

THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS OF TURKEY  
DEPLOYING TURKISH TROOPS TO KOREA

A Master's Thesis

by

HAKAN TEK

Department Of  
International Relations  
Bilkent University  
Ankara  
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**THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS OF TURKEY  
DEPLOYING TURKISH TROOPS TO KOREA**

**The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences  
of  
Bilkent University**

**by**

**HAKAN TEK**

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I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations.

Asst. Prof. A. Gülgün Tuna

Thesis Supervisor

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations.

Asst. Prof. Mustafa Kibarođlu

Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations.

Asst. Prof. Aylin Güney

Examining Committee Member

Approval of the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences

Prof. Erdal Erel

Director

## **ABSTRACT**

### **THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS OF TURKEY**

#### **DEPLOYING TURKISH TROOPS TO KOREA**

Tek, Hakan

M.A., Department of International Relations

Supervisor: Assistant Prof. A. Gülgün TUNA

December 2005

This thesis examines the foreign policy decision-making process and its functioning in Turkey (especially in Turkey's troop deployment decisions) within the context of the Korean War. Turkish Foreign Policy (TFP) shifted with the changes in the international era after World War II. The threat perception increased resulting in Turkey joining in the United Nations and sending its troops to Korea in order to support the USA and to join NATO. The decision of sending Turkish troops to Korea was given and executed by a few leaders governing Democratic Party. Besides the disputes on the legality of the decision held at the Turkish Assembly the main argument was on the political outcomes (being excepted to western security institutions). So, by underlining how the decision was given, the governing party leaders were criticized rather than the decision itself. In the post-Cold War era, Turkish Foreign Policy was released from Cold War burdens and foreign policy options multiplied.

**Keywords:** Korea, Turkish Foreign Policy, United Nations, NATO, Troop Deployment, Decision-Making,

## ÖZET

### TÜRKİYE’NİN KORE’YE ASKER GÖNDERME KARAR VERME SÜRECİ

Tek, Hakan

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

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Bu tez, Kore savaşı örnek olayı çerçevesinde dış politika karar verme sürecini ve Türkiye’de bu sürecin (özellikle yurtdışına asker gönderme kararları alınırken) nasıl işlediğini incelemektedir. İkinci Dünya Savaşı ile uluslararası alandaki değişime bağlı olarak Türk dış politikası da değişmiş, Türkiye artan tehdit algılamaları sonucu Birleşmiş Milletlere üye olmuş; Kore ye asker göndererek ABD’nin yanında yer alıp NATO’ya girmeye çalışmıştır. Kore’ye asker gönderme kararı hükümette yer alan Demokrat Parti’nin birkaç yöneticisi tarafından alınmış ve uygulanmıştır. Mecliste yasallığına dair yapılan tartışmalara rağmen en önemli konu siyasi beklentiler( batı güvenlik ittifakına dahil olup olamamak) olmuştur. Bu nedenle kararın kendisi değil sadece nasıl verildiği üzerinde tartışılarak karardan ziyade hükümetteki parti ve onun liderleri eleştirilmiştir. Soğuk savaşın sona ermesi ile birlikte Türk Dış Politikası da rahatlamış, seçenekler artmış ve Türkiye barış gücü operasyonlarında daha fazla yer almıştır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Kore, Türk Dış Politikası, Birleşmiş Milletler, NATO, Asker Gönderme, Karar Verme

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

<b>CIA</b>	Central Intelligence Agency
<b>DP</b>	Democrat Party (in Turkey)
<b>DPRK</b>	Democratic Peoples' Party of Korea (North Korea)
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>ISAF</b>	International Security Assistance Force
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>NP</b>	Nation Party (in Turkey)
<b>NSC</b>	National Security Council (in Turkey)
<b>MEDO</b>	Middle Eastern Defense Organization
<b>PKK</b>	Kurdistan Workers Party (Terrorist Organization)
<b>ROK</b>	Republic of Korea
<b>RPP</b>	Republican Peoples' Party (in Turkey)
<b>TAF</b>	Turkish Armed Forces
<b>TFP</b>	Turkish Foreign Policy
<b>TGNA</b>	Turkish Grand National Assembly
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNSC</b>	United Nations Security Council
<b>UNSOM</b>	United Nations Force in Somalia
<b>USA</b>	United States of America
<b>USSR</b>	United Soviet Socialist Republic
<b>WW II</b>	World War Two

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

The Iraq War of 2003 has dominated the foreign policy of Turkey during the first half of that year and once again put forward the question of deploying troops outside Turkey. The basic problem is that while the military is dedicated to the defense of the country, it can neither be deployed outside nor can it be used for the political demands of the policies of the governing parties'.<sup>1</sup>This study aims to clarify the foreign policy reactions of Turkey in troop deployment decisions.

The very first experience of the Turkish Republic to deploy its troops outside its territories is the Korean War. Besides objections and the tragic burdens (721 deaths, 2147 wounded and 175 missing in action while all 234 prisoners returned home), it became a heroic legend of the Turkish Army and labeled its *Esprit de Corps*. The Korean War started at the beginning of the Cold War and led the world to a bipolar system. Outside of the Korean War where Turkey, in fact, was fighting against the Soviet Union, Turkey refrained from any actions to provoke its neighbor during the Cold War.

After the Korean War, bipolarity became more visible and the international era moved towards a balance between the two superpowers. During the Cold War, aside from the Korean War, Turkey did not deploy its troops outside or participate

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<sup>1</sup> A similar statement was made in 1950's by Nihat Erim (member of RPP and a former Prime Minister) at Turkish Daily Ulus and by Kasım GÜLEK the general secretary of the RPP, in Turkish Daily Cumhuriyet on 28<sup>th</sup> July 1950 about the troops sent to Korea. For details see: *Türk Parlamento Tarihi* (History of Turkish Parliament)(1950-1954), Volumes I, TBMMVakfı Yayınları, Ankara, 2001, p. 750 and p. 759

in any peace operations,<sup>2</sup> not only to ease the tension between its communist neighbors but also to concentrate on its own problems. Domestic conflicts and *coup d'etat's*, and the bulk of the TFP during the Cold War (disputes with Greece on Cyprus and the Aegean Sea, which were heightened in 1974 with the intervention in Cyprus and came to the brink of a war at 1987), restrained Turkey's foreign policies.

After the end of the Cold War Turkey was released from its foreign policy burdens and moved to a multifaceted and multidimensional policy and became more active. Despite the lack of economic power its army, which gained war experience after fighting against the ethnic terrorist party PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) for more than 16 years (1984-2001), became an important tool in its foreign policies.

Turkish foreign policy has similarities with other states but it also has some differences unique to Turkey, which needs to be stressed. These differences emerged from Turkey's unique position both geographically and socioeconomically. Turkey is situated between the West and the East, the South and the North. It has a predominantly Muslim population with western institutions and a secular regime. It inherited the tradition of the Ottoman Empire but it is founded on the characteristics of nation state. It has a strong military that is effective in politics, which is different from the West, but also the military is a supporter of Westernization, which is different from other developing countries.

After the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the foreign policy was under the dominance of the leaders who found the new republic. Until the end of the World War II that was the case with the one party government. Also, the Ottoman heritage was clear during this period. In the following years by joining

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<sup>2</sup> Neither the Cyprus case, which was made on the basis of a guarantee treaty nor the troops other than land forces including observation tasks are within the limits of this thesis.

NATO Turkey became a part of the Western security system against the communist threat, which shaped the foreign policy options of Turkey during the Cold War.

This study intends to clarify the decision process of Turkish Foreign Policy by evaluating the Korean case. It underlines the external and domestic factors together with the legacy that led the leaders of the Turkey to decide to assist USA in UN operation in Korea, even without asking the approval of the Turkish Great Assembly.

The second chapter describes the world in the aftermath of World War II and examines the Korean War to clarify the international conjuncture.

The following chapter glances over post-War period from the TFP perspective, the internal agents that forced Turkey to feel insecure and search an alliance. The political structure changed from one party rule to a multiparty system in 1946. However the first democratic elections would be possible in May 1950. Democrat Party, just two months after they came to government, made a decision to send troops to Korea. This was novel since Turkey had not sent its troops abroad since the establishment of the republic neither attended to a battle.

The fourth chapter is the assessment of the Korean decision. Besides some objections there was little opposition and mostly on 'how's rather than the Korean decision itself. There seemed to be a consensus on contributing to Korea among the actors and an inevitable consensus on the decision after it was ratified in the Assembly. The actors refrained from a dispute within the state, which might be abused by the Russia, the close and apparent threat.

The last chapter is the conclusion part, which underlines the mainlines of decision-making process of Turkey on sending troops abroad with reference to Turkey's other troop deployment experiences.

This study purports to answer the following research questions: What were the main factors behind the decision to deploy troops to Korea? How does the 'Process' function in 'Troop Deployment' decisions? Who are the actors and how effective are they? What are the tenets of the 'Turkish Foreign Policy Decisions'?

## CHAPTER II

### FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AND THE BACKGROUND OF THE KOREAN DECISION

#### II.1. The Decision-Making Process

International relations (IR) being a young branch of science and the need for parsimonious theories keep IR students away from a study about which they do not have much knowledge. However beginning with Snyder and Paige, IR scholars in some way began to touch that area. One of the problems is the 'level of analysis' that Snyder encourages IR students to go inside the units, the main actors of IR, to learn and predict their actions. He stated that examining the inside would ease to understand the outside. To review the political science will help us to cover the process better.

Political science, which has to deal with the decision-making, has some basic approaches that can be divided as Classical and Radical. Decision-making is within the Classical approach of political science.

Decision-making also has different approaches while examining the process. They are Smith's '*homo economicus*', Weber's '*rational man*', and as a third one the efforts of finding a midway between them. The first one does not look for causality, the second one does. To maximize the benefit is common in both and

the third one stays between the two approaches and uses the '*limited rational behavior*' model.<sup>3</sup>

Homo economicus of Smith, as a rational man:<sup>4</sup>

1. In all cases, can give a decision when faces alternatives
2. Limits the case according to his own preference
3. The order of the preference is transitive
4. When making a decision he picks the choice that is on the top of the order
5. In the same cases makes the same choice

This approach assumes that the decision-maker is rational and makes a consistent decision.

On the contrary, Weber's rationality is to make the decision according to the goals and to reach for them. Weber's starting point is the cause-result relationship. His approach has a hierarchy of the decisions for the man who is inclined to meet the goal. The man is rational depending on how successful he is on reaching the goal. Still Weber's rationality does not reject the impact of the environment and refer to the compromise. The rational choice is the one that is best within its conditions.<sup>5</sup>

The decision-making process has three phases:

1. Limitation of the alternatives
2. Evaluation of the alternatives
3. Comparison of the alternatives

However, this cause-result relation has some embedded problems. First, the accuracy of the goal might differ according to different preferences. Second, a strict

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<sup>3</sup> Kemali Saybaşı, *Siyaset Biliminde Temel Yaklaşımlar* (Main Approaches of Political Science), BireyToplum, Ankara, 1985, p. 28

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 27-28

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 29-31

cause-result differentiation cannot be made in reality. Third, time is neglected. Therefore some scholars refuse to apply Weber's model. They base their objections on humans' limited capacity of problem solving and insufficiency of the knowledge together with the variety of the choices, high cost of the process, the challenge between the theory and the reality, and the integration of knowledge with norms. Then in such circumstances the decision is to constitute a new 'policy' by focusing on the tools rather than the goals. The midway scholars built a new model named '*study of disjointed incrementalism*' announcing:<sup>6</sup>

1. Choices are together with marginal changes
2. The choices are limited
3. Only limited number of outcomes are handled
4. Generally, the goals are chosen according to an available policy rather than choosing appropriate means to reach the goal
5. The decision making process is executed by public on all levels of the society
6. Analyses and evaluation are made continuously

In summary, it can be said that decision-making is to choose the best among the alternatives. However, like the midway approach put forward, this is not clear in all cases. In international relations, the uncertainty and unclear conditions of the international arena may lead to debates over the best choice.

Studying the decision-making structure of foreign policy is important to analyze and understand the tenets of a country's foreign policy. The role of the actors, the international conjuncture and tendency of a country embedded the possible future behaviors of a country in international relations. Thus, it is

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<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 32-37

important to know the decision-making process within a country to predict an international actor's (the state) behavior.

Scholars who study the decision-making processes embraced state level analysis. The units of analysis are the leaders, groups, organizations that participate in the decision-making process<sup>7</sup>. This study pursues a state level analysis and a method in which external and internal settings given before a narrative of the decision process and end with an evaluation. However, it has not been possible for our case to pursue the process day by day since the decision process of Turkey is not always clear and it often takes a long discussion within the state.

## **II.2. The International Power Configuration After World War II**

“The events within and outside of a state will increase or decrease the ability and the freedom of action of the decision-makers. These can be divided as two groups internal and external or three as 1) National Power and its elements, 2) Decision-Makers, Public Opinion and Interest Groups and 3) Structure of International System”.<sup>8</sup> The first classification, internal and external, will be used while evaluating Turkey's decision to deploy its troops to Korea.

In the aftermath of World War II, the most primary stake for the western states was to build a peace after a devastating war. The first efforts gave the way to the United Nations, an institution that aimed to avoid wars and solve the disputes of the new world's states. However, peace dreams were frozen by the Cold War. The world was struggling behind two poles. While warring at peace the states were

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<sup>7</sup> Glenn D. Paig, *The Korean Decision (June 24-30 1950)*, Free Press, New York, 1968

<sup>8</sup> Tayyar Arı, *Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Dış Politika* (International Relations and Foreign Policy), Alfa, 4th Edition, İstanbul, 2001, pp. 79-80

more secure and could enjoy the peace in this new war. A basic structural change occurred in international relations.<sup>9</sup>

Turkey, which could succeed not to join the World War II with an active neutral policy, was in a worse position than it was during the war. Isolation is the word that most scholars agree on for Turkey, which forced it to join on NATO the side of the USA and the West. The international ‘conjuncture’<sup>10</sup> that led Turkey feel alone played an important role on the decision makers of Turkey since “there were little objections on troop deployment to Korea and they were on ‘how’ rather than ‘why’”.<sup>11</sup>

### **II.2.1. The World in the Aftermath of World War II**

World War II devastated Europe and weakened the European countries both in economic and military means. However, the USA and Soviet Russia were still powerful. The weakness of European countries had not been a problem until the Soviets’ irredentist policy came to surface. Until then the USA had believed a peaceful world based on the UN charter was possible.<sup>12</sup> Even the Soviet demands for Turkish territories and bases on the Turkish straits did not attract enough attention for a while. The USA was reluctant to be involved in European policies. At that time the USA had 10 divisions all around the world after the war and

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<sup>9</sup> Mehmet Gök, *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türk Dış Politikasının İç ve Dış Kaynakları* (Republic Period External and Internal Sources of the Turkish Foreign Policy) in *Bildiriler: Atatürk Türkiyesi’nde Dış Politika Sempozyumu* (Documents: Foreign Policy Symposium of Atatürk’s Turkey) (1923-1983)’, Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul, 1984, p. 55 and Baskın Oran (ed), *Türk Dış Politikası* (1919-1980), Vol. I, 6th Edition, İletişim, İstanbul, 2002, p. 480

<sup>10</sup> For a detailed explanation of ‘Conjuncture’ and its applications to Turkish Foreign Policy see: Reşat Arım, *Foreign Policy Concepts: Conjuncture, Freedom of Action, Equality*, Foreign Policy Institute, Ankara, 2001, pp. 6-41

<sup>11</sup> Füsun Turkmen,, *Turkey and the Korean War*, p. 5. Available at EbscoHost <file:///A/turkey and the korean war.htm>

<sup>12</sup> That was the case even on the eve of the Korean War when USA president Truman was thinking that ‘the world was closer to the peace than at any time since 1945’. For this statement see Glenn D. Paige, *The Korean Decision* (June 24-30 1950), Free Press, New York, 1968, p. 76

preferred to see its soldiers back at home. “The USA policy initially had a tendency to go back to isolation as it was before the war”.<sup>13</sup>

On the contrary the Soviet leaders’ agenda was to expand their communist ideology. The Soviets backed a communist rebellion in Iran, demanded territories and common defense of the straits from Turkey sponsored the civil war in Greece where Communists and right of center nationalists were fighting together against liberals and the supporters of the king. Afterwards the communist parties with the support of Soviets began to gain power in their countries, as in Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland and also in Czechoslovakia after a coup. The belligerent actions of Soviet Russia and its communist expansionist policies increased the threat perception of the European countries and the USA as well.<sup>14</sup>

### **II.2.2. The Cold War and the USA’s Involvement in Europe**

The US Department of State on February 21, 1947 received two critical notes that came from the British Government. They were about the situations in Greece and Turkey. Britain invaded Greece to end the German occupation. British troops stayed there due to the civil war. However, after the end of World War II Great Britain’s economy was suffering due to a lack of food and fuel and more than half of its industry stopped. The first note was about Greece. Britain stated that it hoped that the United States would be able to take the burden. Britain also declared that it was withdrawing from the eastern Mediterranean and that the USA should take over its duty, in 38 days.<sup>15</sup> If the USA were reluctant to do this, that would

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<sup>13</sup> Fahir Armaoğlu, *20nci Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi* (Political History of 20<sup>th</sup> Century) (1914-1980), 6ncı Baskı (6<sup>th</sup> Edition), İş Bankası Yayınları, Ankara, 1989, p. 441

<sup>14</sup> Dean Acheson, *The Korean War*, W.W. Norton & Company Inc., New York, 1971, pp. 8-14 and Fahir Armaoğlu, *20nci Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi* (Political History of 20<sup>th</sup> Century) (1914-1980), 6ncı Baskı (6<sup>th</sup> Edition), İş Bankası Yayınları, Ankara, 1989, pp. 423-434

<sup>15</sup> Füsün Turkmén, *Turkey and the Korean War*, p. 5. Available at EbscoHost [file:///A/turkey\\_and\\_the\\_korean\\_war.htm](file:///A/turkey_and_the_korean_war.htm)

mean Soviet superiority in that territory and a 'loss for the West'.<sup>16</sup>

The acute demand that caused American involvement in Europe was made by the Britain as mentioned above. US President Truman took the issue to Congress and demanded 400 million dollars for military aid to Greece and Turkey in order to defend the Western states (and their liberal economies) against Russia.<sup>17</sup> This action that is known as the Truman Doctrine is the explicit sign of American aid to Turkey and a handing over of the duty from Britain as well as the first tangible event that symbolizes the containment policy of the USA. "Besides the amount being little, the aid was much more important from the historical point of view that it opened door for the USA to be a world power and leader."<sup>18</sup> The congressional response to Truman proposal "had the effect of giving him legislative approval for the president to run the Cold War as he saw fit."<sup>19</sup>

After the Truman Doctrine the United States increased the aid to Europe and Marshall Plan, the European Recovery Program came into force. Later, the western states decided on economic cooperation and built up the European Economic Community and the European Council. The military cooperation, which was the nucleus of NATO, followed with the involvement of Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, France and Britain.<sup>20</sup> This cooperation was not so powerful because neither of them (nor all of them together) was strong enough to put up with the demands of Soviet Russia. The defense posture of the agreement became more apparent and strong with the involvement of the USA in 1951 and paved the way to

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<sup>16</sup> Truman's words cited in Hüseyin Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 50'liYıllar* (Turkish Foreign Policy at 50's), Metu Press, Ankara, 2001, p. 7

<sup>17</sup> Mehmet Gönlübol, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası* (Events and Turkish Foreign Policy) (1919-1973), Sevinç Matbaası, Ankara, 1974, pp. 228 and Fahir Armaoğlu, *20nci Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi* (Political History of 20<sup>th</sup> Century) (1914-1980), 6ncı Baskı (6<sup>th</sup> Edition), İş Bankası Yayınları, Ankara, 1989, pp. 441-442

<sup>18</sup> Burcu Bostanoğlu, *Türkiye-ABD İlişkilerinin Politikası* (Policy of Turkish-USA Relations), İmge, Ankara, 1999, p.244

<sup>19</sup> Paul M. Edwards, *The Korean War*, Krieger Publishing Company, Florida, 1999, p.10

<sup>20</sup> The Collective Defense Treaty (also known as Treaty of Brussels) signed on 17 March 1948.

NATO, “the organization of the containment”<sup>21</sup>. The antagonistic policies of Soviet Russia let the Europeans join and establish the world’s greatest defense cooperation. Soon the alliance would face its first greatest challenge in Far East Asia “on the reluctant test ground of the Cold War.”<sup>22</sup>

### **II.2.3. A Major Thaw: The Korean War**

Korea is located near the south east of China. Korea was under the governance of Japan until 7 November 1945. Korea had been united and governed from one center. The country has been within the interests of China, Japan and Russia, until the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, which led them to a struggle. The USA’s demand was an independent Korea to support its interests in the Pacific.<sup>23</sup>

During World War II Koreans hoped to be independent on the basis of the Wilson Principles and to slip out from the control of Japan. First talks were held at the Cairo Conference in December 1943. The three states, the USA, Britain and China decided that Korea would be independent when the appropriate time came.<sup>24</sup>

At the Yalta Conference in April 1945, Allies agreed that the removal of the Japanese forces in Korea would be made by the USA and Soviet Russia. At the Potsdam Conference, the USA referred to the Cairo Conference and underlined that the decision on Korea would be applied. The Soviet Union agreed on it and declared war on Japan.<sup>25</sup>

Japan surrendered at 10 August 1945. After the surrender of 1 million Japanese soldiers in China and Manchuria, the USA Minister of Defense asked the

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<sup>21</sup> Burcu Bostanoğlu, *Türkiye-ABD İlişkilerinin Politikası* (Policy of Turkish-USA Relations), İmge, Ankara, 1999, p.260. Baskın Oran (ed), *Türk Dış Politikası* (1919-1980), Vol. I, 6th Edition, İletişim, İstanbul, 2002, p.485

<sup>22</sup> Hyung-Kook Kim, *The Division of Korea and the Alliance Making Process*, University Pres of America, New York, 1995, p. xiii

<sup>23</sup> Genel Kurmay Başkanlığı, *Kore Harbinde Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin Muharebeleri: 1950-1953* (General Staff, Battles of Turkish Armed Forces in the Korean War: 1950-1953), Gn. Kur. Yayınevi, Ankara, 1975, pp. 5- 13

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 16

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17

Soviet Union to capture of Japanese forces in Korea.<sup>26</sup> North of the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel would be under the responsibility of the Soviet Union and the south would be under American responsibility. Soviet troops entered into the north of Korea on 12 August 1945 and the USA troops on 8 September 1945 to capture Japanese troops; thus, Korea became divided. When the initial efforts of the USA to unify Korea failed, the USA took the case to the UN. The republic of Korea was built up with the consent of the UN after the elections on 17 July 1948. On 11 September 1948, the American General Hodge handed over the governance to the republic of Korea. Six months after the elections in 12 December 1948, the UN recognized ROK as the only legal government of Korea. In the south, the People's Republic of Democratic Korea took power on 9 September 1948, which was backed by the Soviets. After the governments were in charge, the USA and the Soviet Union withdrew their troops, which were anticipated in the UN decision dating 14 November 1947. Only 500 the USA military advisers were left. The UN commission for Korea took duty in 12 December 1948. The commission's mission was to strive for the unification of the Korea that has never been accomplished<sup>27</sup>.

On the communist side, following the irredentist policies in Europe, the Soviet Union turned to the East. The Soviet Union made an agreement with China for 30 years and handed over Manchuria to communist China, which defeated the nationalist, in 1949. As the USA backed the Chinese communists, the USSR backed the North Korean communists and provoked them for a new war. On 25 June the North Koreans passed the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel to invade the south and to free the whole

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<sup>26</sup> In most sources the Soviet invasion is given as a unilateral action and the USA's as a reaction, so it is important to underline the USA's demand Genel Kurmay Başkanlığı, *Kore Harbinde Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin Muharebeleri: 1950-1953* (General Staff, Battles of Turkish Armed Forces in the Korean War: 1950-1953), Gn. Kur. Yayınevi, Ankara, 1975, p. 18

<sup>27</sup> Dean Acheson, *The Korean War*, W.W. Norton & Company Inc., New York, 1971, pp. 11-12. Genel Kurmay Başkanlığı, *Kore Harbinde Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin Muharebeleri: 1950-1953* (General Staff, Battles of Turkish Armed Forces in the Korean War: 1950-1953), Gn. Kur. Yayınevi, Ankara, 1975, pp. 20-24

state. On the same day the UN accepted a resolution and determined the action as a 'breach of the peace' and 'called upon the authorities of North Korea to cease hostilities' and 'to withdraw their armed forces to the thirty eighth parallel'.<sup>28</sup> The resolution was made possible by the absence of the USSR, which had been boycotting the presence of Nationalist China in United Nations Security Council (UNSC) rather than Communist China. On 27 June the UN renovated its resolution, one that was handled by Truman himself. The USA leaders were planning an operation against North Korean communists.<sup>29</sup>

Against more than 183,000 DPRK troops and additional defense forces that were deployed at coastal sides and throughout the country, the south only had lightly armed forces with a hundred men and a police force numbering 50,000. Both were under the authority of the UN. The USA was not able to block the initial attack. At that time, the USA had 4 divisions in Japan and only 2 were available to use in Korea. Thus, the attack could only be stopped around Pusson, a harbor city to the south east of Korea, with the reinforcements, especially the sea and air powers. The UN forces then were available to avoid the attacks and push them to the north. The UN attack started on 15 August. The UN forces captured Seoul on 28 September and reached the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel. On 9 October UN forces passed the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel and kept moving to the north in order to unify and liberate the whole country. They reached as near as 70 kilometers to the Chinese border. Only one last attack was left to build a new unified Korea. Turkish troops, which arrived in Korea 20 days before, were at the far front for the last attacks.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Dean Acheson, *The Korean War*, W.W. Norton & Company Inc., New York, 1971, p. 19. Paul M. Edwards, *The Korean War*, p. 89

<sup>29</sup> Hyung-Kook Kim, *The Division of Korea and the Alliance Making Process*, University Pres of America, New York, 1995, p.9

<sup>30</sup> Genel Kurmay Başkanlığı, *Kore Harbinde Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin Muharebeleri: 1950-1953*, pp. 25-28. Dean Acheson, *The Korean War*, pp. 14-16

### II.3. Turkey after World War II

Following the end of World War II, the most important problem Turkey was facing in the realm of foreign policy was isolation<sup>31</sup>. During the war, İsmet İnönü, who became the president after the death of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (the founder of the Turkish Republic and the first president) and assumed the leadership of the Republican People's Party of Turkey (RPP), was successful in keeping Turkey out of the war and pursuing a neutral policy.<sup>32</sup> "Turkey changed its neutrality and declared war on Germany in February 1945,"<sup>33</sup> "for not being excluded from the west and for not to be alone in new order."<sup>34</sup>

On 19 March 1945, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov gave notice of Moscow's intention to denounce the 1925 Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression with Turkey. Soviets took another more disturbing step on 7 June 1945, and demanded:

- 1- The modification of the Turkish-Soviet border demarcated by the Moscow Treaty of 16 March 1921, in favor of the Soviet Union;
- 2- Joint Turkish-Soviet defense of Turkish straits and the establishment of Soviet land and naval bases on the straits,
- 3- Revision of the Montreux Convention (1936, that confirmed the regime

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<sup>31</sup> Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition (1950-1974)*, E. J. Brill, Leiden, Netherlands, 1975, p. 3. Mehmet Gönlübol, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası* (Events and Turkish Foreign Policy) (1919-1973), Sevinç Matbaası, Ankara, 1974, p. 206. Edip Çelik, *100 Soruda Türkiye'nin Dış Politika Tarihi* (History of Turkey's Foreign Policy in 100 Questions), Gerçek Yayınevi, İstanbul, 1969, p.126

<sup>32</sup> Available at, [http://www.tbb.gen.tr/english/history/inonu\\_period.html](http://www.tbb.gen.tr/english/history/inonu_period.html). On the contrary some scholars stated that Turkey was 'non-belligerent' rather than being 'neutral', see Baskin Oran (ed), *Türk Dış Politikası* (1919-1980), Vol. I, 6th Edition, İletişim, İstanbul, 2002, p. 393

<sup>33</sup> That was a diplomatic necessity and was symbolic and aimed to participate in the San Francisco Conference which necessitates the declaration of war on Germany in order to be a founding member of the UN see Burcu Bostanoğlu, *Türkiye-ABD İlişkilerinin Politikası* (Policy of Turkish-USA Relations), İmge, Ankara, 1999, p. 381. Füsün Türkmen, *Turkey and the Korean War*, available at EbscoHost, [file:///A/turkey and the Korean war.htm](file:///A/turkey%20and%20the%20Korean%20war.htm) Baskin Oran (ed), *Türk Dış Politikası* (1919-1980), Vol. I, 6th Edition, İletişim, İstanbul, 2002, p. 472

<sup>34</sup> Burcu Bostanoğlu, *Türkiye-ABD İlişkilerinin Politikası* (Policy of Turkish-USA Relations), İmge, Ankara, 1999, p. 381

of the Straits) by an agreement of principle.<sup>35</sup>

The first two demands were rejected directly by Ankara and pointed out that any change to the Montreux Convention would necessitate the consent of the states that are parties to that convention. After that the Soviet media set off an enthusiastic anti-Turkish campaign on territorial claims over two provinces of eastern Turkey, Kars and Ardahan.<sup>36</sup>

The British leader Churchill raised the issue at the Potsdam Conference in August 1945. During the meeting, he made clear to Stalin (the leader of the USSR) that the straits issue was of international concern. Truman seemed to be in agreement, but despite the apparent consensus about bringing Montreux up to date, no final decision was reached. Truman declared that territorial claims should be determined bilaterally between Turkey and the Soviet Union.<sup>37</sup>

Moscow sent another note to Turkey on 7 August 1946, repeating its demands on participation in the administration of the Straits and their joint control. On August 19, Washington sent a reply backing firmly the Turkish position and stressing the need for Turkey to maintain single control over the Straits. Moreover, the U.S. note designated that attacks or threats against the Straits would clearly be matters for action by the UN Security Council.

The second note, which was given to the USA by Britain, was about Turkey, where Britain had also been giving economic and military assistance needed by this country to stand up against Soviet pressure. Since the end of World War II, Turkey was facing two serious economic problems:

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<sup>35</sup> Haluk Ülman, *Türk Dış Politikasına Yön Veren Etkenler* (Directing Agents of Turkish Foreign Policy) (1923-1968), in [S.B.F. Dergisi (Journal), Cilt (Vol.) 23, Sayı (No.) 3], 1968, p. 260. Mehmet Gönlübol, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası* (Events and Turkish Foreign Policy) (1919-1973), Sevinç Matbaası, Ankara, 1974, p. 193

<sup>36</sup> Mehmet Gönlübol, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası* (Events and Turkish Foreign Policy) (1919-1973), Sevinç Matbaası, Ankara, 1974, p. 207. Baskın Oran (ed), *Türk Dış Politikası* (1919-1980), Vol. I, 6th Edition, İletişim, İstanbul, 2002, p. 503

<sup>37</sup> Haluk Ülman, *Türk Dış Politikasına Yön Veren Etkenler* (Directing Agents of Turkish Foreign Policy) (1923-1968), in [S.B.F. Dergisi (Journal), Cilt (Vol.) 23, Sayı (No.) 3], 1968, p. 52

- 1- The return of war-inflated export prices to normal;
- 2- The necessity of military readiness coupled by massive efforts of industrialization.<sup>38</sup>

At a Special Joint Session of Congress on 12 March 1947 President Truman made a long speech including the latest economic and political circumstances in Greece and Turkey, assuring support to both countries. Then he announced the statement that is known as the Truman Doctrine: “I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” Afterwards the President requested authority from Congress for \$400 million until 30 June 1948, to provide assistance to Greece and Turkey. He also asked for authority to assign military and civilian personnel to work in Greece and Turkey.<sup>39</sup> The Assistance Act to Greece and Turkey came into force on 22 May 1947 after ratification by Congress. “Soviets announced that it would be a ‘threat to world peace’ and decided to take the issue to the UN Security Council but gained nothing.”<sup>40</sup>

The following aid would be economic, which aimed for the renovation of the western European states. Turkey demanded again to be included in this Marshall plan; however, Turkey was denied this aid at first since it had already been taking military aid and was not destroyed like the western European states because Turkey had not fought in the war. The continuing demands of Turkey made it available for

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<sup>38</sup> Mehmet Gönlübol, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası* (Events and Turkish Foreign Policy) (1919-1973), Sevinç Matbaası, Ankara, 1974, p. 226

<sup>39</sup> Dean Acheson, *The Korean War*, W.W. Norton & Company Inc., New York, 1971, p. 8. Haluk Ülman, *Türk Dış Politikasına Yön Veren Etkenler* (Directing Agents of Turkish Foreign Policy) (1923-1968), in [S.B.F. Dergisi (Journal), Cilt (Vol.) 23, Sayı (No.) 3], 1968, p. 261

<sup>40</sup> Mehmet Gönlübol, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası* (Events and Turkish Foreign Policy) (1919-1973), Sevinç Matbaası, Ankara, 1974, p. 230. Dean Acheson, *The Korean War*, W.W. Norton & Company Inc., New York, 1971, p. 8

it to get the aid at the end.<sup>41</sup> This was significant for Turkey since its economic policy depended on foreign aid.<sup>42</sup>

#### **II.4. Changes in Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkey's Contributions to Korean War**

As mentioned previously 'isolation' was one of the characteristics of the Turkish Foreign Policy, in the aftermath of World War II. Another characteristic was the 'change'<sup>43</sup> that Turkish Foreign Policy would bear in the Korean decision. While one of the tenets embodied in the motto of Atatürk 'peace at home, peace in the world' was wearing out, another one 'westernization', was being championed.<sup>44</sup> Yet, when the application to NATO is considered rather than the decision of sending troops to Korea, some scholars suggest that it was inevitable for Turkey, a country that could never be neutral throughout its history with the exception of World War II.<sup>45</sup>

Deploying troops outside one state's territory, on the basis of the UN Charter, means attending to a softened war. After the demise of the USSR this was more apparent, if not during the Cold War. The peace operations mandated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter turned out to be harsher and began to look like a

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<sup>41</sup> Mehmet Gönlübol, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası* (Events and Turkish Foreign Policy) (1919-1973), Sevinç Matbaası, Ankara, 1974, p. 237

<sup>42</sup> Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition (1950-1974)*, E. J. Brill, Leiden, Netherlands, 1975, p. 3

<sup>43</sup> William Hale stated that the adherence to a Western Alliance (NATO) membership was the most important change since 1920. William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy (1774-2000)*, Frank Cass & Co Ltd., London, 2002, p. 120

<sup>44</sup> When the Korean decision is concerned Türkmen underlines that '[I]t was certainly about security but also 'belongingness'. The purely Realist argument was coupled with the 'socio-psychohistorical' quest for Western identity'. Füsün Türkmen, *Turkey and the Korean War*, Available at EbscoHost, [file:///A/turkey and the Korean war.htm](file:///A/turkey%20and%20the%20Korean%20war.htm)

<sup>45</sup> Karpat stated that Turkish Foreign Policy was 'leaning upon and with the support of one of the Great Powers' 'since its inception in the 1920ies', Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition (1950-1974)*, E. J. Brill, Leiden, Netherlands, 1975 p. 3. Also in Mehmet Gök, *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türk Dış Politikasının İç ve Dış Kaynakları* (External and Internal Sources of the Republic Period Turkish Foreign Policy) in *Bildiriler: Atatürk Türkiyesi'nde Dış Politika Sempozyumu* (Documents: Foreign Policy Symposium of Atatürk's Turkey) (1923-1983)', Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul, 1984, p. 55

war. Thus, troop deployment gained the priority in international relations, a discipline that aims to prevent wars. That was the case also in the Korean War where the UN was on one side and fighting in an interstate war. Examining a state's decision to send troops then may guide one to obtain the details of its behaviors and realize the changes and continuities in its foreign policy. That was the case in Turkey's decision to send its troops to Korea which is important as being itself a critical and risky decision, and as being a marginal point for the Turkish foreign policy, one that embedded the previous developments and guidelines for future events. This would be similar in following decisions on troop deployment, which also reflects the changes of Turkish Foreign Policy. The following events will guide readers to the context in which the decision was made.

## CHAPTER III

### THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS OF DEPLOYING TURKISH TROOPS TO KOREA

#### III.1. The Korean War: Turkish Decision to Send Troops

Less than two months after the elections of 1950 that brought Menderes come to power, the Korean War broke out. On 25 June 1950, North Korean forces had crossed the 38th parallel to launch an all-out armed invasion of South Korea. The UN Security Council immediately condemned the attack as a threat to world peace and recommended that the UN members come to the aid of South Korean forces. A unified UN Command would be established in order to repel North Korean aggression and restore peace in the area.<sup>46</sup>

A cabinet meeting of governing Democrat Party (DP) was quickly convened on 18 July 1950 and the decision to send troops to Korea was taken by some seniors of the DP at Yalova near Istanbul.<sup>47</sup> On 25 July 1950, the Menderes government announced its decision to send a 4,500-man brigade to Korea. This was a clear change because the armed forces were going outside their borders to a war for the first time after the establishment of the republic.<sup>48</sup> “Foreign Minister Köprülü was

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<sup>46</sup> Paul M. Edwards, *The Korean War*, Krieger Publishing Company, Florida, 1999, p. 89

<sup>47</sup> (Together with President Celal Bayar, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes also Chairman of TGNA Refik Koraltan and General Chief of Staff Nuri Yamut was in the meeting) Hüseyin Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 50'liYıllar* (Turkish Foreign Policy at 50's), Metu Press, Ankara, 2001, p. 20. Baskın Oran (ed), *Türk Dış Politikası* (1919-1980), Vol. I, 6th Edition, İletişim, İstanbul, 2002, p. 545

<sup>48</sup> Salim Burçak, *On Yılın Anıları* (Memoirs of Ten Years) (1950-1960), 1998, pp. 61-62. Baskın Oran (ed), *Türk Dış Politikası* (1919-1980), Vol. I, 6th Edition, İletişim, İstanbul, 2002, p. 547

proud of being the second state, after the USA, which responded to the invitation of UN General Secretary, Tyrgue Lie.”<sup>49</sup>

### **III.2. A New Government: Democrat Party’s (DP) Policy**

The DP foreign policy, according to its governmental program, can be summarized as entering to Western institutions, particularly to NATO, to make investments to strengthen the insufficient and outmoded infrastructure and obtain economic development by benefiting from foreign aids as much as they can and to tighten its relations with western states, France, Britain and especially the USA, and secure the country.<sup>50</sup>

The DP members criticized the RPP as being slow and inefficient to join western institutions. They also criticized İnönü because of his reluctance to join World War II. They even stated that “RPP discouraged the Turks and acted cowardly towards the USSR.”<sup>51</sup>

Yet, when the DP won the elections in 1950<sup>52</sup> they were afraid of a coup, which was a wide gossip. When some generals informed İnönü that they were ready for a coup if he demanded it, he rejected such a move since he was determined to refrain from any tricks or a coup.<sup>53</sup> He assumed his support for the government in

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<sup>49</sup> Hüseyin Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 50’liYıllar* (Turkish Foreign Policy at 50’s), Metu Press, Ankara, 2001,p. 20. Baskın Oran (ed), *Türk Dış Politikası* (1919-1980), Vol. I, 6th Edition, İletişim, İstanbul, 2002, p. 545

<sup>50</sup> Kemal Girgin, *T.C. Hükümetleri Programlarında Dış Politikamız* (70 Yılın Panoraması) (Our Foreign Policy in Programs of Turkish Republic Governments) (A panorama of 70 years), Dışişleri Bakanlığı, Ankara, 1993,p. 6, 26. Ercüment Yavuzalp, *Liderlerimiz ve Dış Politika*, pp. 74-77. Cem Eroğul stated that DP’s efforts were to patch Turkey to the West and so made Turkey a satellite of the West, particularly USA. For details see Cem Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti, Tarihi ve İdeolojisi*, p. 53. Also Edip Çelik, *100 Soruda Türkiye’nin Dış Politika Tarihi* (History of Turkey’s Foreign Policy in 100 Questions), Gerçek Yayınevi, İstanbul, 1969, p. 157

<sup>51</sup> Cem Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti, Tarihi ve İdeolojisi*( Democrat Party, History and Ideology), İmge, Ankara, 1990, p. 56

<sup>52</sup> For the results of the elections see *Türk Parlamento Tarihi* (History of Turkish Parliament)(1950-1954), Volumes I to IX, TBMM, Vakfı Yayınları, Ankara, 2001, pp. 8-9

<sup>53</sup> William Hale, *Turkish Military and Politics* (from 1789 till now), Routledge, London, 1994, p. 88

bilateral talks with Celal Bayar. On 6th of July 1950, the DP assured its governance by making a wide change on the command of the army.<sup>54</sup>

The Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) selected Celal Bayar, the leader of DP, as the president of the country. The Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, who was assigned by Bayar when he was in his office to ask for Köprülü to be prime minister. Bayar insisted on Menderes to be the prime minister.<sup>55</sup>

Bayar and Menderes were members of the RPP. They came together to establish a new party when that was freed by the RPP's leader İnönü. They were more liberal and accused the RPP of being more prone to state control. When they won the elections besides other factors common to both parties, they saw westernization as a tool for their survival because they were able to build a party and came to government by the help of western states. They were lucky that İnönü's dilemma, the demands of the west, and deficiency of the economy prompted İnönü to adopt multiparty elections in order to be accepted in to western institutions which would result in Turkey receiving financial aid packages, caused him lose the government.

The first effort of DP to survive would be sending troops to Korea in order to join NATO and to satisfy Turkey's strategic partner, the USA. Moreover, the DP would win its second round against the RPP, which was refused in the first application for NATO membership.

### **III.3. The Opposition Party (RPP) and Objections**

After governing Turkey under the rule of one party for 27 years, the RPP became the opposition party in the elections of 14 May 1950. The leader of the party was İsmet İnönü; the second leader in the Liberation war of Turkey became

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<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 57. Salim Burçak, *On Yılın Anıları* (Memoirs of Ten Years) (1950-1960), 1998, p. 53

<sup>55</sup> Salim Burçak, *On Yılın Anıları* (Memoirs of Ten Years) (1950-1960), 1998, p. 51

the second leader of the party as well. He succeeded Atatürk and became the president of Turkey and ruled for 12 years. He became an important actor in foreign policy during the Second World War and kept Turkey away from joining that war.

In the aftermath of World War II, İnönü was faced with many challenges. His authority and position began to decrease. “The international era weakened the one party rule in Turkey.”<sup>56</sup> UN membership, international refusal of totalitarian regimes as in Italy and Germany, the increasing domestic problems, security that was threatened by the USSR and the huge army against it with economic burdens prompted İnönü to adopt multiparty elections.<sup>57</sup> The RPP won the elections of 1946 with suspicion that the RPP cheated. The elections were made to prove that Turkey was ready to satisfy Western requirements. Moreover, to ease the demands of the USSR might be another one that affected İnönü’s decision.<sup>58</sup> Turkey was once again trying the multiparty experiment and that would be successful with the first democratic elections, which would be held in less than five years.

The motive of transition to democracy was ‘Westernization,’ the process that was assumed as the base for economic, military and political development. That was the case on 11 May 1950, just before the elections, when the RPP made the first official application of Turkey for NATO membership.<sup>59</sup> But the NATO members declined it. As the refusal of the application the citizens refused their governance in 14 May the DP was signed to build up the new government.

The RPP generally backed the new government’s foreign policy since two parties were similar; the DP members were the old members of the RPP. This was

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<sup>56</sup> Salim Burçak, *On Yılın Anıları* (Memoirs of Ten Years) (1950-1960), 1998, p. 51

<sup>57</sup> Sander, Oral and Ülman Haluk, *Türk Dış Politikasına Yön Veren Etkenler* (Directing Agents of Turkish Foreign Policy) (1923-1968) (1923-1968), in S.B.F. Dergisi (Journal), Vol. 23/3, 1968, p. 5

<sup>58</sup> Ülman, Haluk, *Türk Dış Politikasına Yön Veren Etkenler* (Directing Agents of Turkish Foreign Policy) (1923-1968), in S.B.F. Dergisi (Journal), Vol. 23, No. 3, 1968, p. 260

<sup>59</sup> The first application was backed only by Italy. Mehmet Gönlübol, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası* (Events and Turkish Foreign Policy) (1919-1973), Sevinç Matbaası, Ankara, 1974, p. 245

the case until the end of 1950s with an exception of the troop contribution to the Korean War.<sup>60</sup> However, the objections to troop deployment were not acute. The RPP and its leader İsmet İnönü tended also to assist the USA but in a less dangerous way. They offered to deploy a non-battle troop to Korea as some other countries (Greece) did. They raised objections on the timing that the government hurried to give that decision. The other objection was on the legality of the decision that the government was required to consult to the Great Assembly, which was the only authority on the basis of the constitution. Still, they did not paralyze the process and ratified the decision in the Assembly at the session about Korea in December 1950.<sup>61</sup>

İsmet İnönü regretted the leaders of the DP. İnönü stated his demands as it would be better if they had asked him, a leader who was in the governance from the very beginning of the republic. “He pointed out that during World War II; he had consulted the Parliament even before cutting economic relations with Germany.”<sup>62</sup> As far as Korea was concerned, his preoccupation was to be a part of a common UN front. İnönü seemed to be skeptical towards an eventual UN support in case of a similar attack against Turkey. But then, he had no objection towards the very substance of the decision. However, İnönü’s objections seem to be more like a lecture and an advice for his students, to the ex-members of the RPP.

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<sup>60</sup> William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy (1774-2000)*, Frank Cass & Co Ltd., London, 2002, p. 122

<sup>61</sup> Hüseyin Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 50’liYıllar* (Turkish Foreign Policy at 50’s), Metu Press, Ankara, 2001, p. 29. Salim Burçak, *On Yılım Anıları* (Memoirs of Ten Years) (1950-1960), 1998, pp. 61-63. *Türk Parlamento Tarihi* (History of Turkish Parliament)(1950-1954), Volumes I to IX, TBMM,Vakfı Yayınları, Ankara, 2001, pp. 522-738

<sup>62</sup> Salim Burçak, *On Yılım Anıları* (Memoirs of Ten Years) (1950-1960), 1998, pp. 62-64. Füsün Turkmen, *Turkey and the Korean.*, p. 5. Available at [EbscoHostfile:///A/turkey and the Korean war.htm](http://EbscoHostfile:///A/turkey%20and%20the%20Korean%20war.htm)

### III.4. The Legal Aspect and Disputes at the Assembly

According to the Constitution of 1924, the legislation was superior to execution. The constitution embraced the unity of the powers and made the Turkish Grand National Assembly the superior authority and gave the power of legislation and execution to the Assembly. The Assembly's power was due to the citizens rather than the constitution and it embodied the sovereignty of the state. According to the 1924 Constitution, there was a strong hierarchy between the Assembly and the President and the Ministers. The responsibility of execution and application of foreign policy was given to the President and the Council of Ministers; however the final authority was the Assembly. The Assembly was not commissioned the government to form the foreign policy.<sup>63</sup> (See Table 1.1: Foreign Policy Model-1924 Constitution)




Table 1.1: Foreign Policy Model-1924 Constitution<sup>64</sup>

#### TABLE 1.1

From the legal aspect the decision has some shortcomings and may be labeled as illegal on the basis of the 1920 constitution. However, the decision was made on the basis of an international law, which was ratified by the Great Assembly and thus legalized the decision. The independent deputy Kemal Türkoğlu and the only deputy of the Nation Party, Osman Bölükbaşı introduced with a view to

<sup>63</sup> Ertan Efegil, *Körfez Krizi ve Dış Politika Karar Verme Modeli* (Gulf War and Foreign Policy Decision-Making Model), Gündoğan, Ankara, 2002, p.141

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.* p.142

discuss the government's decision to send troops to Korea in Parliament. Türkoğlu and Bölükbaşı referred to the legality of the decision and put forward that UN Charter allows such decisions but that would not mean that it is binding. The UN Charter does not allow the government to by-pass the Assembly or the constitution. Türkoğlu and Bölükbaşı also referred to Article 47 of the Charter and stated that the UN resolution would be binding if the military staff had been operated. The DP rejected the latter and strictly accused the Soviets of paralyzing UNSC efforts in order to keep the UN away from its irredentist actions.

While the oppositions were on the legal points and on the technical analyses of the laws, the government insisted on their legality and underlined that they were 'right' and preferred to stress the significance of participating with West and assisting the USA. Kemal Türkoğlu and the Nation Party (NP) agreed on the decision with abstention on the legality. Türkoğlu insisted that if the decision was ratified at the Assembly that would mean full support of all parties and the public and would underline its coherence in the eyes of outside enemies. The leader of the NP declared that the decision would be valuable if NATO membership for Turkey was guaranteed. The RPP differed in the size and the scope of the troops and stressed that the troops could have a non-combatant role like Greece and some other European states. Opposition spokesman Faik Ahmet Barutçu accused the government of having violated Article 26 of the Constitution, which stipulated that "the power to declare war and participate in a war as well as to declare peace belongs to the Turkish Grand National Assembly."<sup>65</sup>

At the time of the disputes, which were held in November about 4 months after the decision Turkish troops were fighting bravely in the far front of the battle. The heroic fights strengthened the DP's position. Prime Minister Menderes

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<sup>65</sup> Edip Çelik, *100 Soruda Türkiye'nin Dış Politika Tarihi* (History of Turkey's Foreign Policy in 100 Questions), Gerçek Yayınevi, İstanbul, 1969, p. 151

responded that his government's decision had been taken upon the appeal of the UN Security Council and, consequently, could not be considered as declaration of war, thus Article 26 had not been violated. Following heated exchanges between government and opposition members, the proposal was voted upon. The result was an overwhelming defeat for the opposition: 311 against, 39 for, 1 abstention. One hundred nineteen deputies did not join the voting.<sup>66</sup> One year later, when asked by a reporter about the reasons of his bypassing the opposition while sending troops to Korea, Menderes responded: "Since we have seen that our country's safety depends on taking long term risks and on keeping the initiative in foreign policy... we could not leave America alone in its struggle for the free world. Our NATO membership is due to our efforts in this way. Turkey is labeled as a 'big power' in international relations."<sup>67</sup>

In the initial declaration of the DP, they condemned the North Korean troops and the Soviets, and backed strongly the decision of the UN. Köprülü stated this thought at the Great Assembly on July 30. All deputies supported the decision and applauded the government. However that decision was only about Turkey's support for the UN but not about sending combat troops to Korea. The troops were ordered on 3 August and sailed to Korea on 18 September. The UN was back on the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel and was moving to the north to occupy all of Korea and liberate all Koreans. Turkish troops participated in the last attack, which was at a 70 kilometers distance from the Chinese border. However, they were not aware of the Koreans and Chinese troops which were poised for a counter attack. Turkish troops had one of their most heroic battles during this fight.

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<sup>66</sup> *Türk Parlamento Tarihi* (History of Turkish Parliament) (1950-1954), Volumes I to IX, TBMM, Vakfı Yayınları, Ankara, 2001, p. 708. Hüseyin Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 50'liYıllar* (Turkish Foreign Policy at 50's), Metu Press, Ankara, 2001, p. 25. Salim Burçak, *On Yılın Anıları* (Memoirs of Ten Years) (1950-1960), 1998, p. 69

<sup>67</sup> Hüseyin Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 50'liYıllar* (Turkish Foreign Policy at 50's), Metu Press, Ankara, 2001, p. 26

Briefly, the disputes revolved around the relations between international law and the Turkish constitution. The government party DP, preferred a political stance that they were right and the UN Charter Articles give them the legality to deploy troops outside. The objections repeatedly forwarded that ratification by the Great Assembly would mean the complete consent of Turkey. The DP's leader refused to state that the issue was urgent. It was difficult to clarify the legality of the decision but the government legitimized it by stating that they would get some national stakes. Yet the stakes were kept secret by Menderes.

Turkey would face similar debates later on following troop deployment cases. In the 1990s the governing Motherland Party decided to deploy troops to the Gulf War. The RPP took the case to the Constitutional Court. Ahmet Nejdet Sezer, member of the Constitutional Court and later the President, labeled it as illegal according to the 1980 constitution.<sup>68</sup> On the other hand, and different from previous processes, the Justice and Development Party took the case to the Assembly and asked for the consent to deploy troops in Iraq War. With an arithmetic irony, the majority was obtained but decision has not been ratified due to the abstentions.

### **III.5. Public Opinion and the Media**

Public opinion in Turkey welcomed the government's decision to send troops to the Korean War with great interest. The newspapers published many articles on relations with West. They were very sensitive to the membership of western organizations as well as foreign aids. They reflected the enthusiasm for the USA aid with the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. The dailies reflected the disappointment of the public when Turkey was refused NATO membership. When the Korean decision was declared they deemed it as a path to NATO membership

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<sup>68</sup> For a detailed analyze of legality of trop deployment see Gencer Özcan, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Rejim ve Dış Politika* (Political System In Turkey And Foreign Policy): 1983-1993, pp. 511-534) in Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi* (Analyze of Turkish Foreign Policy) ,DER, 2001

and a strong, permanent step in westernization for Turkey's security. They referred to the importance of collective defense and collective security and underlined that if Turkey wanted other states to help it then Turkey had to fulfill its responsibilities. The Turkish troops in the Korean War would let Turkey ask for help when Turkey needed in case.<sup>69</sup> Another reason was the demands of the Soviets that revived 'Russian phobia'<sup>70</sup>. There was a great enmity against Russia because of the long wars in the past between Turks and Russians. The last belligerent policies once again surfaced the enmity, which has been ceased since the establishment of the new republic. The Russians' anti-UN broadcasts were countered with patriotic articles and radio programs.<sup>71</sup> Yet the propaganda and censorship of the DP government might also have been effective on the public and on some members of media.<sup>72</sup> The government also used radio broadcasts for its propaganda and traveled through villages within the 'Korean Campaign'. The newspapers had been a field for the arguments of the parties during the decision.<sup>73</sup> However 'The Society of Peace Lovers' would be closed on 28 July 1950 due to their declaration, dating 14 July, which condemned the Korean decision. As a harsher measure taken in August, seventeen Humor Magazines were closed because of being 'communist.'<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> Turkish Daily, *Zafer*, 3 August 1950, in *Türk Parlamento Tarihi* (History of Turkish Parliament) (1950-1954), Volumes I to IX, TBMM, Vakfı Yayınları, Ankara, 2001, p. 780

<sup>70</sup> Hüseyin Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 50'li Yıllar*, p. 21

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 21-25

<sup>72</sup> Cem Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti, Tarihi ve İdeolojisi*, p. 58

<sup>73</sup> For the implications in dailies concerning Korean decision see *Türk Parlamento Tarihi* (History of Turkish Parliament) (1950-1954), , pp. 743- 808

<sup>74</sup> Baskın Oran (ed), *Türk Dış Politikası* (1919-1980), p. 546

## CHAPTER IV

### TURKEY'S ADMISSION TO NATO: THE ASSESSMENT OF THE DECISION

The last attack of the UN troops in Korea had been stopped with a counter attack of North Koreans that were reinforced by 'more than 400,000 Chinese troops.'<sup>75</sup> American leaders refused the continuing demands of General McArthur for an attack on Manchuria and Chinese troops. The USA preferred to keep the war local within Korea and prevent a new world war and so just blamed China and Russia.<sup>76</sup> The 4500 troops of Turkey arrived in Korea on 18 September under the command of Major General Tahsin Yazıcı. After some duties on the rear, the troops were on the way to the north beginning on 10 November. When they arrived at the front they were ordered to cover the right flank of the USA's 9<sup>th</sup> Army Corps, which would let Turkish troops move towards the Chinese troops that were on the way to south, to the rear of the 8<sup>th</sup> Army. The bloodiest battles of the Turkish Brigade would be in the following days. On 28 November at Wavon, on 29 November at Sinnam-ni, on 30 November at Kunu Ri, Turkish soldiers were fighting bravely even with bayonets against multiple Chinese troops and preserved a possible surrender of the 8<sup>th</sup> USA Army with the 'Kunu-Ri Victory'. During 1951 Turkish soldiers fought at Sunchon (1 December), at Kumyangjang-ni (25 January) and were back at the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel in June. 721 men were killed, 2147 were wounded, 346 got sick and 175 were declared missing in action. All 234 prisoners

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<sup>75</sup> Jim Caldwell, *Korea-52 Years Ago This Week*, Tradoc News Service.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

returned home.<sup>77</sup> During 1950-1960 ten brigades were deployed but only the first three brigades fought (1950-1953). Until the end of the mission, 25,000 Turkish soldiers were sent to Korea with 10 percent casualties. Turkey's reward of bravery and self-sacrifice was admission to NATO.'<sup>78</sup>

To evaluate Turkey's decision to send its troops to the Korean War, it is better to raise the question whether it was the main reason for Turkey's admission to NATO, or if it just accelerated the process that Turkey would be invited to the alliance anyway since the conjuncture had changed and the USA and Britain were ready to accept Turkey's membership more than before.

Most authors prefer to accept that the Turkish troops in Korean War led the way to Turkey's membership in NATO. Many of them see it as a step for NATO since they were successive events and it is easier to shortcut than explain a complex era that led Turkey join the alliance. However this study asserts the opposite view suggesting that even if Turkey had not joined the Korean War, it would be a member of the alliance soon. Thus the Korean War was 'no gain' game for Turkey either, like the parties of the war. It will be sarcastic to say that Turkey gained its Western alliance through the Korean War since the war just left back unnamed monuments of the casualties, the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel underlying the division of the world and nothing else.

Some scholars and journalists claim that Turkey would join NATO even if she had not participated in the Korean War. They stated that the international conjuncture benefited Turkish demands, and that sooner or later, Turkey's adherence to NATO was inevitable, and so there was no need to send troops to

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<sup>77</sup> Genel Kurmay Başkanlığı, *Kore Harbinde Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin Muharebeleri* (Battles of Turkish Armed Forces in Korean War) (1950-1953), Gn. Kur. Yayınevi, Ankara, 1975

<sup>78</sup> Ender Deniz, *Kore Savaşı Unutulmamalı* (The Korean War should not be Forgotten), Available at <http://www.gazilerdergisi.com/sonsayi.htm#toplanti>

Korea.<sup>79</sup> The USA backed Turkey's NATO membership in May 1951, as US Military Staff referred to the strategic importance of the Turkey. Also, at that time, the Strategic Air Command was thinking of a system that would encircle the USSR and so Turkish airfields could therefore be available for NATO allies.

Britain had been planning to build up a defense organization in the Middle East to preserve its bases. Turkey was the key state for Britain to accomplish the Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO). Turkey tended to accept its model role since Turkey deemed it an extension of NATO. When Israel was founded Turkey took a stance against Arabs. On the other hand Egypt rejected Britain's demands and hindered the establishment of the MEDO. Besides this disappointment Britain preferred to compensate itself with having the command of the Turkish troops if it joined NATO. London insisted upon relating Turkey's NATO membership to a Middle Eastern regional arrangement. The Menderes government was willing to play such a role if London assured support for Turkey's application. At last the British Government decided that the best way was to admit Greece and Turkey to the Alliance.

Another important actor was George McGhee whom Bağcı presented as the key person for Turkey's NATO membership.<sup>80</sup> Also Ambassador Feridun C. Erkin stated that the government started a new campaign, which would be more realistic since they took Congress into account and were more intensive.<sup>81</sup> The admission of Greece may be the evidence that Turkey did not have to make heroic fights to convince NATO members. Furthermore, the West was realistic enough to examine

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<sup>79</sup> Burcu Bostanoğlu, *Türkiye-ABD İlişkilerinin Politikası* (Policy of Turkish-USA Relations), İmge, Ankara, 1999, p.390. Nur Bilge Criss, *Turkey's Relations with the West*, Thesis, Ph.D., Department of IR, Bilkent University, Ankara, p. 11. Mensur Akgün, *Asker Gönderme* (Troop Deployment) Available at [http://www.hurriyetim.com.tr/abd\\_dehseti/05mensur.asp](http://www.hurriyetim.com.tr/abd_dehseti/05mensur.asp)

<sup>80</sup> Bağcı stated that USA Ambassador to Turkey was the key actor for the admittance of Turkey to NATO. For details see, Hüseyin Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 50'liYıllar* (Turkish Foreign Policy at 50's), Metu Press, Ankara, 2001, pp. 30-35. William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy (1774-2000)*, Frank Cass & Co Ltd., London, 2002, p. 119

<sup>81</sup> For Erkin's explanation see, *Türkiye ve NATO* (Turkey and NATO), Türk Atlantik Derneği Yayınları, Ankara, pp. 5-34

Turkey's importance not only with a battle. However, the hasty decision of the DP government to back the USA might have impressed the Americans as Turkey would be a reliable partner. "Adnan Menderes, the new Turkish Prime Minister, would, in turn, prove to be a reliable and loyal ally to Washington."<sup>82</sup> Above all, the NATO relationship served as a new base of Turkish-American relations including its political, economic, and military aspect. The 'visit of Missouri' enhanced with NATO membership of Turkey, which would become "an outpost for containment with its 22 Divisions."<sup>83</sup> The USA gained some bases in Turkey that it had asked for previously but Turkey refused it unless it became a NATO member.<sup>84</sup>

Füsün Türkmen stated that 'Korea has been a catalyst in accelerating Turkey's integration to the Western security system' and its role for 'Turkey's admission to the Western security scheme and in determining its political path throughout the Cold War seems irrefutable.'<sup>85</sup>

Relating the NATO membership with participation in Korean War was in the center of the discussions from the very beginning of the convention held at the Assembly. On the eve of the decision when the ministerial meeting was held, Ambassador Sarper- then Permanent Representative of Turkey to the UN - asserted that the assistance to South Korea should be directly related with entrance to NATO. Erkin refused that idea since that would be a serious error and depreciate the decision. He said: 'We should rather fulfill our duty in helping South Korea and,

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<sup>82</sup> Füsün Türkmen, *Turkey and the Korean War*,

Available at EbscoHost, [file:///A/turkey and the Korean war.htm](file:///A/turkey%20and%20the%20Korean%20war.htm)

<sup>83</sup> Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition (1950-1974)*, E. J. Brill, Leiden, Netherlands, 1975, p. 26

<sup>84</sup> Haluk Ülman, *Türk Dış Politikasına Yön Veren Etkenler* (Directing Agents of Turkish Foreign Policy) (1923-1968), in S.B.F. Dergisi (Journal), Vol. 23, No. 3, 1968, p. 262

<sup>85</sup> Füsün Türkmen, op. cit., p. 11. For similar statements that Turkey's participation to Korean War caused its attendance to NATO see Ender Deniz op. cited., and John M. Vander Lippe, *Forgotten Brigade of the Forgotten War: Turkey's Participation in the Korean War*, Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 36, No. 1, January 2000, p.98

on the other hand, continue our efforts to join NATO without setting up any linkage between the two.’<sup>86</sup>

When we rationalize the DP’s decision, it can be said that the government’s main motive to send troops to Korea may be to join the Western Alliance or to get the most portion of joining it. Through the conversations on the Great Assembly besides sincere explanations on the issue, the parties mostly search for their political gains. The NATO membership would be “a great victory for the government”<sup>87</sup> and will end “diplomatic and military isolation experience since 1878.”<sup>88</sup>

From a legal perspective, it is better to restate some debates that occurred within the Turkish Grand National Assembly. The debates were centered upon Article 26 of the Constitution and Articles of the UN Charter under Chapter 7, which designates the actions (use of force) against ‘threats to the peace,’ ‘breaches of the peace’ and ‘acts of aggressions.’<sup>89</sup>

Article 42 refers to the military enforcement measures, Article 43 requires the assistance of all UN members to the Security Council via agreements and through their constitutions, and Article 46 foresees a UN Army with the assistance of the Military Staff. Article 47 states the establishment of the Military Staff and its species.<sup>90</sup>

Faik Ahmet Barutçu, the spokesman of the RPP, underlined that the Article 43 of the UN Charter refers to the bilateral agreements for troop contribution and so the decision should have been adopted in the constitution, especially Article 26, and

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<sup>86</sup> For the efforts of Ambassador Erkin and the Turkey’s adventure of NATO applications see Yusuf Turan Çetiner, *The Making of Turkey’s Western Allies: 1944-1952*, Thesis Ph.D., Department of IR, Bilkent University, Ankara, 2001, pp. 226-229

<sup>87</sup> Mehmet Gönlübol, *NATO and Turkey An Overall Appraisal*, in *Milletler Arası Münasebetler Türk Yıllığı* (Turkish Annual of International Relations), XI, p. 2. Baskın Oran (ed), *Türk Dış Politikası* (1919-1980), Vol. I, 6th Edition, İletişim, İstanbul, 2002, p. 545

<sup>88</sup> Nur Bilge Criss, *Turkey’s Relations with the West*, Thesis, Ph.D., Department of IR, Bilkent University, Ankara, p. 11

<sup>89</sup> UN Charter, available at, <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/contents.htm>

<sup>90</sup> UN Charter, available at, <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/contents.htm>

be voted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly.<sup>91</sup> Fuad Köprülü, Turkey's Foreign Minister, refused his proposal and underlined that the agreements were supposed to be done with the military staff committee according to the Article 47, which could not be done because of the known reasons.<sup>92</sup> Prime Minister Adnan Menderes declared that the decision was made on the basis of Article 42 rather than Article 43 and so the decision did not need the approval of Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA), since it allows the actions against the aggressor without referring to bilateral agreements.<sup>93</sup> Another deputy, Cezmi Türk, pointed out that Article 51 of the UN Charter even permits regional arrangements and organizations to collaborate against the aggressor.<sup>94</sup> Osman Bölükbaşı, the only deputy of the NP in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, summarized Chapter 7 of the UN Charter and explained that Articles 39, 41, 42, 43 and 44, opposed the resolution of the government that Article 42 gave them the authority to deploy troops in a war.<sup>95</sup> Menderes went over the same articles from his point of view and uttered that deploying troops outside was within the authority of the government. If the government had taken the issue to the TGNA for approval then it would mean 'to escape from its responsibility.'<sup>96</sup> Against the question of independent deputy Kemal Türkoğlu, whether the decision was taken by unanimous votes of all ministers, and whether the contingent is standard (will be reinforced to keep the number same-about 5000), the Prime Minister confirmed the unanimity but refused to answer the latter due to the security of the country.<sup>97</sup> Discussions followed with examples from other states' actions and discussions on the legality. Through the session almost all

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<sup>91</sup> *Türk Parlamento Tarihi* (History of Turkish Parliament)(1950-1954), Volumes I to IX, TBMM, Vakfı Yayınları, Ankara, 2001, p. 548

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 550

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 556-558

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 568

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 606-612

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 614-618

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 626-628

seemed to support the decision in some way since the Turkish troops were fighting in far front at that time. The debates came to an end with voting and the decision was ratified by TGNA. “After the Korean case, foreign policy decisions began to be discussed in TGNA”<sup>98</sup>.

Turkey was a water-full glass bottle in the icebox (if the degree goes deeper the sensitivity of water would increase and would brake the glass). Hopefully Turkey was not broken. However the water (TFP options) was frozen and would take a long and hard time to take it out and flow it.

On the other side, the generals of the army, who were silenced with the changes on the command structure by DP, would make much more noise later.

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<sup>98</sup> Baskın Oran (ed) *Türk Dış Politikası* (1919-1980) Vol. I, 6th Edition, İletişim, İstanbul, 2002, p. 548

## CONCLUSION

The Korean War was the first case that Turkey deployed its troops outside its territories. During the Cold War Turkey did not participate in peace operations nor deployed its troops outside.<sup>99</sup> After the end of the Cold War Turkey's participation in peace operations increased and Turkey deployed its troops in Somalia, Yugoslavia and Afghanistan. All three cases were international operations made with the consent of the UN.

Decision-making, in short, is to choose the best among the alternatives. This is not the same all the time in international relations. The uncertainty and unclear conditions of international relations may lead to debates over the best choice. While handling decisions, there is not only one 'right choice' since it depends on the assumptions and is evaluated according to the outcomes. In the Turkish foreign policy decision process, the instant and short timed outcomes are valued more highly by the decision makers. As in Korea, the most important outcome looked for by the decision makers have been NATO membership whereas in the case of Afghanistan it was to recover from the economic crisis with American aid.

Briefly, it can be said that the success of the decision would be possible if the assumptions of the decision makers are precise and parallel to reality, which would inevitably lead to the right solutions, and would also assist researchers and decision makers in being able to predict future reactions of TFP in troop deployment decisions and to develop causality forecasts.

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<sup>99</sup> Neither the Cyprus case, which was made on the basis of a guarantee treaty nor the troops other than land forces including observation tasks are within the limits of this thesis.

In the Korean case, Turkey's decision seemed to be illegal on the basis of the 1924 constitution. But the discussions were on 'how' rather than 'why'. It was the first time that foreign policy was discussed publicly. When Turkey sent its troops to Korea it tried to be supporting of the USA so as to get American aid and be a NATO member. As a short sighted evaluation, the NATO membership made the Turkey's decision of deploying its troops in the Korean War valuable, but the question 'Why did Turkish soldiers die in Korea?' is still lacking an adequate answer.

In the Somalia decision, Turkey's motive seemed to be its membership to western institutions (NATO, UN). Besides the enthusiasm of Cevik Bir's chief role in UNSOM II, the Somalia decision had little attention in Turkish foreign policy due to being out of Turkey's interests. The lacking Turkish source on Somalia and on UNSOM may be indicators of the above interpretation.

On the contrary Yugoslavia took much more attention not only on the Turkish foreign policy agenda but also in public opinion. The religious and ethnic enthusiasm of the public might be the factor. Yalım Eralp, a Turkish Ambassador, put forward that Turkey was pressed to send troops to Somalia. However, in the Yugoslavia case Turkey tried in vain to convince the other states that the situation was in need of international response.<sup>100</sup>

Contributing to ISAF and leading it can be a model for troop deployment decisions of Turkey, which also underlines the burdens of such operations. Turkey was eager to lead ISAF but the possible outcomes revealed its political, military and economic disabilities: A future Iraq operation, turmoil in politics, inability of the army to deploy its troops to long distances and slender economy that would not put

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<sup>100</sup> Yalım Eralp (Ambassador), NTV, 12 July 2004

up with additional load. Yet, the American aid, the prize of hegemonic power to its assistants, helped Turkey to recover the above problems.

In all cases similar fundamentals became explicit in Turkish foreign policy, which lead the decision makers: 'Westernization', 'security', 'non-involvement in neighboring countries', and Atatürk's peaceful aphorism 'peace at home and peace abroad'. Also through decision-making process we can see the problems that limited the Turkish foreign policy dynamism and made the process more complex. The main problem seems to be economic (Korea, ISAF). Security depends on the economy since Turkey would be able to handle the threats if it had a better economy. And the army is powerful enough to secure the country in all cases even in the worst scenarios, as it was during World War I (1914-1918) and the War of Independence (1919-1922). The vulnerability might have been the second handicap of Turkey participating in peace operations, however only in Korea Turkey had casualties.

The decision-making process depends on the actors. The role of the military, absence of a long lasting government, and absence of a powerful leader (especially presidency), which made Turkey unable for to take 'ad hoc' and immediate decisions are the other shortcomings of Turkish Foreign Policy.

In the post-Cold War era, Turkish foreign policy has two major objectives as its vision for the future.<sup>101</sup> The first goal is to make Turkey an integral part of the European integration process. The second, goal is to transform Turkey into an essential and rich country at the center of the huge geography called Eurasia. The Turkish army, as the second largest in NATO and the best-trained and equipped one

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<sup>101</sup> According to some scholars both are the prolongation of 'Kemalist' identity: to make Turkish Republic a part of the West. Şaban H. Çalış, İhsan D. Dağı, and Ramazan Gözen eds, *Türkiye'nin Dış Politika Gündemi (Foreign Policy Agenda of Turkey)*, Liberte, Ankara, 2001

in its region, is an important instrument for Turkey to achieve these goals.<sup>102</sup> It can be said that the main object of the TFP has been to restore security in order to keep its independence. Therefore Turkey worked hard to strengthen UN as much as she did for its defense.<sup>103</sup>

As Füsün Turkmen stated ‘the western dream has the face of the European Union. And most certainly, the way to the EU will not pass by another war. Peace being always more difficult to achieve than war, Turkey has yet to strive for its chosen destiny.’<sup>104</sup> On the contrary, in the Iraqi War Turkey became close to being involved in a war not mostly because of its security perceptions on Southern Iraq but because of its ‘*dream*’. After all thanks to the soldiers who participated in the above cases and succeeded in their jobs, the actors of TFP were relieved.

Besides the importance of external factors in the case of Turkey the internal factors seem to be much more effective in the foreign policy. This is not because of the constitutional foundations of foreign policy but due to ‘de facto’ limitations on it. These limitations are mainly based on the security perceptions, which may be taken as a ‘natural reflex’ of such ‘modernizing states’. Turkey’s political complexity and ambiguous identity make it more difficult to examine Turkish Foreign Policy decisions. The troop deployment decisions of Turkey are generally reflexive and can be called as ‘*Alice Syndrome*’<sup>105</sup>. The decision to go to war in Korea is an example to support the above idea. While it was a crisis for the USA, it was only a receipt for Turkey given by the USA and frightened by Russia instead of

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<sup>102</sup> Kemal Karpat stated that Turkish army is the most powerful instrument of Turkey together with Turkey-USA partnership. Milliyet (Turkish Daily), 12 July 2004

<sup>103</sup> Çiğdem Tunç, *Değişen Dünya Düzeni, Değişen Barış Gücü Misyolları ve Türkiye'nin Katkısı* (Changing World Order, Peacekeeping Missions and Turkey's Contributions) in *Avrasya Dosyası* (BM Özel), İlkbahar 2002, Cilt: 8, Sayı: 1, (UN Special Issue, Spring 2002, Vol.8, No.1), p. 265

<sup>104</sup> Füsün Turkmen, *Turkey and the Korean War*

Available at [file:///A/turkey and the korean war.htm](file:///A/turkey%20and%20the%20korean%20war.htm)

<sup>105</sup> Alice Syndrome: Turkish Foreign Policy resembles the behavior of novel character Alice in Wonderland, who follows instructions without any questions asked. Turkey follows IMF prescriptions in the same way to recover from its economic crisis. That is similar in Turkey's troop deployment cases. For behavior of Alice see Lewis Carroll, *Alice in Wonderland*, Longman, Essex, 1976, pp. 15-18

Alice curiosity. The Korean decision was not a crisis management for Turkey; rather it was a choice that Turkey was trying to make after World War II to cooperate with USA. However calling Turkish troop deployment decisions an '*Alice Syndrome*' would be an underestimation of the role of the actors of Turkish Foreign Policy, especially the ministry of foreign affairs and the military the two most institutionalized organs of the Turkish republic. Further research can look into the cases of Somali, Yugoslavia and Afghanistan and inquire decision-making process of Turkey contributing to UNSOM, UNPROFOR (IFOR-SFOR) and ISAF.

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