

**THE ANALYSIS OF TURKEY'S SECURITY CULTURE IN LINE WITH  
THE  
EUROPEANIZATION PROCESS**

**A Master's Thesis**

**by**

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**The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences  
of  
Bilkent University**

**by**

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**in**

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**September**

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# ABSTRACT

## THE ANALYSIS OF TURKEY'S SECURITY CULTURE IN LINE WITH THE EUROPEANIZATION PROCESS

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The aim of this master's thesis is to analyze the security culture of Turkey when she is in the accession process with the European Union. This research does not only deal with the historical evolution of the security cultures of the European Union and Turkey, but it also tries to shed light on the changes on Turkey's security culture on the road to EU membership.

**Keywords:** Security culture, Europeanization, membership, changes

## ÖZET

### TÜRKİYE’NİN BATILILAŞMA SÜRECİNDEKİ GÜVENLİK KÜLTÜRÜNÜN ANALİZİ

Karayığit, Yasin

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**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Güvenlik kültürü, Batılılaşma, üyelik, değişim

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## INTRODUCTION

The issue of national security has attracted many scholars, philosophers, policy makers, and academicians throughout the history of the political communities. Security, defined as the lack of threat and physical danger, has been the main purpose of the mankind. Although the security culture and the notion of security are changeable with the changes in the world, the importance of security will always remain. In international relations, security is very important because the states make all their national and international policy decisions with the aim of preserving the security of the state and its subjects/citizens. This thesis attempts to analyze Turkey's changing security culture and threat perceptions at a time when she is in the process of EU membership. The literature is very rich in terms of this subject and this thesis has been written with the aim of contributing to those studies on the issue of security.

This thesis will explain in which ways and to what extent the accession process with the EU has transformed Turkey's security culture/identity/interests. It will be explained that the main purpose of Turkey in her attempts to join the EU, is that she wants to increase her own security via integrating herself to the global international system. Turkish officials believe that through integrating into the EU, Turkey would get more secure. However, the ambiguous attitude of the EU makes Turkey consider that the Europeans want to exclude Turkey out of the union. Turkey

is busy with what policies she should follow if the EU insists on excluding Turkey from integration. Although Turkey has carried out a good deal of reforms according to the criteria of the EU, she still seems to be very away from integration. As this is the case, Turkey becomes vulnerable to the separatist movements and demands. This thesis will conclude that for these reforms to be successful and in order to make Turkey a secure state in the globalization era, Turkey has to be included in the EU.

The first chapter will deal with the theoretical dimension of security. Security is one of the key aspects that no state can ignore in order to sustain the health of the authority. This importance of security leads the governments into developing some strategies for both reaching a secure situation and then, preserving it. Furthermore, states have a responsibility to be the guardians of not only sovereignty but also the people's identity. Since 1980s, identity has gained much more importance. Thus, the states did not only work hard to protect sovereignty, they had to protect their citizens' identity from being assimilated. However, this process is not simple, because the path to security is not straight, it acts like a labyrinth; dealing with that labyrinth and not getting lost in that depends on making the right decisions at right times. This necessity is closely related with the characteristics of each nation; each society evaluates the real life and the threats differently and reacts in different ways; therefore, in order to reach the security at best conditions, the nations should generate their own strategies.

The approaches different nations employ about security can be named as English school approach, neo-realist approach, liberal approach, constructivist approach and revisionist approach; these approaches differ in their perception of the real life and international relations and are used for different solutions to the security

problem. Neo-realist scholars believe that international community is a chaotic entity and, therefore, each state has to work hard to be able to protect itself. Like in Hobbes' state of nature, the physically more powerful state, while there is no binding law, would swallow the others. Since being powerful is the most desirable position, each state should be able to survive through building a powerful army and investing in armament. Otherwise, with no binding rules and superior ruler in the international community, the weakest state would go extinct with all its name, people and identity. Realist approach can be found too pessimistic to be applied to real life. The international community has some certain standards, rules and norms that are able to provide a relative degree of justice and order. Although decision-making process is highly slow and achieving an agreement among the states can sometimes be difficult, the international system still possesses regular, operational system. Thus, members of the international system should not be obsessed with security issues in a paranoid manner. Heavy investments on the military areas would only decrease the welfare of the state.

The second approach that we employ is liberal approach. The scholars of this tradition believe that international community is not totally chaotic environment with a minimum amount of cooperation and mutual trust; rather there is cooperation in the international community that lets individual states not get obsessed with their physical safety but also provide for their welfare in all aspects. Moreover, domestic politics, needs and actors are not secondary to international politics but they are equally important for security of all individual state. No state is an island; the states coexist and need each other. Therefore, cooperation is and should be inevitable for the states to resolve their domestic and international problems.

The third approach is revisionist one that interests in domestic problems and dilemmas of the third world countries. Such states must build a powerful military force because they are facing a double security dilemma. The regime and the government are not under guarantee to survive in these kinds of states because there is always a threat from within state. In the process of democratization, these states have a rest on military to mute the interior discontent and opposition.

The fourth groups of scholars, constructivists, take individuals and identity as the heart of their argument and believe that it is the individuals and national identity that the states should work to provide security of. Constructivists are successful in their perception of threat because with the process of globalization, states started to put identity protection at the top of their security agenda.

Lastly there is the fifth approach that is divided into two, solidarists and pluralist. According to both solidarist and pluralists, there are certain rules and moral principles that link the members of the international community. However, they differentiate in their priorities. While solidarists believe that it is the individuals who are premier in security policies, pluralists believe that states should be able to protect sovereignty and repulse any foreign intervention in the first place.

As a conclusion, there are many countries that can exemplify the relation between culture and security policy. There is still one common thing among the policies that different nations use for security, they aim to preserve their national identity and resist to be assimilated. Also, the states can only exist if they can construct a security policy that is successful enough in protecting sovereignty of the nation that they represent. In this chapter, the importance of cultural traits, the

different perceptions of threat and the different forms of security policies will be discussed.

The second chapter will explain the threats and security strategies of the European Union and will examine which stages that EU has passed in order to achieve its contemporary situation. The European Union is a very important project that has helped its members avoid the danger of war. After WW2, there was an emergence of the understanding of collective security among the powerful European states. After the experience of two major wars, the Europeans understood that they had to be very cautious in order not to face such a situation again. Furthermore, there was the threat of Communism. Therefore, these two major problems encouraged them to act collectively. The aim of constructing a pan-European collective identity within the EU zone underlined the significance of security issues. The legacy of two world wars and the communist threat from the East forced the European countries to speed up their integration process and adopt a cooperative approach on security. The 1948 Brussels Agreement and then the appearance of NATO were the early steps to reach security in Europe.

Despite this, until the end of the Cold War, Europeans could not seriously come and agree that they needed a collective security and foreign policy establishment in order to be a union, thus safe and powerful in the contemporary world order. Euro-skeptics supported the idea that NATO should never be undermined. They believed that NATO should be the authority to supply peace and order for the international society, with no need for a distinct European collective army. There were some reasons behind this idea of Euro-skeptics and they will be counted in the following sections. This chapter will not only highlight the main tenets of the EU's security culture but also try to explain what kind of changes

might take place in the security understanding of the countries that aspire to join the EU.

In the third chapter Turkey's security concept will be analyzed in a detailed way so that it would be easier to depict what kind of changes have taken place during Turkey's accession process with the EU. So, chapter starts by giving detailed information about the main characteristics of Turkey's security culture.

Turkey is perceived as an important regional power thanks to her unique geopolitical location. She shares borders with key countries in the world, so she has to follow a very careful foreign policy during her interaction with her neighbors. At this point militaristic power comes to scene in terms of pursuing successful foreign policy and ensuring Turkish Republic's security. In fact the military has always been the most important security actor since the foundation of the Republic. It has always supported westernization process as a key security strategy.

The security-oriented did in fact start during the Ottoman Empire and it was later inherited by the new Turkish Republic. Turkey's making alliances with western powers during the Second World War and being a member of NATO in 1952 during the Cold War era were good examples in this regard. And even today Turkey's EU membership efforts can be interpreted in the same vein. The membership process enforces Turkey to take more concrete steps on her westernization strategy. This in return leads a quite number of Turkish people to critically examine the EU membership criteria from a security perspective. Some European demands are increasingly seen as threatening the main tenets of Turkey's security identity. For example Turkey doesn't seem to renounce her unitary state system, as the EU requires. This is one point that makes Turkey confront with the

EU since the EU wants to bring federal system to this country. Plus the EU has concerns about the enlargement; especially on the issue of Turkey's prospective membership because the EU members believe that the moment Turkey becomes member she will bring terror, poverty, minority, etc. problems along her side. This chapter also explains the impacts of the EU accession process on Turkey's security understanding in the following way in the next paragraph.

The conclusion part will simply summarize the main findings of the research and make some prediction as for the future. This is a timely research, for Turkey has already reached an irreversible stage in its relations with the EU. The challenge is that during the accession process not only Turkey would need to face EU-oriented challenges in terms of its security understanding but also the EU would have to figure out how Turkey's prospective membership might impact EU's future identity.

## CHAPTER I

# THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY

This chapter is important in the sense that it will explain which theoretical approach is in compliance with the security developments in the accession process of Turkey with the EU. Through which approaches to security can one analyze the security identities of the EU and Turkey? Can any theoretical approach to security help one better understand the ways the accession process with the EU affects Turkey's security understanding? These are important questions and this chapter will basically examine alternative theoretical approaches to security.

### 2.1 Definition of Security

Security is a dynamic concept, which can be shaped according to the date, and/or environment that is concerned with.<sup>1</sup> Security policies are changeable when the society and/or political culture change. We can basically define the word 'security' as the lack of threat and danger, however such broad definition would definitely be void because even the understanding of the concepts of threat, risk, danger, harm, and so on are changeable. A perception of threat according to one

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<sup>1</sup> K. Krause and M. Williams 1996, 'Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods', *Mershon International Studies Review* 40: 229-54; K. Booth and P. Vale 1997, 'Critical Security Studies and Regional Insecurity: The Case of Southern Africa' *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*; K. Krause 1998, 'Theorizing Security: State Formation and the "Third World" in the Post-Cold War World' *Review of International Studies* (21)1: 125-36; S. Dalby 2002, *Environmental Security: The Geopolitics of Colonising Nature*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

state may not be the same to the others. Also, as time goes by, a threat perception may perish and be replaced by another one. The point is that the societies, political agendas, both domestically and internationally, are due to change, so is the lack of threat, security.<sup>2</sup> Politics and the issues it covers are all doomed to change everyday and since security is a political issue, we cannot expect static and certain security understanding and notion to remain forever.

When having a look at some of the political theorists' ideas about the existence and proper construction of a state, of Thomas Hobbes and Machiavelli for instance, it is observed that their main argument about why people need a state is that they need a state in order to have security. States become sovereign and thus legitimate when it accomplishes to eliminate any threat from inside or outside.<sup>3</sup> The political leaders have to provide the security of their citizens.

If the electorate have agreed on a particular group of leaders to make policies for the future of a country, this would mean that the security choice of the people have been equal with that of the winners of the elections; the security agenda of the government is trusted by the people. The political leaders define the threat, make solutions to eliminate it, but they do these without making a concession from their sovereignty and identity. As Simon Dalby and David Campbell endeavor to put forth that during the Cold War, the security policy of the United States was directly influenced by the identity politics, meaning the United States officials have distinguished effectively between the Western and the Eastern Bloc and denigrated

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<sup>2</sup> M. McDonald 2002, 'Human Security and the Construction of Security.' *Global Society* (16)3: 277-95.

<sup>3</sup> M. Clarke 1993, 'Politics as Government and Politics as Security' *New Perspectives on Security*. London: Brassey's; R. Lipschutz 1995, 'On Security' *On Security*. New York: Columbia University Press; M. Dillon 1996, *Politics of Security*, London: Routledge.

it. Bill Mc Sweeney identically emphasizes how identity is crucial for the collective security policies in a society.<sup>4</sup>

The concept of security has resembled the considerable changes in the system of international community and the scholars have started to suggest various new theories with the political actors introducing a new style of policies since the end of Cold War. The conventional discourse of security has differentiated and the insufficiencies of the old security system is now being attempted to be fulfilled by the international bodies and individual states rapidly.<sup>5</sup> However, none of these attempts has reached a concrete result yet; all the discussions about the definition, understanding about security point to a state of commotion. The only fact that is accepted by all the scholars and academicians is that the conventional definition and understanding of security has changed.

## **2.2 Theoretical Approaches to Security**

### ***2.2.1. The (Neo) realist Approach to Security***

First of all, conventionally, security has been defined as being free from danger physically.<sup>6</sup> Such definition was plausible since the states were seen as the protectors of their citizens from the dangers emanating from the external environment. The method and threat understanding of the states have led to the conventional security discourse, realist approach to security, which puts an emphasis on a strong military as well as the need to make arrangements with the other states

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<sup>4</sup> B. Buzan et al 1998, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, London: Lynne Rienner.

<sup>5</sup> <http://spirit.tau.ac.il/zeevmaoz/qhaicp/html>

<sup>6</sup> Patrick Morgan, 'Regional Security Complexes' in David A Lake and Patrick Morgan (eds) *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World*, Pen State UP, 1997, pp. 50-3.

and going into war if necessary.<sup>7</sup> Therefore, for decades, states have preferred to follow this realist approach in order to keep their environment secure.<sup>8</sup>

When the realist approach and how it has been applied is analyzed largely, it is firstly seen that realists take the nation-state as the focus of their security studies. For realists, state is the major actor in the international community, which works for the benefit of her citizens. Since the state is the most important body, security is nothing more than the state's safety from the outside dangers. This is normal, for the international community is a chaotic body with no supreme and regular authority to provide order.<sup>9</sup>

As the international community is said to be a chaotic grouping, security becomes the most important value that states see armament in their national interests, thus be secure. Naturally, this situation leads to the so-called security dilemma.<sup>10</sup> Other states feel threatened by the deterrence-based security policies of their fellow states.

The anarchic international community also pushes states to adopt a particular style of security policies, which are extremely irrelevant to rationale of domestic policies.<sup>11</sup> While domestic policies are applied in a regulated way through laws and stable bodies, the international policies are not; the international system is not reliable since it lacks a sound, secure law system and a leading organization. These

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<sup>7</sup> Zeev Maoz, 'Regional Security in the Middle East: Past, Present and Future' *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 20/1, March 1997, pp. 1-46.

<sup>8</sup> Henry A. Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1994.

<sup>9</sup> Stephen Walt, 'The Renaissance of Security Studies', *International Studies Quarterly* 35/2 June 1997, pp. 211-40.

<sup>10</sup> Robert Jervis, 'Cooperation under Security Dilemma', *World Politics* 30/2 January 1978, pp. 167-214.

<sup>11</sup> John A. Vasquez, *The Power of Politics*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed., Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998.

circumstances, according to realists, cause states to impose policies which will provide them security and peace based on “self-help” principle<sup>12</sup>

Another important point is that states show a regular and organized image in fields other than security, for example in their financial, managerial relations. This is important because we see that the chaotic nature of the international community turns out to be a systematic community when it comes to economics, management and so forth.<sup>13</sup>

The agreements and arrangements between states in the field of security appear to be necessary since otherwise the anarchic nature would swallow them. These agreements and arrangements either rest on informal or formal rules and via both kind of rules.<sup>14</sup>

Realists believe that states’ need to feel secure and safe with making no concession on sovereignty, national identity and integrity -in the chaotic international community-. Therefore, in order to preserve its life, sovereignty, national identity and integrity, states should and does invest on armament and military in a legitimate way. A large and powerful military is assumed to contribute to the state’s political and economical goals whenever necessary.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1986.

<sup>13</sup> Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables’. *International Organization* 36/2 Spring 1982, pp. 185/205.

<sup>14</sup> Robert Jervis, ‘Security Regimes’, *International Organization*, 36/2 Spring 1982, pp. 357-78.

<sup>15</sup> John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York: W. W. Norton, 2001; Stephen Walt, ‘The Progressive Power of Realism’, *American Political Science Review* 91/4 December 1997, pp. 931-35; Jack S. Levy, ‘War and Peace’, in Walter Carlsnaes et al, (eds.) *Handbook of International Relations*, Thousand Oaks, California: Sage, 2002, pp. 350-69.

Realists support the idea that states consider national security as the most basic purpose in their agenda and they consider the external threats as the main impediment to their safety. What the fellow states aim at, talk about and do are of great concern, thus each state works hard to be ready and powerful with a well-equipped military force and a good deal of diplomatic power whenever she feels under threat or attack.

In the making of security policy, states begin with deciding what the threat is, where it is coming from and what consequences it would cause. Then officials decide what the most successful policy, with the least possible cost, to eliminate it could be. They decide on the instruments to be adopted to eliminate already designated threats. Afterwards, security agents implement the security policies adopted. Finally, both practitioners and observers evaluate the consequences of this whole process.

The main instrument to achieve security is to have a formidable and deterrent army. The degree of success in this would hinge on the economic potential of states. Another instrument is to form security alliances with other states against common external threats.

Realists adopt an instrumental approach towards international/regional institutions. They are highly skeptical about the merits of regional cooperation. They find security cooperation difficult for concerns over relative gains. Suspicions on the true intentions of others would prevent it. A regional cooperation would be likely

when there were a commonly shared threat in the region.<sup>16</sup> NATO can be given as an example to this. All in all, realists think that the anarchic international environment leads states to adopt similar security understanding and policies. States are assumed to be like billiard balls. Threats to security are external. Threats are observable and measurable. Security policies are instrumental in the sense that the goal is to enforce others to make cost/benefit analysis. Security would come if others were deterred from challenging the status quo.

### ***2.2.2. The Liberal Approach to Security***

The roots of this approach can be claimed to rest on the studies of Keohane and Nye or Mansbach and Vasquez; they all perceived world politics as an arena which requires states to be interdependent on each other.<sup>17</sup> Liberal approach is distinguished from the realist approach on three important points as shown below:

First of all, liberals do not agree with the realists that states' first and most valuable goal is their survival; there are many times when states do not put the purpose of survival on the first place since the issues of the international community are more about economic, political, social and environmental problems that the states face. Realists exaggerated physical safety and misses economic, environmental, social kinds of safety.

Secondly, domestic actors and politics are crucial for a proper national security policy: Domestic actors and their policies unconditionally influence the

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<sup>16</sup> John Mearsheimer, "The False Premise of International Institutions", *International Security*, 19/3 Winter 1994-5, pp. 5-59.  
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1977; Richard Mansbach and John A. Vasquez, *In search of Theory* NY: Columbia UP, 1981.

national security policies. After all, the reason why each state differs in its national security policy is because each one of them has a unique domestic policy process. In this sense, regimes matter. States are not unitary actors and do not act like billiard balls.

Lastly, the construction of the international community that consists of like-minded regimes would increase security. If those regimes were democracies, then the prospects of regional/international security and cooperation would dramatically increase.

After displaying this general picture, the liberal approach to security can be handled in a little more detailed way. The protagonists of liberal approach claim that the international environment can be chaotic and anarchic as well as cooperative and peaceful. The states should not only invest on military armament but also provide their citizens with infrastructure, the citizens' social and economic well-being.

Realists' view that states have to work hard for security since any threat might be deadly for their presence is partially accepted by liberals. In liberal perspective, economic, cultural, social and environmental well-being are heavily influenced by physical security.<sup>18</sup>

Liberals consider the security policy as a "bargaining process" that takes place at two different levels, internal and external. Domestically, the goal is to help achieve a consensus among various interest groups on the details of a security

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<sup>18</sup> Zeev Maoz, 'Threat, Opportunity, and National Security Policy Outcomes', Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, Sept 1998, pp. 1-4.

policy. Externally, the goal is to make other states accept this domestically pre-conceived security policy.

Liberal scholars of security support the idea that states should utilize non-militaristic tools while imposing their national security policy. The non-militaristic tools for security can be counted as economic assistance, economic relations, cultural ties, political cooperation, sanctions, embargos, and so forth.

Since liberals believe that military means should be secondary to economic, cultural, social, institutional tools, they argue that possibility for regional and international security cooperation increase with non-military security instruments adopted. The neo-liberal version of the liberal school assumes that regional and international organizations would facilitate security cooperation since institutionalized relations would increase trust, confidence and good faith among states. Uncertainty over international relations would decrease as states experienced institutionalized relations. Neo-liberals also believe that international security cooperation is likely because states value their absolute gains rather than relative.

### ***2.2.3. The Revisionist (Critical) Approach to National Security***

Before explaining the critical (revisionist) approach to national security, it should be pointed that the approaches given above have taken the developed states as the center of their argument with no regard to the underdeveloped, failed states of the world. They have analyzed the threat perceptions and understandings of the First World. The developed states are ruled by consolidated democracies where the people do not question the legitimacy of the states and where there is stability all the time. The failed, underdeveloped states, however, deal with this question of

legitimacy all the time because their coming to power and their governance are always questioned since they are illiberal democracies or still in the democratization process.

The subjects of the realist and liberal approaches have been the developed states, thus both approach missed the threat perception and security understandings of the failed states. However, failed states, the underdeveloped part of the world also have a security culture and threat perceptions, even though they can be different from those of the industrialized countries. Failed states, before dealing with the external enemy, have to eliminate the domestic opposition and threats. It is the politicians who determine the security policy along with the military. If the government, however, remains illegitimate for some people or group of people, then such government's security policy against the perceived external threats would automatically be void.

The revisionist approach is mainly the approach of the underdeveloped states that are in democratization process, dealing with a high degree of instability.<sup>19</sup> Since these states have to struggle with the domestic instabilities heavily as well as the outside dangers, it is a must for them to possess a powerful military which would be the main guarantee of the state's survival. As military being the major institution for the state, democracy may be harmed with the civilians being powerless in the policy making process. Therefore, revisionists believe that the most basic purpose of the states is to be the indisputable authority inside or outside relying on their militaristic

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<sup>19</sup> Barry Buzan, *People, State and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983; Robert M. Rosh, 'Third World Militarization: Security Webs and the States they Ensnare'. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 32/4 Dec 1988, pp. 671-98; Mohammed Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict and the International System*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995; Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap De Wilde (eds.), *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder, CA, Lynne Rienner, 1997.

force. That is to say, revisionists, at first place, give importance to the domestic strength of a state, because everything starts from within the nation.

The revisionist approach is distinguished from both liberal and realist approaches in the sense that it deeply investigates the relationship and interaction between the state and the military.

The three basic assumptions of the revisionists can be counted as given below:

a) The main concern of the regimes is how to hold on to power when there is a threat to their authority: All the policies of security and attempts to increase the welfare of the nation are carried out for one basic purpose, which is to survive as the rulers of the nation. For many states, the actual threat lies inside the borders of the state. Therefore, states should impose such national security policies which have the domestic threats as their main target.

b) The states utilize the very same tools for making and implementing a national security policy against both domestic and international dangers: The states are obsessed with how to survive and put an end to internal opposition and dangers, and this obsession is no way secondary to states' desire to survive on the international level without making concessions from their sovereignty and integrity. On both domestic and international levels, against the enemies, the state trusts only in its military forces.

c) There is an undoubted inequality between the democratic first world and the democratizing/authoritarian third world states in terms of their national security tools, policies and acquisitions: The regime decides how much the military will be

powerful in a state; if there is a consolidated democracy, as in the case of developed countries, then the role of the military would never be superior to that of the civilians. However, if the regime is on the process of democratization or authoritarian for worse, then the military would be the major player in the state's policy making and implementation process. Therefore, the underdeveloped countries of the Third World, with a low democratic development, have to rely on military to enforce national security policies.

After displaying this general picture, the revisionist approach can be handled deeply. The states need national security for the regime's continuity, sovereignty and integrity against the domestic and exterior dangers.

Revisionists see the center need for security in the states' obligation to give importance to national security because there is always a danger from the inside forces and also outside forces which threat the continuity of the regime and thus sovereignty and integrity of the state. Since the state faces huge enmity from the inside, after all, the regime is not a consolidated democracy, there is no alternative choice for the state is left; the state has to eliminate the internal threats firstly and immediately.

The security agenda is made with the combination of the views of the political actors, intelligence services and the militaristic staffs of the state that come together, look at the conditions, examine both the domestic and external threats and reach a resolution. It should again be pointed that if the international and domestic security policies are in a contradiction, domestic conflict's resolution undoubtedly takes precedence.

Revisionists believe that the military forces and diplomatic forces as the preferential tools for national security; these tools are of great benefit to make the state capable of eliminating its enemies firstly from the inside and then from the outside. Military, for them, is an important symbol of the state's strength. The state could give the message of its external and internal enemies that it is ready to protect itself whenever it becomes necessary. Also, diplomatic agreements and arrangements would help a state increase its legitimacy and power in the eyes of internal and external audience.

Ironically, the revisionist approach entails a two-fold security dilemma for the states. While the states have to face the conventional version of security dilemma that the security measures of a particular state lessens its security because the other states will feel as threatened by that particular state and will take measures in response to it. As if the conventional security dilemma were not enough, the state has to face another security dilemma which arises from its measures taken against the internal enemies; this doubles its security fears because now, acting so, it increases both its internal and external threats. Briefly, the state, as long as remains inharmonious inside and outside, has to be prepared to face more conflict and instability generating from within the state or outside of the state.

It can be concluded that Turkey, in her accession process with the EU, has been transforming from a revisionist understanding of security to a neorealist and a neo-liberal understanding. Although Turkey has more problems about regime, her main concern is not regime survival.

#### ***2.2.4. Understanding of Security According to English School***

Before trying to narrate the English School approach to the concept of security what to do first is to decide whether there is an English School discourse of security. For this purpose it is necessary to make it apparent that the approach of the English school rests on theory and it perceives world politics a concept that is arranged according to agreed rules and norms of different states of the world. The founders of English School, Hedley Bull and Martin Wight suggested that the international society includes a bunch of fields such as security, law, history and economics, and each field needed to be analyzed by a unique methodology, therefore English School had to use a pluralist methodology, which made it hard to talk about a single English School.<sup>20</sup> Also, English School protagonists did not make a clear distinction between themselves and realists or cosmopolitanists.<sup>21</sup> Therefore, although it is not possible to indicate to a particular definition of security given by the English School, some general ideas about English School's the concept of security can be narrated.

First of all, English School is unique in its understanding of security because it binds together the practical and ideal politics. The scholars of English School support the idea that practically, security serves for the national benefits in a given state. As Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight point out, a nation's balance of power and its military force, both are changeable according to time and place, are

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<sup>20</sup> T. Dunne and N. Wheeler 1996, 'Hedley Bull's Pluralism of the Intellect and Solidarism of the Will' *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* (21)3: 91-108

<sup>21</sup> R. Little 2000, 'The English School's Contribution to the Study of International Relations.' *European Journal of International Relations* (6)3, 397.

crucial for its security. On the other hand, ideally, the security has to satisfy moral conditions; after all is not war all about values and norms?<sup>22</sup>

From all these points, three basic ideas of English School scholars can be put forward, first of which is that security is “a normative value rather than an instrumental object”. Their second idea is that security is a concept that is shaped by the society and thus it is flexible. Thirdly and finally they believe that all actions about security occur inside a political community which may or may not be a particular state. Whether thought in a pluralist or solidarist manner, the international arena is a scene to stage actions, conducts of security such as “human security” which is very important in the international arena and “security communities” with common rules, values and benefits.<sup>23</sup>

The English School scholars can be classified as either pluralist or solidarist, as Herbert Bull claims. The common point of them is their perception of states system as a “society of states” which has particular rules, values and establishments. Bull goes on to say that there is a dispute between the members of this society of states about the normative thinking on the debate whether there should be wars, what the roots of international law lie and to what degree the individuals are important in international policy decisions. When the pluralist approach is taken into account, it will be seen that the state’s right to exist along with the fellow states has already been recognized by the international society thanks to the acknowledged principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, which are key to security.

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<sup>22</sup> Reus- C. Simit 2001a, ‘The Strange Death of Liberal International Theory’ *European Journal of International Law* (12)3: 573-94.

<sup>23</sup> E. Adler and M. Barnett 1998, *Security Communities*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; C. Thomas and P. Wilkin 1999, *Globalization, Human Security and the African Experience*. Boulder, co: Lynne Rienner; A. Bellamy 2004b *International Society and Its Critics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Solidarists, on the other hand, believe that the state is not important here because the community whose security we are concerned with is not limited to a particular state. They argue that there are agreed norms and moral principles in the international society<sup>24</sup> and since the states will work for protecting these moral values, security for all individuals will be automatically accomplished. Hedrey Bull says that we can speak of a solidarist society when its member states are successful in enforcing and abiding by the same laws. It can be claimed that while the pluralists concern themselves with the question whether all the states in the international society are all secure, the solidarists takes the security of whole world's individuals as the heart of their arguments and believe that the pluralism also helps for a more secure world for individuals with its political boundaries.<sup>25</sup>

The English School has both similar and distinct points with liberal and neorealist approaches. The pluralists resemble the neo-realists in the sense that they both see the sovereign state as the center value and that the individuals of the states, the identity of the nation do not matter, at all. The liberals, as the solidarists believe that the values and identity, culture that a state's individuals possess are what matter in the security context. Although the neo-realists and pluralists did not pay enough attention to the domestic situation and the importance of internal values and position, the liberals did not fall in such a mistake.

Here, the European Union can be considered to be a good example to both solidarist and pluralist approaches. The current situation of the EU resembles the idea of pluralists because the union still remains as intergovernmental. France and

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<sup>24</sup> Linklater 1998, *The Transformation of Political Community*, London: MacMillan, 166-7.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*

the Netherlands rejected the Constitution, Britain insists on her own traditional currency, there are Euro-skeptics and there is no collective European identity. Thus, it can be said that the EU is an example to the pluralist approach. However, the expectations and efforts of the European states are towards an integrated Europe who has a common foreign and security policy, collective identity. No need to mention that the union had already been integrated in the economic terms. If Europe integrates through a pan-European collective identity, as a supranational organization then the solidarist approach would be right in the European Union case. NATO, on the other hand, fits into the pluralist approach.

English School thought about security seems to be plausible in the sense that it pays attention to international law, takes individuals and different identities into account and also moral part of the picture. The decision makers come to power via democratic processes, meaning people appoint the leaders who make decisions about security. It is natural that the leaders' first priority should be protection of the individuals' life, rights, values, morality and identity. What pluralists see in international community is that each state is recognized as a sovereign entity. Solidarists do not divide between the states' individuals; they see the international community's individuals as one. It seems that solidarists miss a crucial point here that individuals of different nations would not want to be titled as a member of international community but as a member of his/her own country. The point is that each nation has a unique identity and would not give it up in favor of the international community easily. Hence, pluralism seems to be more reasonable.

### *2.2.5. Constructivist Approach to Security*

Constructivists assume that states' scope of activity is not only material but also societal and they believe that thanks to this scope, the states perceive their advantages properly.<sup>26</sup> The material reality gains meaning only through the society's needs, perceptions and cultural constructions. National identities and interests are not given; they are constructed through an interaction process. The society also constructs the threat perception through that process because it is the society's values, cultural identity that decide what is threat and what is not. A nation's interests are not inflicted upon from by an outsider but they come into existence through state's relationship with the environment it is located in. Constructivist scholars agree that security is a subjective issue, includes non-material kind of threats and that it has a changeable purpose since it depends on the environmental context.<sup>27</sup> Perception of where the threat is coming from is different for each states since every state differs from the others in a way; geographically, culturally, environmentally, economically, and so on.

For example, the United Kingdom possesses more amount of nuclear armament than does Korean state. However, the UK is closer to the USA that Americans perceive Korea as a threat but not the UK although the UK possesses weapons of mass destruction. The point is that the material reality gains its meaning through an interaction process which is also decided by the cultural and national values, identity. Since it is the securitization process what matters, then changes are inevitable. Today's enemy may turn out to be tomorrow's ally. Realists did not take

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<sup>26</sup> Jeffrey T. Checkel, 'The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory', *World Politics*, Vol. 50 (1998), pp 325-6.

<sup>27</sup> Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, 'Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods', *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol. 40 (1996) p. 242..

the process-based nature of security, which is due to change, and decided by the interaction.

The realists claimed that the international community had an anarchic nature. They mainly believed that the relations were enemy-type that there is a war of every state against every state. However, as Locke claimed, the relations of the anarchic international community could also have rivalry-type relations or for better, as Kant had claimed, the relations could be friendship-type. The EU is an example to the Lockean and Kantian kind of international community because the European states see the USA and the rogue states of the Middle East as rivals but they also construct friendly relations with many other states, too. Turkey, also does consider the international community as the EU because she is faced with many rivals and threat because of her geopolitical situation but she can still build friendly relations with other nations, too. Realists, though, seem to have jumped to the conclusion that every state is alone, should see the others as enemies since the international community is chaotic. However, although the states may be rivals, not enemies, mutual agreements and discussions in a friendly manner would help them survive in the anarchic international environment.

As Arnold Wolfers points out, constructivist definition of security is being free from any danger or threat to the central values that if those historic values are safe, that particular community is secure. Here, it should be clarified that the realists failed to define what those historic, central values are thus, at a time in which the world is turning out to be a global village; realism seems to be insufficient to give a

clear security policy and/or understanding to apply.<sup>28</sup> Realism remains as unrefined because it could not foresee the coming of globalization.

In the context of globalization, constructivists prefer to analyze the effects of globalization on the central values that should be kept safe and secure. As pointed above, they do not look for a constant, objective threat but they attempt to find out what the joint threat perception is and how to purge this subjective, collectively perceived threat.<sup>29</sup> It should be clarified that the individuals, communities and states, who are to decide what the threat is, are dependent on their environment, scope of activity. This interaction of the individuals, societies and states decide what the crucial values are, what the forms of threats on these values are and how the attacker should be put out of action. And since the environments are changeable, the threat understanding and responses to it will inevitably change accordingly. When we turn back to the globalization's affects on threat understanding, it is seen that what values the intergovernmental, supranational bodies give importance to may not be identical to the individual states' or societies' central values that are to be kept secure. Thus, only if the diversity of states agrees on a value to be protected, that value can be claimed to be central and will be protected.

Security, being dependent on the environmental context, is doomed to change.<sup>30</sup> The main reason behind this fact is that the national actors, along with the global actors and organizations, are still very important in deciding and responding to the security issues in all levels. Copenhagen School distinguishes between the

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<sup>28</sup> David A. Baldwin, 'The Concept of Security', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 23 (1997), p. 21; Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading: Addison Wesley, 1979), p. 126.

<sup>29</sup> Barry Buzan, 'Rethinking Security after the Cold War', *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 32, No. 1 (1997), p. 14.

<sup>30</sup> Krause and Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 244.

state and the society and moving from this distinction, they form a different security discourse.<sup>31</sup> The school considers the security as a naturally “dual” concept which is composed of “state security” based on sovereignty and societal security” based on identity.

Copenhagen Scholars claim that the problems a particular state faces are either about security or political. If the perceived threat is political, then the state attempts to eliminate it through consensus, consultation and mutual discussions. If the threat is about security, then the state utilizes every means to end that security problem. Although security policy is mainly decided by the military officials, the main idea is that the security policy of officials has to be in compliance with the society’s culture, needs and identity. Otherwise, without the consent of the society, security policies of officials would do no good. And all the making of the security policy, harmony between the military and the society’s security understanding are all results of securitization process. This process ends with the naming of the ‘security’ problems as ‘political’ problems. In the end, the society, military and the elected officials will have completed the securitization process with no exaggerated efforts to be secure. The harmony between the three and the process of constructing that harmony will automatically provide the state with security.

Copenhagen School scholars explain that the societies form their identity based on shared culture, institutions, habits, traditions and so forth. Their interests are also decided according to their identities. Thus, societies react to any threat or

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<sup>31</sup> Jef Huysmans, ‘Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, on the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda in Europe’, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 4, No. 4 (1998), pp 479-505; Bill Mc. Sweeny, ‘Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School’, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (1996), pp 81-93.

attack to their own identity very harshly; they can never stay muted when their identities are under attack. Thus the societal security does not become equal to the security of a nation but becomes equal to that of a community wrapped by an identity.<sup>32</sup> When we consider Europe, these identity-concerned social groups are either states or ethnic minority groups. Thus, for a democratic state, the society's values appoint what security agenda the state is bound to and also if the democratic state can protect the identity of its people, then it can be counted as legitimate. But the point is that the world is globalizing rapidly and the individual states are losing influence. The values and identities of a particular state are almost forced to be adapted to those of the neighboring states', and as the process continues, to those of the global construction. And while the interaction between the states and the change of values are becoming inevitable, the ethical and moral values of a particular state remain to be unchanged and thus violate the globalization and construction of an agreed pocket of rules and values.<sup>33</sup>

Constructivists' argument that each state is unique in its purposes, geography, culture, identity, social and economic conditions and thus states are distinct from each other in their security perceptions also seems to be plausible. They pay attention to the societal security, which is an important strength of constructivist approach. States, mainly the democratic ones, are products of the people, the society. Thus, the states, while appointing a security agenda, have to take the people's demands; should protect the citizens from any damage to their identity. Beginning from 1980s, globalization and its outcomes made the world states

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<sup>32</sup> Iver B. Neumann, 'Collective Identity Formation: Self and Other in International Relations', *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 2 (1996), pp 139-74; Ole Weaver, 'European Security Identities', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (1996), p. 113.

<sup>33</sup> Jean-Marie Guehenno, 'The Impact of Globalization on Strategy', *Survival*. Vol. 40, No. 4 (1998) p. 10.

remember how important identity is. Especially the underdeveloped states rested on their cultural, national values to protect themselves from the evils of globalization. After all, if a nation's identity is absorbed and swallowed, that nation becomes extinct. The only value that never loses importance is identity. A threat to identity is an absolute threat to the nation. Hence, constructivists are right in their claim that it should be the identity of the nation, or ethnic group that the states work hard to keep secure and safe.

#### **2.2.5.1. Relationship between Security Culture and Strategic Culture**

This section will be discussed under the Constructivist Approach because the importance of strategic culture and its relationship with security policy have been recognized and analyzed by the constructivists, as it will be seen in later paragraphs. The main point is that culture is also an identity and it is the constructivist approach that takes identity as the heart of their argument.

There is an undeniable connection between the culture and national security policy as we see in the works of Thucydides, ancient Athenian politician and Sun Tzu, author of famous *Art of War*. Later Carl Von Clausewitz, German general and author of *On War*, had developed this idea of connection between strategic culture and security, claiming that the essence of war strategy should be not only physically defeating the enemy but also devastating the opponents morally, too. Hence, the enemy would have been terrified and discouraged forever. Clausewitz supported the idea that the people of the state were the number one tool in the way to a war-glory; he exemplified the French people who provided the armies of Napoleon with human capital and a lyrical morale, made French armies defeat the enemies successfully.

Also, the leading politicians who declare and direct the war and naturally the soldiers are the other most striking components of war.<sup>34</sup>

Clausewitz had written during the beginning of 1800s and Jack Snyder has contemporized his ideas with applying them to the Cold War, to the Soviet Union's war strategy culture. Snyder's ideas have almost razed the conventional national security culture, which rested on the domestic politics and demands. He argued that the political leaders compromise the people's needs with a militaristic proper strategy would bring the glory. In the case of Soviet Union, the strategy of intimidating the enemy through nuclear weaponry has been a result of the people's, political leaders' and the military forces' solidarity and of that public spirit. He explains his idea of strategy as it follows: "...as a result of this socialization process, a set of general beliefs, attitudes, and behavior patterns with regard to nuclear strategy has achieved a state of semi-permanence that places them on the level of 'cultural' rather than mere policy."<sup>35</sup> Just like Clausewitz, Snyder also gives secondary importance to the technological level of development, the type of perception of the external dangers, and the historical, institutional traditions.

Snyder claimed that although both Russian and the Americans have applied to the usage of nuclear armament during the Cold War years, they were extremely distinct with their conceptions of nuclear weaponry and this distinction, he believes is a result of their different strategic cultures, political cultures, historical and institutional strategies. The Soviet officials supported the proliferation of nuclear

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<sup>34</sup> Michael Howard, 'Clausewitz, Man of the Year', *New York Times*, January 28, 1991, p. A17.

<sup>35</sup> Jack Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options*, Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 1977, R-2154-AF; Ken Booth, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism*, New York: Holmes and Meier, 1981.

weapons as a precautionary measure; for a preventive war if necessary. When Russian Empire's political history is thought, this is no surprise because, naturally, empires are monarchic, security-centered political systems. Snyder, from these points concludes that it is the strategic culture which decides the security threats, what weaponry will be used, how the threats will be reacted to, etc... Since all states have distinct history and culture, their strategic culture and style will be different from each other.

Many other national security policy analyses were carried out by various scholars after Jack Snyder, one of which is *Strategy and Ethnocentrism of Ken Booth*. In his work, Booth indicates to how different nations and their different ideas come up against about their dissimilar nuclear strategy cultures. Another important work about strategic culture is *Nuclear Strategy and National Style* of Colin Gray and in this book, the author again points to the historical and cultural differences between nations appoint their strategies as we have seen in the Cold War between the USA and the Soviet Union. Every nation, Gray believes, has got a unique style and this style causes each nation to make different political decisions. He defines strategic culture as it follows: "...referring to modes of thought and action with respect to force, which derives from perception of the national historical experience, from aspirations for responsible behavior in national terms."<sup>36</sup> Strategic culture defines what actual strategies will be carried out but he also points out that strategic culture only directs the national security policy for a particular period of time, not forever. After all, culture and people's needs are immune to changes and they interact with other cultures and people, nations; interaction also brings cultural

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<sup>36</sup> Colin S. Gray, *Nuclear Strategy and National Style*, Lanham, Md.: Hamilton Press, 1986, pp. 36-7.

change. Hence, in result, new security culture starts to influence the national security policy.<sup>37</sup>

After explaining the influences of strategic culture on national security policy, the scholars shift their attention to the practical dimension of strategic culture; they see that in practical terms, too, strategic culture is unique for each nation. But it was hard to define and appoint a strategic culture for a nation, since, as told above, culture and historical experiences are on a movement, change every time. This attitude of nations, being different from each other in cultural, political, historical and strategic terms, requires a cross-national research. However, scholars accept the fact that a cross-national research would be very difficult to do as Gray states in his *The Geopolitics of Superpower*: “Social Science has developed no exact methodology for identifying distinctive national cultures and styles.”<sup>38</sup> Ken Booth also saw a nation’s culture as the main determinant of its political and militaristic policy making. Another scholar, Yitzhak Klein indicated to the necessity of studies and research on the nations’ strategic culture in order to have a more clarified and reliable set of security studies and research. As the scholars insisted on more such studies, 1980s became a decade when such studies and research were carried out successfully; however such studies were not going to be continuous after the dissolution of the Soviet Bloc.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> Colin S. Gray, ‘National Style in Strategy: The American Example,’ *International Security* 6, No. 2, 1981, p. 35.

<sup>38</sup> Colin S. Gray, *The Geopolitics of Superpower*, Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1988, pp. 42-3.

<sup>39</sup> Roland H. Ebel, Raymond Taras, and James D. Cochrane, *Political Culture and Foreign Policy in Latin America: Case Studies from the Circum Caribbean*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991; Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds., *International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995; Michael C. Desch, ‘Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies’, *International Security* 23, No. 1, 1999.

With end of the Cold War, the importance of cultural studies was started to be debated on as the following quotation from Yosef Lapid clarifies:

“Culture and identity are staging a dramatic comeback in social theory and practice at the end of the twentieth century...Political realists- who, under the impact of their Waltzian move to neorealism have harshly marginalized culture and identity- are cautiously partaking in this trend. Similarly, following a period of hostile indifference to ‘ideational explanations’, the time for ideas seems to have come around once again in International Political Economy.”<sup>40</sup>

Desch also described this acceleration in cultural studies as a rebirth, which actually comes onto surface again with the help of constructivists who claimed that the leading politicians have to make policies that are consistent with the national culture.<sup>41</sup>

The dissolution of the Soviet Bloc gave life to constructivism which defended the importance of internal politics and national culture as Ted Hopf states as it follows:

“...Constructivism has no inherent focus on ‘second image’ accounts of world politics...Constructivism provides a promising approach for uncovering those features of domestic society, culture, and politics that should matter to state identity and state action in global politics...Any state identity in world politics is partly the product of the social practices that constitute that identity at home.”<sup>42</sup>

The main concern of the constructivist scholars is about the construction of the identity and how identity influences the developments in historical, traditional

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<sup>40</sup> Yosef Lapid, ‘Culture’s Ship: Returns and Departures in International Relations Theory’, in Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds., *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1996, p. 3.

<sup>41</sup> ; Michael C. Desch, ‘Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies’, *International Security* 23, No. 1, 1999, p. 145; Alexander Wendt, ‘Identity and Structural Change in International Politics’, in Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds., *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1996, p. 47-64; Richard J. Ellis and Michael Thompson, eds., *Culture Matters: Essays in Honor of Aaron Wildavsky*, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997.

<sup>42</sup> Ted Hopf, ‘The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations’, *International Security* 23, No. 1, 1998, p. 914; Jeffrey W. Legro, ‘Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step’, *American Political Science Review* 90, No. 1, 1996, pp. 118-37.

cultural ways. According to Alexander Wendt, the states work for the benefit of its people who set the national identity, culture, and thus the state policies.<sup>43</sup> Valerie Hudson also believes what directs the states' strategy is culture, people's way of attitude, communication, living and so on.<sup>44</sup>

Contemporarily, too, identity has proved its importance in world politics. Starting with the globalization process in 1980, the world became an Americanized and capitalist-led locus. The undeveloped part of the world, however, found shelter in their identity, which was each nation's, all and most important capital. And they perceived the key threat when they felt their identity was under attack. What constitutes identity is mainly culture and values. Therefore, there is no room for deny in the claim that security and strategic culture are mutually defined and practiced.

Away from constructivist wave on the national security, many other works also indicate to the vitally important place of culture in deciding the security policies. One of these works is *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* by Alastair Johnston who attempts to find out how Chinese culture has shaped the militaristic response of China against the outside dangers through analyzing different dynasty-eras. He believes that Chinese culture caused the Chinese strategic policies to be defensive, sober, economic and non-aggressive. Chinese officials, because of their cultural properties, chose to stay in defense and strike only if defense becomes useless.<sup>45</sup> Eventually, such strategic

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<sup>43</sup> Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization*, 46, No. 2, 1992, pp. 391-426.

<sup>44</sup> Valerie M. Hudson, ed., *Culture and Foreign Policy*, Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1997, pp. 28

<sup>45</sup> Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 1.

choice became an undeniable feature of Chinese security culture and policy-making style.

The Chinese example proves that the factors that appoint the security policy are not always material conditions. Rather, the perception of the society decides what the threat is and what would be done to eliminate that threat. The cultural codes that a society possesses reflect years' experience, habits and meanings which give the meaning to the security.

Another important example that depicts the relationship between the culture and security is France, which Elizabeth Kier describes as "...the significance of organizational culture in the development of French military doctrine."<sup>46</sup> Latin America and India are the other regions of the world, which demonstrate that there is an undeniable relationship between culture and security understanding and conception.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> Elizabeth Kier, 'Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars', *International Security* 19, No. 4, 1995.

<sup>47</sup> Stephen Peter Rosen, *Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996; Ebel, Taras and Cochrane, *Political Culture and Foreign Policy in Latin America*, p. 5.

## **2.4. Conclusion**

This chapter has depicted the theoretical dimension of security. Security, the lack of threat, is said to be the most important task of the state; the state owes its existence to the need of national security. The masses elect a group of representatives whom they believe are capable of providing the nation secure and safe conditions. States are the guardians of sovereignty and the people's identity. Starting from 1980s, identity has gained even more importance. The states did not only work hard to protect sovereignty, they had to protect their citizens' identity from being assimilated.

There are five approaches to security: English school approach, neorealist approach, liberal approach, constructivist approach and revisionist approach. Neorealist scholars consider the international community as chaotic entity and thus each state must work hard to be able to protect itself. Realists believe that a state should not count on the fellow states or international law because in chaos, every one would be busy of saving itself. Just as in Hobbes's state of nature, the physically more powerful state, since there is no binding law, would swallow the others. Hence, each state should be able to survive through building a powerful army and investing in armament. Otherwise, with no superior rules or ruler in the international community, the powerless state would go extinct with all its name, people and identity. Realist approach seems to be too pessimistic to be applied to real life. The international community has some definite rules and norms that are able to provide a relative degree of justice and order. Although decision making process is slow and reaching an agreement between the states become difficult sometimes, the international society still possesses regular, operational system. Therefore, states do

not have to be obsessed with security issues in a paranoid manner. Heavy investment in military would only decrease the welfare of the state.

The second approach we covered is liberal approach, the supporters of which believe that international environment is not of a fully chaotic nature with a minimum amount of cooperation and mutual trust; rather there is cooperation in the international community which lets individual states not get obsessed with their physical safety but also provide for their welfare in all senses. Also, domestic politics, needs and actors are not secondary to international politics and needs but they are equally important for security of every individual state. No state is an island, the states coexist and need each other; cooperation is and should be inevitable for the states to resolve their domestic and international problems.

The third approach is revisionist one which is interested in domestic problems of the third world states. These states have to construct a powerful military force because they are in danger of experiencing a double security dilemma. The regime and the government are not guaranteed to survive in these states because there is always a threat from within the state. These states, in the process of democratization, have to rest on military to mute the interior discontent and opposition.

The fourth group of scholars, constructivists, takes individuals and identity as the heart of their argument and claim that it is the individuals and national identity that the states should work to provide security of. Constructivists are successful in their perception of threat because with the process of globalization, states started to put identity protection at the top of their security agenda.

Also there is the English School which is divided into two, solidarists and pluralists. Both pluralist and solidarist approaches consider international community's members are linked through certain laws and moral principles but they differentiate in their priorities: while solidarist scholars of English school believe that it is the individuals who are premier in security policies, pluralists believe that states should be able to protect sovereignty and repulse any foreign intervention in the first place.

Finally, in this chapter, how strategic culture and security policy of a country are in interaction with each other have been narrated. There are many countries who can exemplify the relationship between culture and security policy. Strategic culture is said to be the most important determinant of the national security policy. Since each nation is of different culture and identity, each of them will have a distinct understanding of security, national security policy and threat perception. Each state has its own way of providing the security but one thing that is absolutely true is that the states can only exist if they can formulate a security policy that is successful enough in protecting the individuals' identity and of course, sovereignty of the nation.

## **CHAPTER II**

### **THE ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S SECURITY CULTURE**

This chapter will depict how security is perceived by the EU, into which Turkey is trying hard to be integrated. It will be evaluated historically what stages the EU has passed in order to reach its contemporary image. It will be seen what difficulties Turkey could face in the accession process.

The aftermath of the WW2 marked the beginning of the Europe's collective security developments. After experiencing two major wars, the Europeans knew that they had to be very cautious in order not to experience such a devastating war again. They wanted to be prepared for possible German aggression since Germans were left resentful after causing the break-out of both world wars and also Western Europeans wanted to be ready to eliminate any communist threat coming from the Eastern Bloc.

Regarding the Cold War, it can be concluded that there is both a liberal and a constructivist approach at the same time by the European countries. But it should be pointed that neorealist approach has been more privileged in the era of the Cold War.

The first action on the way to collective security was with 1948 Brussels Agreement, which saw the establishment of an alliance among Britain, France, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Belgium. Cominform, established by the Soviet Union, made the Western Bloc realize Easterners had to be responded by collective organization and in 1949, the United States, Canada and the Western Europe established NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). NATO, from that time on, became the superior body to make and preserve peace and to intervene if necessary. Although the Western Europe was already being contained by the United States against any influence from the Communist Bloc, The Western Europeans wanted to have their own security policy against the Soviet threat. In this regard, the traces of the EU's distinctive security identity as it has increasingly become clear during the 1990's could be dated back to the Cold War years.

Ironically, until the end of the Cold War, Europeans could not seriously come together and agree that they needed a collective security and foreign policy establishment in order to be a real union and thus, safe and powerful in this new world system. Until then, the Euro-skeptics supported the idea that NATO could never be undermined. They believed that NATO should be the body to provide peace and order for the international community, with no need for a distinct European collective army. There were reasons behind this idea of Euro-skeptics and they will be counted in the following sections.

This particular chapter will look at how Europe developed into a union; what stages it has passed in order to be able to reach a collective foreign and security policy. The questions of whether Europe possesses an independent common security identity and culture from those of the USA and what factors have led the European

states towards cooperation in the realm of security are significant. Firstly, the chronological evolution of the EU will be given. Then, it will be seen what differences the end of the Cold War had created in European defense and security system. Finally, it will be concluded that Europe still lacks a solid collective foreign and security policy but as historical developments show, she is in her way to have one.

### ***3.1. Security Cooperation of the Western Europe during the Cold War***

As given above the first important effort of the European powers to form a security organization came with 1948 Brussels Treaty, which constructed the EDC two years later, European Defense Community. It was aimed that through such an organization, a possible German aggression could be prevented and also the European states could stay safe from the Soviet threat. The threat perceptions of the Western European states were the same; they were all cautious towards the German aggression and spread of communism. However, the efforts of French general Charles De Gaulle in the parliament surpassed and the French Parliament annulled the Treaty of Brussels. The main argument of nationalist De Gaulle and his supporters were that an EDC-like organization would bring an end to the sovereignty and nationalist values of the individual states.

Here, from the failure of the EDC, the very first effort of the Western European towards establishing a union, it can be said that the European states at that time were approaching to the idea of the EU through neorealist ideas because they saw the international community as anarchic and full of chaotic relations with no one to trust in. Also, the states' sovereignty was the number one value on their security

policies.<sup>48</sup> The main threat during the Cold War was the SU and the main instrument to deal with it was NATO, a neorealist collective defense organization. EU was under NATO, not independent of NATO; it could not construct an independent security culture/identity away from NATO.

In 1949, the USA, Canada, and ten other states have signed the North Atlantic Treaty and formed NATO. The main task of NATO was to eliminate the communist threat through a collective defense force.

Europeans, however, were aware of the fact that they had different threat perceptions other than the communist threat such as a possible German aggression and the rifts between the USA and France. France was opposed to the idea of 'United States of Europe'. France wanted an integrated Europe without control of the USA but still European Community did not seem to be fully integrated because the states were reluctant to the idea of attaching themselves into a supranational organization.

The second development on the way to collective security of Europe was the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Company of 1951 with Paris Treaty. ECSC can be claimed to be the roots of the EU. It was mainly an economic-based community that could rebuild the destroyed infrastructure and facilities. The USA, throughout the Cold War steadily supported the economic integration and improvement of the Europe as a whole, the Western Europe actually. After all, the USA needed a trade partner and a strong ally against the communist threat.

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<sup>48</sup> Jolyon Howorth, 'European Integration and Defense: The Ultimate Challenge?' *Chaillot Papers*, No: 43, Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, November 2000, p. 9, <http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai43e.html>.

It should be pointed that the USA has been very supportive of European integration. Many authorities have considered this intense closeness of the USA saying that the EU was an American project at all. There were two main policies for the security of the EU. The first was through NATO, neorealist security cooperation against a military external threat. And the second was the European integration, a liberal constructivist project. Thus, the security dimension of the integration was crucial. The USA both wanted European states to be secure against each other through increasing cooperation and also she saw the EU as an ally.

Although the EDC failed, the European powers were still willing to establish an organization against the Soviet and German threats. In 1951, they founded the Western European Union, WEU, which again took the principles of 1948 Brussels Treaty as the main principles of the Union. The WEU was still secondary to NATO in military and defense terms. West Germany, thanks to her membership in WEU integrated into NATO in 1955 after the Korean War.<sup>49</sup>

However, the WEU also failed to create an integrated Europe in security and defense terms. The main impediment in front of the common security policy was the lack of the technological and military capabilities. The USA was undoubtedly very improved in security terms. She was spending a large part of her GDP for security while European states were not that generous in doing so. Also, the debates between the UK and France were so harsh. France was skeptical about any control by the USA or Britain, which she saw as the number one ally and puppet of the USA. France was in support of a European Community under French leadership and separated from NATO in all terms. NATO, for France, was a tool of American Containment Policy.

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<sup>49</sup> John Kent and John W. Young, 'British Policy Overseas: The Third Force and the Origins of NATO in Search of a New Perspective' in B. Heuser and R. O'Neill, eds., *Securing Peace in Europe 1945-1962*, London, p. 43.

However, the reality was that without the USA, Europe could not have stayed safe against the communist threat. The USA did not fight two major wars in her land so devastatingly and she got richer after the two wars.<sup>50</sup>

The WEU became operational only in terms of economic integration. In the context of security, it could only help control the German military equipments and prevent a probable German aggression. However, it failed to implement a common foreign and security policy. NATO remained as the main and only tool to provide and keep security and peace in Europe.

With the end of the Stalinist period in the Soviet Union, a détente period had begun in 1960s with Khrushchev and Nixon in the world. The huge threat of nuclear war was still alive but some sort of predictability and stability were present in term starting from 1960s.<sup>51</sup>

By 1960s, it was clear that Europe was a huge economic power. Also, thanks to the European states' relations with the former colonies, European states were powerful in diplomatic terms, too. However, they were not building these good relationships as a Union, but as individual states. The US influence was still heavy but the Europeans started to be suspicious about the US capability of preventing a Soviet nuclear threat and also they were not happy from the situation of being dependent on the USA for security. The Europeans were also of the view that harsh American attitudes towards the Soviet Union could put Europe's own relations with the Soviets into jeopardy. The Western Europeans did not want to be captive of the United States' problems with the Soviet Union. However, their defense capabilities were low and

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<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> Adrian G. V. Hyde-Price, *European Security Beyond the Cold War*, London: SAGE Publ., 1991, pp. 32-4.

they knew they had to rely on the USA. In order to feel safer, get rid of the US influence and become a major player, European states started to think seriously about a collective defense system.

1950's Korean War was a proof of Europeans' powerless defense capabilities. It was always the USA who could send more number of troops and military equipment when there was a conflict or war. NATO was present with numerous troops in European territories and Europe recognized the fact that they had to be more powerful in terms of defense. They understood that their military spending was insufficient.<sup>52</sup>

Starting from 1960s, European states demanded that NATO should have a separate 'European' part which was going to be led by Europeans and practice according to the European initiatives.<sup>53</sup> The USA also wanted a strong Western Europe who cooperated in defense terms. After all, the Soviet threat and the Communist Bloc required to be opposed by strong allies.

In 1968, Western European states founded Euro Group. The main purpose behind the establishment of it was cooperation in terms of the use of military equipment when necessary. Still, Europeans were aware that their military capabilities were not sufficient against Soviets and they hesitated to make Americans decrease the number of their troops in European territories. Ironically, the USA also did not want an integrated, collective European security system; all she wanted to see was a

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<sup>52</sup> Kenneth B. Moss, *NATO's 50 Years*, [http://www.shape.nato.int/COMMUNITY\\_LIFE/1999](http://www.shape.nato.int/COMMUNITY_LIFE/1999).

<sup>53</sup> Jolyon Howorth, 'European Integration and Defense: The Ultimate Challenge?' *Chaillot Papers*, No: 43, Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, November 2000, p. 9, <http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/cha43e.html>.

cooperative Europe so that she would continue to sell more armament to the continent.<sup>54</sup>

In 1969, the European powers came together in The Hague and decided on a political cooperation which came into force after three years as the European Political Cooperation, EPC. The European powers decided to act together on political terms. This meant that Europe, after integrated economically, was starting to be integrated in political terms, too. Europe was very desirous towards being a major actor in world politics. And they knew that as individual states, they would be ineffective and insecure. The EPC was going to provide for solidarity, communication, order and a road to common culture.<sup>55</sup>

The détente term starting from the early 1960s culminated in the middle of 1970s. In 1973, European powers came together in Helsinki where they organized a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which later will be the second pillar of the EU as Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 was an important development for the politico-military integration of Europe with its principles of cooperation in security, defense, and political, educational, economic and social fields.<sup>56</sup> It should be pointed, though; cooperation was not enough for integration and collectivity.

The 1980s saw important developments on the way to collective foreign and security policy in Europe. In 1984, the European states and NATO members reached

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<sup>54</sup> Gulnur Aybet, *The Dynamics of European Security Cooperation, 1945-1991*, London: MacMillan, 1997, pp. 121-3.

<sup>55</sup> Panaitos Ifestos, 'European Political Cooperation: Toward a Framework for Supranational Diplomacy?', *Aldershot*, 1987, pp. 148-52.

<sup>56</sup> Adrian G. V. Hyde-Price, *European Security Beyond the Cold War*, London: SAGE Publ., 1991, pp. 35-7.

on an agreement to make the European part of NATO more powerful. WEU was revived in 1984. The beginning of the 1980s saw many crisis situations in the world such as Iranian Revolution and the Afghan invasion of the SU. Such developments forced both NATO and the EU to get more powerful. NATO created the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force in order to be more responsive and successful in crisis resolution and management.<sup>57</sup>

Gorbachev's term in the Soviet Union, starting in March 1985, provided further stability and détente in the East-West relations. Mikhail Gorbachev proposed to decrease the investment on armament mutually since it was absurd to increase the armament while that huge amount of money could have been utilized to increase the welfare of the states.

In 1987, Dutch officials demanded from the WEU that it should be a solid body that can and should work for solutions to the Iran-Iraq War, which started in 1980 and later the Gulf War which broke out in 1991. As result of such willingness of European states to act as one cooperative body resulted in the naval blockade of Iraq in 1990.

However, despite all these attempts of cooperation, it could be claimed that both the EDC and the WEU were very far away from contributing to the collective security organization of Europe. For the rest of the Cold War, Europe's security and foreign policy decisions were almost made by the USA. We can count the distinct policy choices of Britain, France and West Germany as the main cause of the failure

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<sup>57</sup> *NATO Handbook, 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary Edition*, Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1998, p. 331.

of a common security system. Britain was on the side of the USA, trusting in NATO and US-led security policies. All in all, Britain never believed in a Europe who had all the arrangements for a concrete collective security policy and tools to practice such policies. Also, Britain, being one of the major powers throughout history, did not decline to be an ordinary European state in the world of states; she wanted to remain as a major power in world politics and believed that this was only possible through being a member of NATO and an ally of the USA.

On the other hand, France was not in favor of the US-led Europe and wanted a Europe whose members cooperated on all political, economical, foreign policy and security issues. Such cooperation would also help as a resistance to the US hegemony. French officials strongly believed that NATO was just another tool of the USA to contain Europe.

West Germany was very resentful after the two great wars, having to pay heavy reparations and left with a minimized militaristic force. She was also heavily dependent on the United States.<sup>58</sup> In contrary to French wishes about a European army with no intervention from the USA, West Germany was in favor of a NATO-based security system for Europe.<sup>59</sup>

Therefore, with Britain, France and West Germany being separated from each other in terms of their ideas about security policies, Western Europe had failed to establish an organization which was independent and powerful enough to produce a

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<sup>58</sup> G. Wyn Rees, 'Britain and the Western European Union', *European Security*, vol. 5, no. 4, Winter, 1996, p. 530.

<sup>59</sup> Tom Lansford, 'The Question of France: French Security Choices at Century's End', *European Security* 5, no. 1, Spring 1996, p. 44.

collective foreign and security policy. She had to remain under the influence and protection of the United States for the rest of the Cold War.

Thus, during the Cold War era, Europe remained as a cooperative but not an integrated Union. As the second chapter discussed, European Union seemed to be in compliance with the pluralist approach since the individual members saw their sovereignty and national identity distinct from that of the Union. No collective pan-European identity could be constructed throughout the Cold War. The idea of supranationalism came almost intimidating to the states like France and Britain. During the Cold War, Westphalian idea of nation-state was still important.

### ***3.2. Security Policies of the Western Europe in the Post Cold War Period***

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked the beginning of a brand new term for an improved, collective European security and foreign policy. When the Cold War finished, the world ceased to be bipolar; West and East Germany united, former Soviet states gained independence and were moving towards democratization that started with Perestroika. The USA gave up the containment policy. The old super powers were not competing for more sphere of influence any more. Europe had enlarged in geographical and political terms. The world became a multi-polar world with new regional, important powers. However, the end of the Cold War did not mean more security; although a nuclear strike was not likely to break out, there were numerous powers with military force in every region. Europe, after the Cold War, had to deal with the Eastern European states' process of democratization, ethnic conflicts,

international terrorism, environmental problems, illegal trafficking and also nuclear armament by the rogue states.<sup>60</sup>

The issue of security has accelerated the foreign policy integration of the EU because of the following reasons. First of all, they have seen that in the absence of Soviet threat the need to continue the integration process became more important. Secondly, they recognized that the USA might cease to act as “the European pacifier”. What would happen if the US commitment to European security decreased? Would the EU members prove to be capable of providing their own security in the absence of the United States? Thirdly, an integrated Germany had to be controlled that she should not follow unilateral policies; hence CFSP and ESDP were important and beneficial. Fourthly, it was important to be integrated and powerful for the EU in order to be seen serious in international relations by the USA, the sole super power of the world. Finally, the EU had to be integrated through CFSP and ESDP in order to be a global actor and deal with the threats around it.

The very first important cooperative action of the WEU was the naval blockade of Iraq in 1990. This action demonstrated that the European states, if acted cooperatively, would be of greater importance in world politics and have more say in their foreign security policy decisions. However, there were still impediments to the unification because while Britain was continuing her attempts to link the WEU to NATO, French officials were strongly against an organization under the US influence.

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<sup>60</sup> Viktor-Yves Ghebal, Brigitte Saurwein, *European Security in the 1990s: Challenges and Perspectives*, Geneva: UN Institute for Disarmament Research, 1995, p. 11-2.

Eventually, in 1992, Maastricht Treaty, the Treaty of the European Union, was signed and came into force in 1993.<sup>61</sup>

The main pillar of the Treaty of the European Union was CFSP. It should be pointed that at first, this pillar was not strong and effective because the members were still reluctant to a common policy on defense and foreign relations; they perceived these as a breach of sovereignty. Also, it was very hard to reach an agreement between the members when the decision-making process arrives. In order to reach a decision to intervene in a region they had to agree with a qualified majority but it was very hard to provide such majority-vote. Every state had veto-rights that if one of the states objected to the intervention or action, then the proposal would automatically be annulled. But most importantly, even if a foreign policy decision was reached, there was no unified, single army to make the intervention. But still, it could be claimed that with Maastricht, Europe started to get rid of the influence of NATO and thus the USA.<sup>62</sup>

The members of the European Union gathered in Petersberg in 1992 and decided on the three main functions of the WEU, which were: militaristic duties when peace is in danger, humanitarian duties of protecting the civilians from any kind of conflicts and coping with the crises. It was emphasized that all the actions and decisions of the WEU were going to be carried out according to the accountability principle and the UN Charter articles.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> Gulnur Aybet, *A European Security Architecture after the Cold War*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000, pp. 97-115.

<sup>62</sup> George Stein, 'The Euro-Corps and Future European Security Architecture', *European Security*, 2, no. 2, Summer 1993, p. 200-13.

<sup>63</sup> Western European Union Council of Ministers, Petersberg Declaration, Bonn, 19 June 1992, [http: www.weu.int/eng/comm/92-petersberg.htm](http://www.weu.int/eng/comm/92-petersberg.htm).

After the end of the Cold War, the states and authorities began to question the presence of NATO since the Soviet threat had been eliminated. Therefore, NATO issued Rome Declaration in 1991, clarifying that it was going to remain as revised in order to provide order and peace in all political, economical, environmental and social terms. NATO ended its military base in Germany. Later, France and Germany united their forces and established a European Rapid Reaction Force which had the tasks of defense, peace keeping and humanitarian aids. The actions and decisions of Eurocorps were in compliance with the provisions of Brussels Treaty, hence they could intervene the outside fields of Europe, too. The main question that arose in minds was how NATO and Eurocorps were going to co-exist. Franco-German answer to this question was that Eurocorps constituted no threat for NATO.<sup>64</sup> In order to end the disputes, French, German Defense Ministers, NATO Defense Planning Committee and Council agreed that Eurocorps were the prior defense unit of the European Union.<sup>65</sup>

NATO's 1994 Summit in Brussels concluded that the WEU is permitted to utilize NATO military equipments and headquarters when a European action is concerned. This principle was named as *Combined Joint Task Force*, CJTF. The notion of CJTF was about combining the forces of NATO, WEU and non-WEU members in order to make and keep peace. However, France again opposed this idea. Also, France demanded that the WEU should apply to NATO's military equipments whenever it needed.<sup>66</sup> In contrary to France, Britain supported for CJTF. France

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<sup>64</sup> Joanne Wright, 'France and European Security', *European Security*, vol. 2, no. 1, Spring 1993, p. 39.

<sup>65</sup> George Stein, 'The Euro-Corps and Future European Security Architecture', *European Security*, 2, no. 2, Summer 1993, p. 215.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 73-75.

reached a compromise with NATO Council in 1995 and in 1996; CJTF came into force in a modified form.<sup>67</sup>

Starting from the end of the Cold War, the disputes between France and the United Kingdom were coming to an end. France reformed her relations with NATO and accepted NATO's strength and importance for European security. Also, the UK became more desirous towards a European defense unity. In 1996, the parties came together in Berlin and reached an agreement that there should be a distinct European pillar within NATO framework. They were trying to build a European Security and Defense identity, ESDI.<sup>68</sup> ESDI was not independent from NATO but it was only an additional force of the Europeans alongside NATO in order to carry out Petersberg tasks.<sup>69</sup>

The turning point for the EU's collective security policy and integration came with Saint Malo Declaration, issued in 1998, and later Cologne and Helsinki Summits of 1999. They were a turning point for the establishment of a unified, powerful European security system. Europe was almost reshaped starting from the mid-1990s thanks to the new government established by Tony Blair government in the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom was no more reluctant to a united Europe.

Another important reason why Europe started to think seriously about a collective security organization was Kosovo War of 1999. During the war, it was the

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<sup>67</sup> David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed the Alliance's New Roles in International Security*, Washington: USIP Press, 1998, p. 397.

<sup>68</sup> Simon Duke, 'European Security and Defense Identity' in Ulrike Schumacher and Peter Lang eds., *Structure, Order, Disorder in World Politics: Conflicts, Options, Strategies in a Threatened World*, 1998, pp. 120-1.

<sup>69</sup> Stanley R. Sloan, 'The United States and European Defense' *Chaillot Papers*, No. 39, Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, April 2000, p. 12, <http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai39e.html>.

USA who provided all the military equipments, information, humanitarian aid and protection of the civilians, not the WEU.<sup>70</sup> Hence, European states realized that they have to be united in order to be powerful, secure and helpful to the civilians and other states. They discovered that they lacked both the practical and ideological unity in order to carry out their principal tasks of humanitarian aids, peacekeeping and environmental protection. Without a common foreign and security policy and a military, Europe was nothing; no power at all.

The final reason that made Europe notice its inferiority in defense and security issues was that the military industrial complexes of European states were also secondary to those of the USA. If not acted as a unity, the European states, as individual states, would be nothing compared to the USA. It was as simple as this: European states had to be integrated around a common foreign and security policy and should have a unified, powerful military to be able to intervene and operate when necessary.<sup>71</sup>

With 1998 Saint Malo Declaration, Europeans announced that a collective security and foreign policy was required. Britain seemed no more as a Euro-skeptic, Atlanticist European member anymore. Rather, Blair called for a common security policy of Europe. It was clear that Europe had to be independent from NATO, start to act as one, outside the influence of in order to be a major power. Even if there were still some minor disagreements between Britain and France, an important step had been moved through Blair's statements. Because before 1998 British officials were always in favor of the participation of NATO in European affairs in order to have a

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<sup>70</sup> Peter Van Ham, 'Europe's Common Defense Policy: Implications for the Trans-Atlantic Relationship', *Security Dialogue*, 31, no. 2, 2000, p. 216.

<sup>71</sup> Margarita Mathiopoulos and Istvan Gyarmati, 'Saint Malo and Beyond: Toward European Defense', *The Washington Quarterly* 22, no. 4, Autumn 1999, p. 67-8.

more secure Europe. However, France was constantly emphasizing a fully independent EU from both NATO and the USA. French officials were confident about the capabilities of the EU of operating without any support from NATO.<sup>72</sup>

In St. Malo, Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair agreed that common foreign and security policy is a must for the EU. All 15 members of the Union, including the former indifferent states, agreed that there should be a collective foreign and security policy-making through collective organizations and establishments. They also agreed that the EU should readily intervene when there is a crisis around the world, rather than leaving crisis-management-issues to NATO.<sup>73</sup>

The Declaration of St. Malo attracted the US officials' attention. The US officials tended to criticize the Europeans' efforts to construct a unity in security terms because they believed that Europe lacked the necessary military force when an intervention was decided to be implemented. The point is that NATO was ready to intervene with its enormous military capabilities and experience while European states were lacking experience and material requirements. Thus, Americans demanded from Europeans to invest on military more, warning them about the three D's of "Duplication, Decoupling and Discrimination".<sup>74</sup> Duplication meant that it was a waste for Europe to invest on military more when NATO was present and ready to do what Europeans intend to do. With 'decoupling', the USA wanted cooperation with the EU within the NATO framework, not a separated Union. Finally, with

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<sup>72</sup> Peter Van Ham, 'Europe's Common Defense Policy: Implications for the Trans-Atlantic Relationship', *Security Dialogue*, 31, no. 2, 2000, p. 217.

<sup>73</sup> Margarita Mathiopoulos and Istvan Gyarmati, 'Saint Malo and Beyond: Toward European Defense', *The Washington Quarterly* 22, no. 4, Autumn 1999, p. 68-9.

<sup>74</sup> Madeleine K. Albright and William Cohen, 'Washington's View: Get ESDI Right- Europe Should Beef up Its Military Capabilities', *Wall Street Journal*, March 24, 2000.

'discrimination' Madeleine Albright was emphasizing there should be no discrimination between the EU and non-EU members. Discrimination is especially important here because Turkey was a non-EU member. The US officials claimed that a united European security policy would exclude many other world states such as Turkey, Americas, Asian countries, etc... and thus it would not be effective, at all.<sup>75</sup>

The main proof of the EU remaining incapable of acting as a credible security actor in its own environment was the EU's failure in the Kosovo crises in the early 1999. The conflict came to end with the active US involvement. The EU stayed muted and could not implement a coherent policy towards any crisis until then.

As Europe were working hard to be a solid unity, NATO tried not to lose its influence on the EU through providing Europe with militaristic equipments and necessary assets, as declared in 1999 NATO Summit. The next important development in European CFSP came with the Helsinki European Council Summit of 1999. The member states enlarged the military capabilities of the EU; there were going to be 15 brigades ready, with support from the air and sea, to take action when a task introduced by Petersburg meeting. The brigades were going to have the ability to plan and operate alone with their own reconnaissance system and intelligence abilities. They decided that when NATO did not engage in an operation as a whole, the EU was going to intervene and resolve the crises or preserve peace if necessary.<sup>76</sup>

Helsinki Summit did not create a powerful and unified European Army but still it created a system, which should be ready to take action when a crisis arises. But

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<sup>75</sup> Stanley R. Sloan, 'The United States and European Defense' *Chaillot Papers*, No. 39, Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, April 2000, p. 17, <http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai39e.html>.

<sup>76</sup> Alexander Moens, 'Developing a European Intervention Force', *International Journal*, Spring, 2000, p. 264.

still, NATO was always there, with a huge militaristic capacity, ready to intervene and solve the crises. Helsinki Summit also did not result in an allowance for the EU to be absolutely free to benefit from the equipments and assets of NATO. It was still a NATO initiative whether to let the EU utilize its assets.<sup>77</sup>

In addition, it should be also highlighted that the EU did not only try to provide its security by founding CFSP and ESDP, but it also tried to accelerate and made the integration process irreversible. Moreover it also tried to spread its values and norms to the candidate countries. The EU was also ambitious to convert the peripheral countries according to its identity and values.

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<sup>77</sup> Peter Van Ham, 'Europe's Common Defense Policy: Implications for the Trans-Atlantic Relationship', *Security Dialogue*, 31, no. 2, 2000, p. 219; Alexander Moens, 'Developing a European Intervention Force', *International Journal*, Spring, 2000, p. 264.

### *3.3. European Security Understanding after 9/11*

European states gained a great deal of conscience after the US World Trade Center and Pentagon were hit by terrorists. 9/11/2001 was a milestone for the whole world of states. The international community knew that overall security degree had diminished dramatically for the world.

]After 11 September, following issues began to be more important considering the security of the EU. EU began to pay much more attention to any event that takes place in the Middle East and North Africa. The reason why the EU has began to consider these regions in a more serious way is that these regions are not only close to Europe but also there is an immense migration to this continent from the above mentioned territories. Moreover there is a huge Muslim population living in European countries.

As a result of security concerns stemming from these regions the EU has accelerated its efforts in order to convert norms and values of these regions. For this purposes some initiatives such as Mediterranean Program, Interfaith/inter-civilizations Dialogue was put into practice. Detailed agreements were signed with almost all of those countries. The reason laying behind these initiatives was to build good-governance in the related regions so that formation of terrorist organizations can be prevented.

The characteristics of the relation between the EU and the USA also gained importance. The relations to be established with the USA became more important than ever for the security purposes of the EU. In such a situation some vital questions revealed like the following. Should the EU strictly follow the USA based policies or

had it better begin to search for new models and alternatives? Is the USA trying to weaken the EU by causing conflicts among the members of the union? Do the policies of the US towards the Middle East raise the security threats for the EU? In the post-11 September era, European leaders began to deal with such questions more seriously. Here, it can be concluded that they are still in search of answers.

In this case, Turkey's prospective membership to the EU became more significant for the security concerns of the latter. The way the EU regards Turkey became influential for the success of European policies related to the Muslim world. The EU authorities question whether Turkey's membership to the union can be sufficient for the credibility of the EU upon the region or whether her membership would affect the newly enlarged union in a negative way and slow down the integration process of the EU.

In the context of the EU, most of the Europeans were disapproval of Bush administration's policies. Iraq invasion was probably the culmination of the US government's aggressive policies. Bush's war against terrorism did not help mute the terrorists and create democratic states in the Middle East, but it caused more feelings and situations of insecurity around the world. EU members, seriously, recognized that they have to transform the union in a way that it would become powerful and unified enough to deal with the US policies and not fail to intervene if necessary.<sup>78</sup> Europe saw that EU was far from being a major player in world politics so European states began to reform the EU.

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<sup>78</sup> Cristopher Flood, Some European Thoughts in the Wake of 9/11, *South Central Review*, Vol. 19, No. 2/3, 9/11, Summer-Autumn 2002, pp. 51-4.

In 2003, 12 December, the EU issued the European Security Strategy document for “A Secure Europe in a Better World” in Brussels. The members declared terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failed states and organized crime as the key security issues. They decided on the adoption of a “European Arrest Warrant” and strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency. The main point was that in the era of globalization, they decided to build a stronger and secure Europe in order not to be vulnerable to the crises and terrorism. They declared that the Cold War was over and the threat perception was not the fear of being invaded any more. The world has changed, so did the threat perceptions and security understandings. They decided to be more “active” with 160b Euro spending on defense expenditures; they also decided to make the military capability more flexible, mobile and effective. The NATO-EU cooperation was said to be beneficial for such a powerful militaristic capability.<sup>79</sup>

The EU enlarged geographically and is continuing to do so, it has a single currency, it has a great economic power and it is successful in helping the countries experiencing crisis. The EU is good at carrying out humanitarian aid, but it is not when it comes to military intervention and protection of the civil population when a crisis or invasion take place, as we saw in Iraq and also in the recent Lebanon crisis. It fails to intervene and avoid the civilians’ losses because it is not a unity that is capable of deciding as one and intervening with an army.

The rejection of the European Constitution draft by France and the Netherlands was also an indication to the difficulty of European states forming a coherent,

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<sup>79</sup> *A Secure Europe For a Better World*,  
<http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf#search=%22european%20security%20strategy%22>

powerful unity. The member-states are still in favor of sovereignty, national identity, unwilling of the membership of other poor and crowded countries. The criteria set by Copenhagen Summit complicate the membership process to the EU much more. Turkey is also striving to implement the social, economic and political practices demanded by the Copenhagen Criteria. Instructions of membership are getting harder and unification through a common constitution seems to be impossible. Europe does not seem to be powerful enough to challenge the United States for now. The irony is that Europeans know that they can stop the USA if unified; however, they are afraid of losing their own identity and sovereignty.

European states' attempt and anxiety to develop a coherent, common foreign and security policy along with a multinational army, was a dissatisfaction for the USA because if a powerful, unified Europe existed, US-led NATO would lose importance, the USA would cease to be the sole super-power of the world, Bush would have to end his arbitrary policy decisions, and commercially, too, the USA would be badly wounded. Briefly, with a powerful Europe, the USA would have to give up the leadership of the world. The three D's were an implication of the USA's unwillingness of a strong EU.

### ***3.4. Conclusion***

From all these developments and points, it can be concluded that Europe, although it could establish an economically powerful union which is good at humanitarian aid and significantly important in world trade and diplomacy, has not established a multinational army that is able to intervene and operate, yet. However, the Helsinki Summit has been an important move towards the foundation of such a multinational army since it has declared that the EU is capable of having such a large

militaristic force to carry out Petersburg tasks. After all, crisis management was adopted by the European states as the number one task. It is also seen that all the impediments on the way to the unification in terms of a common foreign and security policy are being solved one by one as the situation of Nordic countries was regulated successfully.

Although there are such developments and achievements on one hand, on the other, we have various problems and deadlocks that the European states have to tackle with in order to be a strong unity. First of all, Europe is extremely inexperienced about militaristic intervention and crisis resolution. Both in technological and militaristic terms, Europe is secondary to the USA. As we take the diminishing European investment on armament, the future does not bring enough hope for a technologically and numerously powerful, multinational army for Europe. Secondly, European states, traditionally, do not seem to form a coherent unity and give up their sovereignty in favor of a supranational organization. Each state is of different language, culture, having distinct national goals and ideologies. There are a significant number of Euro-skeptics who want to protect the status quo and not let the EU become superior to the individual governments. The rejection of the European Constitution well proves this fact. However, it is a fact that the EU has to be a supra-national organization in order to practice a common foreign and security policy that will be the guarantee of its power, major player role in the world politics and a challenger to the USA. If remained intergovernmental, the EU will suffer from slow decision-making process, be a scene of disagreements and deadlocks, remain as powerless and not go any further than being an economic power. Another impediment on the way to a powerful EU is that European states' policy makers want to avoid militaristic spending as much as they can since all European Union members are welfare states.

The Iraq invasion, the rejection of the Constitution and the recent Lebanon crisis demonstrate clearly that Europe has still a long way to go but also they show that Europe has to achieve getting unified and being one, applying a common foreign and security policy in order to be a major player in world politics. Economic unity is not enough for the EU to be powerful in politics. September 11 changed the world security picture undeniably and Europe has to and/or will have to face this truth as soon as possible.

The question of whether Europe possesses an independent common security identity and culture from those of the USA the individual European states can be answered that Europe has not constructed such a pan-European collective identity but she is on her way to create one. The European states, we stated, had to cooperate and integrate in order to be a major international and regional power, end the US superiority and eliminate the ethnic, national conflicts, environmental threats, nuclear armament proliferation, the instability the rogue states of the Middle East and the former Soviet states experience, the illegal trafficking of the Eastern Europeans, illegal immigration and so on. Many of the threat perceptions of the EU are not perceived as threat by the USA. Europe, in order to eliminate her threat perceptions, is improving the cooperation among her members. Cooperation, however, is not enough for EU if she wants to be a major power and eliminate all security threats she has to deal with. A collective pan-European identity has to be constructed through a European military and common foreign and security policy, only if done so; Europe can be a major player in world politics.

## **CHAPTER III**

### **THE EVOLUTION OF TURKEY'S SECURITY CULTURE IN LINE WITH THE EU ACCESSION PROCESS**

In this chapter, Turkey's security understanding from Tanzimat to the present day will be examined particularly in the light of the changes that have taken place during the Europeanization process. . It will be seen what the place of the EU and the West in Kemalist principles is. Another goal is to demonstrate that Turkey's security understanding made it difficult for her to make the reforms that the EU accession process has demanded.

The question is how the EU integration process has affected the threat perceptions, security identity and security policies of Turkey. Another important question is whether the EU membership process has diminished Turkey's security or not.

## **4.1. Main Characteristics of Turkey's Security Culture**

### **4.1.1. Importance of Geography and Geopolitics in Turkey's Security Culture**

Traditionally, Turkey could feel herself secure as long as she feels herself as a part of Europe, the West. For Turkey, a homogenous and unitary state idea has been the basis of her security. Secularism was a constitutive element of Turkey's security culture. Turkey perceived multiculturalism, federal state order and Islamic states as threats. Until 1990s, Turkey and the EU did not have any dispute over these issues. The end of the Cold War, however, was going to change the security relations between the two.

The geopolitical richness that Turkey possesses is capable of carrying her not only to a role of regional power but also a major power in a globalized world. Turkish borders are located on a key point of the world: she is in the middle of three different continents: Europe, Asia and Africa; she has the Caucasus in the north, Balkans in the west, the Arab World and Israel in the south and east; she has costs to the Mediterranean and Black Sea, which means she is, simultaneously, counted as a major power in four regions. As this is the case, Turkey has to have a very good intelligence and diplomatic staff who are capable of adapting her into the new system of international and regional communities when necessary. The goals of international community and the security understandings are changeable, thus Turkey is one of the key actors who have to be ready to adjust to the new system and survive.

When we analyze the historical background of Anatolia, we would easily see that this particular land has always attracted the masses, Byzantine, Seljukis, the

Ottomans have all chosen Anatolia as their home because it was a fact that Anatolia, geographically and politically, was a key strategic point for all these states. It can be claimed that, Anatolia's geography is also a curse because it had been invaded and plundered many times throughout the history.<sup>80</sup> Although the sea borders make Turkey very fragile to the attacks from outside, the eastern part of Anatolia makes it hard for the enemy to invade because Anatolia is surrounded by enormously high mountains in the east with very hard climate conditions. Briefly, Turkey, with its powerful mountainous, natural defense in the east and fragile, powerless insecurity on the straits and her powerful militaristic power, is of great concern for international security studies.<sup>81</sup>

Another reason why geography occupies a vital place in Turkey's security identity is that nearly all of Turkey's neighbors gained their independence following the end of the Ottoman Empire and covet on Turkey's territory. The countries with which Turkey has borders tend to interpret the Ottoman rule as a colonial experience and they tend to regard Turkey as the heir of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey has to defend itself against many rivals at the very same time.

#### **4.1.2. Role of the Turkish Armed Forces**

Traditionally speaking, the role of the Turkish militaristic force was of vital importance for a solid, successful security policy of Turkey. Even though military is not that important at the moment as it was during the democratization process in the early Republican era and until the very beginning of the new millennium, military

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<sup>80</sup> F. Vali, *Bridges across the Bosphorus, the Foreign Policy of Turkey*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 46, 1971.

<sup>81</sup> M. Aydın, 'Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical Framework and Traditional Inputs', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 1999, 35/4, pp. 152-65.

can be claimed to be the backbone of the Turkish security and a guarantee to the survival of the regime and the state. The importance of the Turkish Armed Forces stems from the fact that the militaristic forces were both the founders of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic. Throughout its history there has been always a close relation with the nation and the army. Basic policies, institutions and actual agendas of the country have always been determined by the army. Turkey had experienced two coup d'états in 1960 and 1980 and a semi-coup d'état in 1971. Military, despite having been criticized sometimes for its heavy influence on Turkish political environment it is the most respectable institution in the eyes of Turkish people due to the fact that it succeeded to remain as unpoliticized, respectable, and incorruptible while the people, officials, even the police, were/are divided and polarized.<sup>82</sup>

The unique feature of Turkish security culture is that neither civilians nor the military powers play the leading role. However, the role of the civilians has increased from the second half of 1990s in parallel to the acceleration of Turkey's accession process with the EU. After all, the civilian decision makers still perceive the militaristic force as the main security tool. It is undeniable that in order to have a proper deterrence system, one has to possess an intimidating militaristic force. Deterrence may be claimed to be the first step of security alongside a powerful intelligence service. Hence, the respect of society, the political actors' dependence on military in order to provide security and the traditional background of Turkey point to the important role of military in Turkey's national security. Military is still

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<sup>82</sup> Dankwart A. Rustow, 'The Military in Turkey' in D. A. Rustow and D. E. Robert (eds), *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1964, pp. 352-88; W. Hale, *The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey*, London: Croom Helm, 1981; George S. Harris, 'The Role of Military in Turkish Politics', *Middle East Journal*, 1965, 19/1, pp. 50-66.

the body that is making the decisions behind the scenes.<sup>83</sup> Military officials of National Security Council assume that the civilian authority is inferior to the military. The secularist, nationalist, republican and integrative principles of Atatürk could only be restored thanks to the military.<sup>84</sup>

Even though democracy was paralyzed by military interventions, NSC was insistent on the fact that the country was face to face with domestic enemies. The public enemy number one was Islamist fundamentalists and two was the divisive Kurdish nationalists. Radical Islamists and Kurds were declared as the main target by the National Security Council in 1997 with the international threats were assumed as Greece in the West because of the Aegean islands and Syria in the south because of her supportive policy for the separatist terrorists. Later, nationalist mafia was added onto this black list in 1999.<sup>85</sup> Such steps taken by the military force regarding the security policy of Turkey in 1990s can be given as good examples to highlight the role of the armed forces play in the formation of Turkey's security culture. Weren't it for the military forces, radical Islamism and separatist Kurdish movement might have not been included to the security agenda of Turkey.

As the revisionist approach has claimed, Turkey, as an underdeveloped country, had to rest on its militaristic power because she at first had to eliminate the anti-regime and separatist movements in the inside. Domestic clashes and conflicts had been the number one threat for Turkey for decades even though her geopolitical location was also very fragile. Military also rested on this revisionist approach

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<sup>83</sup> G. Jenkins, *Context and Circumstance: The Turkish Military and Politics*, Adelphi Papers 337, London: IISS, 2001; N. Narlı, 'Civil-Military Relations in Turkey', *Turkish Studies*, 2000, 1/1, pp. 117-20.

<sup>84</sup> N. Narlı, 'Civil-Military Relations in Turkey', *Turkish Studies*, 2000, 1/1, p. 108.

<sup>85</sup> A. Karaosmanoglu, 'The Evolution of National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey', *Journal of International Affairs*, 2000, 54/1, p. 213.

because the officials continued to stress the internal threats and dangers. The society also recognized that only an intimidating, non-politicized body of generals was incapable of saving the people and the regime. The historical and traditional importance of the military also helped this enormously important role of the military. The armed officials, so did the people, more rested on military rather than the civil rulers and societies.

#### **4.1.3. The Realpolitik Culture**

In order to evaluate Turkish security culture, one should point out to its realpolitik culture. The Ottoman Empire, after the occupation of Istanbul in 1453, started to be the hegemonic power in its environment. It was the decider in all European states' foreign affairs. Economically, politically and militarily Europe and Ottoman Empire were in great interaction and cooperation, with Ottoman Empire being the superior. Europe was, as always, divided between the British, Dutch, French, Spanish and Austria-Hungarian Empire and it was the Ottoman Empire's alliance that was decisive for balance or imbalance.

From 1299 till 1699 the realpolitik culture was offensive in nature. The goal was to expand territory, most of the time towards Europe. Being more powerful meant possessing larger territories. Since 1699, when the European powers put an end to their internal divisions and outpaced the Ottoman Empire in terms of economic achievements and military technology, the realpolitik security culture of the Empire transformed into a defensive one. The goal became to preserve as much territory as possible against the military incursions of the European powers. This tradition continued till the end of the Ottoman Empire. The Turkish Republic inherited this defensive realpolitik security culture from the Ottoman Empire.

#### **4.1.4. Westernization**

Traditionally speaking, Westernization has been a security strategy. The goal has been to become Western and to get recognized as such by the Westerners in order to feel secure. The aim has been not to experience the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire at the hands of the Westerners. During the last century of the Ottoman Empire, in order to catch up with the technological and militaristic developments in Europe, Ottomans attempted to employ a westernized policy in the areas of technology, education and military. The Ottoman officials believed that the only way to survive, thus for security, was through applying a powerful use of technology and military equipment and experience. Starting from the 17<sup>th</sup> century, administrative structure of Ottomans was modified, exemplifying the French. Ottoman officials recognized that with Westphalia, a nation-state notion was created; which notion was obviously against the structure of Ottoman Empire who was ruling over various different ethnic and religious groups. Ottoman Empire understood that the independence-desiring ethnic groups had to be muted and satisfied. Thus, in order to eliminate these domestic conflicts and intervention from the outside, Sultan gave more and more privileges to the non-Muslim population. Westernized legal, administrative and tax-collection system, however, did not become sufficient for the non-Muslim population, whose only concern was independence and sovereignty as Westphalia Peace promised for.

### **4.2. Turkey's Security Culture and the Europeanization Process**

#### **4.2.1. The Inter-War Period**

The national security policies pursued during both phases had the common objective of survival but with the following difference: during the first phase before Lausanne, to maintain and secure the Ottoman Empire within defensible borders,

that is, to survive by prolonging the life of the empire was the main objective; during the second phase, insistence on the international recognition of the independence and sovereign equality of the new Turkish state and survival through collective security arrangements was the main policy pursued. In both cases, Turkish governments played the great powers against one another and exploited the balance of power and the divisions among their opponents, but did not hesitate also to seek assistance from them, be it economic or military, to remedy the deficiencies of the country.

After Lausanne, the Turkish decision makers, just like their Ottoman predecessors, also exploited the balance of power and the divisions among their opponents. The main difference from the Ottoman days was that the new Turkish state was far more internally homogeneous and that its rulers set themselves to limited and achievable goals. This was the time for “nation building” at home and “peace building” abroad.

In such a case, to preserve peace, Turkey had to look now for alternative forms of security. Turkey faced a range of options similar to the Ottoman policymakers in the 19th century. They could either stay out of alliances, relying on the balance of power to maintain security, or it could actively seek an alliance with one of the main European powers, or a coalition of them, but on the winning side this time.

#### **4.2.2. The Second World War Period**

Evaluation of the Turkish national security policy during the Second World War between 1939 and 1945 requires, in the first place, an analysis of the policy maker profiles of the time. The leaders who were governing the state at the time,

had already experienced the most important stages of the close history like the First World War, Turkish War of Independence and foundation of the Turkish Republic and they were still remembering difficulties of war and their own services. For this reason, their first priority was to keep Turkey out of this war.<sup>86</sup>

During the WWII Turkish officials were very cautious in their security policies; they had to establish a balance between the sides. Given her important geopolitical location, both sides increased pressure on Turkey in order to transmit their soldiers and military equipment. In this period Turkey was approaching to definite neutrality.

When fate of the war began to turn towards the Allies through the end of the year 1942, Turkey adopted a tendency more inclined towards the Allies while preserving its neutrality.<sup>87</sup> The main objective of the policy that was based on Turkey-England Treaty and Turkey-German Non-aggression Treaty was still keeping Turkey out of the war as long as Turkey is not subjected to a direct attract. Turkey utilized especially this last article of the Treaty very well during the war and managed to avoid from taking part in the war together with England and France by stating its military insufficiency and demanding the amounts stated in the last article of the Treaty provision of which were very difficult for the Allies.<sup>88</sup>

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86 Hale, William M. *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000*; Frank Cass London; Portland 2000  
Koçak, Cemil *Türkiye'de milli şef dönemi, (1938-1945) : dönemin iç ve dış politika* Yurt Yayınevi  
Ankara 1986

87 Weisband, Edward; *Turkish Foreign Policy 1943-1945. Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics. International Affairs Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-*, Vol. 50, No. 2. Apr., 1974

88 Weisband, Edward; *Turkish Foreign Policy 1943-1945. Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics. International Affairs Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-*, Vol. 50, No. 2. Apr., 1974

1943 was the most critical year of the Second World War for Turkey. The Allies had begun to dominate the war and they had increased their pressure on Turkey in order to force it to carry out its obligations. On the other hand, even though the Axis Powers were in a defense position they were still close enough to damage Turkey.<sup>89</sup> Amid such increasing pressure, Turkey conducted a successful foreign policy, which balanced English and Soviet ambitions on her straits and eastern provinces: Kars and Ardahan.

Turkish National Security Policy in the Second World War cannot be outlined simply by saying that Turkey preferred to stay neutral. When the issue is more deeply examined, it is seen that staying neutral was never easy when it is examined from the point of alliance choices of small powers, the key theme of the policy in that era was implementing a multilateral policy through a ready, powerful army in order to be secure.

Contrary to the idea, which emphasizes that “Turkey was neutral during the Second World War, it did not take part in the war between the Allies and Axis Forces and stayed completely out of the war.”, Turkey showed that it could contribute to such an immense war all over the world by staying neutral due to its special status despite the fact that great powers applied to all kinds of resorts including pressure and threat in order to obtain support of Turkey.

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89 Hale, William M. *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000*; Frank Cass London; Portland 2000  
Aydın, Mustafa *Türk Dış Politikası Kaynakçası (1923-2000)*; Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi  
Ankara .

Gönlübol, Mehmet. *Olaylarla Türk Dış politikası, 1919-1965*. Dışişleri Bakanlığı. Ankara 1968

#### 4.2.3. *The Cold War Era*

The era of the Cold War helped Turkey and Europe build good relations since both parties needed each other during such a tense time. The world was divided into two, all the states, except the two superpowers the USA and the SU, had to choose between the West and the East. Turkey, valuing Ataturk's principle of modernization and westernization, chose to become an ally of the West against the Communist threat. Europe was also desirous to be allied with Turkey because Turkey had historical, ethnic and cultural ties with the Eastern European states that were under the influence of Communism. Without Turkey, Europe could not have avoided the Soviet Union from spreading their 'evil' ideas to the further Mediterranean and the Arab World. Also, Turkey's militaristic force was undeniably powerful as she proved during the Korean War. Thus, during the Cold War, both parties were in favor of constructing good relations and being allies.<sup>90</sup>

When we come to the threat perceptions of Turkey during the Cold War, it could be claimed that the threat perceptions of the EU, Western European Union, and Turkey were similar. Both parties' number one enemy was the Soviet Union and the ideology of communism. As a newly established democratic republic, Turkey was very cautious towards Soviet Union, with whom there had been a good deal of enmity and distrust. On the other hand, Turkey was very desirous of a modernized, westernized image and identity, for which she needed to be allied with the West. These were the reasons behind the Cold War alliance between Europe and Turkey. Turkey became a member of NATO, Council of Europe and an associate member of

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<sup>90</sup> John Roper, 'The West and Turkey: Varying Roles, Common Interests', *The International Spectator*, Vol. 34, No. 1, March 1999, [http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/iai/iai\\_99roj1.html](http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/iai/iai_99roj1.html).

the WEU.<sup>91</sup> Turkey was very ambitious in her Europeanization efforts during the Cold War.

#### *4.2.4. The Post-Cold War Era*

In 1991, the Cold War ended with the fall of Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War has also marked two departure points for Turkey from the EU, the first of which was the European Union's decision to expand its borders giving priority to the former Soviet countries rather than attaching her Cold War ally, Turkey. The second reason behind the resentment of Turkey lies in Europe's changing threat perceptions, and thus tendency to exclude Turkey from the membership.

During the Cold War, as pointed above, Turkey's geo-political and strategic locations came very attractive to the Europeans since she was located on a key area, having borders to the Soviet Union, Arab World, Caucasus and Balkan region. Thus, she seemed to be the ideal ally who could stop Soviet Union to expand her influence.

Turkish military staged a remarkable performance under NATO Command in Korea, Kosovo and Bosnia. Turkish contribution to the European Security was undeniable during the Cold War. However, Europeans only rewarded Turkish alliance and contributions with only making her an Associate Member into the WEU with the Treaty of European Union in 1991, alongside Poland, Norway, Iceland, Czech Republic, Hungary.<sup>92</sup> These Associate Members had the right to participate

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<sup>91</sup> Sadi Erguvenc, 'Turkey's Security Perceptions', *Perceptions*, Vol. 3, No. 2, August 1998.

<sup>92</sup> Munevver Cebeci, 'A Delicate Process of Participation: The Question of Participation of WEU Associate Members in Decision-Making for EU-Led Petersberg Operations, with Special Reference to Turkey', *Occasional Papers*, Institute for Security Studies-Western European Union, Nov. 1999, p. 3.

all the meetings of the WEU Council but had no veto rights although had the right to propose a policy. Another right of the Associate Members was that they could be included in a military intervention with their armies. They were also allowed to be informed and utilize the intelligence services of the WEU on the same basis with the full members. They were expected to support the financial spending of the WEU.<sup>93</sup>

The WEU gave its associate members the right to decide independently on the issues that are related with their own security situation. Meaning, Turkey had the initiative to decide on Cyprus, Aegean Sea Isles and Kurdish Issues with no intervention from the WEU.

Until 1997, Associate Membership in the WEU was not much of a problem for Turkey's security. However 1997's Amsterdam Treaty almost collapsed the Turkey-EU relations with its insecure provisions for Turkey. CFSP was improved more with the Treaty that the WEU was going to be integrated into the EU as the security and defense leg of the Union. Most importantly, the Treaty changed the Associate Members' status for worse. The question whether they will be included in military operations where NATO assets are not utilized was very crucial for Associate Members, especially for Turkey. Even if the other members' geo-strategic locations and threat perceptions were not as of vital importance as those of Turkey, Turkey had to be very cautious about this question's answer. If EU would use NATO assets whenever it wanted, then Turkey would be left insecure as she was a non-EU country and had many threat perceptions such as Cyprus, Aegean Sea Isles and the Kurdish problem. The Amsterdam Treaty had muted the Associate Members

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<sup>93</sup> Ibid, pp. 4-5.

in terms of the decision making process of where and how to intervene.<sup>94</sup> Using NATO assets in case a crisis breaks out was important for Europe because European states did not have a prepared, powerful military force while NATO does.

Turkey, however, was reluctant to such a development. She was already an important member of NATO since 1950s. Membership into NATO was very important for Turkish Republic since it was a Western organization and a proof of Turkey's ambition of modernization/westernization. Turkey's primary security concern was to preserve its unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty. Thus NATO, not the WEU or EU could provide such an international secure environment and erase the instabilities and crises the states experience with its enormous militaristic capability.<sup>95</sup>

EU needed to take the approval of all NATO members, including Turkey in order to use NATO assets when necessary. Turkey, after 1999's Helsinki Summit, not to let the relations with the EU get tense, declared her concerns as the following quotation reveals:

"...NATO...has proved its effectiveness in creating a secure and stable Europe in the last 50 years. What Turkey would urge is that the idea of the ESDI should not be contemplated solely on the logic of integration and institution-building, but as a genuine and realistic response to the strategic facts and requirements of an uncertain security environment. Turkey has confirmed her readiness to support the ESDI in operational, as well as political terms."<sup>96</sup>

Turkey had declared her intentions to be a part of ESDI but she did not want the WEU to be superior to NATO in military terms. Turkey did not have a say in the

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<sup>94</sup> Ibid, p. 16.

<sup>95</sup> Huseyin Bagci, Jackson James and Ludger Kuhnhardt, eds., *Parameters of Partnership: The US-Turkey-Europe*, Baden-Baden: Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999, p. 234; Heinz Kramer, *A Changing Turkey: Challenge to Europe and the United States*, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, Inter-American Development Bank, 2000, p. 212.

<sup>96</sup> <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/af/secure.htm>.

WEU and her security would be in danger if the WEU or the EU had the right to use NATO assets and then decided to solve the issues of Cyprus, Aegean Sea Islands according to the wishes of Greece, who was already an EU member. Turkey, after the Helsinki Summit of 1999 accelerated her attempts to achieve the criteria set by the EU Council to be a full member. However, still, Europe does not seem to be desirous to include Turkey into the Union as a full member.

Turkey is insistent that any operation in Europe would be related to Turkey's security. If Turkey remains outside the European Community when Greece was a part of it, then she would start to see the EU as a threat to her sovereignty and security. She desires to have a guarantee status in the EU in order to eliminate her threat perceptions about Cyprus and the Island in the Aegean Sea.<sup>97</sup> Turkish leaders state that Turkey is ready to combine her forces to the Rapid Reaction Force of the EU with at least 20.000 troops available.<sup>98</sup> After all, she had already shown her friendship with the EU for the rest of the Cold War. Thus as the following quotation declares, Turkey was ready to reject EU's use of NATO assets if EU continued to exclude Turkey from the European security perspective:

“...the EU would require Turkey's consent to use NATO assets and capabilities...that each request would be decided on a case-by-case basis and through consensus.”<sup>99</sup>

In 2000, The Secretary General of NATO, Lord Robertson well summarized the Turkish fragile security perceptions and her important geo-strategic situation:

“...we all need Turkey. Its proximity to the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East and the Mediterranean puts Turkey at the center of a vital strategic area...virtually all military scenarios involve Turkey...if the crisis is very serious, NATO will be involved – and that includes Turkey. If the

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<sup>97</sup> Michel Evans, 'Turks Block Development of EU Army', *Times*, 15 December 2000, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/0,,20-51726,00.html>; Michael R. Gordon, 'Turkey Offers Troops for New European Force, with a Provision', *New York Times*, 22 November 2000.

<sup>98</sup> Joseph Fitchett, 'Turkey Puts Roadblock in EU Force Negotiations', *International Herald Tribune*, 26 January 2001.

<sup>99</sup> <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/af/secure.htm>.

crisis is less prone to escalation, but still requires a significant amount of force, then the EU may lead, but only with the lower end of the spectrum, the EU may act autonomously but will want to take into account eventual contributions by Turkey. In any case, Turkey needs to be involved – because NATO assets are required, because Turkish contributions are needed, or because the operation takes place in a region close to Turkey. In other words, the military realities of crisis management will ensure that Turkey will play a role commensurate with its weight as a major security actor.”<sup>100</sup>

Therefore, Turkey was simply insistent on her veto since she saw such a use of NATO assets as a threat to her own security. She demanded to participate in the decision making process regarding the military interventions. In 2000, Turkey announced that she was ready with her military capabilities to join the ESDP with 5000 troops, war planes and ships.<sup>101</sup> Europe, on the other side, was insistent on not including Turkey in the decision making process.<sup>102</sup> Thus, although the EU members reached an agreement to utilize NATO assets and capabilities, Turkey immediately vetoed the decision as a NATO member and European states’ decisions went astray.

In 2001’s Brussels meeting the EU members warned Turkey to cooperate with the EU in the issue of the use of NATO assets if she wanted to integrate into Europe. Leaders of Britain, France and the Netherlands stressed that despite the breach of the agreement due to Turkish veto, Europe could still achieve to develop her CFSP. Greece went further and claimed that it was time that Europe started look for an alternative way to develop CFSP outside NATO.<sup>103</sup> The USA was also

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<sup>100</sup> Lord Robertson, ‘Turkey and a European Security and Defense Identity’, *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 3, No. 1, March 2001, pp. 48-9, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2000/s001123a.htm>.

<sup>101</sup> Michael R. Gordon, ‘Turkey Offers Troops for New European Force, with a Provision’, *New York Times*, 22 November 2000.

<sup>102</sup> [http://www.euobs.com/index.phtml?selected\\_topic=13&action=view&article\\_id=1183](http://www.euobs.com/index.phtml?selected_topic=13&action=view&article_id=1183).

<sup>103</sup> ‘ESDP Message from Europe to Turkey’, <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/85347.asp>.

involved in the issue that she did not want a tense relationship between the EU and Turkey as Turkey's geo-strategic location has always been of her concern.

Same year, in Budapest, Turkish Prime Minister İsmail Cem gave the final verdict that although Turkey wanted good relations with Europe and wanted to be a part of the military construction of Europe's CFSP, Europe rejected to include Turkey from the decision making process. He also pointed out that Turkey, as she has a very critical geo-political and strategic location, had to consider her threat perceptions and veto Europe's use of NATO assets without the consent of Turkey.<sup>104</sup>

Eventually, in 2001's Laeken meeting, a compromise was reached between Turkey and the EU. Turkey was going to retain her WEU Associate Member rights and no military operation regarding Turkey's security situation will be carried out. Thus, Cyprus and Nagharno-Karabagh Crisis were omitted from the security agenda of the EU.<sup>105</sup> This issue –Turkey's place in ESDI/P- was finally resolved in 2002 Copenhagen Summit. The EU officials demanded many reforms from Turkey and also it was decided that Turkey's security agenda will be paid attention when the EU plans an intervention. If the intervention includes some area of Turkish security interests, then Turkey will be the authority and the EU would not make an intervention. Although this problem has been resolved, other problems were going to shadow the relations between the EU and Turkey.

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<sup>104</sup> <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/85845>.

<sup>105</sup> Ugur Sefkat, 'The Military Explained the Aim of the EU', 'Agreement in ESDP' <http://ntvmsnbc.com/news/99508.asp>; <http://ntvmsnbc.com/news/99924.asp>.

#### *4.2.5. Divergent Security Perceptions of Turkey and the EU*

The end of the Cold War even increased Turkey's geo-strategic importance and her threat perceptions. Turkey, adopting Ataturk's "Peace at home, peace abroad", gave the priority in her security agenda to the protection of territorial integrity and national sovereignty.<sup>106</sup> In this regard, NATO was considered as the provider of security in Europe and the rest of the World, while the EU was seen as a model for modernization and improving the economical conditions of Turkey and the fellow European states.<sup>107</sup> Turkey has always depicted Turkey as the guarantor of peace and stability in the world.

Turkey's main threat perceptions are again about the protection of her national integrity. The separatist terror organization, PKK, is one of the top issues of the security agenda of Turkey. As a country, being a part of four regions simultaneously, she has to build good relations and remain secure with Balkan, Middle Eastern, European and Caucasus countries. Turkey is in the middle of fragile, instable regions and also she has to deal with Cyprus issue and the Aegean Islands problem.

Also, Russia continues to threaten the Turkish security with the pipelines issue and the conflicts in the Caucasus and the Central Asia. The ties between Turkey and the Turkic countries of the region force Turkey to take action when there is a clash between Russia and them. Also, there are still Russian forces on Armenian borders. There are allocation issues in the gas pipelines of Caspian that Russia sells her gas to Turkey very expensively and also Russia wants to exclude

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<sup>106</sup> Sadi Erguvenc, 'Turkey's Security Perceptions', *Perceptions*, Vol. 3, No. 2, August 1998.

<sup>107</sup> Ali L. Karaosmanoglu, 'NATO Enlargement and the South: A Turkish Perspective', *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 20, No. 2, June 1998.

Turkey from the road of gas and oil transportation, which is again an important threat to Turkish economic and strategic situation. Another problem with Russia is that Turkey suffers from illegal trafficking and Russia's proliferation of nuclear weapons. As the following quotation reveals, Turkey's security perceptions are a lot complicated and bigger in amount than those of the EU states:

"Turkey...in the zone of Maximum Danger will undoubtedly have a different threat perception than the Netherlands...the zone of Maximum Peace. Turkey is likely to put more emphasis on NATO's traditional collective defense tasks, while the Netherlands will emphasize NATO's crisis response operations, including peacekeeping."<sup>108</sup>

The main threat perception of the EU is the possible violent ethnic and national conflicts as the crises in Kosovo and Bosnia. Secondly, European security agenda places the proliferation of nuclear armament at the very top. The rogue states of the Middle East and also the South African states, hence, are being watched by the EU very cautiously. Thirdly, the EU has to deal with the Eastern Europeans' illegal migration, human trafficking, and drug trafficking, illegal trade. Fourthly, organized crime and international terrorism continue to remain in the EU's security agenda. And finally there are environmental problems resulting from the industrialization, military operations and transportation.<sup>109</sup>

It should be pointed here that the proliferation of nuclear weapons is not a prior security concern of the EU actually. While Turkey has borders with Iran, on whom the US plans an intervention, the European states are geographically away from the Middle East and also they prefer to resolve the problems with the Eastern Europe at first place. However, Turkey has many critical security issues that constitute a threat to her integrity and security such as Kurdish problem, the Middle

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<sup>108</sup> Rob de Wijk, Bram Boxhoorn, and Nikolaas Hoekstra, *NATO After Kosovo*, Breda: Tilburg University Press, 2000, p. 4.

<sup>109</sup> Heinz Kramer, *A Changing Turkey: Challenge to Europe and the United States*, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, Inter-American Development Bank, 2000, p. 206.

Eastern states' WMD, the wars that are fought on her borders such as the two Iraqi wars, the Cyprus issue, the Aegean islands issue, terrorism, low economic conditions, economic crises, and so forth.

Firstly, the Nagharno-Karabagh crisis was viewed differently by the EU and Turkey. While Turkey had historical and cultural relations with Azerbaijani population, Europe did not. And secondly, during and after the Persian Crisis of 1991, Europe did not respect the Turkish cautious attitude towards the Kurdish population. Also, the War devastated Turkish economy, which the Europeans did not even compensate.

The Cyprus issue is one of the most significant issues in Turkey's security agenda. After 1960, Turkish and Greek citizens started to live together on the island with Britain, Turkey and Greece being the guarantor states. However, after the violent revolts, in 1974, the island was divided into two. The problem arises from the fact that while the Greek Government in the South is recognized to be legitimate internationally, Turkish Government of the Northern Cyprus is not. The UN is also included in the issue, but there is no concrete result, yet. The probable membership of Greek Cypriots would further complicate the relations between Turkey, Greece and also with the EU.

Turkey's geo-strategic location is exceptional and makes her vulnerable to various threats. Other European Union countries do not have such geo-strategic location and thus, the threat perceptions of the EU are not as concrete and dangerous as those of Turkey's. Turkey is a bridge between the West and the East, the energy transfer passes from Turkey and all other legal/illegal trafficking pass from the territories of Turkey. She has historical, cultural, religious, ethnic and economic ties

with Balkan, Caucasus and Arab countries. If either NATO or the EU wants to make and keep peace, they definitely need Turkey which can always contribute to the peace forces in militaristic, diplomatic and also negotiation terms.<sup>110</sup>

#### **4.3. Impacts of the EU Accession Process on Turkey's Security Understanding**

As is the case in the field of social science, before beginning to narrate the changes in Turkey's security culture on the road to EU membership, it is plausible to have a look at the traditional security culture of Turkey in the Republican era.

Traditionally, Turkey's security culture during the republican era has been based on what the civilian-military bureaucratic elite perceives from the concept of national security. Due to the highly effective role and the respectability of the Turkish armed forces in the eyes of the Turkish people, security understanding of Turkey i.e. that of the civilian-military bureaucratic elite has almost never received criticism.<sup>111</sup>

Until the end 1990s Turkey's traditional security culture was mainly based on two components. Firstly, the fear of abandonment and the fear of loss of territory. Secondly, the assumption of geographical determinism. While explaining the first component; the fear of abandonment and fear of loss of territory, this factor is generally associated with the Sevres-phobia which stems from the Sevres Treaty of 1920. However, as it has been exemplified in the previous sections the origins of these components can be dated back to the last times of the Ottoman Empire during

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<sup>110</sup> Onur Oymen, 'Turkey and Its Role in European Security Defense', *Insight Turkey*, March 2001, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 56.

<sup>111</sup> Pinar Bilgin; "Turkey's Changing Security Discourses: The Challenge of Globalisation." *European Journal of Political Research* 44: 175-201, 2005

which the Ottoman Empire had to adopt certain which were thought to be dangerous for the security of the empire. Namely, those norms had resulted from the rise of nationalism among the Christian population and the problems caused by some movements and territorial demands within the empire all left a negative point of view in the minds of Turkish people.<sup>112</sup>

The fear of abandonment and fear of loss of territory resulted in minimal participation in international affairs during the early republican era and within this period which lasted till the end of the Second World War only a few treaties were signed including the Balkan Pact of 1934 and the Sadabad Pact of 1937. Despite the fact that Westernization was one of the main characteristics of Turkey's security culture her interaction with the Western world was limited. Only after having joined NATO Turkey began to make attempts to overcome such fears and began to be more active for her security gains related to her international relations; mainly with the West.

Different from the Cold War period during which both the EU and Turkey was alerted against a common threat, in the post-Cold War period in addition to the already existing threats excluding the one having stemmed from the Soviet Union, Turkey also had to begin to struggle with the PKK. Moreover the efforts for probable membership to EU made the fear of abandonment and fear of loss of territory reappear in the security agenda of Turkey.<sup>113</sup>

Besides the feeling of 'fear of abandonment and the fear of loss of territory' a postulation of geographical determinism has portrayed the classical security

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<sup>112</sup> Ibid

<sup>113</sup> Ibid

discourse that has dominated the Republican era. Various discourses on security challenge each other within states nonetheless, even if others seek to influence the policy-making, it is the state elites who determine the shape of practices. Since 1923 Turkey's security policies are shaped by the traditional discourse on security, which is a legacy of the Ottoman, during the years Turkey was transferring in to a functioning democracy. As Turkey's accession process with the EU accelerated new circumstances began to occur which would create pressures for the security discourse to renew itself. As soon as the security culture seemed to be changing on the road to EU membership debates over the changing security culture as a result of the accession process culture arose between the Euro-skeptics and pro-Europeans.

The Euro-skeptics believe that the reforms demanded by the EU, threatens the national security of Turkey, even if they are aware of the potential advantages of the accession to EU. In this connection, they attribute all the demands of the EU actors as interference in Turkey's domestic affairs at the extreme level; attempts against the territorial integrity of Turkey. The Euro-skeptics are tend to be anxious about one scenario that, if Turkey satisfies all the demands of EU, and EU will still deny the accession of Turkey, not the scenario that Turkey fails to satisfy the requirements of the EU. According to them, if Turkey continues to adopt the reforms of EU, within 15 years time, Turkey will be unable to cope with internal and external threats to its national security.

In contrast to Euro-skeptics, pro-EU actors believe that changes that would stem from the accession process with the EU would be a supplier for the democratization process. To them, when accession criteria are completely fulfilled, the tradition of defining Turkey's security policy behind the closed doors will come

an end. Then public and representatives of it will have the opportunity to have more to say on the security issue. In this case, a better and more effective security policy which is in accordance with the contemporary situation will be defined, which will be totally to the benefit of Turkey.

While such debates continue concrete examples that prove the claim that Turkey's security culture is on the verge of changing especially after Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party came to power the appointment of Hilmi Özkök as the chief of staff.

At the very beginning such developments bore questions in minds such as what if the two leaders will be unable to cooperate with each other. AKP defined its policy in terms of committing to economic liberalization and privatization, like the way EU want Turkey to uphold, which will contribute to the warming of relations with the business elite and the Muslim bourgeoisie. According to Özkök, given that AKP remain loyal to the demands of the consensus their Islamism would not be a great concern.

As the reforms continued, the military representatives on the boards of the council of Higher Education and the Radio and Television High Council were removed. The Kurds were allowed to broadcast in their own national tongue, in 2003, the ration of civilians to military officers on the NSC was increased, and a civilian was elected to head the NSC's secretariat. Changes on a variety of other issues had continued within the military leaders continued as such, civilians are authorized to supervise the military expenses, the laws those are strengthening the military's autonomy were removed.

The examples given above can be easily claimed to mean that Turkey is changing its security culture. Because, during the time before the EU accession process began one could not even imagine that one day Kurds would be allowed to broadcast in their own national tongue and/or would attend legal Kurdish language courses. Furthermore, before the process accelerated it would be absurd to claim that the general secretary of the National Security Council would be a civilian. So, even in the light of these brief examples, Turkey is transforming her security culture in compliance with the EU criteria. However, it is also a fact that questions raise concerning how long and to what extent these changes will/will be able to continue.

#### ***4.4. Turkey's Non-European Security Alternatives***

The relations with the US are important for Turkey's process of European integration. Turkey's geo-strategic location has always attracted the US officials and the relations between the two parties have always been good. In the era of the Cold War, the WEU, the US and Turkey had all the same threat perception, which was the spread of communism. After 1991, however, the threat perceptions of the three parties began to differentiate. While European states concerned themselves with only Europe, the US and Turkey knew that a coherent secure environment needed a multi-regional basis.<sup>114</sup> Thus, for America, Turkey was crucial with her neighborhood with the Arab World, Caucasus and Balkan countries, not to mention her links with those states.<sup>115</sup> When Bill Clinton was in power, Turkey was named 'frontline state' for America.<sup>116</sup>

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<sup>114</sup> John Roper, 'The West and Turkey: Varying Roles, Common Interests', *The International Spectator*, Vol. 34, No. 1, March 1999.

<sup>115</sup> Zalmay Halilzad, *The Future of Turkish- Western Relations: Towards A Strategic Plan*, Santa Monica: RAND, 2000, pp. 54-61.

<sup>116</sup> F. Stephen Larabee, 'US and European Policy toward Turkey and the Caspian Basin', *RAND Reprints*, Santa Monica, 1998, p. 145.

The European states, on the other hand, after the Cold War, are unwilling to include Turkey in the EU. The rejection of the European Constitution in France and the Netherlands were also an indication to the European population's unwillingness to see Turkey integrated into Europe. With her 70 million-population, Islamic identity and fragile security location, Europeans consider Turkey as a new threat to European security. Ian O Lesser explains the European Union's concerns as it follows:

“...as Europe looks to the creation of its own defense identity, there is a risk that Turkey will be seen as a strategic and political liability: a strategic liability because of its complex and immediate security concerns; a political liability because of its position outside the European Community and its close bilateral relationship with the United States,”<sup>117</sup>

As the quotation declares, Turkey's possible integration into the EU is seen as a burden for the Europeans. The US, on the other hand, is always attracted to be an ally of Turkey. Therefore, the US officials worked hard to convince the European states to include Turkey into the CFSP as one of D's, Discrimination indicated.

As Europeans postpone the Turkish membership into the EU, Turkish political leaders tend to build close relationship with the US rather than waiting for the European ambiguity to end. After all, the US is enormously rich in material, militaristic and information capabilities. If Turkey wants to guarantee its security in case of a nuclear attack or a separatist threat, it is natural for her to trust in the US defense capability. America also needs Turkey because of her geo-strategic location and her ties with the Arab World.

Turkish-Israeli Relations are also good and friendly as the State of Israel is one of the constant allies of the US. When Turkey, the US and the State of Israel are

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<sup>117</sup> Graham Fuller and Ian O. Lesser, *Turkey's New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China*, San Francisco: Westview Press, 1993, pp. 101-3.

considered together, they have all the nuclear threat coming from the rogue states at the top of their security agendas.<sup>118</sup>

Another important point about the good relations between Turkey and the US is that the US does not force Turkey to adopt a whole bunch of adoptions and want her to compensate from her security defense as the EU does.<sup>119</sup> The US knows very well that Turkey is very cautious about the Kurdish problem and the historical tense relations with the Greek state. Also, the US does not demand from Turkey to convert her administration system, resembling the American one. The point is that in order to have good relations and be friendly, the allies should not constantly asks for more reforms and changes everyday just as the EU asks for from Turkey.

#### *4.5. A Theoretical Analysis of Turkey's and the EU's Security Cultures*

The European Union of today is a result of developments that took almost 50 years. The Union was at the beginning an economic-oriented Coal and Steel Company and there was no intention at first related with the idea of common security identity. For the rest of the Cold War, the US provided Europe with security defense. The continent and the UK achieved to be an integrated economic giant as time went by but they could not construct a successful, collective security identity yet. The EU could not become a supranational organization with all the members having a single cultural and security identity. The rejection of the Constitution in 2003 and the Atlanticist attitude of Britain are indications to the difficulty for the EU to become fully integrated.

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<sup>118</sup> Tarik Oguzlu, 'An Analysis of Turkey's Prospective Membership in the European Union from a 'Security' Perspective', *Security Dialogue*, Sage Publications, 2003, Vol. 43/3, p. 285.

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid*, p. 295.

Neo-realists would put forward that the EU remains to be an intergovernmental organization with no actual unification because the members are not trusting in the organization's capability to serve for the security and defense of the members. For example France seems to be very skeptical toward the EU's supranational character as the rejection of the Constitution demonstrated. Nation-state notion, in most of European states seems to be still having the priority. The citizens count on the national government to provide security and peace rather than a Union, which seems to be very complex with its organs and slow decision-making and implementing processes. After all, as realists believe, international community is chaotic, thus the individual states should not go further from making some arrangements with the fellow states. Being absorbed by a supranational, chaotic international community would bring the death of sovereignty.

Realists would support the idea that Turkey should stop waiting to be a member of the EU since the threat perceptions of the two are different, the EU's lack of collective security identity and the intra-problems in it. After all, even the members of the EU have reluctance to the idea of full integration.

The liberal school thinkers believe in the importance of political, economic and social developments that they are not obsessed with the importance of security; they would explain the EU's present situation as a successful organization since it is the second biggest trader and the largest market of the world. The EU, though it lacks a coherent collective security identity, has improved considerably in economic, social and diplomatic terms. Liberals would support the development of CFSP under the framework of the EU since they believe that an international community that consists of the like-minded regimes, democracies preferably, would

help become more secure. Also, liberals emphasize the non-militaristic tools of peace making and peace keeping, at which Europe is very good at since the EU lacks a multinational collective army.

Liberal School of thought would urge Turkey to fulfill the EU demands to be a member and thus integrate into Europe since Europe would help Turkish government with economic, social and cultural easiness and benefits.

Critical approach, as an approach of the underdeveloped countries, would emphasize the domestic problems of Turkey and that she, first of all, should complete her democratization process. If democracy becomes the only game in town, then Turkey would automatically be more secure after eliminating the domestic anti-regime enemies. The EU process would help Turkey to accelerate her democratization process so Turkey should continue her policies of the EU membership. However, Turkey, in her adoption process to the EU, has to compensate from the security issues of Cyprus, Kurdish problem and the Aegean Islands. Thus, revisionists would state, Turkey should never compensate while attempting to attach herself to the EU. The Kurdish problem would destroy Turkish sovereignty and national integration. Revisionist School would see the US and Israel and other regional alliances more attractive and beneficial for Turkey's security.

The constructivists, on the other side, would draw the attention to the cultural and identities of the subjects. The EU members are all Christian and they are all economically well-developed countries with high levels of literacy. Their cultural and historical ties are strong. They use the same currency with a few exceptions. However, there are still sharp cultural differences between the members. Britain did not accept to change its currency and she is the closest ally of the US. France, on the

other hand, is opposed to many of the US policies. The rejection of the Common European Constitution also proved that the members are not desirous to be integrated. There is no single strategic culture of Europeans, thus they cannot become a single body that can decide on a policy and implement it easily. Turkey is fully different with its culture, security identity, religion, language and economical situation from the European states. Thus, constructivists would urge the European states to construct a collective pan-European security identity in order to provide the European security with no regard to NATO or other superior organs. And Turkey, constructivists would say, should look for alternative arrangements and allies in order to guarantee her security since she has a very different, unique security culture, identity and geo-strategic location.

The English School, as mentioned in the second chapter, would state that the present image and construction of the EU resembles the pluralist approach with no collective security identity. The individual states give priority to the domestic problems and their own identity. However, European states are seemingly improving their CFSP and after a long time we may see the EU turn out to be a solidarist organization with a collective identity and supranational outlook.

#### ***4.6. Conclusion***

In conclusion, the security culture and policies of the Ottoman Empire and Turkish Republic have common and distinct points. The Ottoman Empire, until 17<sup>th</sup> century's Karlowitz Agreement was an important world power who had the ability to resolve the conflicts and lead the European states. After the Karlowitz Treaty, Europeans started to take the lead technologically and politically, forcing the Ottomans to follow a balance-of-powers policy. In 1839 Ottoman Empire started to

modernize itself to reverse its backwardness and insecurity. Non-muslim millets were given privileges and the military, educational, legal, administrative systems were regulated. However the reforms could not stop the dissolution of the Empire. Young Turks obtained power in 1908 and with a German adoration, put the Ottoman state into the WWI which ended destructively for the Ottomans.

After the declaration of the Republic, Ataturk and his friends were very cautious about the state's security policies. The main principle became peace at home peace abroad because Ataturk knew that any aggressive policy would bring an end to the tired, poor, newly founded state. A communist Russia, the chaotic Middle East and a greedy Europe had to be balanced through peaceful policies. Also, internal regime enemies had to be eliminated, too. As the economic conditions were poor and the domestic conditions were fragile, Turkish politicians did not join the WWII; they made alliances in order to guarantee the national security in the case of a surprise attack, though.

During the Cold War, Turkey had watched a very cautious security policy again. Not trusting in the communists, especially during the Stalinist regime, Turkey seemed to be more close to the West, the USA. She sent troops for the Korean War and joined NATO in 1952, becoming an important, strategic member of the Organization.

The end of the Cold War made a new world order with multilateralism getting on the scene. The world ceased to be a bipolar world and various regional and major actors appeared with new threat for the national security of the individual states. The nuclear armament, environmental problems, ethic and religious conflicts

broke out. The Persian Gulf Crises, Iraqi invasion and Lebanon Crisis and other conflicts were all significant for Turkey's national security. Thus, Turkey had to be cautious in all Caucasus, Middle East and Balkan regions; she had to construct a powerful, intimidating military. In her democratization process she had to rely on armed officials more than the civil politicians. Turkey knew how to stay away from conflicts and provide the balance in this almost chaotic international community and protected its territorial integrity and sovereignty. Today, she is working hard to be a member of the EU, which membership, she hopes, would better help her to feel secure amid so many conflicts and threats around her.

The EU accession process forced Turkey to conduct a more moderate policy in some critical security issues such as Cyprus and Kurdish issues. The EU demanded from Turkey to convert into a federal state system step by step. However, the administration system of Turkish Republic is unitary. While the EU asked for many concessions and reforms, the membership date is not clear yet. This ambiguous accession process led to an insecure and unreliable attitude towards the EU by the Turkish political and military elite. Turkey's security understanding rests on unitary state system, secularism, integrity and sovereignty. The security understanding of the EU rests on a secure, peaceful Europe. Turkey has to fight with many hard-core security issues as well as the soft core ones. Europe, however, as a developed and welfare continent, only has to fight with some soft core issues. Thus, Turkey and the EU do not seem to meet on the same point in a foreseeable future.

The point is that many of the EU countries' officials consider the integration and expansion policies as dangerous; especially a possible membership of Turkey could devastate the Union with additional issues that are hard to deal with. Europe

wants a continent where there is no illegal trafficking, organized crime and environmental dangers. Turkey, however, in the middle of so many critical regions, wants to protect its sovereignty, integrity, identity and also become a welfare state. European Union members believe that Turkey's integration would mean more issues such as WMD issue, rogue states, terrorism, Kurdish minority and separatist movements, economic poverty, etc...

Turkey's security perceptions are concrete and more dangerous when compared to those of the EU. Turkey is located very near to the Arab World where is full of rogue states with anti-democratic regimes and nuclear armament. There is Russian threat in the north and she has also many domestic economic and social problems what are absent in the EU. These reasons were behind the veto decision of Turkey in the issue of the EU's accession to NATO assets and capabilities.

While Europe is reluctant to the membership of Turkey as it excluded Turkey from the decision making process of the ESDI and forces her to adopt a good deal of EU criteria, the US has always been friendly to Turkey and knows how important the geo-strategic conditions are. The nuclear threat is the number one issue on the US agenda as it was proven with 2003 Iraqi invasion and a possible attack on Iran in the near future. Thus, if the EU continues to put limits on the integration into Europe, Turkey would start to perceive the EU as a threat and vice versa since the threat perceptions of the two are divergent and sometimes contrary as in the issues of Greece and the use of NATO assets.

However, despite the above mentioned disputes between the EU and Turkey from the point of security concerns, it is also a fact that Turkey began to change or least to say modify her security culture with the effects of the EU accession process.

To support this claim it would be sufficient to give the examples in the following security issues about which Turkey once conducted a very strict policy. For instance, the removal of military representatives from the boards of Higher Education and the Radio and Television High Council, granting the Kurds the right of education in their own national tongue and the replacement of the general secretary of the National Security Council with a civilian. Before the accession process began one could not have estimated that one day Kurds would be able to broadcast in their own tongue and attend legal Kurdish language courses. Furthermore 10 years ago it would have been absurd to claim that a civilian would be appointed to the general secretariat of the NSC.

## CONCLUSION

After making an introduction in the first chapter, the definition of security, theoretical dimension of the understanding of security has been given in the second chapter of the thesis. Security is said to be a dynamic concept which is due to change according to different environments, cultures, nations, and so forth. Although the security perceptions are changeable, the importance of the issue of security is undeniable. The political societies become alive and survive if the rulers of that political society are successful in protecting the sovereignty and integrity of the political system and society. There are five approaches to security discussing the need for security, how it should be provided, by whom and also the threat perceptions for a state.

The most conventional approach is the realist approach whose first assumption is that the international community is anarchic so the individual state should not trust in any fellow state or a superior organization or international law. The states should be strong and pay a huge attention to the provision of the security. The second approach we covered is the liberal approach which believes the international community is regulated according to certain rules and principles and does not believe that the individual states should be paranoid to be obsessed with security. Rather, economic and social developments should be given importance. Both of the approaches take the first world states as their subjects. The revisionist (critical) approach on the other side, gave importance to the security understanding

of the third world states. Revisionists believe that the lack of consolidated democracy and social problems create internal threats for the state and the state should have a strong army to fight with the internal enemies. Therefore, the undeveloped states' security understanding should first take the domestic problems into account.

The most important approach was constructivist approach because they explained the national security policies of the states according to identity and social realities of them. Identity, as a constructed notion, decides the security policies of a nation because security is all about the society of a nation who constructs every kind of identity, including the security identity, according to their own cultural, traditional and historical facts. Thus, security perceptions are changeable and appointed according to the national identity. The English School of Thought also paid attention to the importance of national identity with regard to national security policies. While solidarist branch of the school claimed that a supranational organization adopting the same, collective identity would serve as a successful tool for security. The pluralists, on the other hand, believed that the domestic politics and identity is more important while appointing the national security policy.

When these theories are applied to the case of Turkish national security, we would see that, as a third world country, or a developing one, she has to fight with the domestic problems and low economic conditions in the first place. Also, as the international community is guided by the rules and principles that mostly serve for the good of the industrialized countries, Turkey should keep her army strong and be cautious against the threats emanating from the multiregional external enemies.

In the third chapter, the evolutionary developments of the EU have been handled. After two magnificent wars that destructed the European continent, the European states decided to be cautious towards a possible revival of German

aggression. With the beginning of the Cold War in 1945, Europeans became an ally of the USA against the Soviet threat. In the beginning, Europe was a multinational, economically powerful continent who would fall under the influence of communism. Thus, Truman implemented the Marshall Plan and the Containment Policy to empower the European states and make them a trade partner and a strong ally against the Communist Bloc. In 1949, NATO was established and started to provide security for the world. The presence of NATO was going to render the plan of collective European defense abortive for the rest of the Cold War.

Through the end of the Cold War, in 1986, European issued Single European Act declaring that a collective European security system was a must. In 1991's Treaty of the European Union, CFSP was decided to be the second pillar of the EU. The ESDI was built in order to react the crisis situations in Europe or elsewhere, however European Union forces, until today, could never resolve a crisis. Rather, it was NATO forces that kept and made peace everywhere. Although the EU became an economic giant and integrated in terms of economics, they have not constructed a solid unity with a single European identity in terms of foreign policy, security and defense. The members of the EU still seem to approve the pluralist approach of the English school rather than the solidarist one.

The main items of the EU security culture are stopping illegal human, drug trafficking, stopping organized crime and international terrorism, eliminating the environmental pollution that results from industrialization, wars and militaristic studies, making Europe a peaceful and welfare continent, spreading the European – Western- ideals and values to the Eastern Europe and the rest of the world, if possible, contributing to the democratization process of the illiberal democracies of the Eastern Europe and finally, later in the security agenda list, stopping the spread

and proliferation of the nuclear weapons. As it is seen, the prior security threats are of soft core while Turkish security concerns are mainly hard core.

In the final chapter, the Turkish evolution of security culture on the road to EU membership and understanding since the Ottoman times has been uncovered. Although Ottoman Empire was the decider of international relations from 15<sup>th</sup> century until the Karlowitz Agreement, she had to fall behind the European powers and the Russian Empire from 1699 on. European powers and the Russian Empire started to be dominant, thus in order to be secure, the Ottoman leaders had to imply balance-of-power politics. Also, in order to reverse the backwardness of the Empire in militaristic, technological terms, the officials started a westernization process, too. With Tanzimat and Islahat reforms in 19<sup>th</sup> century, the Empire wanted to improve the Empire in technological and militaristic terms and also mute the minorities through giving them legal, economic and social privileges. However, as nationalism was on rise and also because of the separatist interventions of European and Russian powers, the Empire dissolved after the loss of the WWI.

The declaration of the Republic and the Lausanne Treaty marked the beginning of a peaceful and cautious foreign policy attitude. The Sevres Treaty, however always remained as an indication of the European powers' evil intentions. Thus, although westernization and modernization were the principles of Atatürk, he knew that Europeans should be approached cautiously in terms of security. Turkey has always been friendly towards Europe that she chose to be an ally of the West against the Communist Bloc during the Cold War. Turkish contributions for the Korean War made her a member of NATO. She followed a multinational security policy and never made a concession from national integrity and the principle of "peace at home, peace abroad". She did not participate in the WWII thanks to İsmet İnönü's cautious approach.

After the Cold War, in the middle of very threatening regions with Greek and Kurdish problems, Turkey attempted to attach herself into the EU. The Middle East is especially problematic and there is the nuclear threat. Turkey's geo-strategic conditions force her to have a strong army and allies in order to feel secure. After the Cold War, the world became a multilateral world and since Europe seems to be unwilling towards Turkish membership, Turkey should be allied with the USA and make multilateral, bilateral arrangements to eliminate the international threats she is face to face.

The threat perceptions of the EU and Turkey were compared and it was concluded that the threat perceptions and security understanding of the two are different. While Turkey has many internal and external enemies and threats, Europe is more concerned with the social, economic problems of the European states. Turkey's threat perceptions are about the Kurdish problem, Cyprus, Aegean Sea Islands, Russia, Armenia, and also domestic problems of Islamic fundamentalism and low economic conditions. With so many important problems, Turkey still believes she could contribute to the ESDI and be a full member of the EU. She believes her geo-strategic condition and links with many of European states and also other states of the Middle East and Central Asia would help the EU better deal with the crises in these territories. However, the EU's ambiguous approach toward Turkey carries the risk of negatively affecting Turkey's relations with Greece. EU ambiguity might also lead Turkey come much closer to the USA and Israel in the realm of security.

All in all, despite all the above mentioned problems, disputes and concerns it is also a clear fact that Turkey's accession process with the EU has affected and continue to affect Turkish policies including the one related to the national security. In order to comply with the EU accession criteria Turkey began to change or least to

say modify in more a moderate way her national security policy. The fact that the military representatives on the boards of the council of Higher Education and the Radio and Television High Council were removed, Kurds were allowed to broadcast in their own national tongue and a civilian was elected to head the NSC's secretariat is clear indication of the effects of the accession process on Turkey's security culture. The fact that Turkish foreign policy has gradually gained a liberal character over the last decade can also be explained in reference to Turkey's EU membership process. Turkey now pursues "a benign regional power" role in its environment. Non-military solutions to security problems are increasingly sought. Adoption of multi-lateral and co operational strategies in relations with neighbors is now "rule" rather than "exception". While there exist such clear indications regarding the changes on the security culture of Turkey, there also exist questions whether these changes will continue. If so how long and to what extent will they continue? The only preliminary answer to this question might highly probably be: The time will tell it...

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