ...³³⁶.

Next generations will laugh at the crisis when they read it in history books... They will learn that Imia/Kardak has a more important meaning than its tiny place on the map. ... At that time they will learn that although Turks are quite powerful, they extraordinarily put up with the nonsense that their fanatic neighbours uttered.... When you chat with even the most moderate Greek, he talks about peace, fraternity and friendship; but when the topic comes to the Aegean or Cyprus, he says that both are mine... If he has drunk a little bit much alcohol, he babbles 'Izmir, the Aegean coasts and Istanbul are mine' ...³³⁷.

One of the main components of othering is reminding the public opinion of history. History has continuously repeating itself. In 6- 7 September 1955 newspapers reminded the public of Lousanne Treaty, War of Independence, 30 August and 9 September Victories. Likewise, during the Imia/Kardak Crisis, newspapers were full of the reminiscence of 1974 Cyprus Victory.

Greece wants to be slammed as they were in Cyprus."³³⁸

Also Megali Idea occurs whenever a Turkish –Greek crisis occurs.

³³⁵ *CUMHURİYET*, Nazmi Akman, 01.02.1996, p.11.

³³⁶ *HURRIYET*, Rauf Tamer, 31.01.1996. .p.3.

³³⁷ *HURRIYET*, Tufan Türeñç, 31.01.1996. .p.22.

³³⁸ *HURRIYET*, 31.01.1996. p.1.

... The reason for the inability to have friendly relations between two countries is the clash of their interests. Turkish foreign policy depends on national pact and “peace at home, peace in the world” principle. However, Greek policy depends on Megali Idea, propaganda and terror. ... It is the Megali Idea policy that Greece runs for the Aegean Sea and Cyprus³³⁹.

Greece, creating one more problem day by day, since she gained its independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1830. ... Lastly she tried to occupy Imia/Kardak Rocks that has belonged to Turkey for four hundred years. This is her historical behaviour. ... By doing this she made a rehearsal to extend her territorial waters to twelve miles ... In order to make Megali Idea real, Greece has been ready to spend effort³⁴⁰.

As stated in the newspaper texts, Greeks were perceived through a negative image due to the relations and the same problems that both countries have and share. Imia/Kardak Crisis was only one of these problems. They are always ready to fight and Turkey always announces the critical situations as *casus belli*. The reason for this is, due to the course of time and the experiences that both countries share Greece was looked upon as a potential suspect. Millas summarizes the critical history of both countries³⁴¹.

In order to found their national state the Greeks fought against the “Turks”. Turks, hundred years later, fought against the Greeks for the same ideal. For the first time in history, perhaps, two countries fought against “the other” to found their national states and the other side was looked upon, mutually, “the enemy” ... For the Turks, the Greeks has always had a tendency to expand. In 1829 they expanded their land against Turkey (the Ottoman).

In this section, three newspapers *Hürriyet*, *Cumhuriyet* and *Zaman* are chosen to reach a better understanding of Greek otherisation in nationalist discourse during the Imia/Kardak Crisis Period.

All in all, this chapter as a whole, studied and analysed newspapers of some specific periods in the history of Turkish Republic. In the first section of the fourth chapter, how the Greeks, as enemies, were otherised in the Turkish War of Independence in 1919-1922 in newspapers are analysed. In the second section of this chapter, how they were perceived and otherised during 6-7 September Events are

³³⁹ *CUMHURİYET*, Suat Bilge, 18.02.1996, p.12.

³⁴⁰ *ZAMAN*, Osman Kasap, 04.02. 1996, p.4.

³⁴¹ Millas, *Daha İyi...*, p.21.

studied. And, lastly, in the final section of this chapter the Imia Crisis Period and Greek otherisation in newspapers during the Crisis are studied in terms. Conclusion chapter, on the other hand, summarises the main chapters, and puts forward a comment on the fifth chapter and reaches a conclusion on the topic.

CONCLUSION

Nations are constructed entities, that comprise practical elements, having emotional (sentimental), rational, symbolic and historical influences on their members.

Nations are constructed, because with the emergence of rationalism through the French Revolution, societal balance of Europe changed and the need for independent, secular and institutional formations with ethnic ties -to make the attempts more reasonable and causal- came out.

In the first place, nations consist of emotional elements, because the members of them are connected to one another with willingness and are proud of being “fellow members”. Under the category of emotional elements, territory can be counted. Territorial integrity and its defence is of indisputable importance for a nation. That’s why, territory is named as motherland. Secondly, nations are rational formations, because national interests are to be taken into consideration in order to survive among the others. The government of a nation should watch for and protect its national, territorial, economic, regional and social interests. In relation to the third category, symbols can be emphasized. Symbols and their spiritual value make a nation more self-confident and proud. The elements such as the flag, monuments, anthems, heroes, heroic stories, compulsory education system and military service, which turn a community into a nation, are the most outstanding ones, that consolidate national integrity and national identity. As well as these, the last category, has a deep influence on the members of a nation. Nations are historical constructions, since they were formed up after wars, sacrifices, successes or bitter and pleasant experiences, which are taught to the next generations via history teaching.

National identity, similarly, is the social and political practice of the concept “nation”, because it is, in general, willingly internalised by the members of a nation. This means, nationalist ideals are kept alive by the members. Nation and national

identity, on the other hand, encompass “the other” and “otherisation process”. While defining itself with these frames, a nation, define the other(s). The other(s) is not defined as valuable as a nation’s own self. The other is different and rarely right. The other quite often creates crises and is the responsible for the unpleasant relations. The other might be an ethnic group, another nation, religion or a country. Naturally, the values, beliefs, actions, manners, habits or belongings that the other has, are also otherised. All in all, otherisation is a defence mechanism to name or identify the threat. However, meanwhile, the difference between the enemy and the other should be stated. Enemies can occur all of a sudden when an international, regional or frontal situation is in question. Enemy can be associated with war, and it has a more temporary place in the minds of the members of a nation. However, the situation is different for the other, because othering is a more historical process which comes out in time and takes a more permanent shape in the minds of a people.

Turkey, in particular, is of no difference. Nationalist feelings cover all the constituents counted above. After experiencing imperial identity embellished with a strong religious identity, it was not easy for the Turkish to become the Turks from the Ottomans. Throughout Westernisation, the Ottoman Empire tried its best to create an Ottoman Identity, but she couldn’t. However, with the belated effect of the French Revolution on the Ottoman scholars, whether in the name of Ottomanism or Turkishness, Turkish identity found a chance to blossom.

Regarding othering in Turkish history, within the framework of this thesis, we can strongly mention the Greeks. Though Turkish people brought Greek the other into focus in the first few decades of the twentieth century, it might be wrong to strongly claim that otherisation of Greeks started with the invasion of Izmir. It goes back to Greek independence in 1829. Indeed, the Greeks had already become unwanted due to their revolt in 1827 and independence in 1829. This anger continued as a chain and spurted out the in following decades. The war that broke out in 1897 between Greeks and Turks was another phase of otherisation process. Greco-Turkish War of course had a considerable effect on collective mind of the Turks, who were

about to warm up feeling nationalist sentiments. In addition to these events and perceptions, the Balkan Wars constitute another stimulant phase of othering owing to the exile of Moslems from the Balkan States. No sooner had the outrage that the war caused alleviated, Greek occupation of Izmir, under British control, caused a turmoil in Turkey. Suffice to say that untitled nationalist feelings of the Turks were fertilized by the Greek occupation.

Particularly, the fall of Constantinople is a source of hatred among the Greeks against the Ottomans and the Turks. By the same way the conquest of Istanbul is a source of proud among the Turks against the Greeks. Today, however, to some extent, it symbolises the relations between the Turks and the Greeks. Whenever there is a problem between these nations, this outstanding incident is remembered as failure from the Greek viewpoint and as pride from the Turkish viewpoint. This event has been and is just a symbol between the two countries. That's why, it is always kept on the agenda, whenever a crisis occurs.

This symbol is, of course, used to humiliate the setback of the other and to have it feel upset because of its past. As well as that, the Turkish War of Independence is of the same kind. The outrage against the Greeks, which was nourished throughout the War united the Turks not only against the enemies but also the Greeks.

Whenever a problem raises between Turkey and Greece, the public, the media and press and some politicians rarely hesitate to declare Greece as an eternal enemy, as it was in the past. Therefore, this question emerges, "What has been the role of Greece in Turkish nationalist discourse since the War of Independence?" As studied throughout the last chapter, print media has a great role as the representative of nationalist discourse in Turkey. Nationalist ideology can easily be reflected through media and press. It is indubitable that, they have a great role in controlling the minds. Mind control via newspapers is not a new one. In the study, the effect of the print media over mind control while othering the Greeks is studied. As a result of all the

information, mentioned throughout the last chapter, we can say that the Greeks were otherised with the great influence of media on Turkish public.

In the light of the comments and newspaper excerpts in the last chapter, we can reach three arguments:

- 1) When Greece occupied Turkish land in 1919, the Turks, naturally, perceived it as a humiliation, because their land was landed by a country, which had been a subject of the Ottoman Empire just a few decades ago. Whatever the conditions were and however limited they were, these feelings were reflected in the newspapers of the period. The public were reminded of their identity and encouraged to act against the Greeks. Due to being warfare, this process can be regarded as enmity rather than otherisation. This is true, but what is more important at that point is that, this process prepared the natural background of negative future perceptions against the Greeks.
- 2) As stated in the last chapter, the role of the press during the 6-7 September Events Period, including the London Conference, was immense. Before the Conference Greeks were the followers of a “priest” and a futile dream. During that period, the Turkish political parties forgot not only domestic matters but also party disputes. They united against “Greek the other”. They supported and concentrated on only one purpose: the preservation of the present *status quo* or the annexation of Cyprus to Turkey. Newspapers, stated and emphasised this as tough solidarity.

Another striking thing the newspapers stated was that the Greeks reminded of history: They were always defeated by the Turks when history was analysed. While emphasizing this some symbols such as Victory on 9 September and 30 August were used. Also, Megali Idea was continuously repeated in the newspapers.

- 3) During the Imia/Kardak Rocks Crisis, the newspapers followed the same path. According to the news, published in the studied newspapers, the Greeks were glamorous and the Turks were dignified and proud. The Turks kept their calm; while the Greeks were quite hectic and wrong, “as usual”.

While Greeks were being otherised during these periods, national solidarity was one of the most striking discourses that the newspapers mentioned. In addition to that, some symbols such as Atatürk, the Turkish flag, historical accomplishments against the Greeks and Megali Idea were repeatedly used.

As a result of all these comments on Turkish national identity and Greek the other, we can say that otherisation process has been a natural and expected one due to historical reasons. We cannot say that, politicians or the Turks thought and decided to declare the Greeks as the other deliberately. Given the grudge nourished against the Greeks throughout the Turkish Independence War, the evil days of 6-7 September provoked by a malleable conglomeration of men and a possible war due to Imia/Kardak Isles Crisis in 1996, it is not difficult to understand that these tensions were due to uncontrollable reasons; warfare, a historical one; geography, a natural and permanent one and politics, a realistic one. When all these reasons are considered thoroughly, there remained only one explanation left: negative perceptions against the long-suspected Greeks could not be eradicated it was only encapsulated to be opened at some future time.

The diachronic perspective held throughout the thesis has shown that, Greek and Turkish relations and mutual perceptions are mainly determined by historical facts. National symbols in Turkey such as statues, patriotic poems, historical films and nationalist discourse impressed their stamp to the perception of “the Greek”.

However, if the last few years of the twentieth century are taken into consideration, it can be said that, Greek and Turkish relations in terms of mutual

perception have changed. Apart from its subversive and unfortunate results, 1999 Earthquakes in Turkey and in Greece cleared the misty path between these two countries. The considerable loss of life and the destructive effects of the earthquake in economy led these two countries, together with their politicians and society, to pursue a more peaceful way. They are no longer the sides of a relentless enmity for the last six years.

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